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For an investment treaty tribunal to proceed to adjudge the merits of claims arising out of 
an investment, it must have jurisdiction over the parties and the claims, and the claims 
submitted to the tribunal must be admissible. Inconsistent interpretations of substantive 
and procedural principles of international investment law that govern the existence and 
exercise of the arbitral tribunal’s supremacy to adjudge an investment dispute have caused 
incoherence in investment treaty arbitration. The thesis is an in-depth study of article 25 of 
the 1965 Washington Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), 
which articulates the Material, Personal and Consensual requirements for establishing the 
existence of the adjudicative power (Jurisdiction) for dispute resolution and to exercise 
that adjudicative power (Admissibility) under the aegis of ICSID. The main findings of the 
research are as follows:  
1) ICSID’s double-filtering nature, which has been largely overlooked in ICSID 
jurisprudence, is fundamental to correct decision-making by arbitral tribunals when 
deciding on admissibility and jurisdiction issues. 
2) ‘Fraudulent intent’ criterion, which borrows its rationale from the concurrent themes in 
international law jurisprudence, is instrumental to test compliance as required in the upper 
jurisdictional threshold.    
3) ‘Bona fide investor’ test used to measure compliance with the objective requirements of 
article 25 of the ICSID runs counter to the object and purpose of the Convention.  
4) ‘Dynamic’ test, rather than plain ‘objective’ test, would be the adequate pattern to 
ensure compliance with article 25 of the ICSID Convention for the contemplated 
investment due to evolving meaning of such generic term. 
5) ‘Lex Juridictio’ or set of rules, principals and mechanisms governing jurisdictional and 
admissibility issues is required as foundation for legal unification and harmonization. 
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1. CHAPTER ONE: THE INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 
 INTRODUCTION 1.1.
Developing Countries,
1
 the principal exporters of capital, have driven the creation of the 
international investment regime. Until recently they accounted for 90 per cent of world 
outward investment flows; even at the end of the first decade in twenty-first century, they 
accounted for more than four-fifths of such flows. Accordingly, the principal objectives of 
developed countries in creating the international investment regime have been, first and 
foremost, to give strong international investment law protection to investments made by 
their firms abroad and, second, to facilitate the entry and operations of their firms in other 
countries.
2
  
Today, the proliferating number of investment agreements includes an increasing number 
that are concluded between emerging markets. Bilateral Investment Treaties, Free Trade 
Agreements,
3
 along with more specialized multilateral agreements such as the Energy 
Charter,
4
 constitute today’s international investment law regime. This regime provides 
distinct protection for the post entry treatment of foreign investors, including fair and 
equitable treatment, full protection and security, treatment otherwise in accordance with 
the international minimum standard, and prompt, adequate, and effective compensation in 
case of expropriation. 
Much of the investment climate in a country will consist of economic and political factors 
such as market access, the availability and cost of production factors, taxation, the 
existence of infrastructures, the existence of a functioning public administration, the level 
of corruption and political stability. In addition to economic and political factors, the legal 
framework for foreign investment is also important in determining its investment climate. 
                                                          
1 ‘Developed countries’ are all members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 
MINUS Chile, Mexico, the Republic of Korea, and Turkey. ‘Emerging markets’ are all economies that are not members 
of the OECD, plus Chile, Mexico, the Republic of Korea, and Turkey. ‘Developing countries’ are all emerging markets 
that do not belong to the Commonwealth of Independent States and South-East Europe. See UNCTAD, World 
Investment Report 2009: Transnational Corporations, Agricultural Production and Development (Geneva: UNCTAD 
2009) for individual members of these groups (UNCTAD, WIR 2009). 
2 J E Alvarez and K P Sauvant, ‘The Evolving International Investment Regime’ (Oxford University Press 2011) p xxxi. 
3 The great majority of recent Free Trade Agreements contain an investment chapter. See, e.g., Australia-United States 
Free Trade Agreement (AUSFTA), entered into force on January 1, 2004. U.S. FTAs are at 
http://www.export.gov/TA/index.asp.  
4 Energy Charter Treaty (ECT), Part III, Arts 10-17, at <http://www.encharter.org> accessed 15 July 2010. 
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This legal environment is, in turn, determined by a number of factors. These include the 
stability of the legal conditions under which an investor can operate the quality of the local 
public administration in applying relevant regulations, the transparency of the system of 
local regulations and an effective system of dispute settlement. 
The settlement of disputes between hosts States and foreign investors is a particularly 
important aspect of the legal protection of foreign investments. Impartial and effective 
dispute settlement is an essential element in investor protection.  
In this chapter the author will initially introduce Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), 
followed by elaboration on nature, evolution and context of international investment law 
and foreign state immunity. The chapter will then address general aspects of the research 
(including the scope, aims, methodology and limitations). It will end with synopsis of the 
taxonomy and structure of other chapters included in the thesis. 
 INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AND ITS RISKS 1.2.
Expansion of economic activities from one hand and the acceleration of globalization 
process on the other hand have led the world into a single marketplace where national 
borders are no more of economic and legal significance. Businesses have transcend 
national/domestic laws and stepped into transnational legislations. International 
Investment Agreements (IIAs) of various natures particularly in form of Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) have been the commonplace transaction entered into between states and 
foreign investors in the pursuit of raising Funds, Goods and Services.  
There is a highly competitive global market for foreign investment. The standing of each 
nation state in that market depends upon a myriad of factors, among which the stability 
and predictability of the existing regulatory regime for investment is always important and 
often decisive.
5
 
A. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is investment directly into production in a country by a 
company located in another country, either by buying a company in the target country or 
                                                          
5 Z Douglas, The International Law of Investment Claims (Cambridge University Press 2009) p.1. 
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by expanding operations of an existing business in that country. Foreign direct investment 
is done for many reasons including to take advantage of cheaper wages in the country, 
special investment privileges such as tax exemptions offered by the country as an 
incentive to gain tariff-free access to the markets of the country or the region. Foreign 
direct investment is in contrast to portfolio investment which is a passive investment in the 
securities of another country such as stocks and bonds.
6
 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is a measure of foreign ownership of productive assets, 
such as factories, mines and land. Increasing foreign investment can be used as one 
measure of growing economic globalization. FDI is investment in productive assets, not 
financial assets. It does not include short-term flows of money, such as portfolio 
investments and foreign exchange dealings. 
In most of today’s academic literature, the expectations of developing countries regarding 
the international investment regime are typically analyzed exclusively in terms of the 
abilities of the developing countries to attract greater foreign direct investment (FDI) 
inflows. This discussion assumes that the international investment regime attempts to 
regulate three interrelated primary actors: the MNEs, the developed countries, and the 
developing economies. The MNEs are portrayed as the main international investor, the 
developed countries are envisioned as capital exporting and as homes to the MNEs, and 
the developing economies are viewed as capital importing and thus, as hosts to the 
investments made by MNEs in their territories.
7
 
After World War II, when many colonized countries gained independence, officials in the 
new governments believed that foreign investment, foreign ownership of production, was 
neocolonialism, a continuation of colonialism in economic form. Acting on these ideas, 
many governments of newly independent countries nationalized foreign owned industry. 
This meant that the factory, mine or other enterprise was taken over and run as a state 
enterprise. In recent years, recognition of the low productivity of state enterprises has 
                                                          
6
 B Matthew ‘Essential Economics’ (2004) The Economist 102. 
7 J D Sachs, ‘The Context: Foreign Investment and the Changing Global Economic Reality’, in JE Alvarez and KP 
Sauvant with KG Ahmed and GP Vizcaino (ed) The evolving international investment regime: expectations, realities, 
options (Oxford University Press 2011).  
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contributed to the reversal of the trend toward nationalization. Many state enterprises have 
been privatized, that is, turned into privately owned corporations.  
Global foreign direct investment (FDI) flows exceeded the pre-crisis average in 2011, 
reaching $1.5 trillion despite turmoil in the global economy. However, they still remained 
some 23 percent below their 2007 peak. UNCTAD predicts slower FDI growth in 2012, 
with flows leveling off at about $1.6 trillion. Longer-term projections show a moderate but 
steady rise, with global FDI reaching $1.8 trillion in 2013 and $1.9 trillion in 2014, 
barring any macroeconomic shocks (Table 1).
8
 
 
FDI inflows increased across all major economic groupings in 2011. Flows to developed 
countries increased by 21 percent, to $748 billion. In developing countries FDI increased 
by 11 per cent, reaching a record $684 billion. FDI in the transition economies has 
increased by 25 percent to $92 billion. Developing and transition economies respectively 
accounted for 45 percent and 6 per cent of global FDI. UNCTAD’s projections show these 
countries maintaining their high levels of investment over the next three years.
9
Africa and 
the least developed countries (LDCs) saw a third year of declining FDI inflows. But 
                                                          
8 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, ’World Investment Report 2012’ at <http://www.unctad-
worldinvestmentforum.org/page/wir-2012> accessed 6 August 2012. 
9  Ibid. 
2005–2007 2009-2011 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Global FDI flows 1,473 1,344 1,198 1,309 1,524 1,495 – 1,695 1,630 – 1,925 1,700 – 2,110
Developed countries 972 658 606 619 748 735 – 826 810 – 941 840 – 1 021
European Union 646 365 357 318 421 410 – 450  430 – 510 440 – 550
North America 253 218 165 221 268 255 – 285 280 – 310 290 – 340
Developing countries 443 607 519 617 684 670 – 760 720 – 855 755 – 930
Africa 40 46 53 43 43 55 – 65 70 – 85 75 – 100
Latin America and the
Caribbean 
116 185 149 187 217 195 – 225 215 – 265 200 – 250
Asia 286 374 315 384 423 420–471 440–521 461 – 570
Transition economies 59 79 72 74 92 90 – 110 100 – 130 110 – 150
Source:  UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2012.
Table 1. Summary of econometric results of medium-term baseline
scenarios of FDI flows, by region
(Billions of dollars) 
Host region
Averages Projections
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prospects in Africa are brightening. The 2011 decline in flows to the continent was due 
largely to divestments from North Africa. In contrast, inflows to sub-Saharan Africa 
recovered to $37 billion, close to their historic peak. 
Against a backdrop of continued economic uncertainty, turmoil in financial markets and 
slow growth, countries worldwide continued to liberalize and promote foreign investment 
as a means to support economic growth and development. At the same time, regulatory 
activities with regard to FDI continued. Investment policy measures undertaken in 2011 
were generally favorable to foreign investors (table 2).
10
  
 
There is now consensus among governments of industrialized and non-industrialized 
countries that foreign direct investment is desirable, even essential, for economic growth 
and poverty reduction. Many questions remain about how foreign investment should be 
regulated.  Critics of foreign investment have suggested that it led to dependent, or 
restricted, development. Supporters have suggested that foreign investment can bring 
capital and technology, develop skills and linkages and increased employment and 
incomes.  
In 2011–2012, several countries took a more critical approach towards outward FDI. In 
light of high domestic unemployment, concerns are rising that outward FDI may 
contribute to job exports and a weakening of the domestic industrial base. Other policy 
objectives include foreign exchange stability and an improved balance of payments. Policy 
                                                          
10 Ibid. 
Item 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Number of countries that introduced changes 51 43 59 80 77 74 49 41 45 57 44
Number of regulatory changes 97 94 126 166 145 132 80 69 89 112 67
More favourable to investment 85 79 114 144 119 107 59 51 61 75 52
Less favourable to investment 2 12 12 20 25 25 19 16 24 36 15
Neutral/indeterminate 10 3 0 2 1 0 2 2 4 1 0
Source:  UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2012.
Table 2. National regulatory changes, 2000−2011
(Number of measures)
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measures undertaken included outward FDI restrictions and incentives to repatriate foreign 
investment.
11
 
B. International Investment Agreements (IIAs) 
In furtherance of their economic development policies, most countries have entered into 
one or more investment agreements that in various ways liberalize, promote, protect or 
regulate international investment flows. Such agreements typically apply to investment in 
the territory of one country by investors of another country.  
Developing countries seek foreign direct investment (FDI) in order to promote their 
economic development. This is their paramount objective. To that end, they have sought to 
establish — through national legislation and international instruments — a legal 
framework aimed at reducing obstacles to FDI, while providing foreign investors with 
high standards of treatment and legal protection for their investments and increasingly 
putting in place mechanisms to assure the proper functioning of markets. Developing 
countries participate in international investment agreements (IIAs) — whether at bilateral, 
regional, interregional or multilateral levels — because they believe that, on balance, these 
instruments help them to attract FDI and to benefit from it.
12
  
During the 1990s, the number of international agreements dealing with foreign investment 
increased dramatically at the bilateral, regional and interregional levels. As the new 
millennium begins, negotiating activity in this area continues to be intense. Many of these 
instruments and negotiations involve countries at different levels of development. Indeed, 
the full participation of developing countries in IIAs is important, given that these 
countries are increasingly becoming destinations and even, slowly, important sources of 
FDI. While developing countries acknowledge the value of FDI for their economic growth 
and development, they are equally keen that IIAs in which they participate strike a balance 
between the interests of foreign investors and the national development objectives of host 
countries.
13
 
                                                          
11 Ibid. 
12 United Nations, UNCTAD, ‘International Investment Agreements: Key Issues’, Vol.1, New York & Geneva (2004). 
13
 Ibid. 
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Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs), Preferential Trade and Investment Agreements 
(PTIAs), International Taxation Agreements and Double Taxation Treaties (DTTs) are 
considered as most common types on IIAs. They usually cover investments be enterprises 
or individuals of one country in the territory of its treaty partner. Since the early 1990s, a 
considerable degree of conformity has emerged in terms of the main contents of BITs, 
although with significant differences concerning their substantive details. On the other 
hand, the surge in BITs has been accompanied by a degree of normative evolution. This 
development presents new challenges for policymakers.
14
  
While all BITs limit the regulatory flexibility within which contracting parties can pursue 
their economic development policies, more recent BITs include a wider variety of 
disciplines affecting more areas of host country activity in a more complex and detailed 
manner. At the same time, these treaties put more emphasis on public policy concerns, in 
particular through, inter alia, the inclusion of safeguards and exceptions relating to public 
health, environmental protection and national security. Furthermore, the interaction of 
BITs with other agreements at different levels, including the bilateral, regional, plurilateral 
and multilateral levels becomes more complicated. As global economic integration 
deepens, managing the impacts of integration on the domestic economy becomes more 
demanding and the challenges involved in concluding BITs are correspondingly greater.
15
 
The first BIT was concluded in 1959 between the Federal Republic of Germany and 
Pakistan.
16
 Between 1959 and 1969, the total number of BITs concluded came up to only 
75 treaties. Another 92 BITs were concluded between 1970 and 1979. Further 219 BITs 
were concluded between 1980 and 1989. In other words from 1959 until 1989, the total 
number of BITs summed-up to 386. In the 1990s situation changed rather drastically. 
Between 1990 and 2006, the number of BITs rose significantly to a total of more than 
2,500. Today there are over 2,600 bilateral, regional and sectoral investment treaties and 
over 300 known investment treaty arbitration cases. Global foreign direct investment 
                                                          
14 United Nations, UNCTAD, ‘Bilateral Investment Treaties 1995-2006: Trends in Investment Rulemaking’, New York 
& Geneva (2007).  
15
 Ibid. 
16 Treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and Pakistan for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, 
signed on November 25, 1959, entered into force on April 28, 1962. 
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(FDI) rose moderately to $1.24 trillion in 2010. They are expected to rise to $1.7 trillion in 
2012 and reach $1.9 trillion in 2013.
17
 
By the end of 2011, the overall IIA universe consisted of 3,164 agreements, which include 
2,833 bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and 331 “other IIAs”, including, principally, free 
trade agreements (FTAs) with investment provisions, economic partnership agreements 
and regional agreements. With a total of 47 IIAs signed in 2011 (33 BITs and 14 other 
IIAs), compared with 69 in 2010, traditional investment treaty making continued to lose 
momentum (figure 5). This may have several causes, including (i) a gradual shift towards 
regional treaty making, and (ii) the fact that IIAs are becoming increasingly controversial 
and politically sensitive.  
 
Source: UNCTAD: World Investment Report 2012 
 
In quantitative terms, bilateral agreements still dominate; however, in terms of economic 
significance, regionalism becomes more important. The increasing economic weight and 
impact of regional treaty making is evidenced by investment negotiations under way for 
the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Agreement; the conclusion of the 2012 trilateral 
                                                          
17 United Nations, UNCTAD, World Investment Report (2011). 
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investment agreement between China, Japan and the Republic of Korea; the Mexico–
Central America FTA, which includes an investment chapter; the fact that at the EU level 
the European Commission now negotiates investment agreements on behalf of all EU 
member States; and developments in ASEAN.
18
 Instead of simplification and growing 
consistency, regionalization may lead to a multiplication of treaty layers, making the IIA 
network even more complex and prone to overlaps and inconsistencies.  
With thousands of treaties, many on-going negotiations and multiple dispute-settlement 
mechanisms, today’s IIA regime has come close to a point where it is too big and complex 
to handle for governments and investors alike. Yet it offers protection to only two-thirds of 
global FDI stock and covers only one-fifth of possible bilateral investment relationships. 
To provide full coverage a further 14,100 bilateral treaties would be required. This raises 
questions not only about the efforts needed to complete the global IIA network, but also 
about the impact of the IIA regime and its effectiveness for promoting and protecting 
investment, and about how to ensure that IIAs deliver on their development potential.
19
 
C. Foreign Investment Risks 
Like any other trade and business relation there are naturally risks inherent through a 
foreign investment where the public interest of a state overlaps with that of the private 
interest of a foreign investor leading to complexities and disputes. Bilateral Investment 
Treaties (BITs) and Multilateral Investment Treaties (MITs) were ratified to boost investor 
protection in the host state. 
BITs and MITs operate to reduce the level of sovereign risk inherent in every foreign 
direct investment project by establishing a regime of international minimum standards for 
the exercise of public power by the host contracting state in relation to investment made in 
its territory by the national of another contracting state.
20
  
                                                          
18 Ibid.  
19 Ibid.
 
20 Z Douglas, The International Law of Investment Claims (Cambridge University Press 2009) p.1. 
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Berlin claims that one of major considerations inherent in any investment decision-making 
is the political risk represented by the host country.
21
 Political risk is construed as ‘the 
possibility that political developments in the host state undermine the economics on which 
an investment decision was based.’22 Wälde and N’Di define it as the occurrence of events 
in the political sphere which disrupt the routine activities of a business venture with a 
detrimental financial impact on the commercial viability of the enterprise.
23
 It 
encompasses an ample number of issues, such as, inter alia, expropriation, unclear, 
contradictory and unstable legislation, breach of license rights and that of contract - all 
constitute different peculiarities of the political risk now faced by investors all over the 
world.
24
        
Among the aforementioned risks, expropriation is referred to as the most dramatic form of 
the political risk.
25
 George contends that an expropriatory act entails ‘the taking, 
deprivation, confiscation, or interference, by a state, of property, owned (or partially 
owned) by foreign investors.’26 The Harvard Draft Convention, in turn, interprets 
expropriatory act as ‘any such unreasonable interference with the use, enjoyment or 
disposal of property as to justify an inference that the owner thereof will not be able to 
use, enjoy or dispose of the property after the inception of such interference.’27 North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) between the United States of America, 
Canada and Mexico defines that expropriation must be justified by a public purpose and 
applied on a non-discriminatory basis, and compensation must be ‘equivalent to the fair 
market value’ of the investment at the date of expropriation, must be ‘paid without delay 
                                                          
21 A Berlin, ‘Managing Political Risks’ <http://www.Transnational-Dispute-
Management.Com/Samples/Freearticles/Tv1-1-Article_54.Htm> accessed 02.01.2010. 
22 T Wälde, ‘Investment Arbitration under the Energy Charter Treaty’ < http://www.Transnational-Dispute-
Management.Com/Samples/Freearticles/Tv1-2-Article224b.Htm> accessed 12 December 2009.
 
23 T Wälde and G N’Di, ‘Stabilizing International Investment Commitments: International Law versus Contract 
Interpretation’ (1996) 31 Tex Int'l LJ 215. 
24 T Wälde, ‘The Russian Oil and Gas Industry and Foreign Investment’ (1994) OPEC-Bulletin 7, p. 16. 
25 ‘The Investment Decision-Making’ available at 
 <http://ivythesis.typepad.com/term_paper_topics/2009/02/the-investment-decision-making.html>, accessed 10 January 
2010. 
26 L George, ‘Expropriation’ (2002) International Energy Law and Taxation Review 3, p.46. 
27 1961 Harvard Draft Convention on the International Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens, 55 AJIL 553-554, 
art 10 (3). 
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and be fully realizable,’ and must bear interest at a commercially reasonable rate until the 
date of actual payment.
28
 
Notably, transition economies, wherein a significant share of large-scale investment 
projects is located, tend to use very vague language in provisions of so-called Foreign 
Investment Laws pertaining to conditions under which the government can rightfully 
expropriate property and calculate indemnification for expropriated property. As a logical 
consequence, it is commonplace that this gives rise to conflicting interpretations by the 
host governments and foreign investors with such differences further crystallizing into an 
investment dispute, which is indeed the case of many instances wherein investors claim 
that the host government illegally and discriminately expropriated their property. 
The risk for the investor inherent in major investment projects has led to the evolution of a 
market for investment insurance schemes. As to the type of risks covered, these are similar 
to those addressed in bilateral investment treaties. Beyond the protection of assets, most 
programs offer protection against non-compliance with contracts. Also the risks of 
currency inconvertibility and of restrictions on currency transfer are covered. Of course, 
all schemes provide for protection against direct and indirect expropriation, and some 
insurers also cover cases of business interruption. Risks of war and civil disturbance are 
generally covered. Nonpayment of an obligation under an arbitral award may constitute an 
expropriation as understood in international law and as covered by an insurance contract, 
even if the host country considers that is not able to pay the amount due under the arbitral 
award.
29
 
In a number of disputes tribunals set up under insurance contracts have addressed legal 
issues of expropriation, of currency inconvertibility, of breaches of contract, of the 
consequences of political violence, and of attribution. Some decisions of these tribunals 
set up under insurance contracts have been relied upon in disputes between investors and 
                                                          
28 Article 1110, NAFTA Agreement, North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 
International Legal Materials 32, 289. 
29 See e.g. MidAmerican Energy Holding Company v OPIC, citing the Restatement (Third) of Foreign 
Relations Law § 712 cmt.h (1999) and the Harvard Draft Convention on the International Responsibility of States for 
Injuries to Aliens, <http://www.investmentclaims.com/decisions/MidAmericanEnergy-OPIC-Indonesia-Nov1999.htm>; 
an excerpt of the case is reprinted in D Bishop, J Crawford, and M Reisman, Foreign Investment Disputes (2005) 563. 
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States.
30
 The authority of arbitral awards rendered under insurance contracts to disputes 
between States and foreign investors will depend, not least, on whether the provisions in 
insurance contracts and the standards of protection in treaties and customary law are the 
same.  
  RIGHTS AND REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 1.3.
Under the rules of customary international law, no state is under an obligation to admit 
foreign investment in its territory and to its economy. In particular each state has the 
supremacy to evaluate the economic viabilities and financial credentials of a treaty-based 
foreign investment against the consequences of being committed to the standards of 
protection tendered in the treaty. The right to accept and to regulate foreign investment, 
and the power to conclude treaties with other states flow from the concept of state 
sovereignty.  
At the same time, the release of economic activity from territorial linkages challenges both 
the ability of States to regulate their economy
31
 and their capacity to provide the legal 
institutions that are necessary for the functioning of the global economy.
32
 Such 
institutions include, for example the legal concepts of contract and property rights, as well 
as regulatory frameworks, compliance procedures, and dispute settlement mechanisms that 
enable economic actors to unfold their activity and to structure economic exchange. 
While host State and investors initially have largely converging interests  in attracting and 
making investments, the situation changes once an investment has been made. As the 
investor’s option to simply withdraw his investment without sever financial loss will be 
limited, the host State has an incentive to change unilaterally the investment contract, 
                                                          
30 The award in Revere Copper v OPIC, Award, 24 August 1978, 56 ILR (1980) 258, is often cited in the context of 
defining an indirect expropriation. 
31 Von Bogdandy, ‘Globalization and Europe’ (2004) 15 Eur. J. Int’l L. 885. 
32 Institutions are understood in North, Structure and Change in Economic History, pp.201et seq. (1981), as ‘a set of 
rules, compliance procedures, and moral and ethical behavioral norms designed to constraint the behavior of individuals 
in the interests of maximizing the wealth or utility of principals’, ‘or more plastically: ‘Institutions are the rules of the 
game in a society or, more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction.’(North, 
Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance, p.3 [1990]). Institutions are characterized by constraints 
with a certain performance and durability which are imposed on actors of any kind. Legal rules that impose restrictions 
on the behavior of individuals as well as legal requirements that concern the exercise of public power, therefore, qualify 
as institutions in this sense.    
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amend the law governing the investment, or even expropriate the investor without 
compensation.
33
  
This so called risk stemming from opportunistic behave of the host State not only 
increases the cost of investment for investors and consumers, it may even prevent the flow 
of foreign investment completely.
34
 As a consequence, promoting and protecting foreign 
investment behooves the establishment of institutions that reduce political risk and 
outweigh incentives of the host State to act opportunistically in order for private actors to 
unfold foreign investment activities. 
Conceptually one may ask today whether the operation of the international law of foreign 
investment amounts to a body of international rules of administrative law governing the 
relationship of the foreign investor and the host state.
35
 It is thus of paramount importance 
that rights and remedies of investors and host States are sufficiently protected and 
precisely balanced within the realm of the domestic and international laws of foreign 
investment. As suggested by UNCTAD in its 2012 annual report, investment policies 
should be balanced in setting out rights and obligations of States and investors in the 
interest of development for all. 
Today, treaties typically grant national treatment, most-favored-nation treatment, fair and 
equitable treatment and full protection and security, prohibit direct and indirect 
expropriations without compensation, and contain the consent of host State to investor-
state arbitration.
36
 
A. Foreign State’s Immunity:  
Until the twentieth century, mutual respect for the independence, legal equality, and 
dignity of all nations was thought to entitle each nation to a broad immunity from the 
                                                          
33 This change in incentives after one party has started performing or placed an asset under the control of the other party 
is also described as a hold-up or dynamic inconsistency problem. See Williamson, ‘The Economic Institutions of 
Capitalism’ (1985), p.52; Guzman, ‘Why LDCs Sign Treaties that Hurt Them’(1998) 38 Va. J. Int’l L. 639. Unlike 
contractual situations where mutual obligations are carried out in a directly reciprocal and simultaneous manner, foreign 
investment is, therefore, comparable to contracts involving the performance of continuing obligations.   
34 See R Cooter and C Ulen, Law and Economics (4th edition 2004) p.195 
35 R Dolzer , ‘The Impact of International Investment Treaties on Administrative Law’ (2005) 37 New York University 
Journal of International Law and Politics 953.  
36 For general accounts of investment treaties and related instruments of investment protection see, for example, Dolzer 
and Stevens, ‘Bilateral Investment Treaties’ (1995). 
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judicial process of other states’. This immunity was extended to heads of state, in both 
their personal and official capacities, and to foreign property. In the 1812 case of The 
Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch.) 116, 3 L. Ed. 287, a ship privately 
owned by a U.S. citizen was seized in French waters by Napoleon's government and 
converted into a French warship. When the ship entered the port of Philadelphia, the 
original owner sought to regain title, but the Supreme Court respected the confiscation of 
the ship because it occurred in accordance with French law in French waters.  
With the emergence of socialist and Communist countries after World War I, the 
traditional rules of sovereignty placed the private companies of free enterprise nations at a 
competitive disadvantage compared to state-owned companies from socialist and 
Communist countries, which would plead immunity from lawsuits. European and U.S. 
businesses that engaged in transactions with such companies began to insist that all 
contracts waive the sovereign immunity of the state companies. This situation led courts to 
reconsider the broad immunity and adopt instead a doctrine of restrictive immunity that 
excluded commercial activity and property. Western European countries began waiving 
immunity for state commercial enterprises through bilateral or multilateral treaties.  
When an enterprise contracts with a foreign State
37
 or a foreign State corporation and 
dispute occur, the question arises whether, if proceedings are commenced, the foreign 
State or State Corporation can plead sovereign immunity and thereby evade its 
commercial obligations. Here two theories are advanced. Under the Doctrine of ‘absolute 
immunity’, the foreign State or State Corporation can always plead immunity and must 
actually consent to any court proceedings (by way of submission to the court’s jurisdiction 
or waiver). Under the doctrine of ‘restrictive immunity’, a distinction is drawn between 
acts in the exercise of sovereign authority (acta jure imperii) and ordinary commercial 
transaction (acta jure gestionis). Immunity is accorded to the former but refused to the 
latter.
38
 
                                                          
37 The EC is not a “State” within the meaning of State Immunity Act 1978 and cannot claim immunity    under it: 
International Tin Council cases [1988] 3 All E.R. 257, 316-320. 
38 C Murray, D Holloway and D Timson-Hunt, ‘The Law and Practice of International Trade’ (11th edition, Sweet & 
Maxwell 2010) p.488.   
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Unlike the other party to a business transaction with a state, the general trend is that host 
governments are notoriously reluctant to submit a dispute to a proceeding in another 
country. This is congruous with its sovereign immunity - the untenable principle under the 
law of nations – which dictates that a state is predominantly immune from the legal 
proceedings in another jurisdiction. In other words, when the principle is employed, a 
sovereign state cannot be compelled to a lawsuit in a relevant court or an arbitral 
proceeding in another state’s jurisdiction as well as within the state’s own borders. 
However, greater state participation in international business transactions has shifted a 
paradigm, which conventionally upheld the doctrine of absolute immunity of a sovereign. 
Absolute sovereign immunity has been gradually limited, and pendulum began to swing in 
favor of the possibility to lodge a claim against a state in another state’s forum, the latter 
being the fruit of introducing the restrictive immunity principle.  Hence, the concept of 
restrictive immunity purports to grant state immunity from a legal action where it stems 
from pure governmental acts of a foreign state, however, a state is not entitled to such 
immunity where the dispute is purely commercial in nature.
39
     
With the aim of piercing the cloud surrounding the concept a number of national and 
supranational legislative acts have been adopted, such as, inter alia, the UK State 
Immunity Act of 1978, the US Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 1976, the European 
Convention on State Immunity of 1972.   
Factors responsible for the changing nature and the necessity of introducing the restrictive 
immunity principle are the expansion of economic activities and acceleration of 
globalization processes, whereby the world for all intents and purposes becomes a single 
marketplace. Such a scenario gradually renders national borders of no economic and legal 
significance. Businesses transcend the national boundaries administered by domestic laws 
and step into a global marketplace regulated by transnational legislation.
40
  
A commonplace transaction entered into by states through various entities acting as their 
representatives or agents on the transnational arena is an investment contract. The state 
enters into such investment transactions with investors to raise funds, or actual goods or 
                                                          
39 M Sornarajah, The Pursuit of Nationalized Property (Martinus Nijhoff , Dordrecht-Boston-Lancaster 1986) p. 253. 
40 P Ghaffari, ‘Jurisdictional Requirements under Article 25 of the ICSID Convention’ (2011) 12 4 TJWIT p.603. 
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services.
41
 However, conflicts exist in any relationship. The complexity peculiar to 
investor-state relationship arise due to overlap between public interests of a state and 
private interests of foreign investors.  
For instance, the approach of the European courts in this regard has been that when a state 
enters the market place it must be treated in the same way as private businesses are dealt 
with.
42
 It was also opined in Trendtex Trading Corp v Central Bank of Nigeria that 
sovereign immunity is not applicable to commercial dealings.
43
 Hence, this feeds the 
argument that courts began to categorize and distinguish between disputes emanating from 
the governmental conduct and those having purely commercial nature.  
Broadly speaking, a state cannot claim immunity from a proceeding in another state if it 
has committed to submit to the jurisdiction of that forum either: 
- By international agreement – e.g. bilateral or multilateral agreements, or 
- By an expressed term contained in writing – e.g. contract and its dispute resolution 
clause, or  
- By an explicit consent given after the dispute has arisen between the parties – e.g. 
arbitration agreement concluded after parties’ differences had matured into a 
dispute.
44
 
As earlier discussed in this chapter, in an attempt to obscure the traditional viewpoint that 
endorses sovereign immunity as one of the fundamental principles of customary 
international law, various treaties – be it multilateral (MITs) or bilateral (BITs) – and 
investment agreements were ratified to boost investor protection in the host states. 
Investment treaties usually create two distinct dispute resolution mechanisms: one for 
disputes between a qualifying investor and the host state in relation to its investment 
(‘investor/state disputes) and another for disputes between the contracting state parties to 
the treaty (‘state/state disputes’). Investment treaties generally provide that the state/state 
                                                          
41 I Adebiyi, ‘Is the doctrine of sovereign immunity a threat to investment arbitration?’(CEPLMP, 4 June 2009). 
42 M Sornarajah, The Settlement of Foreign Investment Disputes (Kluwer Law International, London 2000) see generally 
pp. 291 - 292 
43 (1977) Q.B 529 
44 See European Convention on State Immunity and Additional Protocol. 
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mechanism covers disputes ‘concerning the interpretation or application’ of the treaty, 
whereas disputes relating to a specific investment of a particular investor (which may of 
course give rise to interpretative questions) are encompassed by the investor/state dispute 
resolution procedure.            
B. Foreign Investor’s Remedy  
Legally reliable relieves and enforceable remedies are of crucial importance to a foreign 
investor who commits to engage substantial financial resources within domestic 
jurisdiction of a host State. Such relieves would normally be resolved through access to an 
impartial dispute resolution mechanism and an authentic enforcement authority. 
Traditionally, when States and State owned corporations were the economic players in 
foreign investment, compliance and enforcement of international law was vested 
exclusively in the hands of States themselves. The State that was harmed by a violated 
breach would resort to counter-measures, such as reprisal, retaliation, and ultimately the 
use of force.  
Modern Investment treaties, by contrast, instead of laying enforcement exclusively in the 
hands of States, provided for the right of foreign investors to have recourse to investor –
State arbitration and directly claim for the violation of the respective investment treaty. 
Whereas traditionally, foreign private investors could not directly oblige host States to 
comply with their obligations under customary international law, today they may directly 
advance a claim against a host State in front of an independent arbitration tribunal in a 
third party jurisdiction based on dispute resolution mechanism of relevant BIT.    
The aggressive proliferation of investment treaties has led to explosion of investment 
arbitration. Franck argues that since at least 1794, arbitration has been referred to as a 
mechanism for enforcing foreign investors’ rights and providing a neutral forum to resolve 
international disputes.  In practical terms, the distinctive feature of the majority of the 
BITs is the ability to refer a dispute to a neutral arbitral tribunal, oftentimes this being the 
International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), which is 
commonly referred to as a tribunal created by voluntary will of sovereign governments. 
45
 
                                                          
45 M Sornarajah, ‘The International Law on Foreign Investment’ (2nd edition, CUP, Cambridge 2004), p. 430. 
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Arbitration under ICSID facility is also one of the main mechanisms of the settlement of 
investment disputes under four recent multilateral trade and investment treaties – North 
American Free Trade Agreement, the Energy Charter Treaty, the Cartagena Free Trade 
Agreement and the Colonia Investment Protocol of Mercosur.     
One of the remarkable protection mechanisms that ICSID affords to its awards is their 
insulation from the review in the courts of the seat of arbitration. This was prominently 
demonstrated by Occidental v Ecuador case, whereby the claimant has opted for 
UNCITRAL arbitration over ICSID. Pursuant to English Arbitration Act 1996, Occidental 
had to face challenges to the UNCITRAL award rendered in its favor in English court 
proceedings that went from High Court up to Court of Appeal. Whilst Occidental was 
ultimately successful in these proceedings, the foregoing sequence of events wouldn’t 
have had occurred had it been awarded by ICSID tribunal. 
The first awards of ICSID were rendered in 1988 and 1990. It is also interesting to note 
that the frequency with which ICSID arbitration is filed for has been changed dramatically 
over the past six years, with over half of all ICSID cases for its thirty seven year history 
registered within the period 2004-2010.
46
 This progressive statistics suggests that 
multinational enterprises – who are largely considered to be main investors worldwide - 
are increasingly desirous to use investment arbitration as opposed to any other forms of 
dispute settlement to resolve their disputes with the host states. Harten and Loughlin 
contend that investment arbitration has become an influential instrument for foreign 
investors ‘to resist state regulation and seek compensation for the costs that flow from the 
exercise of public authority’.47  
The fundamental rationale behind referring a dispute to arbitration is the expectation of its 
neutrality. According to the logic of a foreign investor, host countries’ judges may have 
real bias in adjudicating investment disputes.
48
 Wälde claims that investment arbitration is 
one of the most powerful instruments available to foreign investors to counteract political 
                                                          
46 See also G Harten and M Loughlin, ‘Investment Treaty Arbitration as a Species of Global Administrative Law’ (2006) 
EJIL 17 (1), p. 124. 
47 Ibid, page 124. 
48 K Clermont and T Eisenberg, ‘Xenophilia in American Courts’ (1996) Harvard Law Review 109, pp. 1133-1134, see 
also W Park, ‘Neutrality, Predictability and Economic Co-operation’ (1995) J.Int'l Arb. 12, p.99 
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risk at least to the extent such risk is within the control of the host state.
49
 Although there 
have been various exigencies as international arbitration has matured into an independent 
discipline with impartial and expert decision makers, it is currently the predominant 
method for resolving complex disputes with a foreign element.
50
  
It should be noted, however, that for an investment treaty tribunal to proceed to adjudge 
the merits of claims arising out of an investment, it must have jurisdiction over the parties 
and the claims, and the claims submitted to the tribunal must be admissible. In the same 
context, eminent ICSID facility of dispute resolution stipulates that a mere existence of a 
dispute related to an investment does not render arbitration of such a dispute possible.  
Article 25 (1) of ICSID Convention reads: 
‘The jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to any legal dispute arising directly out of an 
investment, between a Contracting State (or any constituent subdivision or agency of a 
Contracting State designated to the Centre by that State) and a national of another 
Contracting State, which the parties to the dispute consent in writing to submit to the 
Centre. When the parties have given their consent, no party may withdraw its consent 
unilaterally’ [emphasis added]. 
Hence, under ICSID Convention, for the jurisdiction of ICSID to be upheld, it must be 
proved that there had been investment (ratione materiae) of a foreign investor (ratione 
personae) and there is a written consent of both parties to the dispute (ratione voluntatis) 
to arbitrate under the auspices of ICSID facility  
In general, in order for an investor to benefit from the substantive and procedural rights of 
an investment treaty, the treaty in question has to be applicable ratione materiae, ratione 
personae and ratione voluntatis. This requires that a covered investment has been made by 
a covered investor and that covered parties have consented to an agreed dispute resolution 
mechanism, namely arbitration. The definition of investment, the definition of investor 
and the terms for consent component, therefore, determine the scope of application of the 
obligations States incur under their investment treaties. 
                                                          
49 T Wälde, ‘Investment arbitration under the Energy Charter Treaty’, at <http://www.transnational-dispute-
management.com/samples/freearticles/tv1-2-article224b.htm> accessed on 13 January2010. 
50 See generally J Lelewer, ‘International Commercial Arbitration as a Model for Resolving Treaty Disputes’ (1989) 
New York University Journal of International Law and Policy 21, p. 379. See also S Franck, ‘The Liability of 
International Arbitrators: A Comparative Analysis and Proposal for Qualified Immunity’ (2000) New York Law School 
Journal of International and Comparative Law 20, pp.1-2.  
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While there is no uniform definition of ‘investment’ that is endorsed by every single 
investment treaty – and notwithstanding the fact that some treaties contain exceptions for 
portfolio investments, for investments below a certain value, or for investments in certain 
economic sectors – the large majority of investment treaties define investment broadly.51 
For this purpose, most treaties rely on a non-exhaustive list of rights and interests that are 
covered. 
Similarly, the clear definition of investor’s ‘nationality’ is relevant for two purposes. The 
substantive standards guaranteed in a treaty will only apply to the respective nationals.
52
 In 
addition, the jurisdiction of an international tribunal is determined, inter alia, by the 
claimant’s nationality. In particular if the host state’s ‘consent’ to jurisdiction is given 
through a treaty, it will only apply to nationals of a state that is a party to the treaty. 
 The author contends, based on related professional experience, that the ambiguities 
prevailing around diverse awards of ad hoc arbitral tribunals is much instigated in the 
absence of comprehensive and conclusive definition of these determining notions or in 
other words vagueness of the substantive provisions of investment treaties to uphold 
jurisdiction and tackle the waivers of arbitarbility. In his current research, the author has 
attempted to highlight these notions, discuss their implications, analyze relevant cases 
admitted or rejected on those merits within international and national laws and finally 
propose the thesis of legal unification and harmonization of investment arbitration 
precisely focused at jurisprudence of ICSID.     
  DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 1.4.
‘And the more important international economic interests grow, the more International Law will 
grow.’  
Lassa Oppenheim, International Law (Volume I, 1905) § 51 
 
Economic benefits are undoubtedly among major motives for constitution of legal rules 
and orders. Consequently, law does not impose only normative guidance for individual 
behavior, but is itself product of society, its needs, and preferences, and has the objective 
of sustaining social exchange. This holds true not only in the domestic realm but also at 
                                                          
51 See UNCTAD, ‘International Investment Agreements: Key Issues’ (2004) Volume 1, pp. 77-81, 118-26.  
52 On the issue of rights conferred upon private investors through treaties, see O Spiermann, “Individual rights, State 
Interests and the Power to Waive ICSID Jurisdiction under Bilateral Investment Treaties’ (2004) 20 Arbitration 
International 179, 183 et seq. 
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the international level. The shift from national to international level holds equally true for 
international investment relations, where the demand for international investment law has 
amplified parallel to an increase in foreign investment flows. In fact, foreign investment 
often takes place in a situation that requires international cooperation and ordering 
structure, not so much because of the element of trans-border flows of investment, but due 
to the involvement of the host State as a sovereign actor.
53
 
A. Evolution of Investment Law 
The roots of modern treaty rules on foreign investment can be traced back to 1778 when 
the United States and France concluded their first commercial treaty, followed in the 
nineteenth century by treaties among the United States and its European allies and, 
subsequently the new Latin American States.
54
 These early treaties mainly addressed trade 
issues, but also contained rules requiring compensation in case of expropriation. After 
1919, the United States negotiated a series of agreements ‘on Friendship, Commerce and 
Navigation (FCN), followed by another series of 21 treaties between 1945 and 1966.
55
 
Rules on investment were never prominent or distinct in these FCN treaties. In 1977, the 
US State Department launched an initiative for the United States to join the European 
practice of the past two decades to conclude agreements that are meant to address issues of 
foreign investment only, mainly to protect investments of nationals abroad. Following a 
short period of political hesitation in view of the issue of exporting jobs by way of 
promoting foreign investment, and a shift of responsibility from the State Department to 
the US Trade Representative during that period, the United Sates, between 1982 and 2002, 
concluded 46 bilateral treaties, mainly with developing states.
56
  
                                                          
53 S W Schill, ‘The Multilaterization of International Investment law’ (Cambridge University press 2009) 1,3. 
54 See R Wilson, United States Commercial Treaties and International Law (1960) 2. 
55 See K J Vandevelde, ‘The Bilateral Investment Program of the United States’ (1988) 21 Cornell Int’l LJ 201, 207-208  
56
 As to BIT practice of the United States, see K J Vandevelde, United States Investment Treaties: Policy and Practice 
(1992); K J Vandevelde, ‘A Brief History of International Investment Agreements’ (2005) University of California 
Journal of Investment Law and Policy 157; S M Schwebel, ‘The United States 2004 model Bilateral Investment Treaty: 
An Exercise in the Regressive Development of International Law’ in G Aksen, K H Böckstiegel, M J Mustill, P M 
Patocchi, and A M Whitesell (eds), Liber Amicorum in Honour of Robert Briner: Global Reflections on International 
Law, Commerce and Dispute Resolution (2005) 815; J Paulsson, Denial of Justice in International Law (2005) 228,247; 
K Gugdeon, ‘United States Bilateral Investment Treaties’(1986) 4 International Tax and Business Law 105; M 
Clodfelter, ‘US State Department Participation in International Dispute Resolution’(2001) 42 South Texas Law Review 
1273; N Rubins, ‘The Arbitral Innovations of Recent US Free Trade Agreements: Two Steps Forward, One Step Back’ 
(2003) 8 International Business Law Journal 865; G Gagnė and J F Morin, ‘The Evolving American Policy on 
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With a view to repairing in part the damage it had brought about to the bulk of its pre-war 
foreign investments when starting World War II in violation of international law, Germany 
decided (during late 1950s) to launch a bilateral program for a series of treaties to protect 
the foreign investment of its companies in the future.  
Soon after Germany had successfully negotiated its first treaties, other European states 
followed suit: Switzerland concluded its first such treaty in 1961,
57
 France in 1972.
58
 In 
1961 already, two years after the era of bilateral treaties had begun; the World Bank took 
the lead among the international economic organizations to address the emerging 
international legal framework of foreign investment, pointing to its mandate and to the 
link between economic development, international cooperation, and the role of private 
international investment.  
 The object and purpose of existing treaty based international investment law do not vary 
fundamentally from those of the early days. It was, and is, aimed at promotion, protection 
and indemnity of foreign investment. Arbitral decisions often refer to object and purpose 
of investment treaties. The will of the parties is embodied primarily, but not necessarily 
completely in the totality of the treaty’s provisions. The Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties (VCLT) refers to the object and purpose in Article 18, laying down the obligation 
of a state that has signed but not yet ratified a treaty and, more importantly, in Article 31, 
which sets forth the rules of interpretation. These rules include the object and purpose of 
the treaty. 
Foreign investment law consists of layers of general international law, of general standards 
of international economic law, and of distinct rules peculiar to its domain. The study of the 
field must take into account and turn to all of these three levels of the law. Moreover, it 
                                                                                                                                                                               
Investment Protection: Evidence from Recent FTAs and the 2004 Model BIT (2006) 9 Journal of International 
Economic Law 357; W Dodge, ‘Investor-State Dispute Settlement between Developed Countries: Reflections on the 
Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement’(2006) 39 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 1.  
57 Treaty between Switzerland and Tunisia of 2 December 1961; see N Huu-tru, ‘Le Réseau Suisse d’accords bilatėraux 
d’encouragement et de protection des investissments’ (19880 92 Révue Général de Droit International Public 577. 
58 Treaty between France and Tunisia of 30 june 1972; see P Juillard, ‘Le Réseau francais des conventions bilatérales 
d’investissement: á la recherché d’un droit perdu?’ (1987) 13 Droit et Pratique de Commerce International 9. 
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has long been observed that rules on foreign investment by necessity also incorporate 
aspects of the laws of the host state.
59
 
The interplay between relevant domestic rules of the host state and applicable rules of 
international law may become central to the required analysis of a case; for instance, the 
domestic definition of an investment, domestic rules addressing the jurisdiction of 
international tribunals, or the domestic rules on nationality may determine the nature and 
the outcome of a specific issue.
60
 
International investment law is one of the fastest-growing and most vibrant fields of 
international law and dispute settlement today. It is both shaped by, and is shaping, the 
economic and social processes associated with globalization. In fact, it grows at a rate that 
makes authoring and publishing on international investment law an endeavor that evokes 
Achilles’ footrace against the tortoise: an infinite struggle of catching up to a place and 
point in time that will be past present.
61
 
B. Globalization and Investment Law 
International law is developing, growing, and being refined at an unprecedented pace as 
the need for international legal rules abounds in reaction to the social and economic 
phenomenon of globalization.
62
 Indeed globalization, as one of the formative processes 
which affects today’s cultural, political, and economic life virtually anywhere in the world, 
is gradually transforming international law from a simple tool to coordinate inter-State 
relations to an instrument that provides a legal structure for truly global legal orders. 
One of the characteristics of globalization is the growth of trans-border economic 
activities: goods, services, and capital. These activities have progressively cast off 
territorial ties and circulate increasingly freely across borders.
63
 This option not only 
enhances the options and choices of individual economic actors, both consumers and 
                                                          
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid. 
61 S W Schill, ‘The Multilateralization of International Investment Law’, (Cambridge University Press, New York 2009) 
p.xiii.   
62 On the notion and concept of globalization from a sociological perspective see Beck, What is Globalization? (2000). 
63 For an historical account of economic globalization see Rourke and Williamson, Globalization and History (1999). 
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producers, but leads to expanding economic interdependences and to the increasing, yet 
still incomplete, integration of national economies into a global economic system.
64
  
Parallel to the cross border growth of foreign investment, the principles governing foreign 
investment have over time developed their own distinct features within the broader realm 
of international economic law. Today, it remains a matter of semantics whether it is 
appropriate to speak of the existence of a separate category of ‘principles of foreign 
investment law’, given their strong links to international economic law in general.65 
Certainly, the main function of such foreign investment law to provide international 
institutions necessary for sustainable global economic activities and economic growth is 
closely connected to the interests of those foreign investors and States that push for 
increasingly globalized markets and the legal framework that accompanies them. 
As a consequence of globalization and expansion of economic activities, the demand for 
law as an ordering structure progressively shifts from the national to international levels. 
This shift can be witnessed with regard to international trade and monetary law, where the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and their 
respective legal regimes establish legal and institutional infrastructures that enable and 
enhance trans-border economic exchange.
66
 
The international legal framework consists of international treaties providing for the 
settlement of disputes between foreign investors and host States, instruments providing for 
investment guarantees, and more than 2,500 bilateral, regional and sectoral investment 
treaties that contain substantive standards for the protection of foreign investors against 
undue government interference. At the same time, investment treaties enshrine principles 
of international investment law, rather than hard and fast rules. 
                                                          
64 Even though economic globalization is not a linear, nor necessarily an irreversible development, but rather an 
evolutionary process towards economic integration which has, up to this moment, not abided in a unitary and borderless 
economic space, we can nevertheless understand such trans-border activities as forming part of the economic system of 
the Weltgesellschaft (‘global society’). On the understanding of the economy as a functional sub-system of society see 
Luhmann, Die Wirtschaft der Gesellschaft, (1988) 43-90. On the concept of the ‘global society’ see Luhmann, Die 
Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft, (1997) 145-171; Luhmann, Die Weltgesellschaft (1971) 57 Archiv für Rechtsund 
Sozialphilosophie1.  
65 R Dolzer and C Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law (Oxford University Press 2008) p2-3. 
66 See J H Jackson, ‘Global Economics and International Economic Law’ (1998) 1 J. Int’l Econ. L. 1.  
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Almost unavoidably, international investment law therefore became coined more by the 
dispute settlement activities of arbitral tribunals which entertain claims between foreign 
investors and host states brought under investment treaties rather than by diplomatic 
exchange, inter-governmental negotiations, and inter-state treaty-making. Similarly, 
international investment law transpires and develops more in view of arbitral precedent 
and case law than on the basis of traditional textual approaches to treaty interpretation. 
Nonetheless, applying investment treaties in practice as well as studying and 
understanding the field not only requires knowledge about the jurisprudential development 
but also demands awareness of the historic, economic, and customary international law 
context of foreign investment activities. 
Ultimately, the possibilities for corporate investors to setup multi-level, multi-
jurisdictional structure are phenomenon of the globalization of financial markets and 
cross-border economic activities. Such opportunities illustrate that the criteria that have 
traditionally served to separate different spheres of sovereignty over persons and 
companies are increasingly disintegrating as an ordering paradigm for social relations on 
the international level. Thus the traditional theory of various national economies 
interacting in a global economy is transforming to the notion of a truly global market 
economy in which private economic actors with numerous national backgrounds directly 
interact in a single global market. In line with this transformation of the global economy, 
the nature of bilateral obligations under BITs is increasingly multilateralizing.   
C. Bilateralism v Multilateralism 
The development of international investment law after the Second World War on the basis 
of bilateral treaties contrasts significantly with the multilateral development in other areas 
of international economic law, in particular international trade and international monetary 
law. While multilateralism dominated international relations in these fields through the 
establishment of international organizations, such as the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade and (GATT) and later the WTO, as well as IMF, several approaches to establish 
a multilateral investment regime based on a multilateral treaty failed. 
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In the past, there have been several initiatives for the establishment of a more multilateral 
approach to international investment rulemaking. These attempts include the Havana 
Charter of 1948, the United Nations Draft Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations 
in the 1980s, and the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) of the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in the 1990s. None of these initiatives 
reached successful conclusion, due to disagreements among countries and, in case of the 
MAI, also in light of strong opposition by civil society groups. Further attempts of 
advancing the process towards establishment of a multilateral agreement have since been 
made within the WTO, but also without success.
67
  
Concerns have been raised regarding the specific objectives that such a multilateral 
agreement is meant to accomplish, who would benefit in what way from it, and what 
impact such a multilateral agreement would have on countries' broader public policies, 
including those related to environmental, social and other issues. Particularly developing 
countries may require "policy space" to develop their regulatory frameworks, such as in 
the area of economic or financial policies, and one major concern was that a multilateral 
agreement on investment would diminish such policy space. As a result, current 
international investment rulemaking remains short of having a unified system based on a 
multilateral agreement.
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In sharp contrast to the failure of multilateral agreements, bilateral and regional treaties 
containing substantive law on international investment protection came into existence, 
starting in the late 1950s. The structure of the international economy thus came to be 
compared with an unbalanced and unstable two-legged stool supported only by 
international trade and monetary law.
69
 Indeed this choice of bilateralism in international 
investment law seems surprising compared with the general decision for multilateralism in 
the other main areas of international economic relations.
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In reality, while bilateralism puts the State and its sovereignty center stage, assumes a 
primacy of national interests, and allows for preferential and discriminatory treatment 
among States depending on their relative power,
71
 multilateralism views States as 
embedded in an international community,
72
 stresses the primacy of international law over 
national interests,
73
 and presupposes that international relations are ordered on the basis of 
non-discriminatory principles that apply to all States.  
The mere number of more than 2,600 bilateral investment treaties (BITs) suggests a 
chaotic and unsystematic aggregate of substantive rules governing international 
investment relations. Rather than constituting a consistent and coherent system of law, one 
would expect an extreme divergence and fragmentation in this area of international 
cooperation. The fragmentation into bilateral treaties should in fact compromise any 
attempts at understanding international investment law as providing uniform institutions 
for the functioning of a global economy. Instead, differentiated standards, such as 
preferential and discriminatory treatment, should be the result of bilateral treaty-making.
74
   
In sum, recent developments in bilateral and regional investment treaty making have made 
the system increasingly complex and diverse. Moreover, even to the extent that the 
principal components of IIAs are similar across most of the agreements, substantial 
divergences can be found in the details of these provisions. All of this makes managing the 
interaction among IIAs increasingly challenging for countries, particularly those in the 
developing world, and also complicates the negotiation of new agreements.
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  OBJECTIVES OF THIS RESEARCH 1.5.
While the core claim of this research deals with significance of arbitral jurisprudence for 
the interpretation and development of international investment law, author has 
endeavoured to reach beyond a static perspective of investment jurisprudence in an 
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attempt to make a contribution towards developing a theory of international investment 
law that conjoins the subtleties of arbitral jurisprudence and investment treaty making. It 
contends on resolving one of the principal impediments to developing a theory of 
international investment law, namely the fragmented, disintegrated and disordered state of 
the law that is entrenched in several, largely bilateral treaties and implemented by arbitral 
tribunals which, established on a case-by-case basis, that generate increasing 
jurisprudential inconsistencies. 
This research is expected to provide, hopefully, a conceptual taxonomy for apprehending 
the nature and functioning of international investment law as a genuine system of law and 
dispute resolution and offer remedies to several practical and theoretical complications, 
inter alia, questions of treaty interpretation, of the use of the notions of investor and 
investment regarding the establishment of jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals and 
admissibility of claims. 
Author’s personal experience of ambiguities surrounding arbitral awards rendered by ad 
hoc tribunals caused by implementation of contradictory interpretation of jurisdictional 
and admissibility requirements under the auspices of international arbitration institutions 
has been the main motivation behind initiating this research. It is thus expected that this 
research may pave the path forward in laying down foundations of the basis for legal 
unification and harmonization in investment arbitration based on constitution of set of 
rules and regulations deliberately instituted for the purpose of tackling jurisdictional and 
admissibility issues. 
International investment law has become increasingly prominent in the international legal 
order. This rise to prominence and the current surge of investor-state disputes have, 
however, not always been matched by academic reflection on the content of procedure of 
international investment law which is coined by the dispute settlement activities of arbitral 
tribunals under investment treaties. International investment law transpires and develops 
more on arbitral precedent and case law than textual approaches to treaty interpretation. 
Like every legal system that relies on the judicial solutions of individual conflicts the 
treaty based investment arbitration needs to deal with conflicting and contradictory 
decisions.  
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Inconsistencies and incoherence in decision making of investment tribunals has ensued 
great concern and debate about investment treaty arbitration. A number of factors rooted 
in substantive international investment law are responsible for the potential for 
inconsistent decisions. Fragmentation of sources of international investment law, differing 
assessments of law and fact, inconsistent interpretation of terminologies and multiplicity 
of proceedings can be among numerous potential factors. For an investment treaty tribunal 
to proceed to adjudge the merits of claims arising out of an investment, it must have 
jurisdiction over the parties and the claims, and the claims submitted to the tribunal must 
be admissible.  
The thesis is supposedly the first in-depth study of article 25 of the 1965 Washington 
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), which articulates the 
Material (ratione materiae), Personal (ratione personae) and Consensual (ratione 
voluntatis) requirements for establishing the existence of the adjudicative power 
(Jurisdiction) for dispute resolution and to exercise that adjudicative power (Admissibility) 
in tackling waivers of arbitrability under the aegis of ICSID. Due to deficiency of 
available lexicon as to the scope of jurisdictional and admissibility criteria, the thesis 
sought to delineate their specific contours, scrutinize the process through which the outer 
limits of these requirements are drawn, address uncertainty and lack of clarity in the 
arbitral practice of ICSID tribunals in this regard, explore the double-jurisdictional nature 
of treaty arbitration and conditions surrounding the application of relevant principles. 
The main hypotheses, findings and suppositions of the research are as follows:  
1) ICSID’s jurisdictional double-filtering, which has been largely overlooked in ICSID 
jurisprudence, is fundamental to correct decision-making by ICSID tribunals. 
2) ‘Fraudulent intent’ criterion, which borrows its rationale from the concurrent themes in 
international law jurisprudence, is instrumental to test compliance as required in the upper 
jurisdictional keyhole.    
3) The compliance with the objective requirements of article 25 of the ICSID Convention 
measured through the ‘bona fide investor’ test runs counter to the object and purpose of 
the ICSID Convention.  
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4) ‘Dynamic’ test for the contemplated investment, rather than plain ‘objective’ test, is an 
adequate pattern to ensure compliance with article 25 of the ICSID Convention due to 
evolving meaning of such generic term. 
5) Legal unification and harmonization is proposed through introduction of a set of rules, 
principals and mechanisms for tackling waivers of arbitrability and upholding jurisdiction 
(lex Juridictio). 
This research seeks to scrutinize waivers of arbitrability of disputes – the doctrine of 
sovereign immunity, absence of essential pre-requisites to establish a jurisdiction of a 
particular forum as well as claims related to invalidity of the agreement that contains the 
arbitration clause – which in author’s view fall under the purview of a broader concept of 
lex juridictio – law related to establishing a jurisdiction of a particular forum. The author 
contends that lex juridictio is a multifaceted area of law, which embraces a number of 
fundamental and so far least researched aspects.  
During nearly two decades of legal practice in various jurisdictions the author has been 
directly involved in several trade and investment claims with local and international 
arbitral panels particularly those of Iran-US Claims Tribunal (3,800 claims, often 
involving complex factual and legal measures) the author realized that the taxonomy of the 
principals and rules that govern the existence and exercise of the arbitral tribunal’s power 
to adjudge an investment dispute from one hand and ambiguities surrounding ambivalence 
and inconsistent interpretation of terminologies are most important yet least researched 
factors of incoherence and fragmentation in investment treaty arbitration. 
More importantly, as senior advisor to multinational corporations and governments in 
Middle East including British Petroleum and Samsung Corporation the author was closely 
involved with drafting and execution of several major investment contracts based on 
bilateral treaties when following ambiguities were identified in jurisprudence of 
investment law:  
a. Absence of a comprehensive definition of the term ‘investment’ and uncertainty in 
its formulation by investment treaty tribunals. 
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b. Lack of clarity with respect to the concept of the ‘nationality’ in investment 
arbitration. 
c. Lack of clarity with respect to interpretation of state’s consent to arbitrate arising 
from the overlap between so-called state’s unilateral undertakings and concurrent 
obligation of an investor.  
Based on ambiguities of above nature within the jurisprudence of international law the 
need to strike a fair balance between public and private interest becomes pertinent. The 
uncertainty regarding the formulation of the term ‘investment’, lack of clarity in the 
application of the concept of ‘nationality’ and conflicting interpretative practices as to 
state’s consent to arbitrate have been identified as the key problems surrounding the 
investment treaty jurisprudence in the law governing the jurisdiction of investment 
tribunals.      
Apart from the obligation to treat foreign investors fairly and equitably contained in most 
investment treaties, a step further towards neutral dispute resolution procedure is blurred 
with unclear formulations and inconsistent applications. Thus this research seeks to fill 
legal vacuum of investment arbitration’s jurisdictional criteria to balance the protection of 
investor’s rights with state’s public interests. The problem statement and main quest for 
this research is: 
How can the uncertainties surrounding jurisdictional and admissibility issues related to the 
notions of investment, investor and consent be resolved in investment arbitration? 
In trying to tackle the main question, the following sub questions are also emerged: 
- Given the most recent challenges facing foreign direct investment, is the Salini test 
still fit or the purpose of defining the criteria for a dispute to qualify as arising 
‘directly from an investment’?  
- Is there any alternative method for testing qualification of a project as an 
investment? 
- Should the Salini test be subjective or objective?  
- What should be the approach to interpretation of state’s consent to arbitration?  
32 
 
- Whether the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice can help with respect 
to rules related to corporate nationality of foreign investors? 
- While need to strike a balance between public and private interests is desirable 
should the interpretative emphasis be on the arbitrator’s belief or on an 
autonomous test?  
- Should the regulatory framework form rules to define ‘nationality’ of investors?  
There are no clear-cut answers to these questions within the existing literature on 
international investment law, the jurisprudence of ICSID and bilateral investment treaties. 
As a matter of fact the immature interpretations that come out of investment treaty 
tribunals further add to the uncertainty and lack of clarity in the jurisprudence.   
The author’s findings further illustrate that the current formulation and application of the 
jurisprudence under the investment treaty tribunals are devoid of coherence and 
consistency.  From a practical view point, inconsistent and unpredictable outcomes are 
discrediting to the jurisprudence. The requirement of legal certainty demands that 
investors need to know the level of their protection to enable them design their investment 
fully aware of the associated risks. Host countries need to know their limitations in terms 
of their regulatory powers and their ability to respond to changing circumstances in the 
public interest. Academic scholars and legal practitioners in public service and private 
practice need to offer relative but predictable legal opinion in matters regarding 
jurisdictional criteria in investment arbitration. Thus, the need for clarity in this area is 
imminent. Several arbitral awards highlighted in proceeding chapters of this research 
illustrates how arbitral tribunals have swayed between applying different approaches to 
ratione materiae, ratione personae and ratione voluntatis. It may be emphasized that such 
divergent approach has led to various jurisprudential complications: e.g. uncertainty in the 
law; accusation of tribunals applying personal interpretative preferences; threat to 
legitimacy of the treaty based arbitration system. 
Furthermore, the research tries to analyze current and emerging developments in 
investment laws and policies and law governing jurisdictional criteria of investment 
arbitration – legal issues directly and indirectly related to upholding the competence of the 
arbitral tribunal to hear a dispute. In this regard, it also opens the jurisdiction of the 
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International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) to more scrutiny 
due to the prominent nature of this institution. There are two broad objectives intended to 
be achieved by this research, namely: 
• Gap Filling: To conduct a comprehensive study of Lex Juridictio in transnational 
investment law.  
• Uncertainty Settlement: To resolve the conflict between different interpretative 
practices as to Jurisdiction and admissibility with regards to concept of 
‘nationality’, requirements for ‘consent’ and definition of ‘investment’ in 
transnational investment arbitration.  
• Balancing Overlap: To resolve the conflict between foreign investor’s right to 
investment arbitration and state’s sovereign immunity.  
During earlier academic involvement in international business and legal research, the 
author has not been able to identify a comprehensive study of law governing jurisdiction 
requirements and waivers of admissibility under investment treaty arbitration.
76
 This 
research was therefore aimed at filling this vacuum by proposition of a comprehensive 
study of those requirements. The research would inquire deeply into the constituents of 
these requirements, their sources, basis upon which these requirements are built upon. It 
seeks to determine how the criteria governing these requirements can be identified, 
process through which they are generated, and how they are applied.  The criteria to be 
identified in the formulation of these jurisdictional requirements will assist in fulfilling 
this aim. It is hoped that this research will put together all the fragmented views and fill in 
the literature gap. 
Moreover, both investor’s right to investment arbitration and state’s sovereign immunity 
are metaphorically viewed as two untamed tigers that need to be arrested in a balanced 
way. The research would therefore propose equilibrium between fulfilling investor’s 
interests to a neutral dispute resolution procedure and deference to state’s sovereign 
immunity. In other words to introduce a fair balancing structure within the investment 
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arbitration that would protect above mentioned investor’s rights on one hand, and respect 
the immunity of a sovereign. 
  METHODOLOGY Of THIS RESEARCH 1.6.
Legal researchers have always struggled to explain the nature of their activities to 
colleagues in other disciplines. If Becher’s (1981, p. 111) work continues to represent an 
accurate account of how academic lawyers are viewed by their peers they have much work 
still to do in this respect. He found that they were regarded as ‘not really academic …: an 
appendage to the academic world ….’. 77 
The built environment is usually considered to be an interdisciplinary field linking the 
disciplines of management, economics, law, technology and design (Chynoweth, 2006). 
The field as a whole can benefit from the greatest possible involvement of each of these in 
its collective research agenda. The author presents a welcome opportunity to express his 
views on the actual nature of legal research (or ‘legal scholarship’ as it is more usually 
described) in the context of the law discipline, specifically, to describe the nature of this 
research by reference to the epistemological, methodological and cultural features which 
distinguish it from other forms of built environment research. 
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A. The epistemology of legal research:  
The author consents to the opinion that there is a dearth of theoretical literature on the 
nature of legal scholarship and a consequent lack of awareness about what legal scholars 
actually do. Although there is a tradition of theoretical scholarship (or ‘jurisprudence’) 
within the law, this tends to address abstract philosophical questions about the nature of 
law itself. Many lawyers would recognize Bix’s (2003) description of jurisprudence as 
‘theorists talking past each other’. 
Nevertheless, in a very different context, Arthurs (1983, pp. 63–71) proposed a useful 
taxonomy of legal research styles in his report on legal education and research in Canada. 
It has informed the choice of methodology employed by this research and is represented as 
a matrix in Figure 2 below. It will be seen that the vertical axis of the matrix represents the 
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familiar distinction between pure research which is undertaken for a predominantly 
academic constituency, and applied work which generally serves the professional needs of 
practitioners and policy makers.  
 
 
 
 
                                                       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Legal Research Styles (Arthurs, 1983). 
Doctrinal legal research 
Doctrinal research (on the right in Figure 2) is concerned with the formulation of legal 
‘doctrines’ through the analysis of legal rules. Within the international law jurisdictions 
legal rules are to be found within treaties and cases (the sources of law) but it is important 
to appreciate that they cannot, in themselves, provide a complete statement of the law in 
any given situation. This can only be ascertained by applying the relevant legal rules to the 
particular facts of the situation under consideration.  
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Deciding on which rules to apply in a particular situation is made easier by the existence 
of legal doctrines (e.g., the doctrine of consideration within the law of contract). These are 
systematic formulations of the law in particular contexts. They clarify ambiguities within 
rules, place them in a logical and coherent structure and describe their relationship to other 
rules. Doctrinal research is concerned with the discovery and development of legal 
doctrines for publication in textbooks or journal articles and its research questions take the 
form of asking ‘what is the law?’ in particular contexts. At an epistemological level this 
differs from the questions asked by empirical investigators in most other areas of built 
environment research.
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Legal rules are normative in character as they dictate how individuals ought to behave 
(Kelsen, 1967). They make no attempt either to explain, predict, or even to understand 
human behavior. Their sole function is to prescribe it. In short, doctrinal research is not 
therefore research about law at all. In asking ‘what is the law?’ it takes an internal, 
participant-orientated epistemological approach to its object of study (Hart, 1961) and, for 
this reason, is sometimes described as research in law (Arthurs, 1983).
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The author contends that, the actual process of analysis by which doctrines are formulated 
owes more to the subjective, argument-based methodologies of the humanities than to the 
more detached data-based analysis of the natural and social sciences. The normative 
character of the law also means that the validity of doctrinal research must inevitably rest 
upon developing a consensus within the scholastic community, rather than on an appeal to 
any external reality. 
Interdisciplinary legal research 
In practice, even doctrinal analysis usually makes at least some reference to other, 
external, factors as well as seeking answers that are consistent with the existing body of 
rules. For example, an uncertain or ambiguous legal ruling can often be more easily 
interpreted when viewed in its proper historical or social context, or when the interpreter 
has an adequate understanding of the industry or technology to which it relates.  
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There comes a point, towards the left-hand side of the matrix in Figure 2, when the 
epistemological nature of the research changes from that of internal enquiry into the 
meaning of the law to that of external enquiry into the law as a social entity. This might 
involve, for example, an evaluation of the effectiveness of a particular piece of legislation 
in achieving particular social goals or an examination of the extent to which it is being 
complied with.
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In taking an external view of the law, each of these examples could be described as 
research about law rather than research in law. As one continues to move leftwards along 
the axis one encounters a greater willingness to embrace the epistemologies and 
methodologies of the social sciences. 
Pure and applied legal research  
Within the context of interdisciplinary legal research (to the left of Figure 2) this 
distinction, in one sense, simply represents that between pure academic knowledge about 
the operation of the law (at the bottom of the diagram), and knowledge of the same kind 
which has been produced with a particular purpose in mind (at the top). The purpose of the 
latter will generally be to facilitate a future change, either in the law itself, or in the 
manner of its administration. Arthurs (1983) therefore describes this latter category of 
research as ‘law reform research’. He distinguishes these forms of research from the 
production of pure, academic knowledge which he refers to as ‘fundamental research’.82 
The author’s has noted that there is also a strong correlation between pure, fundamental 
research and the willingness (indeed, the motivation) of researchers in these areas to 
question not simply the operation of law, but also its underlying philosophical, moral, 
economic and political assumptions. The nature of current research would include the 
Sociology of Law as well as the (left wing) Critical Legal Studies and (right wing) Law 
and Economics movements. 
The applied form of doctrinal research (to the right of Figure 2) is concerned with the 
systematic presentation and explanation of particular legal doctrines and is therefore 
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referred to as the ‘expository’ tradition in legal research. This form of scholarship has 
always been the dominant form of academic legal research (Card, 2002) and has an 
important role to play in the development of legal doctrines through the publication of 
conventional legal treatises, articles and textbooks.
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When doctrinal research is undertaken in its pure form it is variously described as legal 
theory, jurisprudence, or (occasionally) legal philosophy. The limitations of this form of 
research in defining the nature of law as an academic discipline have been noted by the 
author. Nevertheless, although rarely used as a practical basis for legal analysis, it does 
provide insights into the nature of the legal methodologies actually employed by lawyers 
and legal scholars.
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B. In search of a methodology 
The dominance of the expository, doctrinal tradition in legal scholarship has been noted by 
the author while realizing that this is not simply a single, isolated category of scholarship. 
Some element of doctrinal analysis is found in all but the most radical forms of legal 
research. 
Although law reform research appears as a separate category within Figure 2, its 
practitioners emphasize the importance of traditional legal analysis within their socio-legal 
work (Cownie, 2004, p. 55). Indeed, even within socio-legal studies, it was once suggested 
that social scientists should be regarded as ‘intellectual sub-contractors’ who should be 
kept ‘on tap, not on top’ (Campbell and Wiles, 1976). Doctrinal analysis therefore remains 
the defining characteristics of this academic legal research and the methodologies 
employed within it. 
The doctrinal approach employed in this research involves the development of scholastic 
arguments for subsequent criticism and reworking by other scholars, rather than any 
attempt to deliver results which purport to be definitive and final. Methodology in this 
research is therefore employed subconsciously by the author who has consider himself to 
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be involved in an exercise in logic and common sense rather than in the formal application 
of a methodology as understood by researchers in the scientific disciplines. 
Deductive Reasoning 
The author is of the opinion that there is no fundamental distinction between the process of 
academic doctrinal analysis and the legal analysis undertaken by practicing lawyers or 
judges. The aim, in each case, is to answer the question ‘what is the law?’ in a particular 
situation. In the case of practicing lawyers or judges this will be a real and well-defined 
situation requiring an immediate answer to the question. For the legal scholar, the purpose 
is to undertake a more in-depth analysis which is capable of informing the deliberations of 
practitioners and judges in future cases. In either case, the initial process of applying a rule 
of law to a factual situation can be understood as an exercise in deductive logic.  
This, of course, is an idealized account of the process of legal reasoning. If the process 
were as simple, and as mechanistic as this, society would have no need for lawyers, and 
still less for legal scholarship. In reality, in almost all cases, the deductive model will fail, 
without further analysis, to produce a definitive answer to the question of what the law is 
in a given situation. 
Legal rules, of necessity, have to be expressed in general terms and were famously 
described by Hart (1961) as having an ‘open texture’, and therefore capable of 
interpretation in more than one sense. In the context of this research, there has, for 
instance, been considerable judicial and academic discussion over the meaning of 
‘investment’ in relation to international investment adjudication. There will, therefore, 
often be an element of doubt as to whether a rule applies to a particular factual situation.  
Although Hart (1961) concluded that adjudicators exercise discretion in these so-called 
‘hard cases’, their decisions are actually based on recognized patterns of reasoning 
employed within the legal community which are used to supplement the deductive model 
described above. Lawyers and legal scholars are therefore often able to predict the 
outcomes of future cases by employing, however subconsciously, the same patterns of 
reasoning that will eventually be used by the judiciary. 
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Analogical reasoning 
The most widely used technique is undoubtedly the process of analogical reasoning. In 
contrast to deductive reasoning, which entails reasoning from a general rule to a specific 
case, analogy involves a process of reasoning from one specific case to another specific 
case. In those many situations where it is unclear whether a particular factual situation 
falls within the ambit of a rule, it can often be helpful to examine apparently similar cases 
which have previously come before the courts and arbitral tribunals. If, upon examination, 
the facts of these cases are found to be sufficiently similar to the facts of the subject case 
then it can be concluded that the facts of the subject case should be treated by the courts in 
the same way. Legal researchers in international comparative law are familiar with this 
process in the context of the operation of the common law doctrine of precedent.
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The decision as to whether a case is sufficiently similar to another is ultimately a 
subjective one as no two cases are ever completely identical. Judges therefore have 
considerable scope to distinguish the facts of a subject case from those in an established 
precedent if they choose not to follow it. Nevertheless, this scope is not unlimited and Bell 
(1986, p. 48) has highlighted how judicial decision making in these circumstances is 
constrained by social conventions within the legal community which he describes as the 
‘rules of legal discourse’. He describes how these ‘provide a framework lying outside the 
power of the reasoner within which he has to operate if his arguments are to count as legal 
justifications’. Judges are subject to these rules but so, of course, are lawyers and legal 
scholars who all participate in the same legal discourse, and who all desire their arguments 
to be taken seriously.
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Inductive Reasoning 
A third technique involves the use of inductive reasoning which can be described as the 
reasoning from specific cases to a general rule. This can be of particular assistance when a 
particular factual situation does not appear to be addressed directly by a legal rule at all 
and it therefore becomes necessary to ‘fill the gap’ in the law. As with inductive reasoning 
in the sciences a general proposition can sometimes be derived from a number of specific 
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instances. In the case of legal reasoning this involves the recognition of a new general rule 
which emerges from a number of earlier authorities which are then regarded simply as 
particular instances of the new rule.
87
  
A variety of other techniques is available which, like those already described, also allow 
the available body of legal rules to be marshaled into coherent patterns (or ‘doctrines’) and 
applied to new factual situations in an apparently logical and consistent manner.
88
 Indeed 
most legal discourse revolves around the verbal manipulation of the available sources of 
law, in the belief that the answer to most legal problems can be found in the underlying 
logic and structure of the rules if only this can be discovered (Smith, 2004). This approach 
is usually described as legal formalism (Vandevelde, 1996) and, despite numerous 
academic criticisms of its assumptions (e.g., Fitzpatrick and Hunt, 1987), continues to 
represent the dominant paradigm within legal practice and within legal scholarship, at least 
in terms of external appearances. 
In author’s view, it is probably incorrect to describe the process of legal analysis as being 
dictated by a ‘methodology’, at least in the sense in which that term is used in the sciences. 
The process involves an exercise in reasoning and a variety of techniques are used, often 
at a subconscious level, with the aim of constructing an argument which is convincing 
according to accepted, and instinctive, conventions of discourse within the discipline. 
Although the discourse is apparently conducted according to formalistic conventions it is 
also influenced by shared value (or policy) judgments which often remain unspoken. The 
‘methods’ employed in legal scholarship are neither consciously learned, nor consciously 
employed as is the case with scientific methods. The skills and conventions of legal 
analysis are instead learned at an instinctive level through exposure to the process, and 
they are then employed on the same basis in the development of legal argument. In much 
the same way that the use of an explicit methodology confers legitimacy in scientific 
research, credibility within legal scholarship is therefore dependent on the researcher’s 
                                                          
87 Ibid. 
88 Ibid. 
42 
 
work demonstrating an understanding and adherence to the accepted conventions and 
norms of its discourse.
89
 
C. The cultural dimension 
This lack of a formal research methodology, and the reliance on analysis and the 
development of argument within a prevailing academic discourse, is of course a particular 
feature of the arts and humanities family of disciplines to which law belongs. This places 
law at the ‘soft’ end of the familiar disciplinary spectrum.90  
The science/arts & humanities distinction reflects genuine epistemological and 
methodological differences between the families of disciplines about the nature of 
knowledge, and about the manner of its production. Becher (1987) has described 
knowledge production in the sciences in terms of the cumulative and piecemeal 
accumulation of individual segments of knowledge which, over time, contributes to a 
comprehensive explanation of particular phenomena. He contrasts this with humanities 
disciplines like law. These, he describes, as being concerned with the organic development 
of knowledge through an ongoing process of reiterative enquiry. They address 
multifaceted, rather than discrete, problems and attempt, not to explain the individual 
components of phenomena, but to develop a holistic understanding of their overall 
complexity.
91
 
The dominance of the scientific disciplines within the built environment inevitably 
influences prevailing views about knowledge and knowledge production within the field. 
Indeed, the language of built environment research is often dominated by the rhetoric of 
the social sciences in particular. This is characterized by a concern with the traditional 
social science methodologies (see, e.g., Fellows and Liu, 2003) and with an emphasis on 
empirical investigations rather than the development of theoretical perspectives (Betts and 
Lansley, 1993; Brandon, 2002). 
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Cultural challenges 
The epistemological and methodological differences between legal scholarship and most 
other built environment research styles also generate cultural differences between the two. 
These produce expectations regarding the external appearance of academic research within 
the field which legal scholars often struggle to satisfy. These may relate to expectations 
about the form and appearance of research outputs, about the process which is undertaken 
in generating the research, and about the more general behavioral characteristics of 
researchers within the field.
92
 
More fundamentally, cultural differences can sometimes obscure the academic merits of 
doctrinal work from those belonging to different disciplinary traditions. As a consequence, 
legal scholars’ experiences of peer review within the built environment have not always 
been happy ones. Their work can all too easily be dismissed as lacking a methodology, as 
being based only on opinion, or even as being ‘not research’ by peers operating within a 
scientific, rather than a humanities paradigm.
93
 
This research does not involve empirical investigation, but with the analysis and 
manipulation of theoretical concepts. The methodology employed is probably more 
accurately categorized, in social science terms, as techniques of qualitative analysis. 
Deductive and inductive logics and the use of analogical reasoning all feature strongly 
within this research. 
Crucially however, as the process is one of analysis rather than data collection, no purpose 
would have been served by including a separate methodology chapter within current 
doctrinal research work. This is perhaps the most striking difference between the 
appearance of this research output with a scientific work, and the one which has 
historically caused most difficulty for legal scholars when subject to peer review by other 
built environment researchers.  
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International investment law transpires and develops more in view of arbitral precedent 
and case law than on the basis of traditional textual approaches to treaty interpretation. 
Nonetheless, applying investment treaties in practice as well as studying and 
understanding the field not only requires knowledge about the jurisprudential development 
but also demands awareness of the historic, economic, and customary international law 
context of foreign investment activities. This study is thus guided by a number of 
methodological principles and research techniques.  
The main area of the research – lex juridictio – is looked at from a diversity of 
perspectives, which feeds the argument that the leading method to be applied in this study 
is a doctrinal-applied method. Its overarching aim is to show how the relevant principles 
operate in practice and how principals such as local legislative acts which promote Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI) in a particular country address issues of investment insecurity. 
The Author would also like to contend that the Historical and Comparative methods were 
instrumental in fulfilling the research aims and objectives. Similarly sources of public 
international law that could accommodate the relevant principles related to jurisdictional 
requirements of investment arbitration were doctrinally analysed with a view to justify the 
application of the principle.  
The jurisprudence of investment treaty tribunals were analysed, the treaty provisions 
dealing with ratione personae, ratione materiae and ratione voluntatis, and the arbitral 
awards rendered in this context. The notions of investment, investor and consent were also 
traced in obiter dicta of arbitral awards. It is noteworthy that it is generally acceptable that 
law of judicial precedent does not exist in international investment law. However, it is 
increasingly evident that ICSID jurisprudence hinges largely on reasoning employed in 
previous decisions. The practice of other international courts and tribunals, such as the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ), the WTO Panels or the WTO Appellate Body, 
epitomizes this phenomenon. Such de facto case law was also reflected in the Gas Natural 
case (Sonatrach vs. Gas Natural Fenosa, ICC arbitration), where the tribunal emphasized 
that it ‘has rendered its decision independently, without considering itself bound by any 
other judgments or arbitral awards’, but it ‘thought it useful to compare its conclusion with 
the conclusions reached in other recent arbitrations conducted pursuant to the ICSID 
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Arbitration Rules’ and found that there were no ‘decisions or awards reaching contrary 
conclusion.’ 
Moreover, relying on the comparative approach, similarities and differences between 
various legal systems were reviewed and the jurisprudence of investment treaty tribunals 
was compared with jurisprudence of the European Union. The focus was to analyse most 
importantly the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice (ECJ). The comparative 
approach would enable the research to transpose relevant principles adopted by ECJ as to 
debate existing within the concept of freedom of movement of capital. The theme adopted 
in one of the research questions is injecting the principles governing the concept of 
‘nationality’ adopted by ECJ into the determination of the nationality of foreign investors 
to uphold the jurisdiction of investment arbitral tribunals. The comparative method also 
entails analysis of dispute resolution provisions in bilateral and multilateral investment 
treaties, national legislations, guidelines or regulatory framework, contractual 
undertakings. 
  SUMMARY OF THESIS ARGUMENT 1.7.
Chapter 1 revisits the historic development and principles of international investment 
protection. It focuses on bilateralism and multilateralism as the ordering paradigms of 
international investment relations. It also covered the aims and objectives of the research, 
its limitations, methodology and the introduction of analytical tools to be used in the 
subsequent chapters. It was shown that proliferation of bilateral and regional treaties over 
the past two decades reflects more stable consensus on the content and scope of 
international investment protection.  
Chapter 2 offers an outline of the various traditional methods for the settlement of 
disputes between hosts States and foreign investors and explains the shortcomings of those 
traditional methods. Theoretical, contractual and judicial nature and concepts of 
international commercial and investment arbitrations are reviewed. The international 
investment treaties, the arbitral institutions and arbitration regimes are reviewed. Rubric of 
growing treaty-based ICSID jurisdiction and the double-filtering as to dispute’s 
arbitrability under the auspices of ICSID associated therewith is discussed.   
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Chapter 3 draws on the importance of getting legal terminology beyond linguistic fidelity 
to proper usage because the scope of judicial review of the arbitral tribunal’s decisions on 
issues pertaining to its own adjudicative power depends upon the classification of such 
issues. The taxonomy of preliminary issues in investment arbitration is explained. The 
chapter focuses on the notion of ‘admissibility’- the prerequisite to exercise of the 
adjudicative power of tribunals in investment arbitration - which has been subject to 
pronounced ambiguity both in lexicon and solicitation.  
Chapter 4 addresses the other preliminary issue in investment arbitration, namely 
‘jurisdiction’ – the prerequisite to existence of the adjudicative power in investment 
arbitration - which has also been subject to much argumentative dialogue in jurisprudence 
and practice of investment arbitration. Admissibility and jurisdiction although very closely 
defined in lexicon, refer to different set of prerequisite terms in investment arbitration. It 
will make a preliminary introduction to jurisdictional requirements raetone materiae, 
ratione personae and ratione voluntatis.  
Chapter 5 draws on other waivers of admissibility which in Author’s view challenge the 
‘arbitrability’ of investment claims. It is the agreement to arbitrate – often the arbitration 
clause embedded in a contract between the parties – which renders an arbitral proceeding 
possible. An unwilling party might contest the arbitration contract and try to involve the 
judiciary, to settle the dispute, instead. This notorious maneuver is normally aimed at 
waiving the arbitrability of the claim/dispute. The chapter furthermore discusses the 
various legal resolutions to uphold arbitrability and reviews relevant rationales and 
doctrines.  
Chapter 6 elaborates on the requirement ratione personae. It argues that ICSID 
investment treaty arbitration presupposes that it is fundamental to establish that an entity is 
indeed ‘a national of the contracting state’. The central theme of chapter 2 revolves around 
definition of nationality and the requirement ratione personae. It is submitted that both the 
treatment and interpretation of incorporation versus real seat/control criteria to establish 
corporate nationality remain vague and unclear. The chapter proposes that ICSID tribunals 
have failed to invoke a galvanized mechanism on establishing nationality of corporate 
investors.  
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Chapter 7 deals with the notion of ‘investment’. ICSID jurisprudence is examined in 
order to expose tribunals’ deliberations as to what constitutes ‘investment’ under article 25 
of the ICSID Convention. The analysis of the arbitral awards on jurisdiction affirmed the 
hypothesis that overlooking the very existence of two separate sets of jurisdictional 
requirements would lead to misleading conclusions. The Author will address questions on; 
difference between a dispute arising directly out of an investment and a dispute arising 
from a direct foreign investment, limitations of party discretion in agreeing that a 
particular transaction is an investment and decision regarding ICSID’s jurisdiction ratione 
materiae.  
Chapter 8 lays proper foundation for giving a descriptive and analytical account of how 
consent to arbitrate evolves and should be deciphered if the tribunal is faced with the task 
of interpreting the disputed consent clause of a treaty. The analysis dwells on the 
contentious aspects of ratione voluntatis: it exposes to legal scrutiny of two central 
arguments - one being related to the appropriate interpretation in case of ambiguous 
expressions of consent, and the other being the debate over the nature and time of 
‘consent’ and its irrevocability when allegedly given in a treaty and/or the municipal laws.  
Chapter 9 provides the summary conclusion of the research, its limitations, findings and 
propositions. It concludes with the Author’s propositions for the prospective and projected 
further academic research on tackling waivers of arbitrability in jurisprudence of 
international investment arbitration in general and ICSID in particular.  
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2. CHAPTER TWO: SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT 
DISPUTES 
  INTRODUCTION 2.1.
Chapter one touched on the economic drives and financial incentives behind the rationale 
of foreign investment, based on which corporate entities established under the municipal 
laws of one country involve in substantial financial and legal interests (investments) 
protected under a host country’s municipal law on long term basis.  
The current chapter offers an outline of the various traditional methods for the settlement 
of disputes between hosts States and foreign investors and explains the shortcomings of 
these traditional methods. It will introduce international commercial arbitration and will 
elaborate on its theoretical, contractual and judicial nature and concepts. International 
treaties relevant to arbitration will receive careful attention to facilitate fluent realization 
of various notions discussed in proceeding chapters. The international arbitral regimes are 
introduced and discussed further on in the chapter and finally the provision of mixed 
arbitration is discussed in context of ICSID Convention.   
The idea underlying the ICSID Convention is to close the gaps caused by shortcomings. 
This chapter explains the origins and history of the Convention on the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (the ICSID 
Convention). It also explains why the mechanism created by the ICSID Convention works 
to the advantage of the investor as well as of the host State. 
It also gives a broad description of the leading principles underlying dispute settlement 
under the ICSID Convention. These include the specialization on investment disputes, the 
substantive law applicable to investment disputes, the mixed nature of proceedings 
between a State and a foreign investor, the requirement of consent to ICSID’s jurisdiction, 
the institutional support given by the International Centre for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes (the Centre), the self-contained and automatic nature of proceedings and the 
overall effectiveness of the system. 
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 INTERNATIONAL TREATIES ON ARBITRATION 2.2.
Arbitration rules ensure the orderly conduct of arbitrations. National laws on arbitration 
offer the support of the courts to arbitration within the State and give recognition to 
resulting arbitral awards. But in order that arbitration be an effective instrument for the 
settlement of international disputes it is necessary that agreements to arbitrate and arbitral 
awards are recognized internationally. This is the essential task addressed by the 
conventions on international commercial arbitration.  
Important milestones in shaping the regulatory framework for international arbitration are, 
among other things, the ratification of: 
- The investment agreements such as BITs or MITs which refer to relevant arbitral 
institutions such as London Court of International Arbitration, International Chamber 
of Commerce, etc. for the dispute settlement,  
- The Washington Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States 
and Nationals of Other States (Appendix 2) to establish the possibility of a dispute 
resolution procedure under the jurisdiction of the International Centre for the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), and that of  
- 1958 United Nations’ Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards.  
These are all discussed further in detail. 
(A) Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation 
Jay Treaty, also known as Jay's Treaty, The British Treaty, the Treaty of London of 1794, 
and officially the Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation, Between His Britannic 
Majesty and The United States of America,
94
 was a treaty between the United States and 
Great Britain that is credited with averting war,
95
 resolving issues remaining since the 
Treaty of Paris of 1783, which ended the American Revolution,
96
 and facilitating ten years 
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of peaceful trade between the United States and Britain in the midst of the French 
Revolutionary Wars, which began in 1792.
97
 
The origins of modern arbitration are usually dated from the Treaty of Amity, Commerce 
and Navigation which set up, inter alia, mixed tribunals consisting of an equal number of 
members appointed by each of the two States, with an umpire in the event of 
disagreement, to consider claims by the nationals of Great Britain and the United States. 
The Jay Treaty commissions decided many claims by awards expressly applying legal 
principles. 
During the first half of the nineteenth century, however, the practice of rendering 
unreasoned awards persisted, particularly in cases where a foreign sovereign was 
designate as the arbitrator.
98
 Moreover, there was still a widespread view that ‘arbitral 
commissions’ were essentially extensions of diplomacy, with the State-appointed 
arbitrators negotiating a solution with the aid of the neutral umpire, who served a function 
akin to that of a mediator. What proved to be the decisive step towards the typically 
modern form of arbitration, with a tribunal reaching by an essentially judicial process a 
reasoned decision clearly based on law, was taken by the United States and Great Britain 
in the 1871 Washington Treaty.
99
  
The works of 1871 Washington treaty under the so called Alabama claims tribunal 
inspired the States represented at the 1899 Hague Peace Conference, convened by the Tsar 
of Russia in an attempt to find ways of reducing the risks of armed conflicts in Europe, to 
adapt a Convention on dispute settlement in which arbitration played a central role. 
(B) Hague Peace Conferences  
The Hague Conventions were two international treaties negotiated at international peace 
conferences at The Hague in the Netherlands: The First Hague Conference in 1899 and the 
Second Hague Conference in 1907. Along with the Geneva Conventions, the Hague 
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Conventions were among the first formal statements of the laws of war and war crimes in 
the body of secular international law.  
The German international law scholar and neo-Kantian pacifist Walther Schücking called 
the assemblies the ‘international union of Hague conferences’100, asserting ‘that a definite 
political union of the states of the world has been created with the First and Second 
Conference’. A major effort in both the conferences was to create a binding international 
court for compulsory arbitration to settle international disputes, which was considered 
necessary to replace the institution of war. This effort, however, failed to realize success 
either in 1899 or in 1907. The First Conference was a success and was focused 
on disarmament efforts. The Second Conference failed to create a binding international 
court for compulsory arbitration but did enlarge the machinery for voluntary arbitration.  
The advantages of arbitration, along with good offices and mediation and inquiry, were 
recognized at the Hague Peace Conference 1899, which sought to facilitate its use as a 
means of settling international disputes and avoiding a course to the use of force.
101
 The 
Conference created the Permanent Court of Arbitration (‘PCA’). It has often been said that 
it is neither permanent nor a court nor, itself, does arbitration. 
The hay day of the Permanent Court of Arbitration was in the years before World War I. 
Among the arbitrations under its auspices to which the United Kingdom was a party were 
the Venezuelan Preferential Claims (1904),
102
 Japanese House Tax (1905),
103
 Muscat 
Dhows (1905),
104
 North Atlantic Coast Fishers (1910),
105
 and Savarkar (1911)
106
 cases.  
After the creation of Permanent Court of International Justice in 1923, the PCA was 
occasionally resorted to, as by the United Kingdom in the Chevreau case (1931).
107
 It 
heard a total of twenty cases. No inter-state cases have been referred to the Court, as such, 
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since 1932, although its facilities have often been used for ad hoc arbitration. Permanent 
Court of Arbitration still exists.  
(C) International Convention on Settlement of Investment Disputes  
 In 1961, then-General Counsel of the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (IBRD) developed the idea for a multilateral agreement on a process for 
resolving individual investment disputes on a case by case basis as opposed to imposing 
outcomes based on standards.  
He held conferences to consult legal experts from all parts of the world; including Europe, 
Africa, and Asia, to discuss and compose a preliminary agreement (see Appendix 3). The 
Board of Directors approved the final draft of the agreement, and the Bank president 
disseminated the convention to its member states for signature on March 18, 1965. Twenty 
states immediately ratified the convention. The convention, establishing the International 
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, entered into force on October 14, 
1966.
108
The convention created the International Centre for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes (ICSID, ‘the Centre’). This why, it is commonly referred to as the ICSID 
Convention. Sometimes the Convention is also referred to as the Washington Convention.  
The convention procedures were designed to provide a balance between the interests of 
investors and of hosts States. It was thought desirable to establish a dispute settlement 
mechanism to which both the investor and the State could become irrevocably committed 
and which either could invoke, and which was detached from the municipal laws of both 
the investor and host States. It was also meant to provide a standing system which States 
and investors could incorporate in their agreements by reference, thus avoiding the need 
for the negotiation of a new settlement procedure in every case.  
The ICSID Convention has been a great success. As of 2012, 158 countries are signatories 
to the Convention and 148 countries have already ratified it from all geographical and 
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political blocs, among them the United States of America, the United Kingdom, France 
and Germany. Accession to the Convention appears to be a high priority for newly 
independent States keen to attract foreign investment The United Kingdom gave effect to 
it by the Arbitration (International Investment disputes) Act 1966,
109
 as amended.
110
  
The aim of the ICSID, as expressed in its preamble (see Appendix 2), is to promote 
economic development through the creation of a favourable investment climate. ICSID 
provides a system of dispute settlement that is specialized in investor-State disputes. It 
offers standard clauses for the use of the parties, detailed rules of procedure, and 
institutional support.
111
 Proceedings under the ICSID Convention are self-contained. In 
particular, domestic courts have no power to stay, to compel, or to otherwise influence 
ICSID proceedings. Nor do domestic courts have the power to set aside or otherwise 
review ICSID awards.  
ICSID awards are binding and final and not subject to review except under the narrow 
conditions provided by the Convention itself (Article 49-52). Non-compliance with an 
award by a State would be a breach of the Convention and would lead to a revival of the 
right to diplomatic protection by the investor’s State of nationality (Article 53 and 27). 
The Convention provides and effective system of enforcement. The obligations arising 
from awards are to be enforced like final judgement of the local; courts in all States parties 
to the Convention (article 54).  
ICSID had a slow start. The Convention entered into force in 1966 but the first case was 
not registered before 1972. The 1970s and 1980s saw steady but only intermittent action. 
One or two cases per year were typical for that period. Since the mid-1990s, there has 
been a dramatic increase in activity. In 1995 there were four ICSID arbitrations pending. 
In early 2007 more than 100 were pending.
112
 On average about two new cases are 
registered every month. 
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(D) Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 
The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, also 
known as the New York Convention, was adopted by a United Nations diplomatic 
conference on 10 June 1958 and entered into force on 7 June 1959. The Convention 
requires courts of contracting States to give effect to private agreements to arbitrate and to 
recognize and enforce arbitration awards made in other contracting states. Widely 
considered the foundational instrument for international arbitration, it applies to 
arbitrations which are not considered as domestic awards in the state where recognition 
and enforcement is sought. Though other international conventions apply to the cross-
border enforcement of arbitration awards, the New York Convention is by far the most 
important.
113
 
In 1953, the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) produced the first draft 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards to 
the United Nations Economic and Social Council. With slight modifications, the Council 
submitted the convention to the International Conference in the spring of 1958. As of May 
2012, 146 of the 193 United Nations Member States have adopted the New York 
Convention. About fifty of the U.N. Member States have not adopted the Convention.
114
 
Under American law, the recognition of foreign arbitral awards is governed by chapter 2 
of the Federal Arbitration Act, which incorporates the New York Convention. However, 
the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards (the ‘Convention’) does not pre-empt state law. In Foster v. Neilson,115 the 
Supreme Court held; 
‘Our constitution declares a treaty to be the law of the land. It is, consequently, to be 
regarded in courts of justice as equivalent to an act of the Legislature, whenever it operates 
of itself without the aid of any legislative provision.’  
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Thus, over a course of 181 years, the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held that 
a self-executing treaty is an act of the Legislature (i.e., act of Congress). 
The provisions involving the enforcement of New York Convention awards in the English 
courts mirror closely the procedures enacted in other contracting States whereby an 
English award maybe enforced. An award creditor will be able to rely on the enforcement 
scheme in order that an award made in England will be enforced in another Convention 
territory.  
The Convention provides a systematic and comprehensive system for international 
arbitration enforcement of awards, much more so than the provisions of the Judgements 
Regulations, which apply within EU only. The widespread ratification of the Convention 
therefore makes the law on recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards significantly 
more predictable and uniform than that relating to recognition of judgements, which has 
been viewed as one of the advantages enjoyed by arbitration as a form of international 
investment dispute resolution.   
  INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION RULES AND REGIMES 2.3.
Arbitration between a host State and a foreign investor may take place in the framework of 
a variety of institutions or rules. If arbitration is not supported by a particular arbitration 
institution, it is referred to as ad hoc arbitration. Ad hoc arbitration requires an arbitration 
agreement that regulates a number of issues. These include the selection of arbitrators, the 
applicable law, and a large number of procedural questions. The drafting of such rules 
represents a potentially lengthy and troublesome preliminary to the settlement of the 
dispute which necessarily falls for completion at a time when relations between the parties 
are likely to be strained.  
It is clearly preferred to have predetermined rules to which the parties can swiftly and 
easily resort. Many institutions, in countries throughout the world, have drafted sets of 
rules that may be incorporated into the parties’ agreement for the conduct of arbitrations, 
in the hope of attracting lucrative business to their centers. The judicial regimes and 
institutions specified for the resolution of international commercial and investment 
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disputes generally include one or more of the following at the option of the claimant 
investor: 
- International Court of Justice. 
- Municipal courts of the host state. 
- Arbitration pursuant to the ICSID Arbitration Rules or the ICSID Additional Facility 
Rules. 
-  Ad hoc arbitration pursuant to the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. 
- Arbitration pursuant to the Rules of Arbitration of the International Chamber of 
Commerce (ICC). 
- Arbitration pursuant to the Rules of Arbitration of the Stockholm Chamber of 
Commerce. 
- Arbitration pursuant to the Rules of the Cour Commune de Justice et d’Arbitrage 
(CCJA). 
- Arbitration pursuant to the Rules of Arbitration of the London Court of International 
Arbitration (LCIA). 
- Arbitration pursuant to the Rules of Arbitration of the Euro-Arab Chambers of 
Commerce. 
- Arbitration pursuant to the Rules of Arbitration of the Netherlands Arbitration 
Institute. 
- Arbitration pursuant to the Rules of Arbitration of the former USSR Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry. 
- A settlement procedure previously agreed to between the investor and host stat. 
It would not be possible to discuss each of these in detail; and the rules are in any event 
much alike. In this chapter attention will be focused on four systems which have been used 
extensively in practice, and which illustrate the main variations in arbitration structures. 
A. The International Court of Justice (ICJ)  
The international Court of Justice was created in 1945 by its Statute, which forms part of 
the Charter of the United Nations. Unlike its predecessor, the Permanent Court of 
International Justice, the International Court is the principal judicial organ of the United 
Nations (charter, article 92). The International Court of Justice acts as a world court. The 
57 
 
Court has a dual jurisdiction : it decides, in accordance with international law, disputes of 
a legal nature that are submitted to it by States (jurisdiction in contentious cases); and it 
gives advisory opinions on legal questions at the request of the organs of the United 
Nations or specialized agencies authorized to make such a request (advisory jurisdiction). 
The seat of the Court is at the Peace Palace in The Hague (Netherlands). Of the six 
principal organs of the United Nations, it is the only one not located in New York (United 
States of America).The Court’s role is to settle, in accordance with international law, legal 
disputes submitted to it by States and to give advisory opinions on legal questions referred 
to it by authorized United Nations organs and specialized agencies.  
Investors rarely refer to their home governments to bring a claim on their behalf at the 
International Court of Justice (the ‘ICJ’). The only case involving FDI which the 
International Court of Justice addressed on the merits as of today was the Case Concerning 
Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (hereinafter, Elsi case).  
In Elsi case, the International Court of Justice reviewed and rejected a claim by the United 
States that the Italian government had interfered with the investment of a United States 
corporation in Italy, in violation of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation 
between the two countries. The United States failed to persuade the International Court of 
Justice that Italy's actions represented an illegal intervention in management and control, 
an illegal impairment of investment rights, an unfair expropriation of property, and an 
unlawful failure to provide protection and security of property.
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B. The International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) 
The best established arbitral institution is the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC). 
It is one of the most important institutions for the arbitration of international trade 
disputes. ICC was founded in 1919and has its headquarters in Paris. Its most distinct 
feature is the administrative assistance and guidance provided by the central institution in 
individual cases.  
                                                          
116
 S Murphy, ‘The ELSI case: an investment dispute at the international court of Justice’ (1991) Yale Journal of Int’l 
Law 16, p. 392. 
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A major role within the institution is played by the so called ‘International Court of 
Arbitration’. Despite its name, this is an administrative body made up of representatives 
from different countries. Similar to the ‘Permanent Court of Arbitration’, the ICC Court 
only provides technical assistance and a list of arbitrators, but will not itself render a 
judgment or award.  
A special feature in ICC proceedings is the ‘Term of Reference’. These terms will provide 
for a short characterization of the case, including a summary of the claims and, specially a 
list of issues to be decided. Another peculiar feature concerns the manner in which an ICC 
tribunal reaches its final award. The role of the Court is limited. Article 27 of the Rules of 
Arbitration states that: 
‘ … The Court may lay down modifications as to the form of the award and, without 
affecting the Arbitral Tribunal’s liberty of decision, may also draw its attention to points 
of substance. No award shall be rendered by the Arbitral Tribunal until it has been 
approved by the Court as to its form.’ 
 
Nonetheless, the prior scrutiny by the Court is a valuable precaution which should ensure 
the validity and enforceability of the final award. Article 6(4) provides:
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‘Unless otherwise agreed, the Arbitral Tribunal shall not cease to have jurisdiction by 
reason of any claim that the contract is null and void or allegation that it is non-existent 
provided that the arbitral tribunal upholds the validity of the arbitration agreement. The 
Arbitral Tribunal shall continue to have jurisdiction to determine the respective rights of 
the parties and to adjudicate their claims and please even though the contract itself may be 
non-existent or null and void.’ 
This provision constitutes an agreement of the parties to empower the arbitrator to decide 
on his own jurisdiction and to have jurisdiction even if the contract containing the 
arbitration clause is non-existent, i.e. void ab initio or invalid or illegal when he gives his 
award. The rules also provide that the award shall be ‘binding’ on the parties who will be 
deemed to have waived their right to any form of recourse. In normal circumstances the 
finality of the ICC arbitration award is accepted by the English courts.
118
   
 
                                                          
117 Rules of Arbitration of the ICC 1998 Art.4(2). A prior nomination of the arbitrator does not ‘commence’ the 
arbitration.: Offshore International SA v Banco Central SA (1976) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 402 at 407. 
118 Sanghi Polyesters Ltd (India) v KCFC (Kuwait) [2000] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 480. 
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C. The London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA) 
The London Court of Arbitration (LCIA)
119
 has existed since 1986, following the pervious 
London Chamber of Arbitration established in 1892. It is a tripartite organization 
sponsored by the London Chamber of Commerce, the City of London Corporation, and 
the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators, and is administered by the latter. Its seat is at 
International Arbitration Centre in London. The Rules of London Court of International 
Arbitration are known as LCIA rules. Regardless of the nationalities of the parties, the 
London Court is designed to deal with disputes arising out of commercial transactions, 
including investor-State disputes. The ‘Arbitration Court’ includes practitioners from all 
the major trading countries.  
 Similar to ICC in terms of private nature of its establishment, the London Court of 
International Arbitration is composed to arrange and administer arbitrations under any 
system of law in any part of the world.  According to Connerty, the tribunal adjudicates 
the disputes either under its own Rules or under the UNCITRAL Rules, and ‘there is no 
more need for an LCIA arbitration to be conducted in London than there is for an ICC 
arbitration to be held in Paris’.120  
As for jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal, Article 23(1) states that: 
‘The Arbitral Tribunal shall have the power to rule on its own jurisdiction, including any 
objection to the initial or continuing existence, validity or effectiveness of the Arbitration 
Agreement. For that purpose, an arbitration clause which forms or was intended to form 
part of another agreement shall be treated as an arbitration agreement independent of that 
other agreement. A decision by the Arbitral Tribunal that such other agreement is non-
existent, invalid or ineffective shall not entail ipso jure the non-existence, invalidity or 
ineffectiveness of the arbitration clause.’ 
Article 23(4) on jurisdiction of Arbitral Tribunals provides: 
‘By agreeing to arbitration under these Rules, the parties shall be treated as having agreed 
not to apply to any state court or other judicial authority for any relief regarding the 
Arbitral Tribunal's jurisdiction or authority, except with the agreement in writing of all 
parties to the arbitration or the prior authorisation of the Arbitral Tribunal or following the 
latter's award ruling on the objection to its jurisdiction or authority.’ 
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 For detailed information, see <http://www.lcia-arbitration.com/>. 
120 See A Connerty, ‘Dispute resolution in the oil and gas industry – recent trends’  
<http://www.dundee.ac.uk/cepmlp/journal/html/vol8/article8-8.html>  accessed 2 January 2010. 
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Based on Article 26(9), all awards shall be final and binding on the parties. By agreeing to 
arbitration under LCIA Rules, the parties undertake to carry out any award immediately 
and without any delay (subject only to Article 27); and the parties also waive irrevocably 
their right to any form of appeal, review or recourse to any state court or other judicial 
authority, insofar as such waiver may be validly made. 
D. The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) 
UNCITRAL, the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, was established 
in 1966 to harmonize and unify the laws of international trade. UNCITRAL was seen as 
well placed to produce a ‘neutral’ set of rules, acceptable to States and parties from all 
regions and of all political complexions, including those who might harbor suspicions that 
ICC and other rules prepared by Western arbitration institutions were somehow colored by 
their capitalist origins. 
The UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules were adopted in 1976,
121
 and have been used for the 
settlement of a broad range of disputes, including disputes between private commercial 
parties where no arbitral institution is involved, investor-State disputes, State-to-State 
disputes and commercial disputes administered by arbitral institutions. As a result of their 
employment by regional arbitration centers in Cairo, Kuala Lumpur and elsewhere, and in 
modified from by the Iran-US Claims tribunal, they have been well tried and tested in 
practice.  
The UNCITRAL has also influenced the development of international arbitration by way 
of a proposal for national legislation called 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law on International 
Commercial Arbitration (1985) and a corresponding proposal on international conciliation 
(2002).  
The UNCITRAL Rules are similar in many respects to the ICC Rules, although they are 
more detailed on certain procedural matters. The differences between the two systems 
derive chiefly from the fact that UNCITRAL system, unlike the ICC has no permanent 
institutions to supervise the arbitration process. 
                                                          
121 See (1976) 15 ILM 701. UNCITRAL also adopted a set of Conciliation Rules in 1980; See (1981) 20 ILM 301.  
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 Article 23 of UNCITRAL Rules ‘Pleas as to the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal’ in 
paragraph 1 provides that:  
‘The arbitral tribunal shall have the power to rule on its own jurisdiction, including any 
objections with respect to the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement. For that 
purpose, an arbitration clause that forms part of a contract shall be treated as an agreement 
independent of the other terms of the contract. A decision by the arbitral tribunal that the 
contract is null shall not entail automatically the invalidity of the arbitration clause.’  
 INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 2.4.
Under traditional international law, investors did not have direct access to international 
remedies to pursue claims against foreign Sates for violation of their rights and had to 
depend on diplomatic protection by their home states. A State exercising diplomatic 
protection espouses the claim of its national against another State and pursues it in in its 
own name.
122
 The International Court of Justice explained in the Mavrommatis Palestine 
Concessions
123
 case; 
‘It is an elementary principle of international law that a State is entitled to protect its 
subjects, when injured by acts contrary to international law committed by another State, 
from whom they have been unable to obtain satisfaction through the ordinary channels. By 
taking up the case of one of its subjects and by resorting to diplomatic action or 
international judicial proceedings on his behalf, a State is in reality asserting its own rights 
- its right to ensure, in the person of its subjects, respect for the international law.’124 
Diplomatic protections depend on a number of factors. The investor whether it is an 
individual or a corporation, must be a national of the protecting State. This bond of 
nationality must have existed continuously from the time of the injury until the claim is 
presented or, according to some, until the claim is settled. In addition the investor must 
have exhausted the local remedies in the state that has allegedly committed the violation. 
The usefulness of diplomatic protection is limited. The investor has no right to diplomatic 
protection but depends on the political discretion of his government. The government may 
refuse to take up the claim. It may discontinue diplomatic protection at any time. It may 
                                                          
122 The International Law Commission has adopted draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection in 2006. See Official Records 
of the General Assembly, Sixty-first Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/61/10). The General Assembly took note of the 
draft articles in Resolution 61/35.   
123 Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v. U.K.), 1924 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 3 (Aug. 30). 
124 Mavormmtatis Palestine Concessions case, PCIJ, Ser. A, No. 2, p. 12.  
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even waive the national’s claim or agree to a reduced settlement. In other words the 
investor is never in control of the process. As the ICJ said in the Barcelona Traction case: 
’The State must be viewed as the sole judge to decide whether its protection will be 
granted, to what extent it is granted, and when it will cease. It retains in this respect a 
discretionary power the exercise of which may be determined by considerations of a 
political or other nature, unrelated to the particular case. Since the claim of the State is not 
identical with that of the individual or corporate person whose cause is espoused, the State 
enjoys complete freedom of action.’125 
The primary method of dispute settlement through diplomatic protection is negotiation. If 
negotiations fail, States may resort to international adjudication, including the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ). Diplomatic protection may also lead to arbitration 
between the two states.
126
 Alternatively, States may resort to unfriendly measures or 
countermeasures (reprisals). This is limited by the prohibition of the use of force treaties. 
Alternatively in many cases investors have also been granted direct access to effective 
means of international dispute settlements that no longer depend on the diplomatic 
protection by their home States. In the absence of an agreement to the contrary an 
investment dispute between a state and a foreign investor could be settled by referral to the 
host State’s courts. Conflict of laws rules will normally refer to these courts, since the 
dispute is likely to have the closest connection to the State in which the investment is 
made.  
From an investor’s perspective, this is not an attractive solution in view of the fear for lack 
of partiality from the courts of the State against whom it wishes to pursue its claim. In 
addition, domestic courts may be bound to apply the local law even if it is at odds with 
international legal rules. Domestic courts may also lack the expertise to deal with the 
highly technical nature of investment disputes and the interpretation of the international 
investment law. 
The gap left by the traditional methods of dispute settlement (diplomatic protection and 
action in domestic courts) has led to the idea of granting direct access to the investors to 
                                                          
125 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co., Ltd. (Belgium v Spain), Judgment, 5 February 1970, ICJ Reports 1970, p. 
44. 
126 See eg Martini, Award, 3 May 1930, 2 RIAA 974; Canevaro, Award, 3 May 1912, 11 RIAA 379. 
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effective international procedures, especially arbitration. Through arbitration investors 
gain access to an effective international remedy while hosts States, by consenting to such 
international procedure, are likely to attract more foreign investors and shield themselves 
against other processes such as diplomatic protection.  
A. The Theoretical Concept of Arbitration  
Arbitration is the name given to the determination of a difference between States (or 
between a State and a non-State entity) through a legal decision of one or more arbitrators 
and an umpire, or of a tribunal other than the International Court of Justice or other 
permanent tribunals. The arbitration may be concerned with one particular matter or may 
be concerned with the claims of nationals of either of the two States against the other 
State. Arbitration can be ad hoc, for the settlement of a particular dispute or institutional, 
for the settlement of a class of disputes.
127
  
Whilst there is no universally accepted comprehensive definition of ‘arbitration’,128 there 
is a general consensus about the characteristics of main features of arbitration. These 
include: 
- Agreement: Arbitration is a consensual dispute resolution process; it requires an 
agreement between the parties to refer their disputes to arbitration as opposed to 
resolving them in the courts. The agreement may be set out in a clause of the main 
contract or may be entirely distinct contract;
129
 
- A tribunal: the process of arbitration requires a neutral third party to resolve the 
dispute. This may be a neutral individual, or panel of individuals, chosen by the 
parties, or by means of a process agreed by the parties, or by law as a default 
mechanism; 
                                                          
127 J Collier and V Lowe, ‘The Settlement of Disputes in International Law’ (Oxford University Press 1999) p.31. 
128 Which is why, traditionally these appear at the end of contracts. Failure to negotiate a clear jurisdiction, arbitration or 
choice of law clause at the outset can result in protracted and expensive disputes about the proper forum, the validity of 
the arbitration clause, the proper law, etc.    
129 See Fouchard, Gaillard and Goldman, at para. 9 in J Savage (ed.), ‘International Commercial Arbitration’ (Klawer 
Law International 2 September 1999). 
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- A dispute between the parties: the process of arbitration is founded upon the 
existence of disputes between the parties which are capable of being resolved by 
arbitration (National laws and international agreements may provide limits to the kinds 
of disputes which are capable of being resolved by arbitration); 
- A Judicial procedure: the purpose of arbitration is to have the parties’ disputes 
resolved fairly and finally. The procedure adopted to resolve the dispute can, to a large 
extent, be chosen by the parties, but most national laws and international agreements 
provide that the procedure must contain a minimum requirement of due process; 
- A Binding Award: the culmination of the process of arbitration is the resolution of 
the dispute between the parties by means of a decision of the tribunal. The binding 
nature of the award may be seen as a consequence of the parties’ agreement to arbitrate 
and is often guaranteed by national law.
130
 An award may not be binding in 
circumstances where it was made without jurisdiction or if the process by which the 
award was made was somehow defective or unfair.
131
  
B. The Contractual Nature of Arbitration  
As mentioned above there can be no arbitration without the agreement of the parties to 
submit to this method of dispute resolution
132
 even after the dispute has arisen.
133
 An 
argument commonly raised by parties who are unhappy with the decision of a tribunal is 
that the decision of the tribunal is not binding because one of the parties did not agree to 
arbitration in the first place or alternatively because the entire agreement was in some way 
invalid.
134
  
Section 7 of the English Arbitration Act 1996 provides that an arbitration agreement, 
unless otherwise agreed by the parties, should be treated as a separate agreement distinct 
from the main contract. The arbitration agreement therefore ‘floats’ clear of the agreement 
embodying the main obligations between the parties. The section enacts in English law the 
                                                          
130 See S.58 of the Arbitration Act 1996. 
131 Schmitthoff, ‘International Commercial Arbitration’ in C Murray, D Holloway and D Timson-Hunt (ed.), Export 
Trade: The Law and Practice of International Trade (1999). 
132 See Kenya Railways v Antares Co Pte Ltd (The Antares) (Nos 1 and 2) (1987) 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 424. 
133 Arbitration Act 1996 s.6, which generally defines an arbitration agreement. 
134 For example that it was procured by fraud, mistake or misrepresentation. 
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concept of separability, recognized in international arbitral jurisprudence,
135
 which was 
fully acknowledged in Harbour Assurance Co (UK) Ltd v Kansa General Insurance co 
Ltd.
136
 
Additionally, s.30 of the English Arbitration Act 1996 confirms that the tribunal may 
decide on its own jurisdiction.
137
 The Act therefore enacts the principle of compétence 
competence (or Kompetenz Kompetenz), which is also part of international arbitration 
jurisprudence.
138
 These principles taken together provide that once an arbitral is 
constituted, a party cannot derail the arbitral process by means of an allegation: 
- That the underlying contract is void and therefore that there is no valid arbitration 
agreement/clause and, and/or; 
- That the tribunal has no jurisdiction and that the matter must be referred to court. 
The principles of separability and Kompetenz Kompetenz referred to above ensure that if 
such allegations are raised, the tribunal has the authority to decide on these matters. Many 
legal systems, including the English legal system provide that the courts may ultimately 
review questions of jurisdiction and have the final say on the matter if one party is 
dissatisfied with the tribunal’s decision on these questions.139 English law, in line with that 
of many other legal systems however, provides that a party who objects to the jurisdiction 
of the tribunal must comply with a strict procedure for raising the objection, laid down in 
ss.31 and 32 of the arbitration Act. A party may lose the right to object and ultimately by 
bound by the decision of the tribunal if he fails to raise the objection in accordance with 
the provisions of the Arbitration Act.
140
  
The contractual nature of arbitration also had to be borne in mind when it was contended 
that the prolonged inactivity of the parties in the prosecution of the arbitration resulted in 
‘frustration’ of the arbitration by delay on the ground that after a lapse of time it is no 
                                                          
135 See Art. 16(1) of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Commercial Arbitration (‘the Model Law’). 
136 Harbour Assurance Co. Ltd. V. Kansa General International Insurance Co. Ltd., (1992) 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 81. 
137 S.30 states that the arbitral tribunal may rule on whether there is a valid arbitration agreement, s.30(1)(a); whether the 
tribunal is properly constituted, s.30(1)(b); and what maters have been submitted in accordance with the agreement, 
s.30(1)(c). 
138 See Art.21 of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, ICC Arbitration rules Art.6. 
139 Christopher Brown Ltd v Genossenschaft (1954)1 Q.B. 8,12.  
140 See s.73 of the 1996 Act. 
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longer possible to do justice between the parties.
141
 This was not frustration in the legal 
sense but simply that inactivity by both parties may prompt the conclusion that the parties 
have agreed to abandon the arbitration or that one has repudiated the agreement and that 
other has accepted that repudiation.
142
  
Both conclusions were possible owning to the contractual nature of the arbitration 
agreement. Prior to the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990 s.102, inserting s.13A in the 
Arbitration Act 1950, the arbitrator had no power to strike out a claim for want of 
prosecution. This is now dealt with under s.41 (3) of the Arbitration Act 1996 where the 
arbitrator, in the absence of contrary agreement by the parties may, in the event of 
inordinate and inexcusable delay, make an award dismissing the claim.  
C. The Judicial Nature of Arbitration  
The arbitrator, although chosen by the parties or otherwise appointed under the arbitration 
agreement, must approach the issues before him in the same spirit as a judge appointed by 
the state. The parties to an arbitration agreement (unlike litigants before the national 
courts) enjoy a great degree of freedom to choose the procedure by which their dispute is 
to be resolved. Nevertheless most national arbitration laws provide that the process must 
provide both parties with a basic procedural right of equal treatment.
143
 The basic 
procedural right of due process is a fundamental characteristic of arbitration; it 
corresponds to the judicial nature of the process and has been referred to as the ‘Magna 
Carta’ of the arbitral process.144 
The judicial nature of arbitration can be seen most clearly by reference to the end result of 
the process. It is internationally accepted that an arbitration award will have the same 
effect as a court judgment between the parties. On the other hand, a failure by a tribunal to 
                                                          
141 See Bremer Vulcan Schiffbau und Maschinenfabrik v South India Shipping Corporation (1981) 1 A.C. 909 and Food 
Food Corporation of India v Antclizo Shipping Corporation (1988) 1 W.I.R. 603. In the latter case it was suggested that 
where arbitration have not been pursued for many years, the court should be empowered by legislation to dismiss the 
arbitration for want of prosechution. 
142 See Bremer Vulcan above. 
143 See Art. 18 of the Model Law. 
144 This Principle is reflected in the English Arbitration Act ss.1 and 33 which require the tribunal to act fairly between 
the parties. The basic procedural rights afforded by most arbitration laws have not been held to be incompatible with 
Human Rights legislation, see Stretford v FA (2007) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 31 and Schulz, Human Rights, Sped Bumps in the 
Arbitral Process (2006) IALR Vol 9 (1). 
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observe the ‘Magna Carta’ of procedural fairness is one of the few accepted reasons why 
an award may be challenged or not enforced by a municipal court. This again illustrates 
the importance of the judicial nature of the process. An award which was arrived at by a 
process which was not ‘judicial’ can be seen to be open to serious challenge and there is a 
serious risk that such an award will not be enforced.   
The ultimate objective of referring a dispute to international commercial arbitration is the 
eventual enforcement of the award rendered by the arbitral tribunal. Admittedly, the mere 
possibility of non-compliance with arbitral awards ostensibly undermines the fundamental 
rationale for arbitrating the disputes. The practice revealed that states may pursue the 
course of evading the authority of the forum. For instance, MidAmerican Energy Holdings 
Co. sued in the arbitration proceedings its Indonesian partner on the ground of lost 
investments. The forum granted an award of almost USD 400 million, but the Indonesian 
partner ignored it. MidAmerican commenced UNCITRAL proceedings against Indonesia 
under Indonesian investment guarantee.  
As the parties to arbitral proceedings may appoint the arbitrator, Indonesia seized this 
opportunity to influence the former by numerous ex parte communications. When the 
maneuver failed, Indonesia forwarded its agents to a Netherlands airport to escort the 
arbitrator to Indonesia so that a full tribunal could not be constituted. Even though the 
incomplete tribunal adjudicated the dispute to the benefit of MidAmerican, Indonesia 
persistently continued to ignore the award. Consequently, MidAmerican had to refer to its 
insurance policy coverage by claiming USD 290 million for its losses.      
Nevertheless, the United Nations' Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1958 (hereinafter, the New York Convention) was once 
described as ‘the most important international treaty relating to international commercial 
arbitration’ and as one of the major contributing factors to the rapid growth and 
development of arbitration as a mechanism for the settlement of international disputes.  
The New York Convention is congruous with the very objective of arbitral awards and 
aims to provide for their mutual recognition and enforcement, which became possible due 
to the fact that the majority of the world nations have ratified the New York Convention.  
An award made against a UK company could be effectively enforced by the German 
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company in the United Kingdom through the UK courts, or if the UK company had assets 
in France and Italy, for instance, the German company could likewise enforce the award 
through the French and Italian courts since both France and Italy have ratified the 
Convention. 
D. The Regulatory Framework of Arbitration 
As indicated above, arbitration is considered to be most appropriate vehicle for settling 
investment and commercial disputes all over the world.
145
   In fact, there are a number of 
benefits that drive a party to a commercial or an investment agreement to choose 
arbitration proceeding over litigation.
146
  Namely, compared to litigation, arbitration is 
referred to as an effective tool for the resolution of commercial and investment disputes 
within the international context due to its confidentiality, neutrality and time efficiency.
147
 
Where the courts might appear remote, rigid, and slow and expensive in their procedures 
and the judges might seem unversed in the ways of commerce and the law, insensitive and 
ill adapted to the exigencies of commercial life, arbitrators offered an attractive 
alternative.
148
 
The fundamental rationale behind referring a dispute to arbitration is the expectation of its 
neutrality. According to the logic of a foreign investor, host countries’ judges may have 
real bias in adjudicating investment disputes.
149
 In other words, the perception is that the 
arbitration is a forum more neutral than the local courts of a host country, and the 
neutrality entails both political and procedural perspectives.  
For instance, in 1994 the above mentioned North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) introduced an adjudicatory regime that gives investors the right to require 
arbitration of disputes arising out of investments in another member country in connection 
                                                          
92 E Bergsten, ‘The Course on Dispute Settlement in International Trade, Investment and Intellectual Property’, United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development, at <http://r0.unctad.org/disputesettlement/course.htm> accessed 21 
December2009, pp.4-9. 
146 The Honorable Justice Jugdish Sharan Verma, ‘Defining the Proper Limits of Judicial Intervention in and Assistance 
for the Arbitral Process; How A-National Can an International Arbitration Be?’ (24 October 1997), at  
<http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/events/conferences/1997/october/verma.html> accessed 19.12.2009. 
147 J Rajski, ‘Arbitration in Central and Eastern Europe’ (1999), 2 Int. A.L.R. 1999, p.47. 
148 J Collier and V Lowe, ‘The Settlement of Disputes in International Law’ (Oxford University Press, 2000) p. 45. 
104 K Clermont, T Eisenberg, ‘Xenophilia in American Courts’ (1996) Harvard Law Review 109, pp. 1133-1134, see 
also W Park, ‘Neutrality, Predictability and Economic Co-operation’ (1995) J.Int'l Arb. 12, p.99. 
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with matters such as expropriation, discrimination, and unfair treatment.
150
 In other words, 
NAFTA Chapter 11 gives entrepreneurs from a member country the opportunity to 
arbitrate investment complaints with the government of another NAFTA country, 
regardless of whether an agreement to arbitrate actually exists in a negotiated investment 
concession or not.
151
 
Admittedly, the underlying maxim of arbitration is that it can only be referred to where 
both parties agree to submit to the jurisdiction of the relevant arbitral institution. 
Entrenching the consent of a state is of prevalent importance. In addition to possibility of 
expressing its consent in an investment agreement, a state may articulate it in the 
contractual agreement with the investor – e.g. a production sharing agreement or a service 
contract, - or in the unilateral offer expressed in its national legislation, which is 
commonly referred to as “arbitration without privity”.152 However, the extent of the 
commitment by a state to that arbitration clause, and the fact that states tend to seek 
immunity from jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal have been and still are among the most 
problematic issues of investment arbitration.  
As to waivers of admissibility, arguments in respect of forum non conveniens (Latin for 
forum not agreeing) may stem from the invalidity of the contractual agreement between 
the parties, hence, absence of consent to arbitrate. Indeed, arbitration clauses are 
continuously being attacked and cited as void, and so is the contract containing that 
arbitration clause. It is commonplace for a party seeking to waive the jurisdiction of the 
arbitral tribunal to claim that the contract as a whole was induced by fraud, was rescinded 
or terminated by its own terms.
153
 And this is where the fundamental principle of 
separability of arbitration clause and that of kompetenz-kompetenz transpire.  
                                                          
150 G A Alvarez, W Park, ‘The new face of investment arbitration: NAFTA Chapter 11’ (2003) Yale Journal of 
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153 R Bishop, ‘A practical guide for drafting international arbitration clauses’ (2000), International Energy Law and 
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  INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT (MIXED) ARBITRATION 2.5.
Investor-State arbitrations are governed by the express provisions of the investment treaty, 
the relevant procedural rules chosen by the parties (such as the UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Rules) and the municipal law of the seat of the arbitration (lex loci arbitri). The municipal 
courts at the seat of the arbitration are competent to exercise a supervisory jurisdiction 
over the arbitral process and hear applications by the parties for intervention in that 
process, such as for interim or conservatory measures of the appointment of an arbitrator, 
and can also hear challenges to investment treaty awards.  
In an attempt to further protect foreign investors from the procedural angle by providing 
reliable multilateral mechanism for the settlement of international investment disputes it 
was thought desirable to establish dispute settlement machinery detached from the 
municipal laws of both the investor and the host State to which both could become 
irrevocably committed and which either could invoke.
154
  
An international consensus would have been required to provide effective procedures for 
impartial settlement of disputes in a manner different to that of traditional mixed 
(State/non-State) arbitrations over investment disputes in the past organized on an ad hoc 
basis.
155
 Those had been organized on the basis of contractual agreements made between 
the States and the company, and followed the pattern of private international commercial 
arbitration.
156
 What was needed now was a standing system which States and investors 
could incorporate in their agreements by reference, thus avoiding the need for the 
negotiation of a new settlement procedure in every case.  
                                                          
154 J Collier and V Lowe, ‘The Settlement of Disputes in International Law: Institutions and Procedures’ (Oxford 
University Press 1999) p.60. 
155 See’ e.g.: Petroleum Development (Trucial Coast) Ltd. v. Sheikh of Abu Dhabi (1951) 18 ILR 122, (1952) 1 ICLQ 
247: Saudi Arabia v. Arabian American Oil Co. (Aramco) (1958) 27 ILR 117; Sapphire International Petroleum Ltd. v. 
National Iranian Oil Co. (1963) 35 ILR 136, (1964) 13 ICLQ 1011. And, for a brilliant account of the shortcomings of 
mixed arbitrations, see V V Veeder, ‘The Lena Goldfields arbitration: the historical roots of three ideas’ (1998) 47 
ICLQ 747. 
156 See, for example of agreements containing such clauses, Egypt-Egyptian Petroleum Corporation /ESSO, Concession 
Agreement of 14 December 1974, (1975) 14 ILM 915, art. XXI; Libyan National Oil Co./Occidental of Libya Inc., 
Agreement of 7 February 1974, (1975) 14 ILM 645, section XII; Syria-Syrian Petroleum Co.-Pecten Ash Shams 
Co./Syria Shell Petroleum Development BV/Deminex Petroleum Syria GmbH, Contract for the Exploration, 
Development and Production of petroleum, 21 August 1985, (1987) 26 ILM 1186, art. XXIII. 
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Against this background it is necessary to return to the sui generis regime of arbitrations 
conducted under the aegis of the ICSID Convention and the CSID Arbitration Rules. It is 
normally assured that lex arbitri for ICSID arbitrations is international law. But what does 
this simple designation actually mean? Does it entail, for instance, that general 
international law on the admissibility of claims should supplement the ICSID Convention 
and Arbitration Rules?    
One of the most remarkable developments in international dispute settlement procedures 
has been the rapid growth of the institution of mixed arbitration; that is to say, arbitration 
between States on the one hand and non-State entities, usually corporations or, less 
frequently, individuals, on the other. The two most striking examples of tribunals handling 
mixed arbitration are the tribunals established under the auspices of the International 
Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (‘ICSID’), and the Iran-US Claims 
Tribunal.      
A. The ICSID Arbitration157 
ICSID arbitrations are more ‘international’ than other forms of investor-State arbitration 
because ICSID Convention facilitates a high degree of detachment from municipal legal 
systems in relation to the conduct of the arbitration and the review of awards. This 
detachment is not, however, absolute: ICSID arbitration is neither completely ‘self-
contained’ nor ‘autonomous’.  
First, the parties to an ICSID arbitration can apply to municipal courts and other 
authorities for provisional measures for the preservation of their rights and interests either 
before the institution of ICSID proceedings or thereafter. Investment treaties often contain 
a provision to the effect that the submission of an investment dispute is without prejudice 
to the parties’ rights to apply for injunctive relief before municipal courts. For instance, 
Article 26(3) of the USA Model BIT (2004) provides that the investor: 
‘[M]ay initiate or continue an action that seeks interim injunctive relief  and does not 
involve the payment of monetary damages before a judicial or administrative tribunal of 
                                                          
157 Z Douglas, ‘The International Law of Investment Claims’, (Cambridge University Press 2009) p.120-125. 
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the respondent, provided that the action is brought for the sole purpose of preserving the 
claimant’s or the enterprise’s rights and interests during the pendency of the arbitration.’ 
Any such application for injunction relief will naturally be governed by the lex fori.
158
  
Second, the municipal rules for the enforcement and execution of final judgments apply to 
the enforcement and execution of ICSID awards in the territories of contracting States.
159
 
For example in AIG Capital Partners v Republic of Kazakhstan,
160
 and the joint venture 
company established for its investment in Kazakhstan petitioned the English High Court to 
enforce an ICSID award rendered in their favor against assets in London held by third 
party custodians on behalf of the National Bank of Kazakhstan. The orders sought by the 
claimants were denied because, inter alia, the assets of the national Bank of Kazakhstan 
were protected by sovereign immunity from execution pursuant to section 14(4) of the 
State Immunity Act 1978. 
Third, the law on sovereign immunity from execution (whether found in international 
custom, treaty or municipal law) applies to the execution of ICSID awards in the territories 
of both contracting States (Article 55) and non-contracting States. Again in AIG Capital 
Partners v Republic of Kazakhstan,
161
 the execution of an ICSID award was refused by an 
English court due to a blanket immunity attaching to the ‘property of a State’s central 
bank’ pursuant to section 14(4) of the State Immunity Act 1978.  
Forth, In the territories of non-contracting states, ICSID awards are likely to be enforced 
in accordance with the municipal rules for the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards 
(such as, where applicable, those contained in the New York Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards or in municipal enactment 
giving effect to this Convection).  
Fifth, when a party has instituted parallel proceedings in a municipal court in breach of 
Article 26 of the ICSID Convention, municipal rules for a granting of a stay of court 
                                                          
158 In ETI Euro Telecom Intrenational BV v Republic of Bulivia and Empresa Nacional de Telecommunicaciones Entel 
SA [2008] EWCA Civ 880, paras 29-31, it was revealed that the US Federal District Court for the Southern District of 
New York had granted an ex parte order to attach assets in aid of ICSID arbitration proceedings. 
159 ICSID Convention, Arts 54(1), 54(3). 
160 [2005] EWHC 2239, [2006] 1 WLR 1420. 
161 Ibid. 
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proceedings apply. In Attorney-General v Mobil Oil NZ Ltd,
162
 the New Zealand High 
Court stayed proceedings brought by the New Zealand Government because there was a 
‘relevant relationship or nexus’ between the issue raised in these court proceedings and the 
pending ICSID arbitration that had been commenced by Mobil.
163
 
Sixth, some contracting States have, by their implementing legislation passed in 
accordance with Article 69 of the ICSID Convention, reserved the possibility of subjecting 
ICSID arbitration to certain procedural rules contained in their municipal laws.
164
 To the 
extent that such municipal procedural rules supplement rather than modify the ICSID 
Arbitration Rules, it is doubtful that the contracting State could be in violation of the 
ICSID Convention. 
Seventh, ICSID arbitration proceedings are conducted within the normative framework for 
the protection of human rights existing at the international and municipal level. 
Particularly at the enforcement stage, municipal courts are likely to scrutinize the impact 
of ICSID awards on the human rights of the disputing parties. In Hornsby v Greece,
165
 the 
European Court of Human Rights held that: 
‘[E]execution of a judgment given by any court must therefore be regarded as integral part 
of the ‘trial’ for the purpose of Article 6 [of the European Convention on Human Rights 
concerning the right to a fair trial].’166 
Eight, there have been rare instances where the arbitration clause in the investment 
agreement has provided for ICSIID arbitration in conjunction with the application of the 
law at the seat of the arbitration. For instance, in Tanzania Electric v Independent Power 
Tanzanian,
167
 the arbitration clause in the contract provided for ICSID arbitration but at 
the same time specified that ‘the law governing the procedure and administration of the 
arbitration … shall be the English law [sic]’, with the English High Court nominated as 
the appointing authority for the chairperson of the tribunal, should the party-appointed 
                                                          
162 118 ILR 620. 
163 Ibid. 630. 
164 See, e.g. in England : Arbitration (International Investment Disputes) Act 1966, s. 3(1), by which the Lord Chancellor 
can direct that ss. 36 and 38-44 of the Arbitration Act 1996 apply to ICSID arbitration. This power has not been 
exercised to date. See: Mayor and Commonalty and Citizens of the City of London v Ashok Sancheti [2008] EWCA Civ 
1283, paras. 12-14. 
165 24 EHRR 250. 
166 Ibid. Para. 40. 
167 (Provisional Measures) 8 ICSID Rep 239. 
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arbitrators fail to agree.  In ruling, the tribunal referred to section 39 of the English 
Arbitration Act 1996, but did not reach any firm conclusion as to whether it applied to the 
ICSID proceedings.
168
       
B. The ICSID Institution 
Somewhat like the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), ICSID is not itself a tribunal 
but rather a framework within which arbitration and conciliation can occur. It provides the 
institutional infrastructure for administering investment arbitration. ICSID has its seat at 
the World Bank headquarters in Washington DC, has an Administrative Council chaired 
by the president of the World Bank, in which each Member State has one vote, usually 
exercised by its World bank representative.
169
 The administrative Council is responsible 
for the adoption of the rules of procedure for arbitration proceedings. 
Again like PCA, ICSID maintains lists of persons ’of high moral character and recognized 
competence in the fields of law, industry or finance, who may be relied upon to exercise 
independent judgment’,170 and who may serve as arbitrators. Each State party may 
designate four persons, who need not be its nationals, to the panel of Arbitrators. Panel 
members serve for renewable six year terms.
171
 It is from the Panels that parties to 
investment disputes are expected to select arbitrators. 
Institutional support by the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(ICSID, the Centre) is one of the main advantages of arbitration under the ICSID 
Convention. The Centre performs a number of supportive functions in relation to 
arbitration. The Secretary-General of ICSID keeps a list of Contracting States that contains 
all information relevant to their participation in the Convention. In addition, the Secretary-
General maintains lists of the Panels of Arbitrators, a register for requests for arbitration 
containing all significant procedural developments and archives containing the original 
texts of all instruments and documents in connexion with any proceeding.  
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169 ICSID Convention, arts. 2-8. 
170 ICSID Convention, art. 14(1). 
171 ICSID Convention, arts. 12-16. 
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The Secretary-General of ICSID and the staff of the Secretariat provide administrative 
support in arbitration proceedings. This support includes provision of a place for meetings 
at the Centre or elsewhere. ICSID also provides other assistance such as translations, 
interpretations and copying. The Secretary-General appoints an experienced member of 
the Centre’s staff as Secretary for each tribunal. The Secretary of the tribunal makes the 
necessary arrangements for hearings, keeps minutes of hearings and prepares drafts of 
procedural orders. The Secretary also serves as the channel of communication between the 
parties and the arbitrators. 
The Secretary-General determines the charges payable to the Centre and consults with the 
tribunal on fees and expenses. He determines the fees of arbitrators. He receives advance 
payments from the parties and makes the payments necessary for the conduct of 
proceedings. He determines and receives the fees for lodging requests and the charges for 
specific services. In a particular proceeding, the Secretary of the tribunal administers this 
system on behalf of the Secretary-General. 
Either party to a dispute within the jurisdiction of ICSID may request the Secretary-
General to establish an Arbitral Tribunal. The tribunals determine their own competence. 
So, it may or instance, decide whether a dispute exists in case where the respondent 
alleges that there is none. 
C. The ICSID Jurisdiction 
The Jurisdiction of ICSID is set out in Article 25 of the ICSID Convention (see Appendix 
2):  
‘The jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to any legal dispute arising directly out of an 
investment, between a Contracting State … and a national of another contracting State, 
which the parties to the dispute consent in writing to submit to the Centre, When the 
parties have given their consent, no party may withdraw its consent unilaterally.’  
The jurisdiction is tightly defined. It extends only to disputes which are both legal and 
arise directly out of an investment. The ICSID Convention is specialized in the settlement 
of investment disputes. Therefore, the existence of a legal dispute arising directly out of an 
investment is a prerequisite for ICSID’s jurisdiction. The concept of an investment is not 
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defined in the Convention. Many BITs and multilateral treaties contain definitions of 
investment. But these definitions are not necessarily decisive for the meaning of the 
concept under the ICSID Convention. For instance, whereas some of these treaties extend 
rights also for the establishment of an investment, the Convention only applies once an 
investment has actually been made. 
In actual practice, the concept of “investment” has been given a wide meaning. A variety 
of activities in a large number of economic fields have been accepted as investments. In 
addition to traditional typical investment activities, these include pure financial 
instruments like the purchase of government bonds and the extension of loans. Decisive 
criteria have been; a certain duration of the relevant activities, the regularity of profit and 
return, the presence of a certain economic risk, a substantial commitment as well as the 
relevance of the project for the host State’s development. 
Two levels of submission to ICSID must both exist: the reference to Contracting States 
and nationals of other Contracting States require that the ICSID Convention should have 
been ratified by both of the States in question; and the reference to the written consent of 
the parties to the dispute requires that there have been a further, explicit acceptance of 
ICSID procedures by the disputing parties. Participation in the ICSID Convention does 
not, by itself, constitute a submission to the Centre’s jurisdiction. For jurisdiction to exist, 
the Convention requires separate consent in writing by both parties. Consent to the 
Centre’s jurisdiction may be given in one of several ways. This will be discussed in details 
in Chapter 8.   
A particular problem arises from the requirement that the dispute arise between one State 
and the nationals of another. Although ICSID Convention recognizes this difficulty and 
the provisions of Article 25(2) of the ICSID deals with nationality of individuals and 
companies, yet determination of nationality of investors has been the subject of continued 
challenge in ICSID investment arbitration. Article 25(2) of the ICSID Convention deals, at 
the outset, with the individual national investors (see Appendix 2).  
They are persons who had the nationality of a Contracting State other than the State party 
to the dispute on the date which the parties consented to submit to ICSID arbitration and 
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also at the date when the application invoking the ICSID procedures was registered by the 
applicant with the ICSID Secretariat – an application of the continuous nationality 
principle. The definition therefore falls back on each State’s own definition of its 
nationals. 
D. The ICSID Proceedings   
Proceedings under the ICSID Convention are self-contained. This means that they are 
independent of the intervention of any outside bodies. In particular, domestic courts have 
no power to stay, to compel or to otherwise influence ICSID proceedings. Domestic courts 
would have the power to order provisional measures only in the unlikely case that the 
parties agree thereto.
172
 An ICSID tribunal has to obtain evidence without the legal 
assistance of domestic courts. An annulment or other form of review of an ICSID award 
by a domestic court is not permitted.
173
 It follows that the place of proceedings has no 
practical legal consequences under the ICSID Convention.
174
  
ICSID proceedings are not threatened by the non-cooperation of a party. The parties have 
much flexibility in shaping and influencing the proceedings. But if one of them should fail 
to act, the proceedings will not be stalled. The Convention provides a watertight system 
against the frustration of proceedings by a recalcitrant party. Arbitrators not appointed by 
the parties will be appointed by the Centre.
175
 The decision on whether there is jurisdiction 
in a particular case is with the tribunal.
176
 Non-submission of memorials or non-
appearance at hearings by a party will not stall the proceedings.
177
 Non-cooperation by a 
party will not affect the award’s binding force and enforceability. 
The system of arbitration is highly effective. This effectiveness is the result of several 
factors. Submission to ICSID’s jurisdiction is voluntary but once it has been given it may 
                                                          
172 Under Article 47 of the Convention a tribunal has the power to recommend provisional measures. 
173 Article 52 of the Convention provides for an autonomous system for the annulment of awards under narrowly defined 
circumstances. 
174 It is advisable to hold proceedings in a State that is a party to the ICSID Convention since another State would not be 
bound by the guarantees of independence and non-interference provided by the Convention. 
175 Article 38 of the Convention. 
176 Article 41 of the Convention. 
177 Article 45 of the Convention. 
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not be withdrawn unilaterally. The principle of non-frustration means that a case will 
proceed even if one party fails to cooperate. 
This circumstance alone will be a strong incentive to cooperate. Awards are binding and 
final and not subject to review except under the narrow conditions provided by the 
Convention itself.
178
 Noncompliance with an award by a State would be a breach of the 
Convention
179
 and would lead to a revival of the right to diplomatic protection by the 
investor’s State of nationality.180 
The Convention provides an effective system of enforcement. Awards are recognized as 
final in all States parties to the Convention. The pecuniary obligations arising from awards 
are to be enforced like final judgments of the local courts in all States parties to the 
Convention.
181
  Domestic courts have no power to review ICSID awards in the course of 
their enforcement. However, in the case of an award against a State the normal rules on 
immunity from execution will apply. In actual practice this will usually mean that 
execution is not possible against assets that serve the State’s public functions.182 
The system of dispute settlement under the ICSID Convention is likely to be effective 
even without its actual use. The mere availability of an effective remedy tends to affect the 
behavior of parties to potential disputes. It is likely to have a restraining influence on 
investors as well as on host States. Both sides will try to avoid actions that might involve 
them in arbitration that they are likely to lose. In addition, the prospect of litigation will 
strengthen the parties’ willingness to settle a dispute amicably. 
During ongoing investment arbitration under the ICSID Convention, the investor’s home 
State is prevented from granting diplomatic protection, from bringing a claim in its own 
name, or from otherwise interfering with the settlement of the dispute between investor 
and host State.
183
 
                                                          
178 Articles 49-52 of the Convention. 
179 Article 53 of the Convention. 
180 Article 27 of the Convention. 
181 Article 54 of the Convention. 
182 Article 55 of the Convention. 
183 Article 27, ICSID Convention. 
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 CONCLUSION 2.6.
There are a number of patterns of compliance with investment norms and enforcement 
mechanisms that inevitably draw a picture for investor behavior should he wish to lodge a 
claim for enforcement of his rights. Namely, arbitral tribunals and international courts are 
usually alluded to as fundamental institutions where investor-state disputes are 
adjudicated.  
Domestic courts of the host State are usually not seen as offering sufficient guarantees to 
foreign investors. Domestic courts of the investor’s home State and of third States are 
usually not available for the settlement of investment disputes. Diplomatic protection is a 
form of dispute settlement that carries uncertainties for the investor and inconvenience for 
the host State. Ad hoc arbitration between the investor and the host State is a useful option 
but carries several procedural disadvantages. 
For investor-state disputes International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(ICSID) is the most popular venue, and a great majority of investment agreements refer to 
ICSID as an exclusive forum for dispute resolution.   International Chamber of Commerce 
is also amongst the world's foremost arbitral institutions, however, it should be noted that 
a tribunal constituted by the International Chamber of Commerce is in no way akin to 
ICSID, which was created by voluntary will of sovereign governments.  
In retrospect, it has become clear that the creation of ICSID amounted to the boldest 
innovative steps in the modern history of international cooperation concerning the role and 
protection of foreign investment. This is so because of the combination of pertinent 
features of ICSID. 
Next two chapters will focus at taxonomy of preliminary issues relating to jurisdiction and 
admissibility in investment treaty arbitration, in other words the principals and rules that 
govern the arbitral tribunal’s power to adjudge the merits of investment treaty. Such 
attempt has rendered unreasonably problematic and polemic, in the past, by the existing 
lexis. 
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3. CHAPTER THREE: PREREQUISITES FOR INVESTMENT 
ARBITRATION – ADMISSIBILITY 
  Introduction 3.1.
There are certain stages and problems common to all judicial procedures for the settlement 
of international disputes. The identity of the problems, and of the solutions, is evident 
when tribunals operate under same rules. The following account of the law is in principal 
applicable to all international tribunals subject, of course, to express stipulations to the 
contrary in the rules under which they operate. For convenience, however, reference will 
ordinarily be made to the law as it operates in the context of arbitration. 
The question of submission to the jurisdiction of the tribunal may appear to be the obvious 
starting point. It is, however, common to raise objections to continuation of proceedings 
by a tribunal that appears to have jurisdiction. Many such preliminary objections are 
concerned with the question whether there exists a dispute of a nature that can probably be 
put to the dispute settlement procedure. This question ought, logically, to be determined 
before the procedure is initiated; and so this chapter considers it first. This discussion is 
followed by a consideration of the question of submission to the jurisdiction of the 
tribunal, and the rules concerning the establishment and operation of the tribunal, and then 
of the question of the law applicable to the proceedings, the lex arbitri.  
This research proposes the hypothesis that there are clear signs of a missing body of 
international jurisdictional rules and principals within the purview of international 
investment law concerning the admission of claims ,establishment and uphold of 
jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal which in author’s view should be named lex Juridictio. 
The determination of the law applicable to the substance of the dispute and the particular 
problems of ‘internationalized’ contracts are discussed in this chapter. The purpose of this 
chapter is to present taxonomy of the principles and rules that govern the decision 
concerning whether a claim qualifies for determination by an international treaty tribunal 
based on the merits of an investment dispute. This task is rendered unnecessarily difficult 
by the lexicon available.  
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 TAXONOMY OF THE PRELIMINARY ISSUES IN INVESTMENT 3.2.
ARBITRATION 
The importance of getting terminology right goes beyond linguistic fidelity to proper 
usage because the scope of judicial review of the arbitral tribunal’s decisions on issues 
pertaining to its own adjudicative power depends upon the classification of such issues. In 
particular the investor or the host State has the opportunity of contesting the arbitral 
tribunal’s decisions with respect to the existence of its adjudicative power (jurisdiction), 
but not to the exercise of that adjudicative power (admissibility or the merits). 
 It is arguable that this is the case both before the municipal courts at the seat of the 
arbitration or before and ICSID ad hoc committee. In contrast, the distinction does not 
assume such importance for other international tribunals, such as the International Court of 
Justice or the International Tribunal for the law of the Sea, for there is no superior judicial 
forum with the power to review their decisions. 
There are other reasons for distinguishing between terminological questions, for example 
the quest of jurisdiction and admissibility. Where the impediment to exercising 
jurisdiction is embodied in a provision of a multilateral treaty, then it cannot be waived by 
the respondent host State whether expressly or by its conduct in the proceedings. No such 
problem arises in respect of objections to the admissibility of a claim. Moreover, a 
question relating to jurisdiction can and must be raised by a tribunal proprio motu,
184
 
whereas that would be inappropriate for issues of admissibility. 
A. Justiciability 
Not all disputes are suitable for judicial settlement. To be suitable, the dispute must be 
justiciable. A dispute is said to be justiciable if, first, a specific disagreement exists, and 
secondly that disagreement is of a kind which can be resolved by the application of rules 
of law by judicial (including arbitral) processes. These elements are reflected in the classic 
definition given by the Permanent Court of International Justice in the Mavrommatics 
                                                          
184 This is made explicit in the ICSID Arbitration Rules 41(2). International tribunals have come to the same conclusion 
even in the absence of an explicit authorization in the applicable statutes: Burton Marks & Harry Umann v Iran (Case 
ITL, 53-458-3, 26 June 1985) 8 Iran-US CTR 290, 296; Rio Grande Irrigation and Land Company Ltd (UK v USA) 6 
RIAA 131, 135 (1923); Belgium, France, Switzerland & UK v Federal Republic of Germany, 59 ILR 524 (1980). 
82 
 
case: ‘A dispute is a disagreement on a point of law or fact, a conflict of legal views or of 
interests between two parties between two persons.’185 
The existence of the dispute may seem an unproblematic question, but it is not. For 
instance, in Peace Treaties case,
186
 complains had been made by the United Kingdom and 
United States of America that Bulgaria, Hungry and Romania were failing to comply with 
certain human rights obligations imposed upon them by the Peace Treaties concluded at 
the end of World War. The International Court concluded that ‘international disputes have 
arisen’, and asserted that ‘whether there exists an international dispute is a matter for 
objective determination’.187  
A rather fuller statement of the principle was subsequently given by the International 
Court of Justice in the South West Africa-contentious cases: 
‘… it is not sufficient for one party to contentious case to assert that a dispute exists with 
the other party. A mere assertion is not sufficient to prove the existence of a dispute any 
more than a mere denial of the existence of the dispute proves its non-existence. Nor is it 
adequate to show that the interests of the two parties to such a case are in conflict. It must 
be shown that the claim of one party is positively opposed by the other.’ 
In the case of most tribunals a further aspect of this precondition of justiciability is that the 
dispute remains in existence up to the point that the judgment or award is given. To put it 
in another way, most tribunals will refuse to give rulings on disputes that are hypothetical 
or have become moot. As Judge Fitzmaurice put in the Northern Cameroons-Contentious 
case (ICJ): 
‘ Courts of law are not there to make legal pronouncements in abstracto … They are there 
to protect existing and current legal rights, to secure compliance with existing and current 
legal obligations, to afford concrete reparation if a wrong has been committed, or to give 
rulings in relation to an existing and concrete legal situation.’ 
We turn now to the second element of justiciability. In order to be justiciable it is not only 
necessary that the disagreement should have hardened into a dispute; it is also necessary 
that the dispute should be capable of solution by the application of judicial or arbitral 
                                                          
185 (1924) PCIJ Ser. A, No. 2, 11. The reference to ‘a conflict of interests’ is unfortunate. A mere conflict of interests, 
without more, does not constitute a dispute, as the Court recognized in the South West Africa case, ICJ Rep. 1962, 319 at 
328.  
186 ICJ Rep. 1950, 65 (First Phase), 221 (Second Phase). 
187 ICJ Rep. 1950, 65, at 74. The dictum was applied in the Case concerning application of the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Preliminary Objections) case, ICJ Rep. 1996, 595, at 614. 
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process, and susceptible to decision upon the basis of law.
188
 In other words, the dispute 
must be a legal dispute, to which the tribunal can apply rules and principles of law so as to 
decide the dispute.
189
 
While it is not possible to draw up an exhaustive list of the kinds of disputes that are legal 
disputes, it is quite clear that some disputes are not legal. This willingness to separate the 
legal and non-legal aspects of a dispute is evident also in the principle that the concurrent 
pursuit of other dispute settlement procedures is not obstacle to a tribunal proceeding to 
hear and determine a case. This point was prominent in the Hostages case, where the 
Security Council was considering the dispute concurrently with the International Court,
190
 
and in Nicaragua v. US case where it was argued that the International Court proceeding 
would interfere with the Contadora peace process.
191
 
 Justiciability is an aspect of a disagreement or clash of interests into a concrete dispute, 
capable of resolution by a judicial or arbitral process on the basis of law. Disputes that do 
not have those characteristics ought not to be submitted to the judicial procedures;
192
 and 
if they are so submitted, a preliminary objection by one of the parties ought to result in the 
dismissal off the case by the tribunal. However it is important to note that, in the context 
of international commercial arbitration, the concept may operate at a different level.  
Even if the dispute is justiciable according to the criteria discussed above, the provisions 
of the municipal legal systems governing the various aspects of the arbitral process may 
stipulate that certain categories of dispute must be submitted to the courts, and may not be 
settled by arbitration. For instance, it might be stipulated that patent disputes are not 
arbitrable, but must be submitted to the national courts. Author will return to this question 
of the limits of arbitrability under national laws below. 
                                                          
188 See British Claims in the Spanish Zone of Morocco (1925) 2 UNRIAA 615, where Judge Huber made a report on the 
Notion of Arbitrability, under the terms of an arbitration agreement made between Great Britain and Spain on 29 May 
1923. Arbitrability and justiciability were essentially interchangeable terms, in his view.  
189
 There is no possibility of a non liquent. If the dispute is a legal dispute, the tribunal must decide it 
according to law. This is at least the rule in contentious proceedings. As Judge Higgins pointed out in her 
dissenting opinion in the advisory Opinion of the International court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat 
or Use of Nuclear weapons, ICJ Rep. 1996, 226, at 583-4, 591-2, the doctrine on non liquent appears not to 
have been applied in these advisory proceedings.  
190 ICJ Rep. 1980, 3, at 21. 
191 ICJ Rep. 1984, 392 at 440. 
192 But those that do have this characteristic should be accepted by courts and decided by them even if the subject matter 
is embarrassing. See the decision of the House of Lords in Buttes Gas and Oil Co. v Hammer [1982] AC 888. 
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B. Arbitrability 
States are, in principle, free to submit disputes of any kind to arbitration. Only the 
possibility of a tribunal giving a ruling of non liquet
193
 or non-justiciability operates to 
circumscribe the concept of an arbitrable dispute. In the case of disputes involving private 
parties, however, States may insist upon certain categories of dispute remaining within the 
jurisdiction of national courts. No municipal law permits private parties completely to 
exclude the jurisdiction of national legal systems.  
One way of describing such limitations on the freedom to arbitrate is to say that certain 
disputes are non-arbitrable.  Under the New York Convention States are not bound either 
to recognize arbitration agreements (article II.1), or to recognize and enforce awards 
resulting from arbitration agreements (article V.2), in cases where the subject matter of the 
dispute is not considered by the State to be capable of settlement by arbitration.  
Neither the New York Convention, nor any other convention, stipulates that certain 
disputes are inherently non-aribtrable. Conventions merely limit their own fields of 
application.  This may be done by stipulating in the convention a particular limitation, 
such as the provision which limits ICSID arbitration to disputes arising out of investments. 
But it is more generally done by reference to the provisions of national laws concerning 
arbitrability. It is national law which determines what disputes are or are not arbitrable. 
This question would typically arise before the courts of the State where the arbitration is to 
take place, or where enforcement of the award is sought, in which case the court would 
determine the question of arbitrability under its own law. However, if the parties had 
chosen as the law governing the arbitration (the lex arbitri) the law of a third State, the 
court could also rest a refusal of recognition or enforcement upon the non-arbitrability of 
the dispute under the lex arbitri. 
                                                          
193 In essence, non liquet is an acknowledgement that the matter is in principle one regulated by the law, but that the 
tribunal cannot determine the rule that can be applied. Non-justiciability is a term used in to senses: (i) the matter is not 
susceptible of legal decision at all, or (ii) the matter is regulated by law but it is inappropriate for the tribunal to apply the 
relevant rule. Meaning (ii) is sometimes found in decisions of municipal tribunals in which they refuse to rule upon 
questions of international law, regarding them as the proper preserve of international tribunals: see e.g., Buttes Gas and 
Oil Co. v. Hammer [1982] 41 CLJ 18.     
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There is a considerable variety among national laws in the categories of disputes that are 
stipulated to be not arbitrable. To put it another way, only those disputes which can be 
compromised by the parties can be arbitrated. The trend in State practice is towards 
widening the category of arbitrable disputes. One notable development was the decision of 
the US Supreme Court in the Mitsubishi case,
194
 in which the Court, reversing the effect of 
earlier decisions, upheld the arbitrability of issues of US antitrust law arising out of 
international commercial disputes.    
Similar developments are evident elsewhere. For instance, Decisions in the 1990s in 
several European civil law jurisdictions held competition law and consumer law disputes 
to be arbitrable: the trend is clearly away from the approach represented by article 2061 of 
the French Civil Code, which states that ‘an arbitration clause shall be void unless the law 
provides otherwise’ and towards that represented by article 177 of the 1987 Swiss Law on 
private international law, which states that ‘any claim of a patrimonial nature may be the 
subject of arbitration’.195   
About one-third of the States Parties to the New York Convention have exercised their 
right under article I.3 to confine the application of the Convention to disputes arising from 
relationships which are, under their own laws, considered to be ‘commercial’. 
C. Admissibility 
Admissibility is a main focus in this research and will be dealt with broadly in sub-section 
3.3 of this chapter. 
D. Jurisdiction 
  Jurisdiction is a main focus in this research and will be dealt with broadly in Chapter 4. 
                                                          
194 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Inc., 473 US 614 (1985), (1985) 24 ILM 1064. Cf. W. F. Fox, 
‘Mitsubishi v Soler and its Impact on International Commercial Arbitration’ (1985) 19 Journal of World Trade Law 579; 
T. E. Carbonneau, ‘Mitsubishi: The folly of Quixotic International’ (1986) 2 Arbitration International 178; W. Park, 
‘National Law and Commercial Justice: Safeguarding Procedural Integrity in International Arbitration’ (1989) 63 Tulane 
Law Review 647; J. H. Dalhuisen, ‘The arbitrability of competition issues’ (1995) 11 Arbitration International 151. 
Volume 12(2) of Arbitration International (1996) is a special issue on arbitrability in international commercial 
arbitration. 
195 A Kirry, ‘Arbitrability: current trends in Europe’ (1996) Arbitration International 373; M. de Boissession and T. 
Clay, ‘Recent developments in arbitration in civil law countries’ [1998] int. ALR 150. 
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  THE EXERCISE OF THE ADJUDICATIVE POWER - (ADMISSIBILITY)  3.3.
The classic statement on the distinction between jurisdiction and admissibility is to be 
found in Fitzmaurice’s study on the jurisprudence of the International Court: 
‘[T]here are a clear jurisprudential distinction between an objection to the jurisdiction of 
the tribunal, and objection to the substantive admissibility of the claim. The latter is a plea 
that the tribunal should rule the claim to be inadmissible on some ground other than its 
ultimate merits; the former is a plea that the tribunal itself is incompetent to give any 
ruling at all whether as to the merits or as to the admissibility of the claim.’196 
The distinction between jurisdiction and admissibility is critically important in investment 
treaty arbitration because a party has the opportunity of contesting the tribunal’s decision 
with respect to the former but not the latter in the municipal courts at the seat of the 
arbitration
197
 and before an ICSID ad hoc committee pursuant to Article 52 of the ICSID 
Convention.   
Article 52(1)(b) of the ICSID Convention refers to a ‘manifest excess of power’ as a 
ground for annulment (see Appendix 2). It might be thought that this formulation is 
infected by a tautology: the tribunal has the power to make the order or decision 
complained of or it does not; what sense does it make to insist upon a ‘manifest’ absence 
of power? The key to a rational interpretation of Article 52(1)(b) is to differentiate 
between the types of powers that are possessed by an ICSID tribunal. Where the tribunal 
has determined an issue going to the merits of the dispute by exercising a power that it 
does not possess or failing to exercise a power that it does possess, and this misfeasance or 
nonfeasance is adjudged to have had a ‘manifest’ impact on the tribunal’s award, then it 
will be susceptible to censure by an annulment committee. Where, however the tribunal 
has ruled upon an issue going to the existence or scope of its adjudicatory power 
(jurisdiction) by the same form of misfeasance or nonfeasance, the ‘manifest’ threshold 
has been satisfied per se because the tribunal’s decision on all other aspects of the dispute 
are infected by that ‘excess power’. 
                                                          
196 G Fitzmaurice, The law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice (1996) 438-9. 
197 See, e.g. English Arbitration Act 1996, Art. 67; French Code of Civil Procedure, Art 1502; United States Federal 
Arbitration Act, Art. 10(a)(4); UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, Art. 34(2)(a)(iii); 
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Unfortunately ICSID annulment committees to date appear to have applied a uniform 
threshold to all issues arising in an ICSID arbitration, despite the conceptual difficulties in 
approaching the review of jurisdictional questions in the same way as questions pertaining 
to the merits. A justification for this uniform approach to the interpretation of Article 
52(1)(b) has never been articulated.  
On which side of this distinction between jurisdiction and the merits do the questions of 
admissibility fall in relation to article 52(1)(b) of the ICSID Convention? The answer on 
balance should be on the side of the tribunal’s adjudication of the merits so that the 
‘manifest’ threshold must be applied to the outcome of the exercise of power as reflected 
in the tribunal’s award.  
The supervisory competence of municipal courts or ICSID ad hoc Committees with 
respect to tribunal’s decision on its own jurisdiction is founded upon the idea that the 
tribunal should not have the final word on the issue of whether or not it is vested with 
adjudicatory power. If the tribunal does have adjudicatory power then, provided it 
exercises that power consistently with fundamental procedural norms, its decisions should 
not be reviewable by another judicial forum. This division is most likely being in accord 
with the legitimate procedural expectations of the parties.  
The rules of admissibility, if properly invoked may require the dismissal of the claim or 
counterclaim before the determination of its merits. The grounds for inadmissibility at 
base represent certain legal defects in a claim that are independent of, and yet, often 
closely connected to, the substantive grounds upon which a claim or counterclaim is to be 
adjudicated on the merits. Admissibility deals with the suitability of the claim for 
adjudication on the merits.  
An objective test to distinguish between preliminary objections relating to jurisdiction and 
admissibility is therefore required.
198
 The principles are twofold. First, if the preliminary 
objections were to be sustained, would it lead to the conclusion that it is inappropriate for 
the tribunal to exercise its adjudicative power in any circumstances?  If the answer if 
                                                          
198 J Paulsson, ‘Jurisdiction and Admissibility’, in Global Reflection on International Law, Commerce and dispute 
Resolution: Liber Amicorum in Honour of Robert Briner (2005) 601; A Rau, ‘The Arbitrability Question Itself’ (1999) 
10 American Rev of Int Arbitration 287.   
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affirmative, then the issue is properly characterized as one of jurisdiction and the 
possibility of judicial review is justified because the issue relates to whether the tribunal 
has adjudicative power at all. Second, if the preliminary objection were to be sustained, 
would it lead to the conclusion that it is inappropriate for the tribunal to rule upon the 
specific claim or counterclaim on the merits? If the answer is affirmative, then the issue is 
properly characterized as one of ‘admissibility’ and the exclusion of the possibility of 
judicial review are justified because the issue is within the adjudicative power of the 
tribunal to resolve.
199
The following grounds for inadmissibility are analyzed in this 
chapter: 
- Contractual choice of forum. 
- Shareholder claims. 
- Dispositions relating to the legal and beneficial ownership of the investment. 
- Denial of benefits. 
The investment treaty jurisprudence discloses a great deal of confusion about the extent to 
which a determination made by the tribunal on its jurisdiction or the admissibility of 
claims in a preliminary decision must be conclusive in respect of such issues. It is often 
asserted, for example, that the tribunal need only be satisfied to a prima facie standard that 
the claim is within its jurisdiction. As a general proposition this is incorrect. If an issue 
relating to jurisdiction or admissibility is to be decided in a preliminary decision separately 
from the merits, then that issue, by definition, will not surface again in the tribunal’s 
award on the merits. Hence such an issue must be determined conclusively by the tribunal 
in the preliminary decision because there is no later opportunity in the normal course of 
the procedure to revisit that issue. 
The confusion arises because there are certain issues of jurisdiction and admissibility 
which, for their disposal in a preliminary decision, require the tribunal to make an 
assessment of the facts asserted by the claimant in support of its claims on the merits. The 
most common issue of this nature is the ratione materiae jurisdiction of the tribunal, the 
legal foundation of which is a contract rather than an investment treaty obligation. 
                                                          
199 Waste Management v Mexico No. 1 (Merits: Dissenting Opinion) 5 ICSID Rep 462,478/58 (‘Jurisdiction is the power 
for the tribunal to hear the case; admissibility is whether the case itself is defective – whether it is appropriate for the 
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A. Contractual Choice of Forum 
A ‘forum selection clause’ or ‘choice of forum clause’ in a contract with a conflict of laws 
element allows the parties to agree that any litigation resulting from that contract will be 
initiated in a specific forum. There are three types of clause: 
- The reference might be to a particular court in a jurisdiction agreed upon by the parties 
(although, if the parties make a mistake as to the power of the nominated court to hear the 
matter, the civil procedures of the nominated jurisdiction will be applied to identify the 
appropriate court); or 
- The clause might refer to a specific kind of dispute resolution process, such as mediation, 
arbitration (see arbitration clause, lex loci arbitri), or a hearing before a special referee; or 
- The clause might refer to both, requiring a specific process to be carried out in a specific 
location. 
A simple forum selection clause covering both the proper law of the contract and the 
forum for resolving disputes might read: 
‘This contract is governed by the laws of England and any dispute shall be finally resolved 
by the English courts.’ 
In many cross-border contracts, the forum for resolving disputes may not be the same as 
the country whose law governs the contract. And the contract may provide for a staged 
procedure for resolving disputes. For example: 
‘1. This agreement shall be governed by and interpreted in accordance with the laws of …. 
2. The parties shall endeavor to settle any dispute that arises by direct negotiation but if 
direct negotiation does not result in a resolution of the dispute, either Party may require 
that it be referred to mediation in accordance with the … Mediation Rules. 3. Any dispute 
that is not settled by direct negotiation or by mediation shall be finally settled under the 
Rules of Arbitration of the … by one or more arbitrators appointed in accordance with the 
said Rules.’ 
The object of all claims founded upon an investment treaty obligation is rights constituting 
an investment. Those rights are private rights that are derived from the law of property or 
contract of the host State or its public or administrative law. An investment treaty 
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obligation prescribes a certain minimum standard of regulatory conduct for the host State 
in respect of acts affecting the private or public law rights that constitute that investment. 
An investment treaty claim is the means of vindicating these private or public rights where 
the host State’s conduct has fallen short of the minimum standard of treatment prescribed 
by the investment treaty obligations. 
Where the object of an investment treaty claim is the vindication of contractual rights 
forming part of the claimant’s investment, complexities can emerge because of a 
contractual stipulation that disputes arising out of the investment agreement must be 
submitted to the exclusive jurisdiction of a particular court or tribunal. The claimant’s 
prior agreement to an alternative judicial or arbitral forum in a contract with the host State 
or one of its emanations gives rise to two distinct problems of admissibility.  
The first, and more pervasive, problem is where the claimant advances a claim based upon 
an investment treaty obligation but the object of that claim is the vindication of contractual 
rights arising out of an investment agreement with the host State or one of its emanations. 
The second problem, which has occurred much less frequently in practice, is where the 
claimant advances a claim for breach of contract before an investment treaty tribunal in 
circumstances where host State’s consent to arbitration in the treaty extends to contractual 
disputes. 
Where the tribunal has determined that the legal foundation of the claim is an investment 
treaty obligation, and the object of that claim is the vindication of contractual rights 
forming part of the claimant’s investment, and there is a bona fide dispute concerning the 
existence or scope of those rights, then the tribunal should generally stay its jurisdiction in 
favor of a judicial or arbitral forum stipulated in the contract as having exclusive 
jurisdiction in relation to disputes arising out of the contract. 
Where the tribunal has determined that the legal foundation of the claim is a contractual 
obligation, the tribunal should decline its jurisdiction in favor of a judicial or arbitral 
forum stipulated in the contract as having exclusive jurisdiction in relation to disputes 
arising out of the contract. 
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The tribunal should exercise its jurisdiction over the claim if the tribunal is satisfied on the 
basis of compelling evidence that the claimant will be subjected to a denial of justice in 
the forum stipulated in the contract. 
Above solutions are concerned to preserve the efficacy of exclusive choice of forum 
clauses in investment agreements.  There are compelling reasons of principle and policy 
that mandate such resolutions. It is not acceptable for a party to ‘be able to approbate and 
reprobate in respect of the same contract’.200  In other words, the integrity of contractual 
bargain must be preserved; one of the essential terms of that bargain cannot be bypassed at 
the suit of one of the parties. It is important to realize that the parties’ consent to 
investment treaty arbitration is no more ‘solemn’ than their consent to the submission of 
their contractual disputes to a different forum. 
In Lanco International Inc v Argentine Republic
201
the Argentine Ministry of Economy and 
Public Works awarded a concession contract for the development and operation of a port 
terminal with Lanco. Argentina objected to the jurisdiction of ICSID tribunal, established 
in accordance with the Argentine/USA BIT, on the basis that Lancon had already agreed 
to refer contractual disputes to state courts of Argentina.
202
 In its discussion of the effect of 
Clause 12, the tribunal noted that: 
‘The jurisdiction of the Federal Contentious –Administrative Tribunals over disputes 
relating to the concession arose by operation of the law and thus would exist even in the 
absence of any specific contractual designation. Clause 12 was not, therefore, a selection 
of a previously agreed dispute settlement procedure for the purposes of the fork in the road 
provision of the treaty.’ 
The Lanco tribunal’s decision, on this narrow basis, is no doubt correct. If the investor has 
made no previous election of an alternative jurisdiction for the resolution of disputes 
arising out of its contract, then there is no scope for conflict with its election of ICSID 
arbitration for its contractual claims subsequent to the conclusion of that contract. It must 
be recognized that tribunals have subsequently interpreted the Lanco ruling as a general 
statement of principle, with the effect that any pre-existing contractual choice of forum for 
                                                          
200 SGS v Philippines (Preliminary Objections) 8 ICSID Rep 518, 561-2/155. 
201 (Preliminary Objections) 5 ICSID Rep 367. 
202 Ibid. 377/24, 380-1/34. 
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the settlement of disputes might be unilaterally avoided at the investor’s option in relation 
to disputes falling within the proper scope of this contractual choice. 
In Salini Construttori SpA and Italstrade SpA v Morocco, Morocco objected to the 
jurisdiction of the tribunal because the regulations incorporated into the construction 
contract vested jurisdiction in the tribunals of Rabat over claims arising from the 
performance of the contract.
203
 The tribunal held: 
‘As the jurisdiction of the administrative courts cannot be extended, the consent to ICSID 
jurisdiction described above will prevail over article 52 of Cahier des Clauses 
Administratives Générales, since this article cannot be taken to be a clause truly extending 
the scope of jurisdiction and covered by the principle of the freedom of the Parties’ 
will’.204 
The tribunal ruled that the submission to the Rabat tribunals did not constitute a true 
contractual choice of jurisdiction, but rather confirmed a jurisdiction that was otherwise 
imposed by operation of law. 
The principle discernible from Lanco and Salini is that no problem of admissibility arises 
when the choice of forum in the contract is not exclusive but rather confirms the 
availability of a local forum existing by operation of the general law of the host State. The 
idea that an express provision of a treaty can be nullified by an appeal to the claimant’s 
natural right to unimpeded access to ICSID arbitration might not be wholly complied with 
the principles of interpretation in Article 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties. 
We have arrived at the point in the analysis of admissibility where a conflict between two 
fora for the settlement of disputes has been established: a judicial or arbitral forum 
previously chosen by the parties in their contract and the arbitral forum established by the 
investment treaty. The author proposes that the investment treaty tribunal should generally 
stay its jurisdiction in favor of the contractually chosen forum save in circumstances where 
the claimant has, or is likely to be, subject to a denial of justice in that forum. 
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If a relationship of coordination between the investment treaty regime, the municipal legal 
system of the host State and multilateral conventions on choice of forum agreement is to 
be achieved , then the general principles of generalia specialibus non derogant, prior 
tempore potior jure and pacta sunt servunda provide the doctrinal basis for sorting out 
conflicts between overlapping jurisdictions.  
In SPP v Egypt,
205
 an ICSID tribunal was required to interpret an Egyptian law recording 
Egypt’s consent to three different methods for resolution of disputes, including: (i) any 
method of settlement previously agreed to by the parties themselves; (ii) dispute resolution 
pursuant to an applicable BIT; and (iii) arbitration under ICSID Convention.
206
 The 
tribunal noted that these methods were listed from the most specific type of agreement on 
the resolution of disputes to the most general and from this deduction concluded: 
‘ A specific agreement between the parties to a dispute would naturally take precedence 
with respect to a bilateral treaty between the investor’s State and Egypt, while such a 
bilateral treaty would in turn prevail with respect to a multilateral treaty such as the 
Washington Convention. [The clause] thus reflects the maxim generalia specialibus non 
derogant.’207 
It is important to emphasis that the tribunal in SPP v Egypt made no distinction between 
the status of each judicial forum contemplated by each method of dispute resolution. It is 
submitted that this approach is entirely correct. 
In Klöchner v Cameroon,
208
Klöchner instituted ICSID proceedings on the basis of the 
supply agreement, whereas Cameroon relied upon the protocol of agreement by way of 
counterclaim.
209
 The tribunal ruled that: 
‘The Claimant is right in denying the jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal to rule on 
disputes arising from this contract.’210 
The tribunal thus upheld the validity of the parties’ contractual choice of ICC arbitration 
for disputes arising out of the management contract, implicitly on the basis of the 
generalia specialibus non derogant principle. The controversial part of the ICSID 
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tribunal’s decision in Klöchner was the partial circumvention of its finding on the status of 
the ICC arbitration clause in the management contract by pronouncing upon issues 
pertaining to the management on the basis of a general provision in the protocol of the 
agreement that recorded Klöchner’s obligation to ‘be responsible for the technical and 
commercial management of the plant’.211 This aspect of the decision was the subject of a 
rigorous dissenting opinion
212
 and was then sharply criticized by the ad hoc committee on 
annulment.
213
  
B. Shareholder Claims 
Perhaps the single greatest misconception that has plagued the investment treaty 
jurisprudence to date concerns the problem of claims by shareholders. The root of this 
misconception is the incorrect characterization of the problem as one of jurisdiction rather 
than admissibility. There is no difficulty in confirming the tribunal’s jurisdiction ratione 
personae over a shareholder with the requisite nationality. There is also no difficulty in 
confirming a tribunal’s jurisdiction ratione materiae over claims by that shareholder in 
relation to its investment in shares in a company incorporated in the host State. But is that 
the end of the analysis? Would an investment treaty claim by each individual shareholder 
of a company (corporate investor) be admissible? The arbitration clause in the investment 
treaty might restrict the class of claimants that can resort to arbitration under that treaty, 
but it can hardly be claimed that this is the panacea for dealing with the problem of 
admissibility.
214
 
In Total v Argentina,
215
 for instance, the tribunal justified its decision to uphold the 
admissibility of shareholder claims as follows: 
‘The protection that BITs afford to such investor is accordingly not limited to the free 
enjoyment of the shares but extends to the respect of the treaty standards as to the 
substance of their investments’.216 
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This statement appears to imply that the ‘substance ‘of the investment of shareholders is 
the property of the company they invested in. The International Court posed the following 
question in Barcelona traction: 
‘It can be asked whether international law recognizes for the shareholders in a company a 
separate and independent right or interest in respect of damage done to the company by a 
foreign government; and if so to what extent and in what circumstances?’217 
That question must be confronted by ever supranational regime concerned with the 
protection of property rights. The investment treaty tribunals have indeed answered the 
International Court’s question in the following terms: 
‘The investment treaty regime recognizes for the shareholders in the company a separate 
and independent right or interest in respect of damage done to the company by a foreign 
government to any extent and in all circumstances.’ 
In this research, shareholder actions for ‘direct injury’ and reflective loss’ are 
distinguished. An action for a ‘direct injury’ is premised upon the third party having 
breached an obligation owed directly to the shareholder rather than just to the company, 
whereas in an action for ‘reflective loss’ the shareholder is suing for the diminution of the 
value of its shares caused by acts of the third party directed to the company itself. The 
third party in investment treaty arbitration is of course the host State or one of its 
emanations. Reflective loss can be defined as: 
‘The diminution of the value of the shares … the loss of dividends … and all other 
payments which the shareholder might have obtained from the company if it had not been 
deprived of its funds.’218 
Great care must attend the deployment of judicial reasoning discovered outside the 
investment treaty context to resolve contentious issues within it. But even greater care 
must be taken before dismissing the valuable insights gained from the rich experience of 
other judicial fora by simplistic appeals to the sui generis nature of investment treaty 
arbitration. This applies with equal force to the relevant experience of international and 
municipal courts. 
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In CMS v Argentina (known as Barcelona Traction case), the International Court in its 
decision on Preliminary Objections stated that: 
‘In short, the question of jus standi of a government to protect the interests of the 
shareholders as such, is itself merely a reflection, or consequence, of the antecedent 
question of what is the juridical situation in respect of the shareholding interests, as 
recognized by international law.’219 
This distinction informed the separate opinions of Judges Morelli, Fitzmaurice and Gros in 
the Second Phase of the Proceedings. According to Judge Morelli: 
‘ To say that there is no rule which authorizes diplomatic protection of shareholders on 
account of measures taken in respect of company is to exclude the existence of any 
obligation of Spain in this connection, vis-à-vis any other States. Belgium’s right is 
thereby denied, not because such a right might hypothetically belong to a State other than 
Belgium, but rather because no such right can be invoked by any State, since no rule exists 
from which it could derive.’220 
Judge Fitzmaurice pronounced in his separate opinion with characteristics lucidity: 
‘If it is not right that international law should distort the structure of the company by 
failing to give all due effect to the logic of its separate personality, distinct from that of the 
shareholders, it is no less wrong, and an equal distortion, if international law fails to give 
due effect to the limitations on this principle recognized by the very system which, mutatis 
mutandis, it is sought to apply on the international plane.’221  
Perhaps the best illustration of the distinction between shareholders claims for a direct 
injury and claims for reflective loss is the judgment of the Chamber of the International 
Court of Justice in ELSI (Elettronica Sicula SpA)
222
.The essence of the claim was that 
corporate investors were deprived of their right to manage the liquidation of ELSI in an 
orderly fashion. Judge Oda’s observations pertaining to article III (2) was: 
‘Raytheon and Machlett certainly could, in Italy, ‘organize, control and manage’ 
corporations in which they held 100 per cent of the shares – as in the case of ELSI – but 
this cannot be taken to mean that those United States corporations, as shareholders of 
ELSI, can lay claim to any rights other than those rights of shareholders guaranteed to 
them under Italian law as well as under the general principles of law concerning 
                                                          
219 (Belgium v Spain) 1964 ICJ Rep 5, 45. 
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companies. The rights of Raytheon and Machlett as shareholders of ELSI remained the 
same and were not augmented by the FCN Treaty.’223   
This statement is perfectly consistent with the approach taken by the Chamber of the 
International Court. The divergence with the Chamber’s approach commences with the 
next line of Judge Oda’s Separate Opinion: 
‘Those rights which Raytheon and Machlett could have enjoyed under the FCN Treaty 
were not breached by the requisition order, because that order did not affect the ‘direct 
rights’ of those United States corporations, as shareholders of an Italian company, but was 
directed at the Italian company of which they remained shareholders.’224  
Although the Chamber did not directly consider this particular point, for the reasons 
previously articulated it cannot be accepted insofar as the ‘direct rights’ of Raytheon and 
Macclett were capable of being prejudiced by the requisition order. That would settle any 
objection to the admissibility of this claim. The Author concludes that: 
‘The claim alleging an interference with the American investors’ right to manage and 
control its investment was admissible for the purposes of the FCN Treaty and that this 
conclusion would be no different in the investment treaty context. Rather than dismissing 
the claim on the merits, the Chamber should have properly investigated those ‘doubts’ and 
found that it was inadmissible and hence Judge Oda’s general point about the lack of jus 
standi of the United States was well taken in relation to this claim. In the investment treaty 
context, the same approach would be required with respect to a claim of this type based on 
an obligation to accord full protection and security.’  
The Iran/US Claims Tribunal considered the admissibility of a claim for a direct injury in 
Foremost-McKesson HBOC Inc. v Iran,
225
 It was alleged that the Iranian company had 
withheld dividends from the US shareholder over a period of several years while 
continuing to pay dividends to its Iranian shareholders. The tribunal found that the claim 
was not within its ratione tempore jurisdiction.  
Where investment treaty tribunals have admitted shareholder claims for reflective loss 
founded upon a breach of the obligation of fair and equitable treatment or full protection 
or security or national treatment or most-favored-nation treatment or other minimum 
standard of treatment, an intractable problem has arisen as to where to draw the line. The 
problem was confronted in Enron v Argentina. 
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In Enron Corporation and Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v The Argentine Republic,
226
 Argentina 
raised an objection to the admissibility of Enron’s claims because Enron could not, as a 
shareholder of TGS, identify any rights attaching to that shareholding, which had been 
affected by measures attributable to Argentina.  
At the hearing on jurisdiction held in the present case, the Tribunal put a question to the 
parties as to whether the Claimants had been invited by the Government of Argentina to 
participate in the investment connected to the privatization of TGS. It turned out that this 
had been precisely the case. It followed that all the claims advanced by Enron were 
admissible. The test for admissibility devised by the tribunal was thus founded upon the 
criterion of an ‘invitation’.   
The concern expressed by Enron tribunal about the prospect of an endless chain of claims 
of different shareholders in different companies with indirect control over the same 
investment was taken up in Noble v Ecuador.
227
 The tribunal’s answer to this problem 
does not inspire confidence: 
‘The tribunal does not disagree with the statement made by the Enron tribunal. There may 
well be a cut-off somewhere, and future tribunals may be called upon to define it. In the 
present case, the need for such a definition does not arise. Indeed, the cut-off point, 
whatever it may be, is not reached with two intermediate layers. The relationship between 
the investment and the direct shareholder, on the one hand, and the indirect shareholder, 
on the other, is not too remote.’228 
The Author affirms that it is impossible to make a legal judgment on the remoteness of a 
claim unless one has a legal test for remoteness in mind. The ‘need for such a definition’ 
certainly dose arise. A tribunal’s failure to give proper analysis to the admissibility of a 
derivative claim by a shareholder generates intractable problems in respect of the 
qualifications of damages if the claim is upheld on the merits. In other words, the assertion 
of jurisdiction over an inadmissible claim by a shareholder leads to consequential errors in 
the assessment of damages. Two such consequential errors can be found in the 
jurisprudence to date. 
                                                          
226 Enron v Argentina (Preliminary Objections) 11 ICSID Rep 273; (Merits). 
227
 (Preliminary Objections). 
228
 Ibid. para. 82. 
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The first is for the tribunal to assess the damages to an investment in shares flowing from a 
breach of an investment treaty obligation by employing the standard of compensation of 
expropriation even where the tribunal has ruled that there has been no expropriation. The 
second consequential error is to assess damages on the basis of a crude estimate of the loss 
to the shareholder caused by an injury to the company. The leading example of such an 
error is the award in Nykomb v Latvia. 
In Nykomb Synergies Technology Holding AB v Republic of Latvia,
229
 the tribunal decided 
to exercise its jurisdiction over a claim brought by the parent company in respect of a 
dispute concerning an entitlement to a double tariff rate in a contract between its local 
subsidiaries. The following finding by the tribunal should have resulted in a finding of 
inadmissibility in respect of Nykomb’s derivative claim: 
‘In the present case, there is no possession taking of Windau or its assets, no interference 
with the shareholder’s rights or with the management’s control over and running of the 
enterprise – apart from ordinary regulatory provisions laid down in the production license, 
the off-take agreement, etc. The tribunal therefore concludes that the withholding of 
payment at the double tariff does not qualify as an expropriation or the equivalence of an 
expropriation under the treaty.’230 
 
The tribunal must be commended as being among the first to acknowledge the axiomatic 
rule of valuation that a loss to a company is not reflected exactly as a loss to a shareholder. 
The problem of quantifying the ‘reflective loss’ has been analyzed extensively in many 
jurisdictions. It is an issue that does not evaporate in the international stratosphere of an 
investment treatment claim.     
Some investment treaties contain express provisions that regulate the instance where a 
controlling shareholder is permitted to claim on behalf of and in the name of its company 
incorporated in the host State for the purpose of Article 25(2)(b) of the ICSID 
convention.
231
 Article 25(2)(b) of the ICSID Convention provided in relevant part (see 
Appendix 2): 
                                                          
229 (Merits) 11 ICSID Rep 158. 
230 Ibid. 194/section 4.3.1.  
231 Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee Model BIT, Art. 1©, UNCTAD Compendium (Vol. III, 1996) 117; 
Switzerland Model BIT, Art. 893) (‘a company which has incorporated or constituted according to the laws in force on 
the territory of the Contracting Party and which, prior to the origin of the dispute, was under the control of nationals or 
companies of the other Contracting Party, is considered, in the sense of the Convention of Washington and according to 
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‘Any Juridical person which had the nationality of the Contracting State party to the 
dispute on that date and which, because of foreign control , the parties have agreed should 
be treated as a national of another Contracting State for the purpose of this Convention.’ 
Schreuer’s analysis of the travaux préparatoires of Article 25(2)(b) of the ICSID 
Convention suggest that: 
‘A suggested solution to give access to dispute settlement not to the locally incorporated 
company but directly to its foreign owners was discarded. It was soon realized that this 
would not be feasible where shares are widely scattered and their owners are insufficiently 
organized.’232  
 
C. Legal and Beneficial Ownership of The Claim 
As with other aspects of the investment treaty regime, it is important to commence the 
analysis of the problem with a clear statement of why the solution provided by the law on 
diplomatic protection is inapposite. In the diplomatic protection context, the question is 
not the transferability of the international claim sensu stricto, but rather the transferability 
of the right of interposition by diplomatic protection that attaches to the injury suffered by 
a foreign national. 
There can be no ‘transfer of claim to diplomatic protection from one person to another’ 
because a claim to diplomatic protection does not belong to an individual but rather vests 
in the individual’s national state. What is transferred in this context is the right to a remedy 
in respect of the injury that exists within a municipal legal order in accordance with the 
applicable choice of law rule. The terminology employed by the Institute of International 
Law is therefore to be preferred:  
‘When the beneficiary of an international claim is a person other than the individual 
originally injured, the claim may be rejected by the State to which it is presented and is 
inadmissible before the court seized of it unless it possessed the national charter of the 
claimant State, both at the date of injury and at the date of its presentation.’233  
                                                                                                                                                                               
its Article 25(2)(b), as a company of the latter’), ibid. 181; UK Model BIT (1991), Art. A(2), ibid. 189; USA Model BIT 
(1994), art. 9(8), ibid. 202. 
232 C Schreuer, ‘The ICSID Convention: A Commentary’ (2001) 291 (references to documents Concerning the Origine 
and the formulation of the convention (1968) are omitted). 
233 Institute of International Law, Warsaw Session, Annuaire de l’Institut de Droit International (Vol.2, 1965) 210 (Art. 
2: ‘The National Charter of an International Claim Presented by a State for Injury Suffered by an Individual’). 
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In contradiction to diplomatic protection, the right to prosecute investment treaty 
arbitration is conferred directly upon the claiming investor. Hence there is no need for 
rules governing the requisite connection between the individual and entity who has 
suffered the injury and the national State of that individual or entity which has standing to 
present a claim. The link of nationality between the claiming investor and its national State 
is of critical importance to the tribunal’s jurisdiction ratione personae because it is the 
national identity of ownership or control over the investment that brings it within the 
framework of the investment treaty. But is less significant in relation to the admissibility 
of claims, because the interest of the investor’s national State in the prosecution of the 
investment treaty arbitration is much less prominent than the interest of the Claimant State 
in diplomatic protection.  
The policies underlying the rules of interposition for diplomatic protection and the 
relevant principles of admissibility in the investment treaty context are also fundamentally 
different. The primary function of the contentious nationality rule in diplomatic protection, 
for instance, is to prevent nationals from transferring their allegiance to more powerful 
States that might have the means to bring diplomatic pressure to bear upon the State 
causing the injury. 
In contrast, the primary concern in fashioning principles of admissibility for investment 
treaty arbitration must be the avoidance of forum shopping by the claimant once the 
dispute has arisen. 
The legal or beneficial ownership of an investment can be structured in such a way as to 
attract the protection of an investment treaty in force at the host State of the investment.
234
 
A putative investor is entitled to structure its investment so as to attract substantive 
protection of an applicable investment treaty and that entitlement is consistent with the 
object and purpose of an investment treaty, which is to encourage foreign investment by 
reducing the sovereign in the country in question.  
The legal or beneficial ownership of an investment cannot be transferred in order to 
establish the jurisdiction of an investment treaty tribunal in respect of an alleged injury to 
                                                          
234 AdT v Bolivia (Preliminary Objections) para. 330. 
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that investment attributable to measures of the host State save where the host State has 
given its express consent to such a transfer on notice of this consequence.
235
 This principle 
rests upon the principle of nemo dat quod non habet or nemo potiorem potest transferre 
quam ipse habet: an individual or entity with legal or beneficial ownership of investment 
at the time of the alleged injury to the investment cannot transfer better rights in respect of 
that investment than it had at that time. The right to prosecute investment treaty arbitration 
before an international tribunal established pursuant to a particular investment treaty is a 
valuable right that may attach to an investment and cannot be created by means of a 
transfer of legal or beneficial ownership to that investment. There has been extensive 
consideration of above principle in two cases. 
In CME Czech Republic B.V. (The Netherlands) v Czech Republic,
236
 the crucial event was 
the alleged coercion of the Media Council that culminated amendment to article 1.4.1 of 
the MOA, which purportedly altered CNTS’s rights in relation to CET 21’s television 
license. But that crucial event occurred before CME had acquired its investment.
237
  
The Tribunal held that the investment was the shares acquired by the Dutch parent 
company. The Netherlands/Czech Republic BIT accorded protection to this investment 
and that protection followed any subsequent disposition of the shares to a daughter 
company. This reasoning is consistent with the principle above because the disposition of 
the investment did not purport to create a new right under an investment treaty.   
In Aguas del Tunari, S.A. v Republic of Bolivia,
238
 The tribunal was hindered by the lack 
of clarity in which Bolivia’s preliminary objections were articulated239 and was compelled 
to rely upon its power in ICSID Arbitration Rule 41(2) to examine its jurisdiction 
independently. 
240
 Nevertheless, the ground of inadmissibility was put in contention: in the 
                                                          
235 Mihaly v Sri Lanka (Preliminary Objections) 6 ICSID Rep 310, 315/24; Impregilo v Pakistan (Preliminary 
Objections) 12 ICSID Rep 245, 273/135; Société Générlé v Domenica (preliminary Objections) para. 110; African 
Holding Co. v Congo (Preliminary Objections). 
236 (Merits) 9 ICSID Rep 121. 
237 The Czech Republic did not raise an objection to the tribunal’s jurisdiction on the basis of these facts and the tribunal 
deemed such an objection to be waived and declined to investigate its own jurisdiction ex officio (ibid. 380/188). Instead, 
the Czech Republic, for the first time at the hearing on the merits, pleaded this point as a substantive defence or a 
defence based on admissibility (ibid. 381/189, 420/197). 
238 (Preliminary Objections). 
239 (Preliminary Objections) para 84. 
240 Ibid. para. 84. 
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context of Bolivia’s ‘second objection’.241 With respect to that contention, the tribunal 
stated: 
‘On the basis of the evidence available, IWH B.V. is not simply a corporate shell set up to 
obtain ICSID jurisdiction over the present dispute. Rather IWH B.V. is a joint venture 
50% owned by Baywater and 50% owned by Edison S.p.A., an Italian corporation.’242     
There is some concern that the ’evidence available’ was insufficient for the tribunal’s 
ruling and this may well have been an instance when disclosure of the relevant documents 
should have been ordered.
243
  
Dispositions relating to the legal and beneficial ownership of the investment that occur 
after the claimant has validly failed a notice of arbitration have no effect upon the 
admissibility of its claims.
244
 Once a claim is presented, the opportunity of forum 
shopping comes to an end. Any disposition relating to the legal or beneficial ownership of 
the investment after the claim is presented should not, therefore, have an impact upon the 
admissibility of the claim. 
In EnCana v Ecuador,
245
 The tribunal ruled that, insofar as Encana was pursuing a claim 
for its own loss, the disposal of its investment was immaterial.
246
  The Author affirms that 
this conclusion must be endorsed. It is consistent with the principle which eschews any 
requirement of continuous control over the investment after the time of the alleged breach 
of the obligation forming the basis of the claim until it is presented. It is also consistent 
with above principle because there was no risk of forum shopping on the part of EnCana 
that would make the disposition of its investment relevant to the admissibility of its 
claims.  
         
                                                          
241 The assertion in the ‘second objection’ was: ‘the Claimant is not a Bolivian entity ”controlled directly or indirectly” 
by nationals of the Netherlands as required by the Netherlands-Bolivia BIT’. 
242 Ibid. para. 321. 
243 The tribunal dismissed Bolivia’s request for documentation in Procedural Order No. 1 and restated its reasons for 
doing so in: (preliminary Objections) paras. 324-7. It was stated that the tribunal’s ruling on the Bolivia’s second 
objection made the request ‘without object’ (ibid. para.327). Bolivia’s second objection was not directly concerned with 
the possible ground of inadmissibility under consideration at the time of this research and the author is not informed as 
to whether Bolivia did in fact request documents relevant to this ground. 
244 National v Argentina (Preliminary Objection) paras. 114-21; EnCana v Ecuador (Merits) 12 ICSID 427, 461/131; 
(semble) Batavian National Bank Claim 26 ILR 346 (1985); Wintershall v Argentina (Preliminary Objections) paras. 55-
60; Rumeli Telekom v Kazakhstan (merits) paras. 325-6. 
245 (Merits) 12 ICSID 427. 
246 Ibid. 461/131.  
104 
 
D. Denial of Benefits 
A ‘denial of benefits’ provision is not self-judging and must be positively established by 
the claimant and positively invoked by the respondent. The burden of the proof clearly 
falls upon the respondent host State and if that burden is discharged before the tribunal, 
then the claimant investor’s claims must be dismissed. A ‘denial of benefits’ provision 
obviously does not supply a defence to the merits of the claims; if the provision is properly 
invoked then merits of the claims will never be tested. It is thus a matter of 
admissibility.
247
 These points are best illustrated in relation to Article 17 of the ECT 
entitled ‘Non-Application of Part III in Certain Circumstances’, which reads:  
‘Each Contracting Party reserves the right to deny the advantages of this Part to: (1) a 
legal entity if citizens or nationals of a third state own or control such entity and if that 
entity has no substantial business activities in the Area of the Contracting Party in which it 
is organized.’ 
Part III of the ECT contains the substantive obligations of investment protection, whereas 
the investor/state arbitration clause is to be found in Part V of the ECT. If there were an 
express reference to Part V of the ECT in Article 17, then a Contracting Party’s reliance 
upon the ‘denial of benefits’ provision would constitute a jurisdictional objection. The 
tribunal would still have the power to rule upon this jurisdictional objection by the virtue 
of the principle of compétence de la compétence. But it is the protection that is denied by 
the Article 17 of the ECT and hence it must be characterized as going to admissibility.  
At the outset, the ultimate conclusion that if Article 17 does not go to jurisdiction then it 
must go to the merits is difficult to comprehend. As previously stated, the particular 
factors leading to a ‘denial of benefits’ have nothing to do with the merits of the claims. 
The tribunal concluded that where the Contracting Party invokes Article 17 in arbitration 
proceedings with the investor, it only has prospective effect. Insofar as the investor in any 
arbitration proceedings is seeking damages for the events of the past, this is tantamount to 
holding that the ‘denial of benefits’ clause is devoid of effect. According to the tribunal, in 
order for Article 17 to apply to events of the past, it would be incumbent upon the 
                                                          
247 This was the characterization adopted by the tribunal in relation to the ‘denial of benefits’ provision in Article 1(2) of 
the USA/Ukraine BIT in: Generation Ukraine v Ukraine (Merits) 10 ICSID Rep 236, 272/15.7 (‘this is not, as the 
Respondent appears to have assumed jurisdictional hurdle for the Claimant to overcome in the presentation of its case: 
instead it is a potential filter on the admissibility of claims which can be invoked by the respondent State.’). 
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Contracting Party to exercise its right under Article 17 before or after the investment was 
consummated. 
The claimant investor and the respondent host state entre into a legal relationship for the 
purposes of the investment treaty for the first time when the investor accepts the host 
state’s unilateral offer of arbitration by filling a notice of arbitration. It is artificial to 
interpret Article 17 in such a way so as to compel the host Contracting Party to take steps 
under the ECT before that legal relationship is consummated. Such an interpretation also 
ignores the reality of how such clauses operate in practice. Even if a Contracting Party 
made the formal ‘general declaration’ envisaged by the tribunal, it is still a matter of 
appreciation for a tribunal constituted pursuant to Article 26 of the ECT as to whether 
Article 17 applies to the circumstances of the particular investor. 
  CONCLUSION 3.4.
As it was mentioned in chapter 2, the eminence of the International Centre for the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes in the sphere of investment arbitration is undeniable. 
However, the mere existence of a dispute related to an investment does not render 
arbitration of such a dispute possible. There are certain prerequisites for an investment 
treaty tribunal to proceed to adjudge the merits of claims arising out of an investment.  
The ICSID arbitration requires that tribunals must have jurisdiction over the parties and 
the claims, and the claims must be admissible. Furthermore the host state must have 
consented to that arbitration of investment disputes.  
The purpose of this chapter was to introduce and elaborate preliminary issues relating to 
arbitrability, justciability and admissibility in investment arbitration with particular 
emphasis on critical cross analyzing of ‘admissibility’ an important terminology used in 
jurisprudence of ICSID.  
Admissibility refers to the exercise of the adjudicative power of the tribunals in arbitral 
proceedings. These terms are being employed inconsistently and with a notable 
ambivalence to the rationale for having different terms in the first place. It was discussed 
that these terms might well have suffered a downgrading in recent times.  
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The rules of admissibility, if properly invoked, may require the dismissal of the claim or 
counterclaim before the determination of its merits.  The grounds of inadmissibility at base 
represent certain legal defects in a claim that are dependent of, and yet often closely 
connected to, the substantive grounds upon which a claim or counter claim is to be 
adjudicated on the merits. Admissibility deals with the sustainability of the claim for 
adjudication on the merits.  
The investment treaty jurisprudence discloses a great deal of confusion about the extent to 
which a determination made by the tribunal on its jurisdiction or the admissibility of 
claims in a preliminary decision must be conclusive in respect of such issues. The 
confusion arises because there are certain issues of the jurisdiction and admissibility which 
require the tribunal to make an assessment of the facts asserted by the claimant in support 
of its claims on the merits.  
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4. CHAPTER FOUR: PREREQUISITES FOR INVESTMENT 
ARBITRATION – JURISDICTION 
  INTRODUCTION 4.1.
This chapter addresses the other important preliminary issue in investment arbitration, 
namely ‘jurisdiction’, which has been subject to much argumentative dialogue among 
legal practitioners and scholars alike. Admissibility and jurisdiction although very closely 
defined in lexicon, refer to different set of prerequisite terms in investment arbitration. 
There are no classified set of rules and principles within the jurisprudence on investment 
arbitration and the realm of international investment law.  
This research has a particular emphasis on the necessity of compilation of a set of rules 
that would be the reference for upholding jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals and tackling the 
waivers or arbitarbility. Lex juridictio is the proposed framework within which such 
principles and rules should be defined and classified. The Author strongly believes that 
solutions to the problems of admissibility and jurisdiction will ultimately contribute to the 
fairness and justice of the system of resolving disputes between foreign investors and host 
states. The Author also supports the hypothesis that principles of fairness and justice are a 
more legitimate source of guidance for resolving these questions than the policy objectives 
for concluding the investment treaty as revealed in its preambular clauses. There is an 
inexorable connection between the general policy of encouraging foreign investment and a 
decision to uphold jurisdiction in relation to a specific investment dispute 
What if the basis for the decision to uphold jurisdiction were in one instance to be 
universal for all future cases, what would be the consequences for the state parties to the 
treaty? Would it open the floodgates to an unlimited number of claims in respect of the 
same underlying damage to a particular investment? Would it undermine the sanctity of 
commercial contracts? Would it have a deleterious effect on the capacity of municipal 
courts to provide effective remedies? This research contests that if such questions can be 
answered in the affirmative, then the tribunal has stayed off the path towards the fair and 
legitimate interpretation of the treaty.  
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 THE EXISTENCE OF THE ADJUDICATIVE POWER–(JURISDICTION) 4.2.
To avoid negotiating the terminological quagmire as a preliminary step in explaining the 
interface and boundaries of jurisdiction from admissibility, three concepts will be 
introduced and distinguished without using the common terms of art. Instead, the relevant 
French terms are identified insofar as they are less corrupted by bad practice than their 
English equivalents.  
The existence of an adjudicative power. Have the conditions for vesting the arbitral 
tribunal with adjudicative power been satisfied? (L’attribution de la jurisdiction.) 
The scope of the adjudicative power. What are the categories of parties and disputes in 
relation to which the arbitral tribunal can adjudicate? (L’ étendue la jurisdiction.) 
The exercise of the adjudicative power. Can the arbitral tribunal exercise its adjudicative 
power in relation to the specific claims submitted to it? (Les conditions de recevabilité.) 
The two meanings ascribed to jurisdiction in this taxonomy find some support in 
international decisions. For instance, the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia gave the following elaboration of a distinction 
between ‘L’attribution de la jurisdiction’ and ‘L’ étendue la jurisdiction’ by characterizing 
an objection in relation to the constitution of the tribunal as pertaining to the former: 
‘Jurisdiction is not merely an ambit or sphere (better described in this case as 
‘competence’); it is basically – as is visible from the Latin origin of the word itself, 
juridictio – a legal power … [I]f the International Tribunal were not validly  constituted, it 
would lack the legitimate power to decide in time or space or over any person or subject-
matter. The plea based on the invalidity of constitution of the International Tribunal goes 
to the very essence of jurisdiction as a power to exercise the judicial function within any 
ambit. It is more radical than, in the sense that it goes beyond and subsumes, all the other 
pleas concerning the scope of jurisdiction. This issue is preliminary to and conditions all 
other aspects of jurisdiction.’248  
                                                          
248 Prosecutor v Dusko Tadic (Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Apeal on Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995) 
ICTY Appeals Chamber, paras 10-12. See also Corfu Channel (UK v Albania) 1948 ICJ Rep 15, 49 (Dissenting opinion 
of Judge Daxner) (‘ In my opinion , the word “jurisdiction” has two fundamental meanings in international law. the word 
is used: (1) to recognize the Court as an organ instituted for the purpose jus dicere and in order to acquire the ability to 
appear before it; (2) to determine the competence of the Court, i.e., to invest the court with the right to solve concrete 
cases’).  
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In contracts the distinction between both meanings of jurisdiction, on the one hand, and 
Les conditions de recevabilité, on the other, is more entrenched in international 
decisions.
249
 
An investment treaty tribunal is vested with adjudicatory power (jurisdiction) if a national 
of one contracting state has acquired an investment in another contracting state and the 
host state of the investment has consented to the arbitration of investment dispute. 
A. Host State’s Consent and The Investment 
The existence of the tribunal’s adjudicative power is predicated upon: (i) the consent of 
the contracting state whose economy has benefited from (ii) the investment made by a 
national of the other contracting state. The first aspect of the quid pro quo is a question of 
treaty interpretation and at this stage the tribunal’s inquiry is normally limited to 
ascertaining whether consent is recorded in the investment treaty and is valid as a matter 
of international law.  There may, however, be conditions precedent to the contracting 
state’s consent to the arbitration of investment disputes recorded in the investment treaty, 
such as the requirement for the claimant to waive the prosecution of local remedies. 
Consent to arbitration of investment disputes is considered in Chapter 8. The second 
aspect of quid pro quo concerns whether or not the foreign national has transferred 
resources to the company of the host state in the manner required to constitute an 
investment pursuant to the terms of the investment treaty. The complex issues that arise in 
relation to the investment are considered in Chapter 5. Naturally there are other conditions 
relating to the L’attribution de la jurisdiction, such as the proper constitution of the 
tribunal. This research is only concerned with those conditions unique to investment treaty 
arbitration and ICSID arbitration in particular, and hence the focus is limited to the host 
state’s consent and the foreign national’s investments. 
In this research, the existence of the tribunal’s adjudicative power by virtue of these two 
elements – the host state’s consent and the foreign national’s investment – is referred to 
                                                          
249 E.g. Interhandle (US v Switzerland) 1959 ICJ Rep 6, 20 et seq.; Nottebohm (Liechtenstein v Guatemala) 1954 ICJ 
Rep 4, 15, 25. This is not to say that it is always properly maintain. For instance, the European Court of Human Rights 
has tended to classify all preliminary objections as relating to ‘admissibility’ even when they clearly relate to the Court’s 
jurisdiction.  
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under rubric of ‘jurisdiction’. This is the first meaning ascribed to ‘jurisdiction’ to convey 
the L’attribution de la jurisdiction. It is encapsulated in the statement of the Mexican-
United States General Claims Commission in the Elton case: ‘Jurisdiction is the power of 
a tribunal to determine a case in accordance with the law creating the tribunal or a law 
prescribing its jurisdiction.’250      
This research is concerned exclusively with the substantive conditions for the existence of 
the tribunal’s adjudicative power, which are unique to investment treaty arbitration. the 
procedural conditions for establishing the tribunal’s adjudicative power would include the 
rules governing the institution of arbitral proceedings (‘la saisine’) and the method for 
constituting the tribunal. 
B. The Scope of the Adjudicative Power 
As stated above, the scope of the tribunal’s adjudicative power is circumscribed by the 
same acts that confirm the existence of that power. Those acts are the host state’s consent 
in the investment treaty to the arbitration of investment disputes and the foreign national’s 
acquisition of an investment in the host state. The various aspects of the scope of 
adjudicative power of investment arbitration tribunals are shown against the consent of the 
host state in the table below: 
Table 3: The various aspects of scope of jurisdiction 
Aspect of the scope of 
adjudicative power 
Consent of host state Investment 
Material (ratione materiae) Which type of claims can 
be submitted to 
arbitration? 
Which proprietary interests can 
be the object of the claim? 
Personal (ratione personae) Who can submit claims to 
arbitration? 
Who made the investment? 
Consensual (ratione voluntatis)  What constitutes consent 
to arbitration? 
How was the consent given? 
Temporal (ratione temporis) When did the obligations 
entered into force? 
When was the investment 
made? 
 
                                                          
250 Opinions of Commissioners, Under the Convention Concluded 8 September 1923, as extended by the Convention 
signed 16 August 1927, between the United States and Mexico. 26 September 1928 to 17 May 1929 (1929), as cited in: 
B Cheng, General Principles of Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals (1953) 259. 
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The consent of the host state recorded in the investment treaty controls the scope of the 
arbitral tribunal’s adjudicative power in several respects. First the consent defines the type 
of claims that can be submitted to arbitration and hence the material scope of the tribunal’s 
adjudicative power. Some contracting states, for instance, consent to claims based upon an 
investment treaty obligation, an investment agreement or an investment authorization.  
Other contracting states only permit claims for compensation due by virtue of an 
expropriation. Second, the timing of the host state’s consent in terms of when it acquired 
legal force determines the outer limits of the temporal scope of the tribunal’s adjudicative 
power. 
Third, the consent determines the class of persons or entities that can avail themselves of 
the arbitral mechanism in the investment treaty and hence the personal scope of the 
tribunal’s adjudicative power. The class of persons or entities is usually defined by 
reference to their having the nationality of one of the contracting parties. 
The act of making a qualified investment is also controlling for the scope of the arbitral 
tribunal’s adjudicative power in several respects. First, the proprietary interests that 
comprise the investment are the object of any investment treaty claim submitted by the 
investor to arbitration against the hos state. Hence the material scope of the tribunal’s 
adjudicative power in this respect is limited to claims having as their object such 
proprietary interests. Second, the timing of the investor’s acquisition of its investment 
determines the commencement of the substantive protection afforded by the investment 
treaty and hence the temporal scope of the tribunal‘s adjudicative power over claims based 
upon an investment treaty obligation. Third the identity of the national who made the 
investment determines the personal scope of the tribunal’s adjudicative power. 
It is the coincidence of these aspects of the host state’s consent and the foreign national’s 
investment that determines the scope of the tribunal’s adjudicative power.  As stated 
earlier, in this research the scope of the arbitral tribunal’s adjudicative power is also 
referred to as its ‘jurisdiction’ in the sense of l’ étendue de la jurisdiction. Each aspect of 
the scope of the arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction is designated by the Latin terms ratione 
materiae, ratione personae, ratione temporis and ratione voluntatis. In view of the 
particular focus of this research on ICSID arbitration, the Author has made an emphasis on 
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the critical analysis of the Material, Personal and Consensual scopes of upholding 
adjudicative power of the investment arbitration tribunals. Each of these aspects of the 
arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction is considered separately in Chapters 6, 7 and 8 that follow. 
C. The Law Applicable to Jurisdiction and Admissibility 
An investment treaty is an international instrument governed by international law; the 
arbitral tribunal is created by the investment treaty; therefore, issues relating the tribunal’s 
jurisdiction or the admissibility of claims submitted to it are to be resolved by the treaty 
and international law. Arbitral tribunals constituted to hear international or transnational 
disputes are creatures of consent. Their source of authority must ultimately be traced to the 
consent of the parties to the arbitration itself.  
Direct access of a national investor of a state contracting party to raise and pursue a claim 
against the host state contracting party does generates complex answer to the question of 
the source of arbitral tribunal’s authority. That authority must be derived from an 
agreement between the host contracting state party to the investment treaty and the 
national of another contracting state party. As the national is not a privy to the investment 
treaty itself, that international instrument cannot be the entire agreement evidencing both 
parties’ consent to arbitration.  
The consent on the part of the host contracting state to arbitrate is recorded in the 
investment treaty. The consent can be conceptualized as a unilateral offer to arbitrate. 
When a national serves a notice of arbitration upon the host contracting state party, then 
that unilateral offer must be deemed to be accepted by the national so that an agreement to 
arbitrate comes into existence.
251
 
The existence of an agreement to arbitrate is critical to the application of the ancillary 
legal regime for the conduct of arbitration and the recognition and enforcement of arbitral 
awards. ‘Consent in writing’ is also a requirement for the application of the ICSID 
Convention,
252
 which is commonly an option conferred upon the putative claimant 
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investor in investment treaties. Where such an option is not exercised, the application of 
municipal laws regulating international arbitration is also contingent upon the existence of 
an agreement in writing to arbitrate.
253
 Finally arbitration rules such as the UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules,
254
 the ICC Rules of Arbitration
255
 and the LCIA Arbitration Rules
256
 
can only be incorporated by reference into the arbitration if there is an agreement to 
arbitrate containing such reference. 
 In Occidental Exploration & Production Co. v Republic of Ecuador,
257
 the court accepted 
that, as a matter of private international law an agreement to arbitrate could in principle be 
subject to international law. From that premise, the Court considered the agreement to 
arbitrate between the parties to investment treaty arbitration: 
‘Although it is a consensual agreement, it is connected with the international treaty which 
contemplated its making, and which contains the previsions defining the scope of the 
arbitrators’ jurisdiction. Further, the protection of the investors at which the whole scheme 
is aimed is likely to be better served if the agreement to arbitrate is subject to international 
law, rather than to the law of the state against which an investor is arbitrating.’ 258 
This reasoning can be fully endorsed. The undertaking to arbitrate in the investment treaty 
itself contains those terms on jurisdiction; the validity of the agreement to arbitrate is 
contingent upon the investor claimant’s acceptance of them.  
The application of international law to the agreement to arbitrate paves the way for the 
development of an autonomous body of principles regulating issues of jurisdiction and 
admissibility for the investment treaty regime. The express provisions of the investment 
treaty and, where applicable, the ICSID Convention, are obviously the starting point for 
resolving such issues, but these provisions do not supply a comprehensive set of answers 
to every problem relating to jurisdiction and admissibility within the investment treaty 
regime.  The chapters that follow are largely concerned with the identification of the 
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problems that commonly arise in relation to the jurisdiction on the arbitral tribunal and the 
admissibility of claims, and with the possible solutions to such problems. 
It is important to distinguish between the issues relating to jurisdiction and admissibility 
from those relating to the procedure of the arbitration. Issues relating to jurisdiction and 
admissibility concern the existence, scope and exercise of the adjudicative power by the 
arbitral tribunal. The subject matter of the agreement to arbitrate is the existence, scope 
and exercise of adjudicative power by the arbitral tribunal. The Author supports the 
paradigm that the applicable sources of law to that agreement is the investment treaty and, 
where relevant, the ICSID Convention. 
The procedural rules governing the arbitration do not regulate the existence, scope and 
exercise of the adjudicative power by the arbitral tribunal but rather issues such as the 
modalities for constituting the tribunal, the taking of evidence, the conduct of hearings, 
and so on. Such rules can be derived from an international treaty (such as ICSID 
Convention),
259
 municipal laws on arbitration (such as the English Arbitration Act 1996) 
and arbitration rules (such as UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules). It is, therefore quite 
possible, and indeed normal, for international law to govern issues of jurisdiction and 
admissibility, and the municipal law of the seat of the arbitration in conjunction with the 
set of arbitration rules chosen by the parties to govern issues of procedure.      
D. Double Jurisdictional Aspect of ICSID Arbitration    
Indeed, in ICSID treaty arbitration there are two, rather than one, jurisdictional keyholes 
for any dispute.
260
 This is being referred to as one of the crucial differences of 
international investment arbitration as opposed to international commercial arbitration. A 
typical arbitration clause of a commercial contract with foreign element conventionally 
provides for (1) ‘referral to arbitration by authorizing the creation of the tribunal’ and at 
the same time stipulates (2) ‘which disputes will be within the jurisdiction of that 
tribunal’.261 For instance, the arbitral clause may provide for (1) arbitration in New York 
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under the rules of London Court of International Arbitration and may limit the jurisdiction 
of the arbitral tribunal to (2) ‘any dispute arising out of this contract’.        
By contrast, in ICSID treaty arbitration, such commercial contract is usually replaced by a BIT, 
wherein there is conventionally a referral to ICSID institution and a definition of jurisdiction.
262
 
This is being referred to as a lower jurisdictional keyhole. And it is that referral to ICSID 
institution created by the 1965 Convention on the Settlement of International Investment Disputes 
that establishes the second jurisdictional keyhole as the ICSID Convention itself contains 
limitations on the types of disputes that fall under the aegis of ICSID. These limitations form upper 
jurisdictional keyhole which the above mentioned article 25(1) of ICSID Convention establishes.   
The tribunal in CSOB v Slovak Republic held in this context:  
‘A two-fold test must therefore be applied in determining whether this Tribunal has the 
competence to consider the merits of the claim: whether the dispute arises out of an 
investment within the meaning of the Convention and, if so, whether the dispute relates to 
an investment as defined in the Parties’ consent to ICSID arbitration, in their reference to 
the BIT and the pertinent definitions contained in Article 1 of the BIT.’263 
Such ‘double requirement’ approach has been also aptly reflected in Plama case. In view 
of the accession to both Energy Charter Treaty and the ICSID Convention by Cyprus and 
Bulgaria at the time of institution of the proceedings, the company invoked the protection 
availed by the Energy Charter Treaty and its dispute resolution provision which explicitly 
refers to ICSID. Bulgaria attempted to deny ICSID jurisdiction over dispute alluding to 
uncertain ownership of Plama, which included persons who were not nationals of ECT 
Contracting States. The Tribunal rejected the Respondent’s motion and found that ‘Plama, 
as a company organized in accordance with the law applicable in Cyprus, was an investor 
of ‘another Contracting Party’ who had made an investment in the area of ‘the former 
Party’ by acquiring a substantial shareholding in a company operating in Bulgaria’. Hence, 
in Plama case the tribunal referred to lower jurisdictional keyhole and addressed the 
relevant provision of Bulgaria-Cyprus BIT to interpret if Plama was an investor in 
Bulgaria. 
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 THE CONCEPT OF SCOPE OF JURISDICTION 4.3.
A. Which Type of Claims Can Be Submitted to Arbitration? 
Fundamentally, it is notoriously difficult to establish when the protection of foreign 
nationals/entities and of their property rights matures into the protection of foreign 
investment. The aforementioned Salini test is being criticized, yet not given the effective 
and viable alternative. 
Krishnan argues that the Salini test dramatically narrows the field of transactions, which 
runs counter to the wording and travaux preparatoires of the ICSID Convention 
suggest.
264
 It is argued that under Salini test, only direct investment is considered to be in 
compliance with ICSID’s notion of investment and other forms, such as portfolio 
investments, are beyond the contours of the test. Indeed, portfolio investments do not 
necessarily entail control rights over enterprise, ‘regularity of profit and return’ or ‘certain 
duration’, as it was set forth in Salini case.265 According to Krishnan, an adequate 
definition of investment is contained in 5
th
 edition of the International Monetary Fund’s 
Balance of Payments Manual, which categorizes investment into foreign direct 
investment, portfolio investment, and other investment, thereby demonstrating that all 
three forms should be referred to as investment: 
‘Direct investment is the category of international investment that reflects the objective of 
a resident entity in one economy obtaining a lasting interest in an enterprise resident in 
another economy ... The lasting interest implies the existence of a long–term relationship 
between the direct investor and the enterprise and a significant degree of influence by the  
investor  on  the management of the enterprise ... The components of direct investment 
capital transactions are equity capital, reinvested earnings, and other capital associated 
with various intercompany debt transactions. 
Portfolio investment includes, in addition to equity securities and debt securities in the 
form of bonds and notes, money market instruments and financial derivatives such as 
options … The major components of portfolio investment which are classified under 
assets and liabilities, are equity securities and debt securities ... Debt securities are 
subdivided into bonds and notes, money market instruments, and financial derivatives that 
include a variety of new financial instruments … Equity securities cover all instruments 
and records acknowledging, after the claims of all creditors have been met, claims to the 
residual values of incorporated enterprises. 
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Other investment is  a  residual  category  […]  classified  primarily  on  an instrument 
basis [...] The instrument classification  comprises trade credits, loans, […] currency and 
deposits […] and other assets and liabilities.’ 
 
According to Krishnan, 184 states have signed International Monetary Fund’s Articles of 
Agreement thereby expressing their assent to be bound by IMF’s views and objectives.266 
It is claimed that in view of inextricable link between investments and macro-monetary 
conditions, ‘the reliance upon this elder-sibling Bretton Woods institution is apt for the 
ICSID Convention’.267  
On the opposite side of the legal argument, Schreuer advocates that Salini criteria are quite 
flexible.
268
 He strongly argues that all five elements are not onerous. According to 
Schreuer, arbitral practice evinces the fact that tribunals at times omit some elements or 
add other criteria to endorse the transaction as an investment. For instance, in L.E.S.I. 
Dipenta and L.E.S.I. Astaldi cases, the tribunal held unequivocally that ‘usefulness for the 
host state’s development’ was not a required element for an investment.269 At the same 
time, the tribunal in Phoenix v The Czech Republic discerned six elements instead of those 
five mentioned in Salini test: “(i) a contribution in money or other assets, (ii) a certain 
duration, (iii) an element of risk, (iv) an operation made in order to develop an economic 
activity in the host State, (v) assets invested in accordance with the law of the host State, 
(vi) assets invested bona fide.”270         
Schreuer contends that notwithstanding numerous attempts to codify the term 
‘investment’, the history of ICSID Convention suggests that all such endeavors failed as it 
is extremely difficult to expound on such an elusive term as investment.
271
 It is claimed 
that at the time of drafting of ICSID Convention the assumption was that in most cases 
there would be agreement in writing on consent to arbitrate thereby suggesting that if the 
parties surrendered their dispute to the competence of ICSID, such parties obviously had 
agreed that there had been investment.
272
 Pursuant to this line of argument and in view of 
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the principle of party autonomy, any transaction may be included in the meaning of 
investment by the parties’ consent.273 At the same time, as Shahabuddeen aptly notes, 
there are ‘outer limits’ set forth in article 25 of ICSID Convention,274 and transactions 
falling beyond these limits do not fall under the definition of investment as required by 
ICSID notwithstanding any agreement between the parties.
275
 In other words, parties are 
indeed at liberty to settle on what constitutes investment, but only within those ‘outer 
limits’, and beyond those ‘outer limits’ their consent is of no use when establishing 
conformity with ICSID’s requirement of investment.    
Bekker also suggests that Salini test is the exercise of Kompetenz-Kompetenz of 
arbitrators, which practically implies that it is often more beneficial to give arbitrators the 
temporary
276
 power to rule on their own competence and decide what dispute is 
arbitrable.
277
 The term ‘Kompetenz-Kompetenz’ originated in West Germany within the 
context of the debate as to whether the parties by submitting the arbitration agreement give 
the arbitrator the power to make a binding decision regarding his own jurisdiction.
278
 
Hence, as Bekker advocates, ‘adopting a definition, any definition of investment’ for the 
purposes of establishing whether a dispute is arbitrable and if that particular tribunal has 
competence to proceed to the merits of the case, is the applicability of the Kompetenz-
Kompetenz principle enshrined in article 41 of ICSID Convention by the arbitrators.  
As to pre-investment expenditures, tribunal has expressly mentioned in Mihaly v. Sri 
Lanka that business development expenses, which amount to 2%-4% of the total planned 
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investment, did not constitute ‘investment’ as it was required under applicable US-Sri 
Lanka BIT. It has been aptly articulated by Walde that a certain duration of performance 
as well as some act or an undertaking of the government ‘encouraging, inducing  or 
accepting such expenditures at first stage of an investment project followed by subsequent 
stages of more intensive investment’, is required for an early expenditure to be construed 
as ‘investment’.279 
B. Who Can Submit Claims to Arbitration? 
Caron contends that for a definition of ‘investor’ it is crucial to take into account the 
double-jurisdictional nature of ICSID arbitration. It is argued that it is not a correct 
approach to interpret the requirement of nationality contained in article 25 of ICSID 
Convention by citing awards which look at a lower keyhole, i.e. the BITs’ definition of 
‘investor’. Similarly, approach to apply a range of texts from BITs to interpret the 
meaning implied in the aforementioned article 25 is also flawed.  It is suggested that if 
encouragement of foreign investments is a goal of an emerging economy, then it is 
fundamental to define the rules of nationality with sufficient clarity so that investor 
understands what the rule is at the time of investment.
280
 
Schreuer notes that the rules on nationality of investors are largely regarded as a highly 
formalistic area of law. Schreuer refers to Tokios Tokeles v Ukraine to support this 
viewpoint, as the outcome of this case, as he claims, was emphatically contingent on 
formal criteria. The respondent in that case requested the Tribunal to ‘pierce the corporate 
veil’ claiming that the real claimants are Ukrainian nationals pursuing an international 
arbitration against their own government, which runs counter to the object and purpose of 
the ICSID Convention. In this context, the tribunal held: 
‘In our view, the definition of corporate nationality in the Ukraine-Lithuania BIT, on its 
face and as applied to the present case, is consistent with the Convention and supports our 
analysis under it. Although article 25 (2b) of the Convention does not set forth a required 
method for determining corporate nationality, the generally accepted (albeit implicit) rule 
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is that the nationality of a corporation is determined on the basis of its siege social or place 
of incorporation.’281  
In order words, the recourse to place of incorporation of a corporate entity or its siege 
social was referred to as the widely accepted position for the purposes of interpreting the 
nationality requirement. The same approach was applied in Champion Trading Co. and 
Ameritrade Int’l. Inc. v Arab Rep of Egypt.282 In Autopista v Venezuela283 it was held that 
no state, court or tribunal has the competence to set aside the corporate identity of the legal 
entity.  
Bekker notes that the question of applicability of rules of international law is relevant for 
the purposes of defining the nationality of the legal entity.
284
 International law has dealt 
with corporate nationality issues in the context of diplomatic protection which states 
afford to its juridical persons. The landmark case in this regard is considered to be 
Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company Limited, wherein the ICJ ruled: 
‘In allocating corporate entities to States for purposes of diplomatic protection, 
international law is based, but only to a limited extent, on an analogy with the rules 
governing the nationality of individuals.[….]. However, in the particular field of the 
diplomatic protection of corporate entities, no absolute test of ‘the genuine connection’ has 
found general acceptance. Such tests as have been applied are of a relative nature, and 
sometimes links with one State have had to be weighed against those with another.’ 
 
Sinclair concludes that it is doubtful if the existence of ‘genuine connection’, or the so-
called effective nationality, is ‘the correct rule of general international law in respect of 
claims against a third state’.285 According to Sinclair, no recognition of dominant and 
effective nationality rule is found in investment treaty arbitration.
286
 It is argued that 
otherwise the legal practice would come across the problematic notion of ‘the nationality 
of convenience’. At the same time, the opponent of Sinclair’s viewpoint makes reference 
to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), its article 91 and the 
phenomenon of flags of convenience. Article 91 of the UNCLOS requires ‘a genuine link 
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between the State and the flag ship’, which serves as a corroboration for those supporting 
‘the genuine link’ principle in determining the nationality of the entity.287 Bekker criticizes 
Sinclair in that the latter refers particularly to the International Law Commission and the 
International Law Association as the sources of international law. Bekker claims that these 
are subsidiary means of determining international law principles as mentioned in article 38 
of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the treaty clause which outlines 
the sources of international law to be applied by the ICJ. The UNCLOS, on the contrary, 
has been ratified by some 140 states, which is indicative of state practice and falls under 
the first three subcategories of sources in the above mentioned article 38.            
The foregoing controversy indicates the debate over applicability of incorporation, siege 
social and control formulas to attribute nationality to an entity. While the ICSID 
jurisprudence largely favors either incorporation or incorporation and siege social 
principles to determine corporate nationality, and as one of the first ICSID cases clearly 
supports the same criteria,
288
 it is noteworthy that international law and ICSID 
jurisprudence underwent important changes, and there exist divergent views on the issue 
of corporate nationality.
289
   
The proponents of incorporation/siege social theory argue that the first part of article 25 of 
ICSID Convention sets forth the general rule of attribution (‘any juridical person which 
had the nationality of a Contracting State other than the State party to the dispute on the 
date on which the parties consented to submit such dispute to conciliation or arbitration’), 
while the second part of it becomes an exception (‘any juridical person which had the 
nationality of the Contracting State party to the dispute on that date and which, because of 
foreign control, the parties have agreed should be treated as a national of another 
Contracting State for the purposes of this Convention’). 290 Astorga claims that if a legal 
entity, national of host state, can be treated as a foreigner because of foreign control, it is 
construed that the common rule of defining the host state nationality is other than ‘control’ 
test. Hence, the company can be a national of the host state due to its incorporation 
therein, but can be treated as a foreigner for the purposes of article 25 of ICSID 
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Convention as an exception. As Astorga puts it, control appears to be the exception, while 
other methods, such as incorporation or siege social and the mix thereof, constitute the 
general norm.        
In this regard, Broches argued that article 25 implicitly assumed incorporation as the 
criterion of nationality, but this was not an exhaustive list of criteria to attribute corporate 
nationality. Broches pointed to the importance of the flexibility and advocated the 
approach which would take into account economic realities such as ownership and control, 
but at the same time warning that ICSID objectives must be complied with.     
On the other hand, Walde argues that it is commonplace that law and legal thinking lags 
behind economic reality. According to Walde, the majority of publicly-traded companies 
nowadays cannot be linked to solely one country with different institutional shareholders 
residing globally and with ownership structures which changes within days. It becomes 
virtually impossible to detect the ownership, which means that there is a movement 
towards global claimant in a global economy. But, as Walde contends, this will not be fast 
movement as legal practice and thinking do not accept fast movement.    
C. What constitutes ‘Consent to Arbitration’? 
Blyschak notes that although state’s consent to waive its sovereign immunity is the 
cornerstone of investor-State arbitration, many states are of opinion that ‘their consent has 
been taken for granted, illegitimately expanded and exploited’.291   
Harten and Loughlin outline the difference between a sovereign consent to investment 
arbitration and that of private party to commercial arbitration. It is claimed that a private 
party’s consent to commercial arbitration is expressly given to the dispute in question or is 
specific to the private relationship within which the dispute has arisen. In contrast, a 
state’s consent to investment arbitration is by and large ‘an agreement to the compulsory 
arbitration of future disputes with investors as a group.’292  
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Advance consents to arbitration under the aegis of ICSID Convention can be found in 
about twenty investment laws and 900 bilateral investment treaties.
293
 According to Pate, 
many of such investment laws globally are ambiguously worded. The findings of his 
research state that while few investments laws seem to have a common substantive 
reference to ICSID arbitration, most of investment laws generate legal argument as to 
interpretation of dispute resolution procedures.
294
  
Shihata argues that in some instances, investment laws were drafted ‘on a condition for 
presentation of a loan to the Bank’s Board, or for the effectiveness of the loan 
agreement’.295 It is claimed that while such approach may guarantee some development in 
legislative sphere, it may not necessarily imply that ‘sufficient deliberations have taken 
place to achieve appropriate legislative changes’.296 Pate holds that when a state makes 
unilateral declarations and thereby allures investors to make an investment, this creates a 
legitimate expectation that a binding legal obligation of a state has arisen.
297
 
In this context, Lauterpacht also asserts that this is also compliant with the doctrine of 
estoppel which, albeit having its roots in common law jurisprudence, has been recognized 
by a number of scholars as a principle applicable in international law practice.
298
 This has 
been also opined by ICSID tribunal in Amco v Indonesia, where it held that ‘the Tribunal 
is of the view that the same general principle is applicable in international economic 
relations where private parties are involved; [i]n addition, the Tribunal considers that, in 
particular for its applications in international relations, the whole concept is characterized 
by the requirement of good faith’.299 
Pate rightfully notes that such unilateral offers of the states to arbitrate has spurred 
criticism and mixed reactions.
300
 Proponents of liberal investment regime believe that this 
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is a good trend and is indicative of the good faith requirement. It is claimed that ‘states 
should not be concerned provided that they intend to comply with their obligations vis-à-
vis foreign investors’.301 However, the problem may arise due to ‘possibility that the 
dispute resolution provisions will be used veraciously against a blameless host state.’302  
Pate believes that, in view of controversial Lybian oil arbitrations, there had been ‘inherent 
biases’ against emerging economies in the past.303 In this context, Paulsson claims that 
while it may have been true in the beginning of twentieth century up until 1950s, this is no 
longer true today.
304
 To support this viewpoint, Delaume argues that the majority of 
scholars and practitioners today are of the view that developing states are in a position to 
successfully enforce their rights by means of arbitral proceeding and execute arbitral 
awards that are rendered in their favor.
305
  
Schreuer, however, warns that such approach may be acceptable provided states make 
unilateral offers to arbitrate and obtain reciprocal rights.
306
 Paulsson is of the same view 
advocating that ‘this new world of arbitration is one where the claimant need not have a 
contractual relationship with the defendant, and where the tables could not be turned, the 
defendant could not have initiated the arbitration’.307  
Nolan and Sourgens also note that interplay between articles 25(1), 71 and 72 of ICSID 
Convention is lacking scholarly deliberation.
308
 This is also the reflection of the ICSID 
history as to consent withdrawal - Bolivia only recently became the first state ever to 
denunciate its consent to arbitrate under ICSID Convention.  On the other hand, Nolan and 
Sourgens note that the ‘offer-and-acceptance’-based approach implies that a state only 
becomes subject to ICSID jurisdiction when its offer is accepted by an investor. In this 
regard, Orrego suggests that the ICSID Convention was drafted with a contractual type of 
consent in mind.  
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The Author argues that a state’s consent to ICSID is more than the offer; it is rather an 
obligation. The above mentioned aspects are centered primarily on the issue of 
interpretative practices. Schreuer suggests that relevant interpretative practices are 
considered to be a recurrent theme raised in arbitral proceedings before ICSID tribunals. 
Andreeva contends that in the context of BITs or MITs, wherein states are considered to 
offer investors to arbitrate if a dispute arises, consent should not be interpreted with 
reference to traditional rules, and instead, it should be governed by the rules applicable to 
unilateral acts. Above mentioned restrictive versus effective interpretation principles are 
invoked, however no legal consensus is reached at which of these principles carry weight 
and will do justice to consent clause.
309
  
  CONCLUSION 4.4.
The existence of a legal dispute concerning an investment is a jurisdictional requirement in 
investment arbitration. If proceedings are to be conducted under the ICSID Convention, 
the test is that there is a ‘legal dispute arising directly out of an investment’ [Article 
25(1)]. Each of these elements, the existence of the dispute, and the existence of an 
investment may raise jurisdictional questions.   
Respondents have sometimes argued that the tribunal lacked jurisdiction because the 
dispute before it was not legal but rather of a political or economic nature. Tribunals have 
invariably rejected these arguments, since the claims had been presented in legal terms.  
The existence, scope and exercise of the adjudicative power of ICSID arbitration tribunals 
is determined by conformity with the criteria expressly emphasized within article 25(1) 
and (2) of ICSID Convention with respect to investment, nationality and consent. 
Investors and host states have tried to reject jurisdiction of ICSID tribunals by way of 
questioning the Personal, Subject and consensual jurisdictional prerequisites of a claim.  
These were briefly discussed in this chapter, but will be elaborated and analyzed in detail 
in Chapters 6 to 8.  
                                                          
309 C Schreuer, ‘ICSID Dispute Resolution: UNCTAD Handbook’, p. 34. 
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Jurisprudence of ICSID presently falls short of clear and conclusive definitions for notions 
of investor, investment and consent. Consequently such inadequacies have led to 
controversial awards by ICSID tribunals. These deficiencies, incoherencies and 
doubtfulness within jurisprudence of ICSID and its arbitral awards have been the main 
motive for the present research.  
The author has proposed the relevance of an autonomous body of principles and rules 
regulating issues of jurisdiction and admissibility for investment treaty arbitration. This 
proposition might be considered very bold, given past failures in this respect and because 
considerable obstacles would have to be overcome before any unification could be 
reached. 
A more coordinated and collective approach towards such issues that seek to enhance 
multilateral consensus building could have several advantages, namely a gradual 
harmonization effect on the arbitration system, an increase in clarity and stability of 
investment relations, an improvement on the consistency of its awards.  
It is manifested that the proposed clarity and coherency in tackling jurisdictional and 
admissibility issues will ultimately contribute to the fairness and justice of the system for 
resolving disputes between foreign investors and host states.  
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5. CHAPTER FIVE: PREREQUISITES FOR INVESTMENT 
ARBITRATION – ARBITRABILITY 
  INTRODUCTION 5.1.
 
It is defined that it is the agreement to arbitrate – often the arbitration clause embedded in 
a contract between the parties – which renders an arbitral proceeding possible. However, 
an unwilling party may undertake steps to eventually avoid  the arbitration process by 
claiming that the contract between them is either null or was void from the very beginning 
(and thereby jeopardizing the validity of the arbitration clause) or that there was even no 
agreement to arbitrate and further involve the (sometimes non-neutral) judiciary to finally 
settle the dispute. This notorious maneuver is normally aimed to waive the admissibility of 
the claim/dispute best classified by the Author as waivers of ‘arbitrability’.  
In the author’s opinion, the authority to decide the very jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal 
per se even in the event of party challenging the validity/existence of the commercial 
contract and/or validity/existence of the arbitration clause  (arbitrability) shall be extended 
to many if not most instances. To elaborate the foregoing, this chapter further provides the 
background for the solutions that were found to address the situation if a party to a 
commercial contract is willing to avoid arbitration by challenging the validity/existence of 
the underlying contract or by questioning the validity/existence of the agreement to 
arbitrate - the separability doctrine and the competence-competence principle respectively.  
This chapter will address queries such as: What is the theoretical framework for these 
solutions? What is the rationale for applying them? How are they correlated with each 
other? To address these issues, current academic debate surrounding these concepts, and 
the main criticisms these solutions face are further discussed.  
Additionally, it is the internal law of the host state, which is frequently viewed as being 
the lex contractus – law governing the contract –hence, comparative analysis of a number 
of domestic law regimes and their procedural rules as to the aforementioned principles of 
separability and competence-competence would be of interest. 
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  THE AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE 5.2.
The literature on international commercial arbitration heavily debates the topic of 
distribution of powers between courts and arbitrators in case if a challenge is brought with 
regard to the contract that contains an agreement to arbitrate (that gives arbitrators an 
authority to arbitrate a dispute) and, yet, the arbitration agreement/clause itself.
310
 Such a 
situation draws an interesting picture.  
Firstly, if a party challenges the validity or even existence of the commercial contract, it 
consequently jeopardizes the validity or existence of the arbitration agreement, thereby 
nullifying the arbitrators' competence.
311
    
Secondly, it is manifest that if a party to a contract claims that there was no arbitration 
agreement, i.e. the arbitration clause, at all, it would be logically inconsistent to silently 
leave them a power to hear a particular case.
312
 It is asserted that arbitrators receive their 
authority from the parties' agreement and ‘a challenge to this agreement's validity or 
existence would logically leave them powerless to hear a case until it was determined that 
the agreement was indeed effective, conferring on them authority to resolve the relevant 
disputes’ [emphasis added].313 The above mentioned illustration implies a need for 
interference of a third party whose competence is not questioned and such a role is often 
played by courts.
314
  
                                                          
310 C Petrus, ‘Spanish perspectives on the doctrines of kompetenz-kompetenz and separability: a comparative analysis of 
Spain's 1988 Arbitration Act’ (2000), 11 Am. Rev. Int'l Arb. 397, p. 397. See, for example, also: W Park, ‘The 
Arbitrability Dicta in First Options v. Kaplan: What Sort of Kompetenz-Kompetenz Has Crossed the Atlantic?’ (1996) 
12 ARB. INT'L 2, p 137, W. Park, ‘Determining Arbitral Jurisdiction: Allocation of Tasks Between Courts and 
Arbitrators’ (1997), 8 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 133, A Rau, ‘The Arbitrability Question Itself’ (1999) 10 AM. REV. 
INT'L ARB. 287, J Rosen, ‘Arbitration Under Private International Law: The Doctrines of Separability and Compétence 
de la Compétence’ (1997), 17 FORDHAM INT'L L.J., p. 599, H Smit, ‘The Arbitration Clause: Who Determines Its 
Validity and Its Personal and Subject Matter Reach?’ (1995), 6 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 395, C Svernlov, ‘What Isn't, 
Ain't: The Current Status of the Doctrine of Separability’ (1991), 8 J. INT'L ARB. 4, p. 37.  
311 W Park, ‘Determining arbitral jurisdiction: allocation of tasks between courts and arbitrators’ (1997), 8 Am. Rev. Int'l 
Arb. 133, pp. 142-143; S Bennett, ‘Developing American approach to arbitrability’ (2003), Dispute Resolution Journal, 
February-April, p. 6. 
312 For example, A. Samuel, ‘Jurisdictional problems in International commercial arbitration: a study of Belgian, Dutch, 
English, French, Swedish, Swiss, U.S. and West German Law’ (1989) as cited in C. Petrus, ‘Spanish perspectives on the 
doctrines of kompetenz-kompetenz and separability: a comparative analysis of Spain's 1988 Arbitration Act’ (2000), 11 
Am. Rev. Int'l Arb. 397, p. 397. 
313 C. Petrus, ‘Spanish perspectives on the doctrines of kompetenz-kompetenz and separability: a comparative analysis of 
Spain's 1988 Arbitration Act’ (2000), 11 Am. Rev. Int'l Arb. 397, p. 397. 
314 Ibid. At pp. 397-398. 
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Nevertheless, the judicial intervention to determine whether the agreement to arbitrate is 
effective in case of a challenge to the validity of a contract or an arbitration agreement 
itself in order to solely establish the jurisdictional authority of the arbitral tribunal seems, 
in practice, quite unreasonable.
315
 In this regard, potential pitfalls and disadvantages of 
such a judicial intervention are going to be addressed in detail below.  
In general, perhaps not absolutely logical, but a practical perspective states that it is often 
more beneficial to give arbitrators the temporary power to rule on their own 
competence.
316
 For instance, Gross expresses it in terms of convenience and logic by 
claiming that such temporary power ‘addresses this problem and this need by placing 
convenience ahead of logic, albeit within certain limits.’317 Additionally, as it was 
interestingly and quite correctly expressed by Lee, ‘it is actually a ‘chicken-or-egg-first’ 
issue’.318    
In this context, the legal academia arrived at the conclusion that arbitrators at least need to 
be allowed the power to ascertain provisionally whether they have competence to hear a 
particular case or not. Two legal solutions were found: the principle of separability of 
arbitration clause and the doctrine of competence-competence. It should be noted, 
however, that these solutions are not alternatives to each other.  
  LEGAL RESOLUTIONS TO UPHOLD ARBITRABILITY 5.3.
As it has been pointed out earlier, an agreement to arbitrate is the cornerstone of any 
arbitral proceeding.
319
 Hence, the legal logic states a valid arbitration is the consequence 
of a valid agreement to arbitrate. It is the arbitration agreement that is a source for 
arbitrators to define their competence and power in regard of a dispute in question.
320
  
There are generally two basic types of arbitration agreements: the arbitration clause and 
the submission agreement.
321
 The former, however, is more popular. In other words, such 
                                                          
315 Ibid. At p. 398. 
316 J Barcelo, ‘Who decides the arbitrators’ jurisdiction? Separability and competence-competence in transnational 
perspective’ (2003), 36 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational law 1114, pp. 1116-1118. 
317 P Gross, ‘In Competence of Competence: An English View’ (1992), 8 Arb. Int'l 206.   
318 See, T H Lee, ‘Encyclopedia of international commercial litigation.’ 
319 A Redfern, Law and practice of international commercial arbitration, (4th edition, Sweet & Maxwell 2004) page 6.  
320 Ibid. page 155 
321 Ibid.  
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an arbitration agreement is included in the main contract as an arbitration clause and 
entitles the parties to submit future disputes to arbitration.
322
   
A. Doctrine of ‘Separability’ of Arbitration Clause 
The doctrine of separability/severability/autonomy
323
 of arbitration clause is alluded to as 
‘the conceptual cornerstone’ of arbitration law and particularly that within the 
international context.
324
The doctrine of separability of arbitration clause stipulates that the 
latter is ‘separable’ from the contract containing it.325 Broadly speaking, separability 
signifies that the invalidity of the parties' commercial contract does not necessarily 
invalidate the agreement of these parties in that contract to arbitrate disputes arising under 
that contract. Szurski claims that the essential practical advantage of the doctrine is that it 
constitutes a serious obstacle, for a party willing to delay or repudiate his arbitration 
agreement, to nullify the arbitration clause by questioning in court the existence or validity 
of the arbitration agreement through challenging the validity of the main contract.
326
 
The doctrine of separability is approved by a number of institutional and international 
rules of arbitration.
327
 For instance, the UNCITRAL Model Law lays down that: 
‘… [t]he arbitration clause which forms part of a contract shall be treated as an agreement 
independent of the other terms of the contract.’328    
Similarly, the London Court of International Arbitration prescribes in its rules that: 
‘[a]n arbitration clause which forms or was intended to form part of another agreement 
shall be treated as an arbitration agreement independent of that other agreement.’329  
                                                          
322 Ibid. 
323 For the purposes of this paper, these terms are used interchangeably.  
324 J Barcelo, ‘Who decides the arbitrators’ jurisdiction? Separability and competence-competence in transnational 
perspective’ (2003), 36 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational law 1114, pp. 1114-1115; Rau, A, ‘Everything you really 
need to know about “separability” in seventeen simple propositions’ (2003), 14 Am. Rev. Int'l Arb. 1, p. 1 
325 K Davis, ‘A Model for arbitration law: autonomy, cooperation and curtailment of state power’ (1999), 26 Fordham 
Urb. L.J. 167, p.196; A Rau, ‘The arbitrability question itself’ (1999), 10 Am. Rev. Int'l Arb. 287, p. 331; A Rau, 
‘Everything you really need to know about “separability” in seventeen simple propositions’ (2003), 14 Am. Rev. Int'l 
Arb. 1, p. 2; Huber, S., Arbitration and Contract (August 19, 2003). 
326 Szurski, p. 76 as cited in A Redfern, A et al, Law and practice of international commercial arbitration, 4th edition, see 
supra, p. 193. 
327 J Barcelo, ‘Who decides the arbitrators’ jurisdiction? Separability and competence-competence in transnational 
perspective’ (2003), 36 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational law 1114, pp. 1114-1115; T Oehmke, ‘Separability 
doctrine’, 1Commercial Arbitration § 20:15 (Last updated December 2006); A Maniruzzaman, ‘The new law of 
international commercial arbitration in Bangladesh: a comparative perspective’ (2003), 14 Am. Rev. Int'l Arb. 139, 
pp.149-150. 
328 UNCITRAL Model law on International Commercial arbitration, art.16(1). 
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B. Rationales for Separability Doctrine 
The following arguments validate the underlying necessity of the doctrine of separability 
of arbitration clause. Monestier affirms that the rejection of the separability doctrine's 
application to contracts may lead to unfair permission for one party to evade his 
contractual obligations.
330
 Furthermore, Petrus appropriately notes that the separability 
doctrine is necessary to execute parties' explicit or implicit intent on the issue that any and 
all conflicts between them be arbitrated, including disputes about the validity of the 
contract between them.
331
 It is true to add that if the clause is considered to be invalidated 
contrary to the separability principle, there will be nothing left for a party (especially that 
which is in genuine need) to hope for.  
Firstly, Redfern asserts that ‘it would be entirely self-defeating if a breach of contract or a 
claim that the contract was voidable
332
 was sufficient to terminate the arbitration clause as 
well; this is one of the situations in which the arbitration clause is most needed.’333 
Maniruzzaman claims that the inclusion of an arbitration clause at least provides the 
parties with the chance to ‘ventilate their grievances through it about the principal 
agreement whatever they may be’.334Secondly, as Smit states, the treatment of arbitration 
clause as independent from the contract is justified on the ground that these are different 
kinds of agreements, i.e. the arbitration clause involves issues of procedural dispute 
resolution whereas the contract touches upon the substantive rights and obligations of the 
parties in their contractual relationship.  
A good parallel is made by Judge Stephen M. Schwebel who equalizes a contract 
containing an arbitration clause to two agreements, consisting of a contractual ‘twin’ and 
an arbitral ‘twin’; and the latter ‘survives any birth defect or acquired disability of the 
principal agreement’.335 Park relates the need for application of the separability principles 
                                                                                                                                                                               
329 LCIA Arbitration Rules, Art. 23.1.  
330 T Monestier, Nothing comes of nothing or does it? A critical re-examination of the doctrine of separability in 
American arbitration, (2001) 12 Am. Rev. Int'l Arb. 223, p. 236. 
331 C Petrus, ‘Spanish perspectives on the doctrines of kompetenz-kompetenz and separability: a comparative analysis of 
Spain's 1988 Arbitration Act’, (2000) 11 Am. Rev. Int'l Arb. 397, p. 401 
332 For the definition, see below. 
333 A Redfern, et al, Law and practice of international commercial arbitration, see supra, p. 193 
334 A Maniruzzaman, ‘The new law of international commercial arbitration in Bangladesh: a comparative perspective’ 
(2003), 14 Am. Rev. Int'l Arb.139, p.150. 
335 R Smit, ‘Separability and Competence-competence in international arbitration: ex nihilo nihil fit? Or can something 
indeed come from nothing?’ (2002) 13 Am. Rev. Int'l Arb. 19, p. 19.  
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to the issue of integrity of the arbitral process.
336
 It is implied that the separability doctrine 
is an indispensable conceptual principle that is used in order to preserve the autonomy and 
integrity of the arbitration.
337
 Otherwise, without the principle of severable arbitration 
clause, a party would be able to avoid or delay arbitration merely by questioning, in court 
or in the arbitration, the contract in which the arbitration agreement is found.
338
  
And the application of the separability is deemed to be fundamentally important within the 
international context, in particular in terms of foreign investment, due to the fact that a 
foreign investor wouldn’t engage in business transactions with the host state if there is no 
basis for a neutral arbitration forum in case if the latter challenges the validity of their 
contract thereby escaping the arbitration of the dispute in question.
339
 To clarify, it was 
claimed that ‘the elimination of all uncertainties by agreeing in advance on a forum 
acceptable to both parties is an indispensable element in international trade, commerce, 
and contracting’.340  
It is again true as it is obvious that otherwise it may lead to the business community's loss 
of confidence in arbitration as an efficient and effective dispute resolution mechanism. 
Additionally, Samuel advances the view that in the absence of the separability doctrine, 
arbitrators would be allowed to hear only claims where parties do not raise the objections 
in regard of the existence, validity of the main contract, which is definitely unrealistic 
since the party at fault would certainly do its best to avoid liability.
341
  
This obviously restrains the direct effectiveness of arbitration agreements by limiting them 
to claims that do not question the validity, existence or presence of the agreement to 
arbitrate.  
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C. Doctrine of ‘Competence-Competence’ 
The term ‘kompetenz-kompetenz’ originated in West Germany within the context of the 
debate as to whether the parties by submitting the arbitration agreement give the arbitrator 
the power to make a binding decision regarding his own jurisdiction.
342
   
In this regard, the doctrine of competence-competence or kompetenz-kompetenz
343
 has 
asserted that a tribunal has jurisdiction to decide on challenges to its own jurisdiction.
344
 
To put it another way, in accordance with the competence-competence principle, 
arbitrators are entitled to decide challenges to the arbitration agreements which stipulates 
for their authority to resolve the dispute in question by themselves. This doctrine has 
received a widespread, but not full,
345
 recognition in the national and institutional rules on 
international commercial arbitration.
346
  
For example, the UNCITRAL Model Law stipulates that: 
‘[t]he arbitral tribunal may rule on its own jurisdiction, including any objections with 
respect to the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement…’347   
D. Rationales for Competence-Competence Principle   
The need for the competence-competence doctrine is grounded in a number of arguments.  
Firstly, like separability, it serves as the instrument of bringing into reality the parties' 
implied or explicit intent that any and all disputes arising out of their relationship be 
arbitrated.
348
 As in above mentioned case with the severability principle, this is especially 
useful in international transactions.
349
 It is appropriately stated by Smit that ‘the parties of 
different nationalities generally expect and intend that any and all disputes about their 
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contractual relationship, including disputes about their agreement to arbitrate, will be 
resolved in a neutral, non-national arbitral forum.’350  
Furthermore, Wyss argues that the complexity and specific nature of some arbitration 
proceedings often drive parties to seek arbitral, rather than judicial, dispute resolution in 
the first place. In this regard, Sandrock claims that in the context of international 
arbitration; 
 ‘[t]hese reasons include: greater knowledge of arbitrators about sophisticated international 
commercial matters; confidentiality of the proceedings; better command of foreign 
languages by arbitrators, which dispenses with the need for furnishing translations and 
employing interpreters; other economies of expense; the relative speed of arbitration 
proceedings.’351  
Additionally, as with separability, the doctrine significantly contributes to the maintenance 
of the arbitral tribunal's autonomy and capacity to operate without undue external 
interference. Otherwise, a party to an arbitration agreement would be able to frustrate or 
delay the arbitration merely by challenging the parties' arbitration agreement and insisting 
upon judicial determination of that challenge.    
E. Corollary of Separability and Competence-Competence  
Born contends that the separability and competence-competence doctrines are ‘corollaries’ 
of each other as ‘the separability doctrine implies the arbitrator's power to consider his 
own jurisdiction’.352 Actually, most rules on international commercial arbitration and 
foreign arbitration statutes approach these two principles in one article.  
As was mentioned earlier, they are not alternatives to each other. Instead, these doctrines 
are considered to be of complementary use. For example, if a contract appeared to be 
invalid due to, for instance, its illegal object and the challenge to the validity of arbitration 
agreement was made; a following scenario would be derived. Firstly, arbitrators in any 
way shall first decide the issue of their competence in order to proceed to the merits stage 
                                                          
350 See R Smit, see supra, p. 26. 
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of a dispute resolution. This appears to be in the jurisdictional phase of the arbitral 
proceeding and is considered to be in compliance with the doctrine of prima facie.  
And in order to decide whether they are competent to arbitrate the issue given that the 
challenge to the validity of the arbitration agreement is made arbitrators resort to the 
principle of competence-competence. In this regard, it is reasonable to mention that the 
separability and competence-competence intersect here only in the sense that arbitrators 
who rule on their own jurisdiction will envisage the arbitration clause alone, not to the 
entirety of the contract, because in accordance with the separability doctrine the clause is 
considered to be autonomous from the underlying contract.  
It is appropriately asserted that separability principle would permit arbitrators to find the 
main contract invalid (due to its illegal object) without thereby destroying their authority 
to render an award pursuant to the arbitration clause.
353
 The separability doctrine would 
not, however, make the arbitration agreement itself valid if a person who signed the 
agreement had no power to do so.
354
 In turn, competence-competence principle allows 
arbitrators to examine the power of the person who signed the contract. But, as Park 
claims:  
‘under competence-competence principle standing alone, without the sister doctrine of 
separability, the arbitrators could not declare the main contract void for illegality without 
thereby undermining their jurisdiction to do so’.355 
Significantly, it should be kept in mind that they are still different conceptions and should 
not be confused. In fact, sometimes there is misinterpretation of the doctrine of 
separability and that of competence-competence.
356
 Separability says nothing about the 
validity of the arbitration clause itself.
357
 The fact that an arbitration clause might be valid 
even if there are imperfections in other contract terms and conditions does not lead to 
express affirmation that the clause itself will be valid.  
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So, in fact, these principles are considerably distinct, being, however, very closely 
intertwined. In other words, it is defined that the separability doctrine, on one hand, 
ensures the power of arbitral body to decide challenges to the contract containing the 
arbitration clause, not the arbitration clause itself, which, in case of absence of the 
competence-competence principle in the procedural rules of the arbitral proceeding, are 
reserved for the courts. The competence-competence doctrine, on the other hand, vests the 
jurisdictional power on the arbitral tribunal to decide challenges to the arbitration clause 
itself.
358
 Smit, for example, provided a very comprehensive explanation when stating that 
‘while separability addresses the issue of ‘who decides’ challenges to the contract, 
competence-competence addresses the second-tier issue of ‘who decides who decides’ 
challenges to the contract’.359  
F. Criticism, Problems and Arguments 
Arbitration clause is normally very short. Such arbitration agreements for the dispute 
resolution which may possibly appear in the future usually are not elaborative. The reason 
is that parties do not know what kind of disputes may arise and how they can best be 
settled.
360
 The other motive may be the case that although parties to a contract may agree 
to such an arbitration agreement, they may be of strong opinion that there will be even no 
need to resort to it.   
Most international arbitrations take place in accordance with an arbitration clause inserted 
into a contract between the relevant parties. These clauses are often called as ‘midnight 
clauses’361 since they are the last clauses to be drafted in contract negotiations that 
sometimes effectuate late at night or early in the morning. As a result, insufficient 
attention is given to the details of the dispute settlement and often an inoperative and 
substandard agreement is accepted.
362
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indeed come from nothing?’ (2002) 13 Am. Rev. Int'l Arb. 19, p. 31-32. 
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361 Ibid. 
362 Ibid. 
137 
 
However, the severable nature of the arbitration clause also spurred much debates and 
criticism. Smit contends that many parties to a contract ‘would be surprised to hear that 
they have signed not one but two separate agreements’, as the doctrine of severability of 
arbitration clause postulates.
363
  
The United States, as was previously mentioned, continuously resist the acceptance of the 
competence-competence principle. For example, in Sphere Drake Ins. Ltd v All American 
Ins. Co.
364
 case, Judge Easterbrook considered that ‘courts have jurisdiction to determine 
their jurisdiction not only out of necessity but also because their authority depends on 
statutes rather than parties' permission’ and, actually, the statutory authority is not subject 
to validity/existence challenges unlike the authority derived from the parties’ consent is. It 
is claimed that ‘arbitrators lack a comparable authority to determine their own authority 
because there is a non-circular alternative (the judiciary) and because the parties do control 
the existence and limits of an arbitrator's power’.365    
The criticism of competence-competence doctrine has a practical backbone as well, and a 
practical perspective seems to be more interesting. It is argued that arbitrators may not rule 
with entire objectivity on the question of their jurisdiction where they have a financial 
interest in upholding their competence over the case and consequently obtain the arbitrator 
fees.
366
 Walt appropriately notes that arbitrators are more than courts biased with respect 
to the existence of the arbitration issue as the compensation for private judges motivates 
them to find jurisdiction in any particular dispute.
367
 In Outtley v. Sheepshead Nursing 
Home, Trafalgar Shipping Co. v. Int'l Milling Co the same opinion was articulated. To 
clarify, ‘once they have bitten the enticing fruit of controversy, they are not apt to stay the 
satisfying of their appetite after one bite’.368  
Despite the widespread criticism that the aforementioned principles face, as of today there 
are a vast number of jurisdictions in Europe and America and, as was previously 
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369, p .408-410.  
368 Trafalgar Shipping Co. v. Int'l Milling Co., 401 F.2d 568, 573 (2d Cir. 1968); Outtley v. Sheepshead Nursing Home, 
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mentioned, international conventions and rules which regulate institutional procedure of 
international arbitration, that uphold to a great degree these principles.
369
  
However, it continues to be ambiguous and, moreover, unsettled in some jurisdictions 
what is the extent, the moment and the manner in which courts may or must intervene in 
the arbitration proceedings to adjudicate issues of arbitral body's competence or 
incompetence over the dispute prior to the moment when arbitrators grant final award on 
the merits. 
As to the competence-competence, there exist situations when early court intervention 
saves time and expense. Firstly, there situations include a circumstance when the parties’ 
agreement to arbitrate is obviously lacking. It is suggested that a resort to the judiciary in 
order to obtain a court’s declaration that the arbitrators lack authority should be allowed, 
when the contract between these parties does not reasonably contain any arbitration 
agreement/clause.
370
 It is reasonable to affirm that the intervention in this case does save 
spending of time and funds.  
However, it is not clear whether such an early court's declaration or intervention would be 
of help in case if, despite a challenge to the validity of the arbitration agreement, it appears 
prima facie that parties have agreed to arbitrate, or when parties have expressly agreed to 
give arbitrators power to decide on their competence. Another example when a court's 
early intervention would be unreasonable is when only the arbitral body's personal reach 
(who is bound by the agreement) and the subject matter reach are subject to a challenge, 
but not the validity of the agreement to arbitrate itself.         
Furthermore, the U.S. practice with respect to the separability doctrine is also worth 
elaborating. The court usually easily applies the separability doctrine to challenges that a 
contract containing an arbitration clause is ‘voidable’. A definition of ‘voidable’ applies to 
contracts, which exist but are subject to annulment. On the other hand, there is another 
                                                          
369 For example, in Germany: Zivil prozessordnung art. 1037; in England: Christopher Brown Ltd. v. Genosseenschaft 
Osterreichischer Waldbesitzer Holzwirtschaftsbetriebe Registrierte Genossenschaft mit beschrankter Haftung, [1954] 1 
Q.B.  8; ICC Rules of Arbitration: Art. 6 (4); UNCITRAL Model Law: Art. 16.   
370 C Petrus, ‘Spanish perspectives on the doctrines of kompetenz-kompetenz and separability: a comparative analysis of 
Spain's 1988 Arbitration Act’ (2000) 11 Am. Rev. Int'l Arb. 397, p. 399. 
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type of a contract that raised a huge debate among the academic world: a distinction is 
drawn between a contract which is voidable and the one which is ‘void ab initio’.  
Hence, in the US the separability principle is applied solely in cases where the underlying 
contract satisfies all the necessary elements of contract formation, but is subject to 
rescission on the basis, for example, of fraud or duress. Where it is claimed that the 
contract containing the arbitration provision never came into existence due to some 
deficiency in contract formation, the U.S. courts have generally refused to refer to the 
doctrine, applying the rationale that a valid arbitration provision cannot be severed from a 
‘contract’ that never came into legal existence.  
The basic reason why courts reject to apply the separability doctrine to claims that the 
contract containing the arbitration clause never came into existence or is otherwise void 
was perhaps best expressed in Pollux Marine Agencies v. Louis Dreyfus Corp. by asserting 
that ‘something can be severed only from something else that exists. How can the Court 
severe an arbitration clause from a non-existent charter party?’371 In other words, U.S. law 
has subscribed to the paraphrased Shakespearean wording, ‘nothing comes of nothing’.372 
  APPROACH OF VARIOUS LEGISLATIONS AND INSTITUTIONS  5.4.
Given the above mentioned criticism and debates, following questions are identified. 
When is it correct for the judiciary to intervene or, otherwise, decline the proceedings? 
What are the instances when the separability and competence-competence are and are not 
to be applied? Given that the US has more than any other jurisdiction elaborated the nature 
of these two doctrines in their case law, what is the correct approach to the void/voidable 
distinction of the contract?  
All these questions are going to be answered after the comparative analysis of the 
approach of four foreign jurisdictions especially that of the United States as being very 
controversial and at the same time being the most interesting one, as well as that of the 
UNCITRAL are examined.  
                                                          
371 Pollux Marine Agencies v. Louis Dreyfus Corp, 455 F. Supp. 211, 219 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). 
372 R Smit, ‘Separability and Competence-competence in international arbitration: ex nihilo nihil fit? Or can something 
indeed come from nothing?’ (2002) 13 Am. Rev. Int'l Arb. 19. 
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The support for the principles of severability and competence-competence is largely 
resembled in the domestic laws on arbitration. Yet, the number of states that have not still 
accepted these doctrines is continuously decreasing.
373
 This paper does not aim to provide 
a detailed analysis of all domestic laws that touch upon the severability and competence-
competence as being beyond the scope of it, so the most significant and notable systems 
will be overviewed.             
A. The UNCITRAL Model Law 
The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law adopted the Model Law on 
International Commercial Arbitration on June 21, 1985. This Model Law aims to lay down 
the most contemporary solutions in international commercial arbitration in order to direct 
national legislators.
374
  
The UNCITRAL Model law embodies both the separability and competence-competence 
principles in its Chapter IV that accordingly elaborates the issues of jurisdiction of an 
arbitral tribunal. So, article 16 states that:  
1. The arbitral tribunal may rule on its own jurisdiction, including any objections with 
respect to the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement. For that purpose an 
arbitration clause which forms part of a contract shall be treated as an agreement 
independent of the terms of the contract. A decision by the arbitral tribunal that the 
contract is null and void shall not entail ipso jure the invalidity of the arbitration clause’. 
[emphasis added]  
2. A plea that the arbitral tribunal does not have jurisdiction shall be raised not later than 
the submission of the statement of defense. A party is not precluded from raising such a 
plea by the fact that he has appointed, or participated in the appointment of, an arbitrator. 
A plea that the arbitral tribunal is exceeding the scope of its authority shall be raised as 
soon as the matter alleged to be beyond the scope of its authority is raised during the 
arbitral proceedings. The arbitral tribunal may, in either case, admit a later plea if it 
considers the delay justified. 
                                                          
373 A Redfern, et al, Law and Practice of international commercial arbitration, see supra, p. 195 
374 C Petrus, ‘Spanish perspectives on the doctrines of kompetenz-kompetenz and separability: a comparative analysis of 
Spain's 1988 Arbitration Act’ (2000) 11 Am. Rev. Int'l Arb. 397, p. 403. 
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3. The arbitral tribunal may rule on a plea referred to in paragraph (2) of this article either 
as a preliminary question or in an award on the merits. If the arbitral tribunal rules as a 
preliminary question that it has jurisdiction, any party may request, within thirty days that 
it has received notice of that ruling, the court specified in article 6 to decide the matter, 
which decision shall be subject to no appeal; while such a request is pending, the arbitral 
tribunal may continue the arbitral proceedings and make an award. 
According to article 16, the powers between courts and arbitrators are deemed to be 
distributed. It clearly provides that the arbitral tribunal is granted with the priority to 
adjudicate on its competence. Such a priority is even extended when the validity or 
existence of the arbitration clause is questioned.  
However, there is an important conclusion that is deducted from article 16. Namely, 
paragraph 1 comprises a very vague definition of the separability doctrine. There is no 
indication whether the arbitration clause will survive even if the initial contract is found to 
be void ab initio or becomes null as a consequence of an event.  
It should be kept in mind that the whole UNCITRAL Model law is meant to be adopted 
with the aim to limit the court intervention. In this sense, Article 5 of the Model law 
stipulates that ‘[i]n matters governed by this law no court shall interfere except where so 
provided in this law.’  
B. French Perspective  
A very extreme approach is provided in France. In 1963, the French Cour de Cassation in 
Gosset case held that the arbitration clause is severable from the main contract and is 
legally autonomous.
375
 In detail, the initial contract between the parties was found to be a 
nullity, but an arbitral award was granted recognition and enforcement due to completely 
separate nature of the arbitration clause that held to be unaffected by the invalidity of the 
initial contract.
376
 This statement is mirrored in article 1466 of the French Code of Civil 
Procedure lays down the power of arbitrators to rule upon their own jurisdiction:  
                                                          
375 Ibid. p. 194. 
376 Ibid. 
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‘If one of the parties contests, before the arbitral tribunal, the principle or scope of the 
tribunal's jurisdictional authority, the tribunal has the power to rule upon the validity or the 
limits of its own appointment.’377  
Also, it is claimed that France has adopted ‘the most radical expression’ of the 
competence-competence principle.
378
 Moreover, according to article 1458 of the French 
Code of Civil Procedure, court intervention is not allowed until an arbitral award is finally 
rendered. The only exception is the case when the arbitration agreement is ‘manifestly null 
and void’ and provided that the arbitral tribunal has not been formed. Otherwise, under 
Section 1 of Article 1458, the court is automatically required to decline jurisdiction over 
any dispute referred to it. The statement that the arbitration agreement shall be ‘manifestly 
null and void’ does not have accurate explanation and, thus, subject to different 
interpretation that, actually, gives power to the court to ascertain this meaning. 
Furthermore, in contrast, claims that the arbitration agreement is the consequence of fraud 
vest the arbitral tribunal first to decide the issue.
379
  
C. The German View 
It was stated above that the competence-competence or kompetenz-kompetenz doctrine 
originated in Germany.
380
 Unlike in most other legal systems, the Federal German Court 
upheld that the parties' agreement empowers the arbitrators to rule conclusively and 
bindingly on the validity of the arbitration clause, i.e. ‘the last word on the issue of 
jurisdiction may be left for the arbitrators’.381  
However, historically, section 1037 of the German Code allows arbitrators to continue 
arbitration even when ‘it is maintained that the arbitral process is inadmissible’ on the 
ground of an invalid arbitration agreement, an arbitrators' acting ultra vires, i.e. on the 
subject matter not determined by the agreement, or an inappropriately appointed arbitral 
                                                          
377 See Petrus, see supra, pp. 406-407. 
378 Ibid. 
379 Ibid. 
380 X Jason, ‘A Brief Introduction to the ‘Kompetenz-Kompetenz’ Principle in International Commercial arbitration’ 
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381 C Petrus, ‘Spanish perspectives on the doctrines of kompetenz-kompetenz and separability: a comparative analysis of 
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body.
382
 It was once commented that such a ruling is although provisional.
383
 This 
‘provisional ruling’ is subject to court control under Section 1041(1) of the German Code, 
provided that the complaining party raised the objection during arbitration, thereby 
preserving the right to object.  
The scholars' commentary on these provisions of the Code identifies the absence of the 
doctrine of the competence-competence. Hence, German courts have ruled that arbitrators 
have the ‘final word’ on their own jurisdiction when such power is conferred upon them 
by the parties to the contract. In other words, it is not an inherent power of an arbitrator 
since it must be explicitly stated in the agreement to arbitrate that parties vest them to have 
the final word.  
D. The English Viewpoint 
As to the separability doctrine, the English law admitted it in Smith v. H & S International 
Holding Inc.
384
 Traditionally, England, however, maintained a moderate version of the 
competence-competence principle. It was asserted that arbitrators are entitled to inquire 
into the merits of a challenge to the validity/existence of the arbitration clause not for the 
purpose of reaching any binding conclusion, but for the purpose of ‘satisfying themselves 
as a preliminary matter whether they ought to go on with the arbitration or not’.385 So, this 
determination was not mandatory and could be overruled by a competent court. The 
parties could resort to a court determination of the issue of arbitrators' jurisdiction at any 
time, whether before, during or after the arbitral proceedings. A court, in its turn, was even 
allowed to impose civil and criminal sanctions on anyone not complying with its orders.
386
  
Recent developments contributed to the maintenance of the continental dominant version 
of the competence-competence doctrine by adopting the Arbitration Act 1996, applicable 
in England, Wales and Northern Ireland.   
                                                          
382 German Code, Section 1037, in S. Phillip, Is the Supreme Court bucking the trend? First Options v. Kaplan in light of 
European reform initiatives in arbitration law, (1996) 14 B.U. Int'l L.J. 119, p. 134. 
383 O Glossner, in ‘International Handbook on Commercial Arbitration’ (Albert J. Van Den Berg & Pieter Sanders eds., 
Supp. 17 1994) as cited in S Phillip, ‘Is the Supreme Court bucking the trend? First Options v. Kaplan in light of 
European reform initiatives in arbitration law’ (1996), 14 B.U. Int'l L.J. 119. 
384 Paul Smith Ltd. v. H & S International Holding Co. Inc., [1991] 2 Lloyd's L.Rep., 127. 
385 Christopher Brown v. Genossenschaft Oesterreichischer [1954] 1 QB 8. 
386 See, for example, Allied Marine Ltd. v Vale Do Rio Doce S.A. [1985] 1 W.L.R. 925. 
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Section 30 of the Arbitration Act 1996 provides that:  
‘(1) Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the arbitral tribunal may rule on its own 
substantive jurisdiction,…’ 
 It should be noted that being based on article 16 of the Model Law, Section 30 of the 
Arbitration Act is different in that parties may agree that the arbitral tribunal is not entitled 
to rule on its substantive jurisdiction, by inserting the phrase ‘[u]nless otherwise agreed by 
the parties’.  
E. The U.S. Legal Setting 
In the United States the separability has been recognized. So, when a court is introduced to 
a challenge concerning the validity of the main contract, which does not affect the validity 
of the arbitration clause itself, it will refer the issue to arbitral proceedings in accordance 
with the Federal Arbitration Act 1925, Section 4, which states:  
‘The court shall hear the parties, and upon being satisfied that the making of the agreement 
for arbitration or the failure to comply therewith is not in issue, the court shall made an 
order directing the parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms of the 
agreement.’387 
In other words, according to the Federal Arbitration Act if a party's claim does not doubt 
the existence of the agreement to arbitrate an arbitral proceeding will definitely take place. 
Otherwise, the discussion goes further. As was previously stated under the main criticism 
of the doctrines, the U.S. courts have distinguished those contracts that are voidable and 
those that are void ab initio. The latter is being largely debated and American courts have 
generally rejected to apply the separability doctrine to this type of contract, i.e. which is 
void ab initio.  
In accordance with Section 4 of the Federal Arbitration Act, the issue of arbitral tribunal's 
jurisdiction over a case is to be decided as a preliminary issue by the courts rather than by 
the arbitral tribunal itself. It stipulates that: 
‘If the making of the arbitration agreement or the failure, neglect or refusal to perform the 
same be in issue, the court shall proceed summarily to the trial thereof.’388  
                                                          
387 The Federal Arbitration Act, Title 9, US Code, Section 1-16, Section 4. 
388 The Federal Arbitration Act, Title 9, US Code, Section 1-16, Section 4. 
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The issue of whether arbitrators have competence over the dispute is treated in the United 
States under the common title ‘arbitrability’.389 The rule of arbitrability, i.e. that it is solely 
decided by the judiciary, was developed in a sequence of cases known as the Steelworkers' 
Trilogy.
390
  
F. An Optimal Approach 
By elaborating the above mentioned jurisdictions and their peculiar approach to the issue 
of application of the separability and competence-competence, the following wording of 
sample arbitration clause is suggested by the Author. For this purpose, it is considered to 
use the UNCITRAL Model law's article 16 as a model clause.  
Firstly, French position that is famous due to its radical application of the separability and 
competence-competence principles seems to be frequently inefficient.  
Secondly, the German perspective as to proposing the contractual approach to the 
competence-competence may be introduced as additional protective measure in case if 
parties want to ensure the applicability of competence-competence and the following 
provision is suggested to be added into article 16 of the UNCITRAL Model law: 
‘The parties may expressly agree in the arbitration agreement to give power to the 
arbitrators to rule conclusively and bindingly on the issue of their competence.’ 
Thirdly, the practice of the United States as to the void/voidable distinction as well as to 
four types of challenges to which U.S. courts have refused to apply the separability 
doctrine do raise a number of arguments that may be of interest. Furthermore, the 
void/voidable distinction is very ambiguous and it raises big impediments in their proper 
interpretation and further appropriate applicability of whether to confer the jurisdiction or 
not. For example, one dictum noted that the void/voidable distinction or fraud in the 
factum/fraud in the inducement distinctions will rather confuse than clarify the issue of the 
dispute and contribute to its resolution.
391
   
                                                          
389 S Bennett, ‘Developing American approach to arbitrability’, Dispute Resolution Journal, February-April, 2003, p. 1. 
390 G Minda, ‘Arbitration in the post-cold-war era – Justice Kennedy’s view of postexpiration arbitrability in Litton 
Financial Printing Division v. NLRB’ (1992), 22 Stetson L. Rev. 83, p. 87, Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation 
Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83 (1960).   
391 See Burden v. Check into case of Kentucky, LLC, 267 F. 3d at 489. It was stated that ‘the void/voidable or fraud in the 
factum/fraud in the inducement distinctions may more confound than clarify the dispositive issue and its resolution’.  
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Interestingly, the claim that ‘there was no meeting of minds’ is perhaps the most 
interesting scenario of application of the separability doctrine. However, it should be kept 
in mind that the alleged failure of the parties' pre-contractual negotiations to mature into a 
final and binding contract should not always necessarily imply a failure to reach 
agreement to arbitrate any dispute that may arise between them.  
Then, the challenge as to the forgery or fraud in factum of the contract shall not in any 
way raise the issue of application of the separability principle. It is, in fact, manifest that a 
person, whose signature has been forged, has never agreed to anything, including 
arbitration. This situation is similar to that raising the issue of obvious non-existence of 
the agreement to arbitrate.
392
  
Furthermore, the challenge arising out of agency relationships does not necessarily entail 
the rejection of separability. It is appropriately stated that so long as the agent had 
authority to enter into the arbitration agreement, the agreement should be severed from the 
remainder of the contract regardless of whether the agent was authorized to enter into the 
contract.
393
  
Additionally, the U.S. court’s rejection to apply the separability doctrine should be also 
reconsidered, i.e. the challenge as to the illegality/lack of consideration. It is reasonably 
suggested that there is no reason why an arbitration clause in a contract that lacks 
consideration should not be severed from their underlying contract and enforced. 
The above mentioned arguments and conclusions give a more detailed overview of the 
separability doctrine with particular cases when its application is advisable and when is 
not.  So, it is suggested that the above mentioned conclusions as to the void/voidable 
distinction should be codified using article 16 of the UNCITRAL Model law as a basis (as 
was previously proposed).   
Fourthly, the English version of article 16 of UNCITRAL Model law seems very 
appropriate. The parties shall be given a right to agree that the arbitral tribunal does not 
                                                          
392 See Chastain v Robinson-Humphrey Co. 957 F.2d 851 (11th Cir. 1992) in R Smit, ‘Separability and Competence-
competence in international arbitration: ex nihilo nihil fit? Or can something indeed come from nothing?’ (2002) 13 Am. 
Rev. Int'l Arb. 19, p. 37. 
393 See, in R Smit, ‘Separability and Competence-competence in international arbitration: ex nihilo nihil fit? Or can 
something indeed come from nothing?’ (2002) 13 Am. Rev. Int'l Arb. 19, p. 37. 
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have a power to rule on its competence. In other words, it is again suggested to add the 
wording ‘unless otherwise agreed by the parties’ as it was made in the Arbitration Act 
1996.  
  CONCLUSION  5.5.
The analytical content of foregoing chapter attempted to elaborate on other waivers of 
arbitrability of disputes with a foreign element namely; invalidity of the underlying 
contractual agreement and that of the agreement to arbitrate.  
However, the main conclusion stemming from the current analysis is that unconventional 
and sophisticated claims need to be elaborated within the context of surrounding 
circumstances, hence, extending the reasoning beyond its prima facie interpretation, be it 
the issue of interpretation of unilateral consent to arbitrate in the host state legislation or 
the qualification of pre-investment expenditure under article 25 of ICSID Convention.   
The Author proposes the arbitral authority to rule on competence over a dispute even in 
the event of a challenge to the validity/existence of the underlying contract (the application 
of the separability principles) between the parties and/or validity/existence of the 
arbitration agreement itself (the doctrine of competence-competence) is proposed to be 
extended in most instances.  
However, in case if the validity or existence of the arbitration agreement itself is at issue, 
the authority to decide the arbitrators’ competence is advisable not to be granted to the 
arbitral tribunal, if there is obvious non-existence of the agreement to arbitrate.  
It is also proposed, the German notion that proposes the ad hoc basis of the application of 
competence-competence may be also taken into consideration as the additional protective 
instrument in case if parties want to ensure the applicability of competence-competence 
principle. Furthermore, the English view in regard to the parties’ right to agree that the 
arbitral tribunal does not have a power to rule on its competence is also advised to be 
added. And as to the separability, the above mentioned conclusions as to the void/voidable 
distinction are also proposed to be added. 
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This research endorses that over the various criticisms that have been lodged against the 
existing system of investor-state dispute resolution, one of the more recurrent has been the 
charge of inconsistency. In even the most harmonious body of case law, there are bound to 
be notes of dissonance. That the significance of such phenomena will be amplified in as 
politically sensitive a field as international investment law is to be expected. Yet in 
criticizing tribunals’ allegedly divergent approaches to admissibility and jurisdiction, one 
must take care neither to exaggerate the extent of the inconsistencies we discover nor to 
disregard the various additional factors that contribute to acceptance or dismissal of claims 
on arbitrability grounds.  
To do so would render injunction to the efforts of treaty negotiators, party advocates, and 
adjudicators in constructing an effective, unified and harmonized set of laws governing 
jurisdiction and admissibility to resolve a wide-ranging and extraordinarily complex series 
of problems.  
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6. CHAPTER SIX: JURISDICTION RATIONE PERSONAE – 
NATIONALITY IN INVESTMENT ARBITRATION 
  INTRODUCTION 6.1.
In many countries, foreign investments are required to be channelled through locally 
incorporated companies. This requirement has important implications for foreign 
investors. If the investment is carried out through a locally incorporated company, a 
national of the host State, the investor would not normally be eligible to be a party to 
proceedings before the Centre. The drafters of the Convention recognized this problem 
and adopted Article 25(2)(b). This provision allows locally incorporated but foreign 
controlled companies to have access to ICSID provided certain procedural requirements 
are met. 
The claimant, whether an individual or legal entity, must have the nationality of one of the 
contracting state parties in accordance with the test for nationality prescribed in the 
investment treaty itself. If the claimant has the option of pursuing ICSID arbitration and 
elects that option, then the requirement of the Article 25 of the ICSID Convention must 
also be satisfied. The difficulty that has emerged in practice is the relationship between the 
test for nationality prescribed in the investment treaty and the rules on nationality that 
from part of the law of the contracting state party.  
This chapter attempts to clarify; whether the fact of the claimant’s possession of the 
nationality of the contracting state pursuant to its municipal law conclusive for the 
purposes of the nationality requirement in the treaty and thus the tribunal’s jurisdiction 
ratione personae over the claimant? What weight should be given to a certificate of 
nationality issued by one of the contracting state parties? In applying the test for 
nationality in the BITs, is a tribunal bound by a determination of the competent national 
authority to the effect that the claimant is a national or enterprise of that state, or is the 
tribunal entitled to conduct its own investigation of the claimant’s nationality in 
accordance with the applicable national law? In applying the same test, is a tribunal bound 
by the provisions of national immigration acts in relation to nationality of a natural person, 
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or the relevant national laws on legal entities in relation to the nationality of an enterprise? 
In other words, if the tribunal concludes on the basis of the law of the relevant contracting 
state party that the claimant is a national of that state, can it nevertheless decline its 
jurisdiction ratione personae over that claimant?  
Having a long-standing history in international law context, the concept of ‘corporate 
nationality’ is deemed to be inextricably linked to that of natural persons. The notion 
witnessed its development particularly in the field of diplomatic protection. Several 
sources of international law have dealt with the concept, but before going into the merits 
of the field, semantics of these sources needs to be explored. 
  SEMANTICS OF SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 6.2.
Methods of identifying sources of national law – which is conventionally made by 
references to constitution, legislation and judicial case law - explicate its highly 
hierarchical structure. Public international law is lacking authority to legislate, and, as 
Malanzcuk contends, same subjects of international law adopt international law norms and 
principles themselves.
394
   
Remarkably, the fundamental source of international law in view of the foregoing was 
customary law which emanates from state practice. Conclusion of an increasing number of 
international treaties, whose subject matters span from the law of the sea to diplomatic and 
consular relations, is oftentimes construed as the replacement of customary law. 
Malanzcuk argues that, provided there is an international consensus on rules of customary 
law, such norms tend to be codified by treaty.
395
  
The list of sources of public international law is deemed to be embodies in article 38 (1) of 
the Statute of the International Court of Justice, which reads: 
‘The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes 
as are submitted to it shall apply: 
a) International conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules 
expressly recognized by the contesting States; 
b) International custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law 
c) The general principles of law recognized by civilized nations 
                                                          
394 P Malanzcuk, ‘Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law’ (London, UK: Routledge, 2003), page 35. 
395 Ibid. page 37. 
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d) Judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists 
of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of the 
rules of law.’ 
 
Some writers have argued that the list is not exhaustive; the others criticized it for being 
too extensive.
396
 Although there have been some heated debates as to exclusive nature of 
the clause, yet no alternative text which had been ever suggested won universal 
approval.
397
 It is argued that ‘treaties are the maids-of all-work’ in international law. 
Sometimes compared to contracts in national legal systems, one should, however, draw a 
distinction. Primarily, within a local legal system, contracts are merely legal transactions, 
not sources of law.  
Interestingly, some publicists juxtapose ‘law-making treaties’ (traités-lois) vis-à-vis 
‘contract treaties’, whereby the purpose of the former is ‘to conclude an agreement on 
universal substantive legal principles’, whereas the latter is, for instance, drawn for a state 
to lend a certain sum of money to another state. Whilst the law-making treaties are 
referred to as sources of law, the contract treaties are not.
398
 It follows that a distinction 
between a law-making treaty and a contract treaty is primarily one of content.    
As to customary law, it was held by the ICJ that international custom is formed by two 
elements – the objective one of ‘general practice’ and the subjective one, the so-called 
opinio juris of states. Hence, it is important to establish not only what states do, but also 
why they do so.
399
  
It is generally accepted that main evidence of customary law is to be found in the actual 
practice of states conventionally reflected in statements of government spokesmen to the 
Parliament, press, at international conferences. The foregoing, however, may be the 
practice of a limited number of certain states. Further corroboration of an existing norm 
can be also reflected in writings of leading legal scholars, and in judgments of 
                                                          
396 Ibid. page 37. 
397 Ibid. 
398 See, for instance; E Raftopoulos, ‘The inadequacy of the contractual analogy in the law of treaties’ (Hellenic institute 
of international and foreign law 1990). 
399 Ibid. page. 44. 
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international tribunals, as it is inferred by article 38(1d) of the Statue of the ICJ. Similarly, 
treaties, particularly multilateral ones, may encompass evidence of customary law.
400
  
Opinio juris, or the psychological element opinio juris sive necessitatis, is referred to as a 
conviction felt by states that a certain form of conduct is required by international law. 
Malanzcuk aptly notes that the current trend to establish opinio juris is ‘not to look for 
direct evidence of a state’s psychological convictions, but to infer opinio juris indirectly 
from the actual behavior of states’. Hence, it is not the official statements, which are 
indicative of opinio juris – rather acts or oftentimes omissions may form the required 
states’ conviction. 
The third source of international law enumerated in article 38(1) of the ICJ Statute makes 
reference to ‘general principles of law recognized by civilized nations’. It is argued that 
this source was taken from the Statute of the forerunner of the ICJ, the Permanent Court of 
International Justice, and it was meant to be utilized when treaties or customary law 
provide no solution.  
Interpretations as to whether it is general principles of national law or those of 
international law abound. Some argue that the genuine meaning of the phrase is to include 
both systems – national and international – to fill in the gaps left by treaty law and custom. 
Cheng claims that, indeed, international tribunals had applied general principles of law in 
both senses for many years, even before the PCIJ was established in 1920.
401
 Such 
principles include, but are not limited to, good faith, estoppel, proportionality, right to fair 
hearing, denial of justice, exhaustion of local remedies, in dubio pro reo.   
In addition to aforementioned primary sources of international law, there exist other 
sources – judicial decisions and teachings of leading scholars stipulated in article 38 (1d) 
of the ICJ Statute – which largely fall under the rubric of subsidiary means for the 
determination of rules of law. Schwarzenberger also contends that judicial decisions 
should carry more weight as opposed to viewpoints expressed by leading scholars.
402
 The 
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rationale behind such proposition is the variety of perspectives the members of the court 
usually look from to adjudicate on a real dispute, which stems from their widely differing 
legal training and experience. As Schwarzenberger argues, this is compared to private 
comments on issues or the discussion of hypothetical cases.  
Most important, however, is instruction for the ICJ to apply judicial decisions subject to 
provisions of article 59, which explicitly exclude the doctrine of precedence and that of 
stare decisis from international law practice. This fundamental premise was 
comprehensively canvassed by Judge Azevedo in Asylum case: 
‘It should be remembered… that the decision in a particular case has deep repercussions, 
particularly in international law, because views, which have been confirmed by that 
decision acquire quasi-legislative value, in spite of the legal principle to the effect that the 
decision has no biding force except between the parties and in respect of that particular 
case.’ 
It was noted that the jurisprudence of municipal courts does not quite fall squarely into the 
context of article 38(1) of the ICJ Statute. Whilst there are certainly exceptions such as, for 
instance, the standing of English judiciary, certain countries’ judicial and legal systems 
may not be as mature and independent as it is necessary, for those decisions to be 
applicable to international law cases. As Chancellor Kent puts it: 
‘In the investigation of the rules of the modern law of nations, particularly with regard to 
the extensive field of maritime capture, reference is generally and freely made to the 
decisions of the English courts… They contain more intrinsic argument, more full and 
precise details, more accurate illustrations, and are of more authority than the loose dicta 
of elementary writers.’403   
 
  NATIONALITY IN THE DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION CONTEXT  6.3.
Tracing back the roots of the doctrine, diplomatic protection was designed to address the 
issue of state responsibility for injury to aliens. From the standpoint of international law, it 
has been generally accepted that wrongful acts or omissions of the state which caused 
damage to aliens are attributable to that state, and the latter holds responsibility under 
international law to treat aliens and their property adequately.
404
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According to International Law Commission, the following constituents form state’s 
exercise of diplomatic protection: 
‘Action taken by a State against another State in respect of an injury to the person or 
property of a national caused by an internationally wrongful act or omission attributable to 
the latter State’405 
The Report, wherein the aforementioned elements were described, also held that in 
exceptional circumstances, diplomatic protection may be bestowed to non-nationals. The 
leading case which was adjudicated by the Permanent Court of International Justice 
(PCIJ), the predecessor of the ICJ, addressed the orthodox interpretation of the right to 
diplomatic protection in the following paragraph: 
‘By taking up the case of one of its subjects and by resorting to diplomatic action or 
international judicial proceedings on his behalf, a State is in reality asserting its own rights 
– its right to ensure, in the person of its subjects, respect for the rules of international law’. 
There are, however, the fundamental prerequisites for an object to be entitled to such 
diplomatic protection. One of key requirements for an exercise of diplomatic protection – 
the effective bond of nationality between the aggrieved party and the state which makes 
the claim – sparked off a lot of criticism among commentators, particularly with respect to 
corporate nationality. However, the first case, which dealt with the notion of ‘the effective 
bond’, or a so-called ‘genuine connection’ with the state in question, was Nottebohm case, 
wherein the ICJ laid down essential criteria of the same: 
‘According to practice of States, to arbitral and judicial decisions and to the opinions of 
writers, nationality is a legal bond having as its basis a social fact of attachment, a genuine 
connection of existence, interests and sentiments, together with the existence of reciprocal 
rights and duties’.406 
As to nationality of juridical entities, Barcelona Traction case, which was mentioned 
earlier in earlier chapters, is regarded as most important and emblematic. In Barcelona 
Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited, the dispute arose between Belgium and 
Spain due to a bankruptcy proceeding in Spain of Barcelona Traction, which was a 
company established in Canada. Belgium shareholders formed the overwhelming majority 
of it. In its suit against Spanish authorities they alleged that actions attributable to Spain 
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were contrary to international law. The Court, however, took a stance which disqualified 
Belgium to exercise diplomatic protection of Belgian shareholders of the Canadian 
company with respect to allegedly illegal behavior of Spanish government.  
The Court upheld the doctrine of incorporation and/or siege social as widely accepted 
formulas to determine nationality of juridical persons. It should be, however, noted that 
the Court stipulated two scenarios when the corporate veil may be lifted to entitle 
shareholders to diplomatic protection exercised by their home state. The first scenario 
refers to case of a company which has ceased to exist, whilst the second situation allows 
for the state of shareholders to exercise diplomatic protection if a state of incorporation of 
the company is incapable of taking action on behalf of such corporate entity.
407
  
The standing of the Court as to protection of shareholders under international law was the 
subject of heated debates among scholars as it barely left shareholders without adequate 
protection under international law.
408
 However, the logic behind a ‘corporate veil’ of the 
company is grasped through the very principle of distinct legal personality and rights vs. 
liabilities argument. Indeed, whereas shareholders shield themselves from liabilities due to 
existence of such ‘corporate veil’, it might have been erroneous to dissociate them and lift 
the ‘corporate veil’ if they need to enforce the company rights.409  
Notwithstanding the conclusions of the ICJ in Barcelona Traction, nineteen years later it 
seemed to alter its position with respect to corporate nationality.  
As it was mentioned earlier, the Court in Barcelona Traction identified that the case 
wherein the state of the shareholders is the claimant exercising diplomatic protection over 
its nationals against the state of incorporation of the company of these nationals would be 
most probably dismissed. In Elettronica Sicula S.P.A. (ELSI) case the U.S. government 
brought a case against Italy for the violation of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and 
Navigation signed by two countries. The United States alleged that, firstly, the Italian 
government seized an Italian subsidiary of a United States corporation in violation of 
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Italian law. Secondly, it was claimed that the subsidiary subsequently went bankrupt and 
that the Italian government purchased the subsidiary for its own use.  
The U.S. government failed to persuade the International Court of Justice that Italy's 
actions represented an illegal intervention in management and control, an illegal 
impairment of investment rights, an unfair expropriation of property, or an unlawful 
failure to provide protection and security of property.
410
 Even though it was argued that 
ELSI case has neither undermined the legal rules that apply to foreign investment, nor 
shown that the International Court of Justice is an inappropriate forum for the resolution of 
investment disputes,
411
 central to this inquiry is the fact that the ICJ deemed there was a 
genuine connection between the company and the state of nationality of the shareholders. 
In other words, the ICJ granted the U.S the right to exercise diplomatic protection ‘as long 
as the company whose rights were at stake was incorporated in the defendant state, a 
frequent situation when talking about foreign investment.’412   
Hence, the practice of ‘lifting the corporate veil’ under international law has been 
eventually brought into existence.  
The question of relevance of the nationality of claims rules for diplomatic protection in 
general international law to the investment treaty regimes has proved to be controversial, 
as it has been for other special international regimes for the adjudication of private claims 
in the past. It should first be noted that, in the diplomatic protection context, the 
nationality of claims rules are rules of admissibility and not jurisdiction. The reason for 
this distinction is obvious: States are the only litigants with jus standi in diplomatic 
protection claims and the primary jurisdiction al concern is whether they have actually 
consented to the adjudication of the disputes by the International Court of Justice or 
another international tribunal. 
If the jurisdiction is upheld then the tribunal can proceed to determine whether the 
diplomatic protection claim is admissible by reference to the rules concerning the requisite 
connection between the claimant state and the individual or entity who has suffered loss 
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by the acts of the respondent state. For investment treaty arbitration, the bond of 
nationality assumes a jurisdictional significance because one of the litigants is an 
individual or legal entity whose jus standi to advance a claim depends upon positively 
establishing that bond. In other words, the respondent contracting state’s offer to arbitrate 
only extends to a limited class of claimants defined by reference to their possession of the 
nationality of another contracting state. 
Suppose that an investor, in a single dispute, asserts claims based on a contractual breach 
of its investment with the host state and a violation of an investment treaty obligation. The 
host state files an objection to the ratione personae jurisdiction of ICSID tribunal 
constituted pursuant to the investment treaty and/or objects to the admissibility of the 
claims on the basis of the tenuous link between the investor and the contracting state 
whose nationality is invoked. 
Should the tribunal defer to general international law on the invocation of state 
responsibility, and in particular the rule on the nationality of claims in Article 44(a) of the 
ILC’s Articles,413 to supplement Article 25 of the ICSID Convection? To posit the 
conundrum differently, is the connecting factor to the general international law on the 
admissibility of claims to submission on a claim governed by international law, or is it the 
status of Article 25 of the ICSID Convention as a rule of international treaty law? 
If the general international law on the admissibility of claims were to supplement Article 
25 of the Convention by reason of the investor’s reliance on a cause of action grounded in 
international law, this would produce an asymmetry between the ICSID tribunal’s ratione 
personae jurisdiction in relation to the investor. This cannot have been the intention of the 
drafters of the autonomous test of nationality in Article 25. The second possibility, that the 
status of Article 25 as a provision of an international treaty attracts the supplementary 
application of other international rules on the nationality of claims, is no more appealing. 
The experience of the Iran/Us Claims Tribunal is informative in this respect. 
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In the Dual Nationality case,
414
 Iran had contended that arbitration before the Iran/US 
Claims Tribunal were an instance of diplomatic protection so that solution to the 
admissibility of claims by dual nationals ‘must be found in public international law and 
not disputes between one State and nationals of the other, which could be resolved by the 
application of private international law’.415 The Tribunal rejected this contention because 
the object and purpose of the Algiers Accord was not to ‘extend diplomatic protection in 
the normal sense’.416 The rules of general international law on diplomatic protection did 
not, therefore, prevent the Tribunal from exercising jurisdiction ratione personae over US 
claimants that simultaneously held Iranian citizenship.
417
        
  THE CONCEPT OF ‘NATIONALITY’ IN ARBITRATION 6.4.
It is commonly accepted that the term nationality originates from the word ‘national’, and 
its definition falls under the jurisdiction of the state in question. The 1930 Hague 
Convention on Certain Questions relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws codifies 
fundamental principle of public international law with respect to competence of each state 
to decide on matters related to nationality. The Hague Convention on Nationality 
addresses the concept of nationality in article 1, which reads: 
‘It is for each State to determine under its own law who are its nationals. This law shall be 
recognized by other States in so far as it is consistent with international conventions, 
international custom, and the principles of law generally recognized with regard to 
nationality.’418 
In other words, the concept of nationality is predominantly subject to national laws. Each 
state is entirely free to prescribe rules as to who was to be considered as it’s national. It 
was held: 
‘It is accepted in international law that nationality is within the domestic jurisdiction of the 
State, which settles, by its own legislation, the rules relating to the acquisition (and loss) of 
nationality. […] But it is no less accepted that when, in international arbitral or judicial 
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proceedings, the nationality of a person is challenged, the international tribunal is 
competent to pass [judgment] upon that challenge.’419 
Schreuer argues that ‘national and treaty-based definitions should be deferred to, so long 
as they are reasonable: 
‘Definitions of corporate nationality in national legislation or in treaties providing for 
ICSID’s jurisdiction will be controlling for the determination of whether the nationality 
requirements of Art. 25(2b) have been met.’420 
A. Nationality under Contemporary BIT Provisions  
As early as in 1959 before proliferation of BITs all around the globe, the Treaty of 
Commerce, Establishment and Navigation between the United Kingdom and Iran dealt 
with the issue of corporate nationality in the following manner: 
‘The term ‘companies’: 
- Means all legal persons except physical persons; 
- ‘in relation to a High Contracting Party’ means all companies which 
derive their status as such from the law in force in any territory of that 
High Contracting Party to which the present Treaty applies; 
- ‘in relation to a country’ means all companies which derive their status as 
such from the law in force in that country’421 
 
However, with economic integration processes and impact of these on corporate activities 
and operations, the definition of an ‘enterprise’ has been gradually expanded. Some 
retained the principle of incorporation as the main criterion to define the nationality of a 
legal enterprise, while the others added other criterion or used a combination of them.  
For example, Chile-United States Free Trade Agreement characterized enterprises as ‘any 
entity constituted or organized under applicable law, whether or not for profit , and 
whether privately-owned or governmentally-owned, including any corporation, trust, 
partnership, sole proprietorship, joint venture, or other association’, whereas ‘enterprise of 
a Party’ was defined as ‘an enterprise constituted or organized under the law of a Party’. 
This exemplifies the method of incorporation as the test for attribution of nationality. On 
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the other hand, some other countries add ‘siege social’ or seat criterion to the above 
mentioned place of incorporation method.  
Article 1 of the BIT between Hong Kong and France reads: 
‘3.b.(ii) Any legal person constituted on French territory in accordance with French 
legislation and having its head office on French territory, or any legal person controlled 
directly or indirectly by French nationals or by legal persons having their head office on 
French territory and constituted in accordance with French legislation.’ 
 
Interestingly, Switzerland is one of the countries whose approach to nationality is 
inclusive of control or substantial interest formula. For instance, Article 1.1 of 
Switzerland-Albania BIT makes reference to it as: 
‘[…] (a)The legal entities, including the companies, the incorporated companies, the 
individual corporations or other organizations, that are constituted or organized in 
accordance with the legislation of that Contracting Party and which have their seat, at the 
same time as their real economic activities, in the territory of the same Contracting Party; 
(b)The legal entities established in accordance with the legislation of any country that are 
controlled, directly or indirectly, by nationals of that Contracting party or by legal entities 
having their seat, together with their real economic activities, in the territory of that 
Contracting party’ 
 
Interestingly, similar provisions are found in BITs, which Switzerland concluded with 
Latvia, Lithuania and Vietnam.
422
  
Article 1 of the China Model BIT (1997) defines ‘investor’ as: 
‘[…] (a) Natural persons who have nationality of either Contracting Party in accordance 
with the laws of that Contracting Party; 
(b) Legal entities including companies, associations, partnerships and other organizations, 
incorporated or constituted under the laws and regulations of either Contracting Party and 
have their seats in that Contracting Party.’ 
 
Article 1 of the Germany Model BIT (2005) defines ‘investor’ as; 
‘[…]- any natural person who is a German … or a national of a Member State of the 
European Union or the European Economic Area …, is established in the Federal 
Republic of Germany; 
- any juridical person …which is founded pursuant to the law of the Federal republic of 
Germany … and is organized pursuant to the law of the Federal Republic of Germany,…;  
which in the context of entrepreneurial activity is the owner, possessor or shareholder of 
an investment in the territory of the other Contracting State, irrespective of whether or not 
the activity is directed at profit;…’  
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Article 1(b) of the Netherlands Model BIT (1997) defines ‘nationals’ as: 
‘[…] i- natural persons having the nationality of that Contracting Party; 
ii- legal persons constituted under the law of that Contracting Party; 
iii- legal persons not constituted under the law of that Contracting Party but controlled, 
directly or indirectly, by natural persons as defined in (i) or by legal persons as defined in 
(ii).’ 
  
Article 1(1) of the Turkish Model BIT (2000) defines ‘investor’ as: 
‘[…] (a) natural persons deriving their status as nationals of either Party according to its 
applicable law, 
(b) Corporations, firms or business associations incorporated or constituted under the law 
in force of either of the Parties and having their headquarters in the territory of that Party.’ 
 
Article 1(c) of the United Kingdom Model BIT (2005, with 2006 amendments) defines 
‘nationals’ as: 
‘[…] i. in respect of the United Kingdom: physical persons deriving their status as United 
Kingdom nationals from the law in force in the United Kingdom; 
ii. in respect of [country];…’ 
 
Section (A) of the United States of America Model BIT (2004) defines ‘national’ as: 
‘…a) for the United States a natural person who is a national of the United States as 
defined in Title III of the immigration and Nationality Act; and  
b) for [Country], [ ]…’ 
 
B. Nationality under Contemporary MIT Provisions 
The Energy Charter Treaty provides in its article 1 that an investor is: 
‘[…] (a) With respect to a Contracting Party: 
(i) A natural person having the citizenship or nationality of or who is permanently residing 
in that Contracting Party in accordance with its applicable law; 
(ii) A company or other organization organized in accordance with the law applicable in 
that Contracting Party; 
(b) With respect to a ‘third state’, a natural person, company or other organization which 
fulfils, mutatis mutandis, the conditions specified in subparagraphs (a) for a Contracting 
Party.’ 
 
Article 17 of the Energy Charter Treaty adds another requirement:  
  ‘(1) Each Contracting Party reserves the right to deny the advantages of this Part to a 
legal entity if citizens or nationals of a third state own or control such entity and if that 
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entity has no substantial business activities in the Area of the Contracting Party in which it 
is organized.’ 
 
The North American Free Trade Agreement addresses the concept in investor in its article 1139: 
‘Party or a state enterprise thereof, or a national or an enterprise of such Party, that seeks 
to make, is making or has made an investment’. 
[…] ‘Enterprise’ is construed to be: ‘An entity constituted or organized under the laws of a 
Party, a branch located in the territory of a Party and carrying on business activities there.’ 
  
It should be further noted that ‘an enterprise of a Party need not be controlled by one or 
more citizens of that Party, provided it is constituted, organized or located under the laws, 
or in territory of such Party’. In view of inclusion of an ‘enterprise of a Party’ to the 
definition of ‘investor’, Rubin and Alexander contend that it effectively means that ‘most 
of the investor protections provided in Chapter 11 will extend to non-NAFTA controlled 
or owned enterprises that are based in another NAFTA country’. 423 
C. Nationality under ICSID Convention provisions  
The case of Soufraki v The United Arab Emirates
424
 was the first arbitral proceeding of the 
International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, in which an individual 
investor has not been granted protection extended by virtue of article 25 (2) of the ICSID 
Convention according to the fact that he did not qualify for the nationality requirements 
enunciated by the Convention.
425
  
The claimant filed a request for arbitration in ICSID, invoking provisions on protection 
afforded by the UAE to Italian citizens under the 1997 UAE-Italy bilateral investment 
treaty. He thereby claimed that he is an Italian citizen and provided his Italian passport as 
a proof thereof. The UAE rejected his claims, and it appears that the principal objection 
raised by the UAE was that ‘in 1991 Mr. Soufraki had acquired Canadian nationality 
without taking the steps necessary under Italian law to preserve his Italian nationality, with 
the result that he lost his Italian nationality in 1991 and was not therefore a national of 
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Italy at the relevant times necessary for ICSID to have jurisdiction under Article 25 of the 
ICSID Convention.’426 It is interesting to note that the tribunal held: 
‘Had Mr. Soufraki contracted with the United Arab Emirates through a corporate vehicle 
incorporated in Italy, rather than contracting in his personal capacity, no problem of 
jurisdiction would now arise. But the Tribunal can only take the facts as they are and as it 
has found them to be’. 427 
At the same time, there had been instances when ICSID ruled to have jurisdiction ratione 
personae over disputes where a claimant was a legal person of the host country controlled 
by foreign nationals. For instance, in Liberian Eastern Timber Corporation v Liberia and 
Kloeckner Industrie-Anlagen GmbH and others v Cameroon, it was held that a mere 
existence of ICSID clause in a contract with a local company will be construed as an 
agreement to treat this local company as foreign because of foreign control. The Tribunal 
stated: 
[…]What is needed, for the final provision of Article 25(2) (b) to be applicable is (1) that 
the juridical person, party to the dispute, be legally a national of the Contracting State 
which is the other party and (2) that this juridical person being under foreign control, to 
the knowledge of the Contracting State, the parties agree to treat it as a foreign juridical 
person.’428  
In case of absence of a formal or implicit agreement to treat the enterprise as foreign, 
ICSID opined that effective foreign control may be not only direct, but also indirect. In 
Societe Ouest Africaine des Betons Industriels (SOABI) v Senegal, all of the shares of the 
local company SOABI belonged to a legal entity incorporated in Panama, the then ICSID 
Non-Contracting State, which deprived ICSID of jurisdiction ratione personae. But the 
tribunal found nevertheless that the legal entity incorporated in Panama was controlled by 
nationals of Belgium, which was an ICSID Contracting State. In other words, ICSID has 
confirmed jurisdiction ratione personae over this case by effectively establishing that 
SOABI was under the indirect control of nationals of a Contracting State:
429
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‘[…]‘a juridical person’ which had the nationality of the Contracting State party to the 
dispute’, the phrase used in article 25 (2b) of the Convention, is a juridical person which, 
in accordance with the laws of the State in question, had its head office, or has been 
incorporated in that State.’ 
In Tokios Tokeles, the tribunal opined: 
‘[…] The ICSID Convention contains no inchoate requirement that the investment at issue 
in a dispute have an international character in which the origin of the capital is decisive.’ 
The dissenting arbitrator held:  
‘…when it comes to ascertaining the international character of an investment, the origin of 
the capital is relevant, and even decisive. True, the Convention does not provide a precise 
and clear-cut definition of the concept of international investment …, and it is therefore 
for each ICSID tribunal to determine whether the specific facts of the case warrant the 
conclusion that it is before an international investment.’ 
 
In Vacuum Salt Products Ltd. v Ghana, in its objections to jurisdiction, the government of 
Ghana argued that Vacuum Salt was its national, was not controlled by foreigners. The 
tribunal unequivocally opined that whether foreign control did exist had still to be 
confirmed: 
‘… the parties’ agreement to treat Claimant as a foreign national ‘because of foreign 
control’ does not ipso jure confer jurisdiction. The reference in Article 25(2b) to ‘foreign 
control’ necessarily sets an objective Convention limit beyond which ICSID jurisdiction 
cannot exist and parties therefore lack power to invoke same no matter how devoutly they 
may have desired to do so.’  
The tribunal investigated the ownership structure of Vacuum Salt and found that foreign 
national held merely 20 percent of shares of the entity as opposed to remaining 80 percent, 
which were effectively possessed by Ghanaian nationals. The Tribunal also examined 
other substantive issues related to ownership structure, such as the foreign investor’s 
management role. The findings ruled out the possibility of treating Vacuum Salt as a 
foreign entity even though it was organized in Ghana.   
  THE CONCEPT OF ‘CONTROL’ IN ARBITRATION430   6.5.
The concept ‘control’ is used in a great number of investment treaties to designate the 
requisite nexus between the claimant and the investment. For instance, the US Model BIT 
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(2004) defines ‘investment‘ as ‘every asset that an investor owns or controls, directly or 
indirectly’, whereas NAFTA stipulates that an ‘investment of an investor of a party’ is ‘an 
investment owned or controlled directly or indirectly by an investor of such party’. No 
definition of control is to be found in either treaty. The Netherlands Model BIT (1997) 
does not identify the requisite nexus in the definition of an investment but rather supplies 
definitions of ‘investment and ‘nationals’ and then extends investment protection to 
“investment of nationals’.  
Whether or not the term ‘control’ is actually used in the text of the investment treaty, it is 
clear that it must be implied. In each and every case, the claimant must have had control 
over the investment that has been affected by measures of the host state in order to fall 
within the scope of the tribunal’s jurisdiction ratione personae.  
The question is then how to define the ‘control’ for the purpose of satisfying the requisite 
nexus between the claimant and the investment. In giving effect to the ordinary meaning 
of the word ‘control’, reference must be had to general principles of property law and 
company law. The majority of investment treaties say nothing about the indices of 
control,
431
 and international law in general does not purport to regulate the relationship 
between an individual or legal entity and its assets.  
An investment is a bundle of rights to tangible or intangible property. The strongest form 
of control that an individual or legal entity can acquire over tangible or intangible property 
is the right of ownership. Full ownership of property entails that the owner has prima facie 
unlimited privileges of use over that property and pima facie unlimited powers to control 
and transmission, subject to the outer limitations upon these privileges and powers 
prescribed by the relevant municipal law of property.
432
 
Schreuer contends: 
‘On the basis of the Convention’s preparatory works as well as the published cases, it can 
be said that the existence of foreign control is a complex question requiring the 
examination of several factors such as equity participation, voting rights and management. 
In order to obtain a reliable picture, all these aspects must be looked at in conjunction. 
There is no simple mathematical formula based on shareholding or votes alone.’ 
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The ICSID Convention does not define the term “foreign control”, but the drafting history 
indicates that control must be exercised by nationals of other Contracting States.
433
 This 
interpretation excludes control by nationals of non-Contracting States or by nationals of 
the host State. This interpretation is in line with the objective of the Convention to 
promote the settlement of disputes between host States and nationals of other Contracting 
States. 
An agreement on an investor’s nationality under Article 25(2)(b) ‘because of foreign 
control’ implies that such control is an objective requirement that has to be determined by 
Tribunal. In other words, an agreement on the nationality of an investor creates no more 
than a presumption that there is ‘foreign control’. Whereas an agreement on foreign 
nationality can be inferred from the existence of a consent agreement, no such an inference 
can be made in respect of foreign control. ICSID tribunals have invariably examined the 
actual existence of foreign control over the local company.
434
 In situations where the 
element of control is lacking, the Tribunal will find that is has no jurisdiction. 
The consideration of elements other than shareholding demonstrates a differentiated 
approach to the concept of ‘foreign control’. In addition to shareholding, indirect control, 
voting powers or ‘managerial control’ were taken into account by ICSID Tribunals.435 The 
complexity inherent in the concept of foreign control is most evident in connection with 
indirect control. Indirect control refers to instances where a foreign corporation, 
controlling the local company in the host State, is itself controlled by nationals of other 
States. In that situation, the question arises whether a Tribunal should concern itself only 
with those who directly control the local company or whether it should look beyond the 
first layer and search for the chain of control that may be exercised by multiple investors. 
ICSID practice on this point is not uniform. 
 
                                                          
433 See Energy Charter Treaty 1994, Article 26(7), 34 ILM 360, 400 (1995). But contrast Article 1117 of NAFTA, 32 
ILM 605, 643 (1993). For a broader discussion see Schreuer, Commentary, Article 25, para. 535. 
434 Schreuer, Commentary, Art. 25, para. 551. 
435 Amco v. Indonesia, Decision on Jurisdiction, 25 September 1983, 1 ICSID Reports 396; Klöckner v. Cameroon, 
Award, 21 October 1983, 2 ICSID Reports 15/16; SOABI v. Senegal; Decision on Jurisdiction, 1 August 1984, 2 ICSID 
Reports 182/3; LETCO v. Liberia, Decision on Jurisdiction, 24 October 1984, 2 ICSID Reports 349, 351; Vacuum Salt v. 
Ghana, Award, 16 February 1994, 4 ICSID Reports 342-351; Cable TV v. St. Kitts and Nevis, Award, 13 January 1997, 
13 ICSID Review— Foreign Investment Law Journal 366-370 (1998). 
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In Amco v. Indonesia, the Tribunal discussed the possibility of examining control beyond 
the first level. The Indonesian Government argued that PT Amco, the local company, was 
not controlled by Amco Asia, a company owned by a national of the United States of 
America, since Amco Asia was, in turn, controlled by a Hong Kong company owned by a 
Dutch citizen. The Tribunal refused to search for indirect control beyond the first level of 
control and found that it was restricted to the immediate control exercised by the parent 
company of the local company.
436
 
The Tribunal in SOABI v. Senegal took a different approach. SOABI, a company 
incorporated in Senegal, was controlled by a Panamanian company, Flexa, which in turn 
was controlled by Belgian nationals. In this case, it was critical for SOABI to convince the 
Tribunal to go beyond the first level of control since Panama was not a Contracting State, 
whereas Belgium was (and is) a Contracting State. The Senegalese Government disputed 
jurisdiction arguing that Panama was not a Contracting State, hence, the nationality 
requirements of Article 25 were not met.  
The Tribunal stated that the Convention was not only concerned with direct control over a 
locally incorporated company. The Tribunal referred to the purpose of Article 25(2)(b) of 
the Convention in facilitating foreign investments through locally incorporated companies 
while still retaining their standing before ICSID. In that spirit, the Tribunal went beyond 
the direct control exercised by the Panamanian company and found that SOABI was, in 
fact, controlled by Belgian nationals.
437
There is no definitive legal position on the issue of 
indirect control as ICSID Tribunals have taken differing approaches. Scholarly opinion is 
also divided. One view is that the correct approach would be to allow a Tribunal to search 
for control by a national of a Contracting State until jurisdiction can be established.
438
 
Under another view, a Tribunal should look at the true controllers thereby excluding 
access to the Centre to juridical persons controlled directly or indirectly by nationals of 
non-Contracting States or nationals of the host State.
439
 
                                                          
436 Amco v. Indonesia, Decision on Jurisdiction, 25 September 1983, 1 ICSID Reports 396. It should be noted that this 
finding was an obiter dictum: even if the Tribunal had decided to probe beyond the first level of control, it would have 
been able to assert jurisdiction because all the relevant nationalities were those of Contracting States. 
437 SOABI v. Senegal, Decision on Jurisdiction, 1 August 1984, 2 ICSID Reports 182/3. 
438 Amerasinghe, C. F., Interpretation of Article 25(2)(b) of the ICSID Convention, in: International Arbitration in the 
21st Century: Towards Judicialization and Uniformity? (Lillich, R. B./Brower, Ch. N. eds.) 223, 240 (1994). 
439 Schreuer, Commentary, Article 25, para. 563. 
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  CONCLUSION 6.6.
In this chapter the Author identified the difficulty that has emerged in practice is the 
relationship between the test for nationality prescribed in the investment treaty and the 
rules on nationality that form part of the law of the contracting state party. The Author 
explains that the challenges facing the concept of nationality in investment treaty 
arbitration originate from the ambiguities prevailing on choice of applicable law.  
The Author contends that the question of jurisdiction ratione personae is a question of 
international law and the test of nationality applied by the investment treaty tribunals serve 
the very limited purpose or regulating who has access to the tribunal. It was elaborated 
that relevant provisions of investment treaties contain a renvoi to the law of the relevant 
contracting state party on nationality.  
The Author then argues whether a conclusion as to the existence or absence of the relevant 
nationality based upon the law is dispositive? In other words, are there factors extraneous 
to determination of the existence or absence of the relevant nationality in accordance with 
the law of the contracting state party that can be taken into account by the tribunal?  
This research affirms that if such factors exist, then it is clear that their source must be 
international law. It is submitted that there are such extraneous factors based upon 
principles derived from the international law of investment treaty arbitration.  
One such principle must be integrity and sustainability of the investment treaty regime and 
it is possible to envisage extreme circumstances whereby a tribunal would be justified in 
declining its jurisdiction ratione personae despite having concluded that the claimant has 
the requisite nationality in accordance with the law of the relevant contracting state party. 
In formulating these principles to apply in extremis, it is important for tribunals to be 
mindful of the object and purpose of investment treaties. The architecture of most 
investment treaties reveals a quid pro quo: to encourage the investment of capital in the 
contracting state party, minimum standards of treatment and are enforceable at the suit of 
the investor once the investment is made. But at the same time there is little justification in 
grafting the ‘genuine link’ requirements propounded by the international Court of Justice.  
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7. CHAPTER SEVEN: JURISDICTION RATIONE MATERIAE –
INVESTMENT IN INVESTMENT ARBITRATION 
  INTRODUCTION 7.1.
The 1965 ICSID Convention availed locus standi to sue the State for breach of its 
obligations under investment contract containing an ICSID clause or under the treaty on 
which ICSID jurisdiction is founded. This does not however mean that any obligation 
arising out of contractual or treaty liabilities of the parties can be reviewed in ICSID. 
Instead, the parties’ ability to set the ICSID mechanism in motion presupposes that the 
other conditions laid down in the Convention have been met. According to article 25 of 
the ICSID Convention, ICSID’s jurisdiction ratione materiae extends to ‘any legal dispute 
arising directly out of investment’.  
‘A dispute arising out of an investment’ is an element of definition which is fundamental 
to the jurisdiction of the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes. 
Regardless of the importance of this notion, no definition of investment, nor even general 
description of what is meant by this concept, is to be found anywhere in the Convention. 
As Delaume puts it, this omission may have been rather intentional.
440
  
What is an ‘investment’ under ICSID Convention? Possible answers to this query may be 
found in the analysis of this notion by arbitral tribunals, where primarily ratione materiae 
jurisdiction of ICSID has been challenged. Again and again one hears the contention that 
ICSID Convention is over-protective of the interests of the host state, in that states were 
given considerable latitude to regulate such matters as the definition of investment and the 
interpretation of investment treaties to which they had adhered.
441
 Others declare that, in 
order to balance the interests of states and investors more evenly, a set of objective criteria 
should be applied.
442
  
                                                          
440 G Delaume, ‘The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States’ 
(1966) 1 International Lawyer 70. 
441 M Hunter and A Barbuk, Reflection on the Definition of an ‘Investment’ (2005) Liber Amicorium in honour of Robert 
Briner, p. 381. 
442 Ibid.   
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The history of the ICSID Convention reveals contradiction between two competing camps 
– the supporters of highly curtailed ICSID jurisdiction, or of those supporting developing 
countries, and of capital-exporting countries advocating ‘wide-open jurisdiction over any 
foreign enterprise’.443 Notwithstanding this tension underlying the scope of ICSID 
jurisdiction, a recent shift in ICSID jurisprudence towards restrictive view of investment is 
indicative of trendsetting, which runs counter to historical arrangement, whereby ICSID 
tribunals were deferring to states’ ex ante decisions as to what constitutes an investment or 
which categories of economic enterprises to protect.  
In this chapter, the Author will try to address following questions and propose unified 
rules and principles based on which they might be clarified for future reference. Questions 
such as: What is the difference between a dispute arising directly out of an investment and 
a dispute arising from a direct foreign investment? Do the parties have an unlimited 
discretion in agreeing that a particular transaction is an investment? Is it conceivable that a 
particular transaction is covered by the definition of “investment” in a BIT but is still 
outside ICSID’s subject-matter jurisdiction? Who makes a decision regarding ICSID’s 
jurisdiction ratione materiae? Will an ICSID tribunal only examine its competence 
ratione materiae if prompted by a jurisdictional objection? Can operations preparatory to 
investments be regarded as investments under the ICSID Convention? 
  THE CONCEPT OF ‘INVESTMENT’ IN ARBITRATION 7.2.
A. Investment under Legal and Economic Realization  
A central thesis of this chapter is that an investment, in order to qualify for investment 
treaty protection, must incorporate certain legal and economic characteristics. The 
economic characteristics derive from common economic conception of foreign direct 
investment.
444
 They are considered as the transfer of resources into the economy of the 
host state and the assumption of risk in expectation of a commercial return. The legal 
characteristics derive from the non-exhaustive example of an ‘asset’ that constitutes 
                                                          
443 J Mortenson, ‘The Meaning of “Investment”: ICSID’s Travaux and the Domain of International Investment Law’ 
(2010) 51 HJIL 259. 
444 See e.g.: A Adhar, Economic Development Institute of the World bank, Terms Used in Investment Decisionmaking: 
A Glossary (1996) 46; J Downes an J Goodman, Dictionary of Finance and Investment Terms (6th edn., 2003) 350. 
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‘investment’ in investment treaties, which generalizes the requirement as the acquisition of 
property rights in the host state.  
It is essential that an investment have both the requisite legal and economic characteristics. 
If, by way of illustration, the legal characteristics of an investment were to be considered 
in isolation from the common sense economic meaning of that term, then, pursuant to 
some investment treaty definitions of an investment, a train ticket would qualify as a 
‘claim to money or to any performance under contract, having a financial value’ and thus 
as an investment.  
In its attempt at a comprehensive review of investment treaty precedents on the definition 
of an investment, the tribunal in Malaysian Salvors v Malaysia distinguished between a 
‘typical characteristics approach’ and a ‘jurisdictional approach’.445 For the purposes of 
this dichotomy, the former was said to reflect the characteristics of an investment 
articulated in Salini v Morocco,
446
 whereas the latter reveals a strict adherence to the terms 
of the definition supplied by the investment treaty. 
A. Investment under Contemporary BIT Provisions 
Article 1 of the China Model BIT (1997) defines ‘investment’ as: 
 ‘1. […] every kind of asset invested by investors of one Contracting Party in accordance 
with the laws and regulations of the other Contracting Party in the territory of the latter, 
and in particularly, though not exclusively, include: 
a. movable and immovable property …; b. shares, debentures, stock and …; c. claims to 
money …; d. intellectual property rights, …; e. business concession conferred by law ….. 
Any change in the form in which assets are invested does not affect their character as 
investments provided that such change is in accordance with the laws and regulations of 
the Contracting Party in whose territory the investment has been made.’  
 
Article 1 of the Germany Model BIT (2005) defines ‘investment’ as; 
‘1. […] every kind of asset which is directly or indirectly invested … in the territory of the 
other Contracting State. The investments include in particular: 
(a) movable and immovable property …; 
(b) shares of companies …; 
(c) claims to money …; 
(d) intellectual property rights…; 
(e) trade-names, trade and business secrets, technical processes, know-how, and good-will; 
                                                          
445 Malaysian Salvors v Malaysia (preliminary Objections) para. 70. 
446 (Preliminary Objection) 6 ICSID Rep 400, 413/52. 
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(f) business concessions under public law,….  
In the case of indirect investments, in principle only those indirect investments shall be 
covered which the investor realizes via a company situated in the other Contracting 
State;…’ 
 
Article 1(a) of the Netherlands Model BIT (1997) defines ‘investment’ as: 
‘[…] every kind of asset and more particularly, though not exclusively: 
(i) movable and immovable property …; 
(ii) rights derived from shares, bonds and …; 
(iii) claims to money, to other assets or to any performance having an economic value; 
(iv) rights in the field of intellectual property, technical processes, good will …; 
(v) rights granted under public law or under contract, ….’ 
 
Article 1(a) of the United Kingdom Model BIT (2005, with 2006 amendments) defines 
‘investment’ as: 
‘[…] every kind of asset, owned or controlled directly or indirectly, …, includes: 
(i) movable and immovable property …; 
(ii) shares in and stock and debentures …; 
(iii) claims to money or to any performance under contract having a financial value; 
(iv) intellectual property rights, goodwill, technical processes and know-how; 
(v) business concessions conferred by law or under contract, …. 
A change in the form in which assets are invested does not affect their character as 
investments and the term “investment” includes all investments, whether made before or 
after the date of entry into force of this Agreement;…’ 
 
Section (A) of the United States of America Model BIT (2004) defines ‘Investment’ as: 
‘… every asset that an investor owns or controls, directly or indirectly, …, including such 
characteristics as the commitment of  capital or other resources, the expectation of gain or 
profit, or the assumption of risk. Forms that an investment may take include:  
(a) an enterprise;  
(b) shares, stock, and other forms of equity participation in an enterprise;  
(c) bonds, debentures, other debt instruments, and loans; 
(d) futures, options, and other derivatives;  
(e) turnkey, construction, management, production, concession, revenue-sharing, and other 
similar contracts;  
(f) intellectual property rights;  
(g) licenses, authorizations, permits, and similar rights conferred pursuant to domestic law; 
(h) other tangible or intangible, movable or immovable property, and related property 
rights, such as leases, mortgages, liens, and pledges. 
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B. Investment under ICSID Convention 
The concept of investment is central to the ICSID Convention’s subject-matter 
jurisdiction. Therefore, it may seem surprising that the Convention does not offer any 
definition or even description of this basic term.  
The Documents Concerning the Origin and the Formulation of the Convention
447
 record 
the background of this omission. The chairman of the sessions in which the Convention 
was prepared, Aron Broches, was reluctant to include a definition of ‘investment’ since the 
parties’ agreement to submit disputes to ICSID would in any event always be required. 
Nevertheless, a series of proposals led to the following definition of investment in Article 
30 of the Convention’s First Draft:  
‘[A]ny contribution of money or other assets of economic value for an indefinite period, 
or, if the period be defined, for not less than five years.’448 
This definition was not satisfactory to all participants. Some found it too imprecise, while 
others wished to introduce qualifications addressing elements such as profit and risk or the 
host State’s development interests. Yet others found that the definition could be 
unnecessarily restrictive. A more detailed definition was drafted, but a proposal that 
omitted any definition of the term eventually prevailed.  
One of the main reasons for resisting a definition of investment in the Convention was the 
fear that it could give rise to lengthy jurisdictional discussions even if the parties’ consent 
to submit a dispute to ICSID was well established. The concerns did not necessarily 
involve the notion of investment itself, but rather what kind of investment would be a 
suitable subject-matter for the ICSID system. Proposals were made for minimum amounts, 
or for the exclusion of investment that pre-dated the Convention. Mr. Broches felt that this 
aspect of the Centre’s jurisdiction was appropriately left to be controlled by the 
requirement of consent. He subsequently remarked ‘that the requirement that the dispute 
must have arisen out of an ‘investment’ may be merged into the requirement of consent to 
                                                          
447 See History of the Convention and the description in Schreuer, Commentary, Article 25, paras. 80-86. 
448 History, Vol. I, p. 116. 
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jurisdiction.’449 The relevant passage of the World Bank Executive Directors’ Report 
accompanying the Convention (see Appendix 3) reads as follows: 
‘27. No attempt was made to define the term ‘investment’ given the essential requirement 
of consent by the parties, and the mechanism through which Contracting States can make 
known in advance, if they so desire, the classes of dispute which they would or would not 
consider submitting to the Centre (Article 25(4)).’450 
In fact, a number of attempts were made in the preparation of the Convention to include a 
definition of ‘investment’ but they all failed. 
Therefore, the approach adopted in the Convention gives potential parties to ICSID 
arbitration wide discretion to describe a particular transaction, or a category of 
transactions, as investment. Ultimately, however, the requirement of an investment is an 
objective one.
451
 The parties’ discretion results from the fact that the notion of investment 
is broad and that its contours are not entirely clear. But the parties do not have unlimited 
freedom in determining what constitutes an investment.
452
 Any such determination, while 
important, is not conclusive for a tribunal deciding on its competence. Under Article 41 of 
the Convention, a tribunal may examine on its own motion whether the requirements of 
jurisdiction are met. 
While it is not possible to give a precise definition of “investment” it is possible to identify 
certain typical features.
453
 
 The project should have a certain duration. 
 There should be a certain regularity of profit and return. 
 There is typically an element of risk for both sides. 
 The commitment involved would have to be substantial. 
 The operation should be significant for the host State’s development. 
 
                                                          
449 A. Broches, The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes: Some Observations on Jurisdiction, 5 
Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 263 at 268 (1966). 
450 1 ICSID Reports 23, 28. 
451 Ibid. at para. 90. 
452 Ibid. at para. 89. 
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These features should not necessarily be understood as jurisdictional requirements but 
merely as typical characteristics of investments under the Convention. 
B. ‘Restrictive’ Test of Investment 
It is noteworthy that roots of the restrictive jurisdictional test professed by Fedax and 
Salini tribunals can be traced back to findings of Christoph Schreuer articulated in his 
seminal treatise on ICSID convention. Preceding Fedax and Salini, Schreuer posited five 
elements typical to most of investment transactions which would fall under ICSID 
jurisdiction.  
Firstly, projects should have certain duration as there is an expectation of a longer term 
relationship. Secondly, a certain regularity of profit should be also relevant, although, as 
Schreuer puts it, a one-time lump sum agreement, albeit possible, would be untypical. 
According to Schreuer, assumption of risk may be alluded to as a function of duration and 
expectation of profit and, thus, regarded as third element of an ‘investment’. Fourthly, the 
commitment is supposed to be substantial. Thus ‘a contract with an individual consultant 
would not be substantial. The fifth element – ‘operation’s significance for the host State’s 
development’ – was referred to as an unconventional characteristic of an ‘investment’ in 
general, but the World Bank’s Executive Directors Report on ICSID Convention and the 
Preamble of the Convention reflect that ‘development is part of the Convention’s object 
and purpose’.454  
A. Fedax Case 
In Fedax v Venezuela, Claimant was a company established and domiciled in Curacao 
(Dutch Antilles), which filed the request for arbitration with regards to a dispute arising 
out of promissory notes issued by the Republic of Venezuela and assigned by way of 
endorsement to Fedax. Republic of Venezuela raised objections to ICSID’s jurisdiction on 
the ground that there had been no investment for the purposes of the Convention. The 
Respondent argued that Fedax acquired promissory notes issued by the Republic of 
Venezuela in connection with the contract made with the Venezuelan corporation 
Industrias Metalurgicas Van Dam C.A by way of endorsement only. Venezuela further 
                                                          
454 C Schreuer, ‘Commentary on the ICSID Convention’ (1996) 11 ICSID Review - FILJ 358.p. 140. 
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contended that promissory notes did not qualify as an investment because such transaction 
was not tantamount to a “direct” foreign investment which usually involves ‘a long term 
transfer of financial resources - capital flow - from one country to another in order to 
acquire interests in a corporation’, and which normally entails certain risks to potential 
investor.’455    
In view of jurisdictional objections, the Tribunal first referred to article 25 (1) of ICSID 
Convention. In reply to the query of textual interpretation of Respondent’s arguments as to 
‘direct foreign investment’, the Tribunal noted that text of article 25(1) of ICSID 
Convention confers jurisdiction of ICSID over ‘any legal dispute arising directly out of an 
investment’ [emphasis added]. The emphasis is of paramount importance as it is apparent 
that the term ‘directly’ has bearing on the dispute in question, and not on the investment 
itself. Hence, despite Respondents contention that the disputed transaction was not a 
‘direct foreign investment’, the Tribunal held that jurisdiction can be established in respect 
of investments that are not of ‘direct’ nature.  
Furthermore, in order to examine arguments of the Republic of Venezuela as to definition 
of ‘investment’, the Tribunal made references to the Report of Executive Directors of the 
World Bank on the ICSID Convention (see Appendix 3), which mentioned the following: 
‘During the negotiations several definitions of ‘investment’ were considered and rejected. 
It was felt in the end that a definition could be dispensed with ‘given the essential 
requirement of consent by the parties’. This indicates that the requirement that the dispute 
must have arisen out of an ‘investment’ may be merged into the requirements of consent to 
jurisdiction. Presumably, the parties’ agreement that a dispute is an ‘investment dispute’ 
will be given great weight in any determination of the Centre’s jurisdiction, although it 
would not be controlling.’ 
In addition to it, it was noted by few distinguished commentators of the ICSID Convention 
that during the history of its negotiations, jurisdiction over loans, suppliers, credits, 
outstanding payments, ownership of shares and construction contracts, among other 
aspects, was left to the discretion of the parties.
456
 The Tribunal further noted that six 
promissory notes in question were issued by the Republic of Venezuela in order to 
                                                          
455 Brief by the Republic of Venezuela on objections to jurisdiction, 17 January 1997, at 8 as cited in E Helgelson and E 
Lauterpacht ICSID Reports (2002) 189  
456 Convention History, Vol. II, at 261, 474, 451, 542, 661, 500 as cited in E Helgeson and E Lauterpacht, p. 191. 
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acknowledge its debt for the provision of services under a contract signed in 1988 with 
Industrias Metalurgicas Van Dam C.A.; Venezuela had simply received a loan for the 
amount of the notes for the time period specified therein and with the respective obligation 
to pay interest. In light of these deliberations, the Tribunal affirmed that promissory notes 
are by default an instrument of credit and a rather typical financial instrument which 
records that a loan has been made.  
In reply to Respondent’s query regarding the nature of the underlying service transaction 
with Industrias Metalurgicas Van Dam CA, the Tribunal opined that the issue whether 
such transaction would have been qualified as an investment had Fedax NV, a Dutch 
company, entered into exactly the same transaction with the Republic of Venezuela as had 
Industrias Metalurgicas Van Dam CA falls outside the Respondent’s contentions. In 
Tribunal’s view, the central issue to the jurisdictional debate was not the nature of the 
underlying service transaction, but the very act of subsequent endorsement of promissory 
notes to foreign holders and Tribunal’s treatment thereof.  
It followed that the definition of ‘investment’ for this particular case was controlled by 
consent of the respective parties, and interpretations set forth in Article 1 (a) of the 
Netherlands-Venezuela BIT govern the jurisdiction of ICSID:  
‘The term Investments' shall comprise every kind of asset and more particularly though 
not exclusively ..... 
(ii) rights derived from shares, bonds, and other kinds of interests in companies and joint 
ventures; 
(iii) titles to money, to other assets or to any performance having an economic value...’ 
 
The foregoing definition evidences that the Contracting Parties to this BIT conferred a 
very broad meaning upon the concept of ‘investment’. Furthermore, the promissory notes 
were issued by the Republic of Venezuela under the terms of the Law on Public Credit, 
which specifically governs public credit operations aimed at raising funds and resources 
“to undertake productive works, attend to the needs of national interest and cover 
transitory needs of the treasury”.457 That is to say that the transaction in question, i.e. 
issuance of promissory note and the endorsement thereof by Fedax, was no ordinary 
                                                          
457 Ley Organica de Credito Publico, 12 August 1983, Gaceta Oficial de la Republica de Venezuela, 14 de Septiembre de 
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commercial enterprise, which involved ‘a fundamental public interest’.458 The status of the 
promissory notes under the Law of Public Credit serves as important evidence that the 
type of investment in question ‘is not merely a short-term, occasional financial 
arrangement, such as could happen with investments that come in for quick gains and 
leave immediately thereafter’.459  
Tribunal further made reference to Schreuer’s descriptive reflections. It therefore argued 
that:  
‘the duration of the investment in this case meets the requirement of the Law [on Public 
Credit] as to contracts needing to extend beyond the fiscal year in which they are made’. 
The regularity of profit and return is also met by the scheduling of interest payments 
through a period of several years. The amount of capital committed is also relatively 
substantial. And most importantly, there is clearly a significant relationship between the 
transaction and the development of Venezuela, as specifically required under the Law [on 
Public Credit] for issuing the pertinent financial instrument.’  
In view of the foregoing, the Tribunal reached the conclusion that the transaction in 
question was in conformity with the basic characteristics of an ‘investment’ earlier 
articulated by Schreuer.  
B. Salini Case   
In the Salini v. Kingdom of Morocco the dispute arose around the contract for construction 
of part of a highway connecting Rabat and Fes in Morocco signed between two Italian 
companies, Salini Costruttori S.p.A. and Italstrade S.p.A (hereinafter, Salini), and the 
state-controlled ADM, a limited liability company that built, maintained and operated 
highways and various road works in accordance with the Concession Agreement 
concluded with the Moroccan Ministry of Infrastructure and Professional and Executive 
Training. However, due to disagreement over performed works, on May 1, 2000 Salini 
filed a Request for Arbitration against the Kingdom of Morocco. 
In reply to Salini claims, Morocco raised an objection to jurisdiction in a letter sent to 
ICSID on July 17, 2000. It maintained that the Request was not admissible because (1) it 
was premature, that the Tribunal had (2) no jurisdiction ratione personae and ratione 
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materiae and that (3) Salini ‘had waived the possibility of pursuing its claims under the 
BIT by signing the agreement which provided for jurisdiction under Moroccan 
administrative law in domestic courts’.460 For their part, Salini argued that consent given 
by the Kingdom of Morocco to ICSID jurisdiction via BIT should prevail over contractual 
acceptance of another forum. In other words, Claimant contended that submission of the 
matter to the courts of Rabat would not imply a waiver of ICSID jurisdiction, particularly 
since the referral to administrative courts was required due to public nature of the contract.  
In reply to Respondent’s contentions, Salini argued that the contract at issue was an 
investment within the meaning of Articles 1(c) and 1(e) of the BIT, which referred to 
‘rights to any contractual benefit having an economic value” and “any right of an 
economic nature conferred by law or by contract.’ The Kingdom of Morocco further 
alleged that these provisions ‘dilute the notion of investment into a broader notion of 
economic rights’ and that ‘articles 1(c) and 1(e) should, therefore, be read in conjunction 
with paragraph 1 of Article 1, which refers to the laws and regulations of the host State of 
the investment’,461 and as per Moroccan Decree 2-98-482 of December, the transaction 
should be characterized as a mere contract for services.  
The Tribunal, however, while noting the Respondent’s contention as to reference to laws 
and regulations of the host state, argued that ICSID’s jurisdiction was contingent on 
existence of investment within the meaning of the BIT as well as that of the ICSID 
Convention. The Tribunal thereby affirmed double-jurisdictional nature of the dispute and 
further disagreed with Morroco’s respective argument stating that paragraph 1 of Article 1 
‘refers to the validity of the investment and not to its definition’.462  
It followed that the investment in question should have been ‘the object of contracts 
approved by the competent authorities’. In Tribunal’s view, this condition was satisfied as, 
inter alia, ‘different stages leading to the signature of the construction contract involved 
various interventions by the authorities’.463  
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Referring to the second jurisdictional requirement set forth in the ICSID Convention, the 
Tribunal noted the unprecedented nature of the debate over the notion of investment in 
ICSID jurisprudence. The Tribunal asserted that definition of investment in consent 
instrument, i.e. the BIT, should be also subject to an objective test, hence, not merely 
subjective, i.e. pursuant to the parties’ will.  
Following the lead professed by Schreuer, it further made references to Fedax tribunal’s 
opinion as to jurisdictional criteria implied by article 25 (1) of the ICSID Convention – 
contributions, a certain duration of performance of the contract, participation in the risks 
of the transaction, the contribution to the economic development of the host State – and 
‘converted these descriptive reflections into a prescriptive set of requirements’.464  
The Tribunal examined claimant’s submissions as to its contributions, which included 
know-how, the necessary equipment and qualified personnel, production tool on the 
building site, loans to finance required purchases and a bank guarantee. Therefore, Salini’s 
contributions were undeniable and so was the duration of the commitment, which was 
fixed at 32 months and later extended to 36 months. With regards to existence of risk, the 
Tribunal argued that this stemmed from the nature of the contract, which allowed for, inter 
alia, premature end of contract, and risk of potential increase in the cost of labor, any 
accident or damage to property, etc.
465
  
As to the requirement of contribution to host state’s development, the Tribunal also opined 
that in most countries similar infrastructure projects fall under the tasks to be executed by 
State or other public authorities. In addition to that, Claimant was able ‘to provide the host 
State of the investment with know-how in relation to the work to be accomplished’.  
Having considered carefully all abovementioned factors within the context of the facts, the 
Tribunal concluded that the contract between ADM and the Italian companies constituted 
an investment pursuant to Article 1 and 8 of the BIT. 
 
                                                          
464 J Mortenson, ‘The Meaning of “Investment”: ICSID’s Travaux and the Domain of International Investment Law’ 
(2010) 51 HJIL, p. 272. 
465 Salini v Kingdom of Morocco [2003] 42 ILM 609, p.55. 
181 
 
C. Interpretation of the Restrictive Test (Objective and Subjective)  
Critics of the restrictive test, introduced by ICSID tribunals, claim that such test is 
contradictory to the expectations of the founding fathers of the ICSID Convention. 
Schreuer argued that those five features should not necessarily be understood as 
jurisdictional requirements but merely as typical characteristics of an investment protected 
under the ICSID Convention.  
Mortenson, for instance, examines the restrictive approach in detail and reaches the 
conclusion that at least three criteria were actually voted against while the Convention was 
drafted initially. In particular, those features are substantiality, contribution to the 
development of a state, duration. Remarkably, “merely” commercial factors referred to as 
another important screening factor was also added into the foregoing list.  
The necessity of policy flexibility has been the main rationale for those advocating 
deference to state’s own legal interpretations of an investment enterprise and opposing the 
restrictive Salini’s threshold. In Mortenson’s view, such approach allows different 
Convention signatories to pursue various investment proliferation policies at any given 
moment in time.
466
 Additionally, it makes it possible for regime participants to adapt to 
different political, ideological and economic realities.  Advocates of deference to state ex 
ante decisions as to protected investments and respective commitments suggest that 
tribunal need to make references to state’s choices with regards to qualifying a particular 
enterprise as an ‘investment’.467 It is argued that flexibility enables host states to, inter 
alia, police the boundaries of protected investments and limit or decline ICSID 
jurisdiction.
468
  It follows that central to this viewpoint is the recommendation for tribunals 
to ‘root any narrowing construction in the BIT, contract or other consent document that 
opened the ICSID doors in the first place’.469  
At the same time, according to Loncle, analysis of the ICSID jurisprudence on the 
definition of investment, notwithstanding the criticisms spurred over so-called ‘Salini 
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test’, leads to the conclusion that only a few economic operations have not been so far 
qualified as investment. As evidenced by the tribunal in Mihaly v. Sri Lanka, expenses 
relating to studies carried out by the investor at pre-investment stage do not amount to an 
investment. Bank guarantees would also fall outside the scope of the definition, as the 
tribunal in Joy Mining v Egypt opined.  
In Loncle’s view, almost all other economic operations can be qualified as an 
“investment”.470 It is further argued that the existence of the agreement between the parties 
to qualify an economic operation as an investment would not suffice, and the arbitrators 
would not be bound by such agreement. Loncle refers to double-jurisdictional nature of 
treaty-based ICSID jurisprudence and contends that arbitrators ‘have the obligation to 
carry out such double test to the extent the tribunal is empowered by the Convention, on 
one hand, and by the parties’ agreement, on the other’.471    
  THE CATEGORIES OF INVESTMENT (CASE LAW) 7.3.
A. Intangible Securities, Bonds and Shares  
 Joy Mining Machinery Limited v. The Arab Republic of Egypt –472  
This dispute between Joy Mining Machinery Limited and the General Organization for 
Industrial and Mining Projects of the Arab Republic of Egypt arose out of a Contract for 
the Provision of Longwall Mining Systems and Supporting Equipment for the Abu Tartur 
Phosphate Mining Project, particularly due to parties’ disagreements over technical 
aspects related to the commissioning and performance tests of the equipment. Although 
Joy Mining was paid the full purchase price of the equipment in accordance with the 
Contract, the guarantees have not been released by Egyptian Government.  
Following denial to release bank guarantees, Joy Mining submitted the dispute to ICSID 
arbitration under the UK-Arab Republic of Egypt BIT, claiming that the Contract was an 
investment under the Treaty and that the Respondent’s denial to release these guarantees is 
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the violation of the Treaty. Meanwhile, Egyptian Government objected to the jurisdiction 
of the Tribunal submitting that certain conditions of Articles 25 and 26 of the ICSID 
Convention and the BIT were not fulfilled, particular the jurisdictional requirement for a 
dispute to arise directly from investment.  
Respondent further contended that contractual conditions were ordinary commercial 
terms. In fact, the Respondent asserted that providing bank guarantees was merely a 
contractual obligation, and these could not be legally released as long as there was a claim 
for failure to perform under the Contract and no settlement was reached in this regard by 
means of dispute resolution mechanisms available under the Contract.  
In reply to Respondents contentions, Joy Mining, the Claimant, accepted the fact that 
letters of guarantee are normally required in commercial transactions, but argued that it 
was not normal at all to require the guarantee of over 97% of the Contract price, as it was 
required in this case. It further maintained that a bank guarantee was an investment under 
the BIT. Article 1 of the UK-Egypt BIT includes in the definition of investment, among 
other elements, every kind of asset, mortgage, lien or pledge, and claims to money or to 
any other performance under contract having a financial value.   
The Tribunal first examined the meaning and extent of Joy Mining’s claims in light of the 
BIT. It established that inclusion of a contingent liability such as bank guarantee under the 
heading of protected investment within the meaning of Article 1 of the BIT, it should go 
far beyond the concept of investment, even if broadly defined. The Tribunal concluded 
that parties to a dispute should also satisfy the objective requirement of article 25 of the 
ICSID Convention. Otherwise, as it was argued by the Tribunal, Article 25 and its reliance 
on the concept of investment, even if not specifically defined, would be turned into a 
meaningless provision. Summarizing the elements that an activity must have in order to 
qualify as an investment, the Tribunal made references to observations made in Fedax and 
Salini, i.e. that the project in question should have certain duration, a regularity of profit 
and return, an element of risk, a substantial commitment and that it should constitute a 
significant contribution to the host State’s development.  
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The Tribunal noted that the scope of the Contract was to replace and procure Longwall 
mining equipment, this being an element of normal sales contracts. The duration of the 
commitment was not particularly significant, as evidenced by the fact that the price was 
paid in its totality at an early stage. Neither was therefore the regularity of profit and 
return. Risk, however, might have been in place indeed, but it was not different from the 
risk involved in any commercial contract, including the possibility of contract termination. 
Therefore, the conclusion it reached was that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the dispute as 
the claim fell outside the scope of both the BIT and the Convention.     
CMS Gas Transmission Company v Argentine Republic –  
In CMS v. Argentine Republic, the disagreement developed over investments made by 
CMS in Argentine. In late 1989, in an attempt to end the economic crisis of late 1980s 
Argentina adopted an economic recovery plan which, among others, encompassed 
privatization program of utilities. In addition to privatization efforts, previously 
monopolized gas sector led by Gas del Estado, a national state-owned monopoly, became 
subject to unbundling and was therefore divided into several transportation and 
distribution companies to be privatized.  
Unbundling and privatization led to formation of TGN, an investment of CMS and one of 
the companies incorporated as a result of the foregoing attempts. According to legislation 
of the Argentine Republic and the license granted to TGN, tariffs were to be calculated in 
U.S. dollars, but conversion to local currency was to be effected at the time of billing to 
the clients.  
The Claimant also argued that under the regime tariffs were also to adjust every six 
months in accordance with the United States Producer Price Index (PPI). It was, however, 
noted that Argentina was of different opinion as to the nature and legal effects of the 
framework for TGN’s operations, hence did not follow them. As a result, CMS filed a 
request for arbitration in July 2001 which was related mainly to the decisions taken in 
respect of application of the PPI to tariffs in the gas sector. Further, in July 2003, the 
Tribunal rendered its decision as to ICSID jurisdiction and affirmed its competence to 
proceed to merits of the dispute. However, in an Award of 12 May 2005, the Tribunal 
denied CMS's claims of expropriation of its investment under Article IV of the Argentina-
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US BIT and Respondent’s allegedly discriminatory and arbitrary treatment of same 
contrary to protection granted by Article II(2)(b) of the BIT.  
On the other hand it held that failure of the Argentine Republic to grant fair and equitable 
treatment was in breach of Article II(2)(a) of the Treaty and that there was violation of 
binding commitments entered into with regard to the investment guaranteed in Article 
II(2)(c) of the Treaty. Argentine Republic wasn’t satisfied with the Award and thus asked 
ad hoc Committee to annul this Award. In its annulment application, one of the main 
submissions of Argentina was that the Tribunal manifestly acted ultra vires as 
requirements of article 25 of ICSID Convention was not fulfilled.   
After reviewing the submission, the Committee confirmed that Article 25 of the ICSID 
Convention did not incorporate any definition of investment and contended that terms of 
the BIT or of other consent instruments would be of relevance. In the present case, this 
definition is provided for by Article I of the Argentina-US BIT which states:  
 ‘Investment means every kind of investment in the territory of one Party owned or 
controlled directly or indirectly by nationals or companies of the other Party, such as 
equity, debt, and service and investment contracts; and includes without limitation a 
company or shares of stocks or other interests in a company or interests in the assets 
thereof.’ 
As to shareholder equity, it was opined that ‘the BIT contains nothing which indicates that 
the investor in capital stock has to have a majority of the stock or control over the 
administration of the company’.473 In other words, minority shareholding falls under the 
heading of an investment as also evident in earlier ICSID jurisprudence. Such equity 
participation was also referred to in article I(1) of the BIT. As CMS made capital 
investment in TGN covered by the BIT, and for this reason, the Committee concluded that 
there was no exercise of excess powers in this respect by the Tribunal which rendered the 
award in May 2005.     
B. Pre-Investment Expenditure and Pure Contractual Claims 
Prospective investors may expend significant sums in the negotiation phase leading up to 
the conclusion of an investment agreement or a concession contract. If a dispute arises 
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before the agreement materializes and negotiations are interrupted, will the project 
expenditures qualify as an investment for the purpose of ICSID jurisdiction? 
The problem is highlighted by the fact that some treaties grant potential investors a right to 
establishment under certain circumstances.
474
This raises the question whether these entry 
rights are covered by the concept of investment under the ICSID Convention. 
Mihaly International Corporation  v. Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka 
475–  
On 29 July 1999, the ICSID received request for arbitration from Mihaly International 
Corporation, a company established under the laws of the United States of America, 
against the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka. The case concerned construction 
and operation of power generation facility on a build-operate- transfer (BOT) basis. The 
Parties signed Letter of Intent, Letter of Agreement, and Letter of Extension, however, no 
investment agreement has ever been signed by and between Mihaly and Sri Lanka. 
Ultimately when the offer made by Mihaly was rejected by the host state and Mihaly was 
unable to proceed with the project, it brought claim against Sri Lanka for expenses 
incurred during the negotiation and preparation phase of the investment project.  
In reply to Claimant’s submissions, Sri Lanka raised two main objections to the 
jurisdiction of the Center. Notwithstanding the fact that these objections referred to the 
jurisdiction ratione personae and ratione materiae, fundamental and most controversial 
contentions of both Parties were concentrated upon the existence of an investment for the 
purposes of Article 25 of the Convention.  
The Claimant argued that ‘the development phase activities were as essential for the 
successful commercial operation of the BOT project as was the physical construction of a 
plant, and that it was standard practice accepted by host governments, lenders and other 
equity investment to include the sponsors’ development expenditures in the investment 
cost’. In response to Claimant’s arguments, the Respondent did not rule out the possibility 
of including sponsors’ development expenditures in the cost of investment for accounting 
purposes ‘provided there was finally an agreement or consent of the host government to 
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receive or admit the investment in question’ [emphasis added]. Mihaly cited three 
documents – Letter of Intent, Letter of Agreement and Letter of Extension – as evidence 
of Sri Lankan ‘agreement or authorization or awareness, if not acquiescence and approval’ 
for Mihaly to make an investment under the proposed project. 
The tribunal affirmed that most commercial activities nowadays involve spending of huge 
sums on pre-investment preparations. In Tribunal’s view, hardly would the relevant 
qualification be governed by the amount spent, rather ‘it is always a matter for the parties 
to determine at what point in their negotiations they wish to engage the provisions of the 
Convention by entering into an investment’.476 It went on to note that parties could have 
agreed to treat formation of a South Asia Electricity Company as ‘the starting point of the 
admitted investment’.477 Nonetheless, according to core facts, it was obvious that the 
Respondent clearly indicated in various documents, in fact referred to by the Claimant, 
that ‘it was not until the execution of a contract that it was willing to accept that 
contractual relations had been entered into and that an investment had been made’.478  
The Tribunal concluded in regard of the Letter of Intent, of Agreement, and of Extension 
issued by and on behalf of the Government of Sri Lanka that no commitment or obligation 
was undertaken by either of the parties. It was noted that evidence of qualification of such 
expenditure as an investment for the purposes of ICSID Convention was to be found in 
‘conventional law or in customary law’.479 Mihaly was also not able to prove that 
development expenses could have been defined as investment within the similar context 
and in the absence of undertaking from the host State, as no evidence of relevant treaty 
interpretation or practice of states on that matter had been furnished by Claimant to the 
Tribunal. Therefore, the Tribunal concluded that it was unable to accept this type of 
expenditure as an investment protected under ICSID Convention.  
C. Contractual Claims of BIT’s Umbrella Clause  
Société Générale de Surveillance SA  v Islamic Republic of  Pakistan –  
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In SGS v. Pakistan, the basis for bringing the contractual dispute to ICSID was the pre-
shipment inspection (hereinafter referred to as “PSI”) agreement, under which SGS 
undertook to inspect through SGS offices and affiliates goods, which were to be exported 
to Pakistan, and at ports of Pakistan jointly with Respondent’s customs authorities, and 
several articles of the Switzerland-Pakistan BIT, including, inter alia, articles 3(1), 4(1), 
9(2) and 11.
480
 Article 9(2) of the BIT provided for ICSID arbitration, while article 11 was 
referred to as a typical ‘umbrella clause’, or so-called ‘observance of undertakings’ clause, 
which aims at bringing contractual claims within the ambit of the BIT: 
‘Either Contracting Party shall constantly guarantee the observance of the commitments it 
has entered into with respect to the investments of the investors of the other Contracting 
Party.’ 
The contractual validity term of five years was subject to automatic renewal provided 
neither party objected to such renewal in writing.
481
 The PSI Agreement came into effect 
in January 1995; however, in December 1996 the Respondent informed SGS that the PSI 
Agreement was terminated with effect from March 1997.
482
  
SGS filed the suit against Pakistan claiming that the PSI agreement had not been validly 
terminated by the Respondent and therefore such unlawful and ineffective termination of 
the PSI Agreement, violations of the PSI Agreement as well as of the BIT therefore gave 
rise to Pakistan’s liabilities under the PSI agreement and the BIT.483  
In its objections to jurisdiction, Pakistan’s fundamental argument for dismissing ICSID’s 
jurisdiction was the PSI Agreement’s dispute resolution clause which stipulated that any 
dispute, controversy or claim arising out of, or relating to the Agreement, should be 
referred to arbitration under the Arbitration Act of the Pakistan.   
Among other claims, Pakistan alleged that ICSID’s jurisdiction should be dismissed on the 
basis of article 2 of Switzerland-Pakistan BIT as SGS’s activities under the PSI 
Agreement did not constitute an investment within the territory of Pakistan since SGS’s 
                                                          
480 Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/13, at 11. 
481 Ibid. at 14. 
482 Ibid. at 16. 
483 Ibid. at 36. 
189 
 
obligations were performed outside Pakistan through SGS controlled or affiliated 
entities.
484
  The Respondent further contended that while SGS may have injected funds 
into offices and personnel in various ports around the world to render services under the 
PSI Agreement, this did not involve an investment in the territory of Pakistan.  
In reply to Respondent’s arguments, SGS observed that according to article 1 of the BIT 
the term ‘investment’ was to include ‘every kind of asset including, inter alia, claims to 
money or to any performance having an economic value and concessions under public 
law, including concessions to search for, extract or exploit natural resources as well as all 
other rights given by law, by contract or by decision of the authority in accordance with 
the law’.485 SGS also submitted that ICSID jurisprudence holds that ‘an investment need 
not be physically or directly made in the territory to satisfy requirements’486 of provisions 
such as Article 2 of the BIT. According to SGS, regardless of where activities arising out 
of the PSI Agreement were performed, SGS’s investment was, in any event, made within 
the territory of Pakistan as significant value of funds was injected into Pakistan’s territory. 
SGS was also of opinion that the Respondent had in fact recognized that SGS was making 
an investment as it required SGS to obtain an authorization from its Board of Investment 
for the opening and operation of the offices. 
After considering claims of both parties, the Tribunal held that non-exhaustive definition 
of ‘investment’ provided in Swiss-Pakistani BIT’s article 1 was sufficiently broad to 
encompass the PSI Agreement as the Agreement’s performance, by granting SGS the right 
to carry out pre-shipment inspection services, gave rise to ‘claims to money’. The Tribunal 
further noted that ‘Pakistan effectively granted SGS a public law concession, since SGS 
was conferred certain powers that ordinarily would have been exercised by the Pakistani 
Customs service’, and ‘such rights as SGS exercised pursuant to the PSI Agreement were 
rights given by law and by contract’.487  
However, the debate over whether the Tribunal had jurisdiction ‘to determine SGS’s 
claims which are grounded on alleged violations by Pakistan of certain provisions of the 
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BIT’ or its claims ‘grounded on alleged breaches of certain provisions of the PSI 
Agreement’, or on both types of claims, was alluded to by Tribunal as being of the central 
importance. It therefore opined: 
‘[…]BIT claims and contract claims appear reasonably distinct in principle. … in case 
where … a claim brought before an international tribunal is a breach of contract, the 
tribunal will give effect to any valid choice of forum clause in the contract’. …, the 
existence of an exclusive jurisdiction clause in a contract between the claimant and the 
respondent state… cannot operate as a bar to the application of the treaty standard. At 
most, it might be relevant – as municipal law will often be relevant – in assessing whether 
there has been a breach of the treaty. […] 
We conclude that the Tribunal has …. We do not consider that, that jurisdiction would to 
any degree be shared by the PSI Agreement arbitrator.’  
 
That is to say, the Tribunal declined jurisdiction over those claims arising solely out of the 
PSI Agreement and conferred it over BIT’s claims, particularly in respect of Pakistan’s 
obligation ‘to promote and protect investment in Pakistan’ (article 3(1) and 4 (1) of the 
BIT), ‘ensure fair and equitable treatment of investment’ (article 4(2) of the BIT), ‘to 
refrain from taking measures of expropriation or measures having the same nature and 
effect without providing effective and adequate compensation’ (article 6(1) of the BIT).  
D.  Rights to Future Income and Claims to Money  
Société Générale de Surveillance SA v. Republic of the Philippines –  
SGS was part of a large Swiss group providing certification services based on pre-
shipment inspections carried out on behalf of the governmental authorities of the 
Philippines in the countries of export. Its services to Philippines covered pre-shipment 
inspection of not only quality, quantity and export market price, but also ‘sought to verify 
compliance with import regulations, the declared value of goods and their classification 
for customs purposes’.488 In addition to it, SGS was to assist in modernization of customs 
and tax infrastructure in the Philippines. Two successive contracts were signed between 
SGS and the Philippines in 1986 and 1991 (hereinafter referred to as “Agreement”) and 
endorsed accordingly by the President of the Philippines. Agreement was further extended 
up until March 2000
489, at which point SGS’s services under the agreement were 
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discontinued.
490
 Services rendered by SGS were partially paid for. Request for arbitration, 
however, was premised on alleged failure of the Philippines to settle the balance, which, in 
Claimant’s view, deprived SGS of the returns on its investments.  
In its objection to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, the Philippines argued that: 
‘[…]there was no investment in the Philippines as required by the BIT’, and ‘the dispute 
was purely contractual in character’, and ‘the issues in dispute are to be governed by a 
subsisting dispute resolution provision in the main Agreement requiring submission of all 
contractual disputes to the courts of the Philippines.’491     
As to the definition of ‘investment’ under Article I(2) of the Swiss-Philippines BIT, SGS 
argued that: ‘(a) the Agreement clearly gave SGS ‘claims to money or to performance 
having an economic value’, in that it gave SGS claims against the Philippines for unpaid 
fees; (b) the dispute concerned ‘rights given by contract’, in that it concerned SGS's right 
to demand that the Philippines perform their obligations under the Agreement by making 
timely payment of fees due; and (c) pursuant to the requirements of the Agreement, SGS 
has invested substantial resources, including money and know-how’.492  
The Philippines, in turn, contended that in order to establish ICSID jurisdiction, it was 
fundamental to establish the existence of an investment under both the BIT and Article 25 
of the ICSID Convention. It further noted that under the ICSID Convention, ‘technical 
assistance or consultancy contracts, suppliers’ credits and peripheral training programs 
cannot be relied on by SGS as satisfying the investment requirement’.493 According to 
Respondent’s contentions, activities of SGS would not fall under the heading of 
investment even if references were made to typical characteristics rely upon by SGS. 
Further, it was argued that the definition of investment referred to in BIT was closely 
intertwined with the place of substantial performance of the overall obligation. In reply to 
this argument, SGS commented as follows:  
- […], it is clear that the BIT does not cover only investments physically located within the 
territory of the host State; 
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- For there to be a qualifying investment it is sufficient that the investor show that the 
effect of or the value added by the investments or the investment activities flow into the 
territory of the host State.
494
 
 
The Tribunal manifested that ‘injection of funds into the territory [of a Contracting state 
other than the State of nationality of investor] for carrying out [activities pertaining to the 
investment]’ was crucial.495 The Tribunal noted in this regard that a Swiss company within 
the SGS Group funded Manila Liaison Office, which employed ‘a significant number of 
people, and requisitions for inspections were channeled through [this] Office which 
arranged the inspection, received the results […] and dealt with any resulting queries’.496 
The fact that the bulk of the cost of rendering the PSI inspection incurred outside the 
Philippines was not decisive.
497
   
Remarkably, as the Tribunal noted, investments made outside the territory of the 
Respondent State, such as, for instance, construction of the embassy in a third state, would 
not involve ‘investments in the territory of State whose embassy it was’, no matter how 
beneficial it could be, and would not be extended similar BIT protection.
498
 The Tribunal 
further made references to earlier ICSID jurisprudence on PSI services’ qualification as 
‘investment’ under similar BIT provisions, such as SGS v Pakistan, and held that SGS 
made an investment ‘in the territory of’ the Philippines. However, as to exclusive dispute 
resolution clause in the Agreement itself which referred to courts of the Philippines, the 
Tribunal further concluded: 
‘[…], in the Tribunal’s view its jurisdiction is defined by reference to the BIT and the 
ICSID Convention. […] SGS should not be able to approbate and reprobate in respect of 
the same contract: if it claims …, it should comply with the contract in respect of the very 
matter which is the foundation of its claim. The Philippine’s courts are available to hear 
SGS’s contract claim. Until the question of the scope or extent of the Respondent’s 
obligation to pay is clarified … a decision by this Tribunal on SGS’s claim to payment 
would be premature.’499   
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E. Indirect and Concession Agreements Investments 
LETCO v. Liberia –  
On June 16, 1983 Liberian Eastern Timber Corporation (hereinafter referred to as 
“Letco”), a company created and existing under the laws of the Republic of Liberia, filed a 
request for ICSID arbitration against the Government of the Republic of Liberia. The 
Request for Arbitration sought recovery of damages based on alleged violation of a 
concession agreement signed between both parties on 12 May 1970 under the title “Forest 
Products Utilization Contract” (hereinafter referred to as “Agreement”).  
The Agreement entered into between the Government of Liberia and Letco necessitated 
‘an extensive outlay of capital’ by Letco which was to be invested into harvesting and 
processing of forest products in Liberia. The Agreement required Letco to provide ‘all 
capital at such times and in such amounts as may be required for the economic and 
profitable development of this concession’.500 However, due to differences which arose 
between the Forestry Development Authority of Liberia (hereinafter, the FDA) and Letco 
as well as Letco’s alleged violations of the Agreement, including, inter alia, FDA’s 
accusations of ‘Letco’s abandoning quantities of logs in the concession area’, the FDA 
sent a letter to Letco on November 18, 1980, indicating that its ‘concession area would be 
reduced by 279,000 acres “with immediate effect”’.501 
According to Letco, it had paid out over $5 million in machinery and equipment alone 
from 1970 to 1982, and the fact of payment of extensive amounts to fulfill its obligations 
under the Agreement was confirmed in Liberia’s own documents. Hence as to existence of 
‘investment’, the Tribunal opined that ‘given the terms of the Agreement, the amounts 
paid out to develop the concession, and other undertakings, there was no doubt that the 
dispute had arisen directly from an ‘investment’ as required under article 25 (1) of the 
ICSID Convention.  
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Tza Yap Shum  v. Republic of Peru –  
In Tza Yap Shum v. Republic of Peru, Request for ICSID arbitration dated 14 September 
2006 was received from Mr. Tza Yap Shum, a national of the People's Republic of China 
and from TSG Perú S. A. C., a company incorporated under the Peruvian law, against the 
Republic of Peru.
502
 In its request for arbitration, Claimant contended that alleged 
violations of the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Peru and the 
Government of the People's Republic of China concerning the Encouragement and 
Reciprocal Protection of Investments affected the investment made by Mr. Tza Yap Shum 
in TSG Peru S. A. C., the Peruvian company involved in producing fish-based food 
products and exporting them to Asian markets. 
According to claimant’s allegations, his rights granted under Peru-China BIT had been 
violated as actions of the Peruvian Tax Administration committed in 2004 had largely 
affected its business operations and, in fact, extinguished TSG’s economic viability, 
including, inter alia, unlawful and arbitrary tax lien on the company's bank accounts 
thereby precluding the company from operating without disruption.
503
  
Peru replied with an objection to ICSID’s jurisdiction claiming that three fundamental 
requirements for ICSID’s jurisdiction – namely, ratione materiae, ratione personae and 
ratione voluntatis – were not met.  
Following contentions of each party as to fulfillment of the requirement ratione materiae, 
the Tribunal first made references to allegations of the Respondent that the Claimant had 
not made an investment in Peru, and that the BIT did not protect indirect investments of 
Chinese investors in Peru. It followed that, according to Claimant’s documents, at the 
outset Mr. Shum acted as the promoter of an investment project in the Peruvian fishmeal 
industry, which led to incorporation of TSG in Peru to perform business activity, and of 
Linkvest in the Virgin Islands to channel his control and financial flows to TSG. 
504
 
Analyzing definitions of ‘investment’ and ‘investor’ in the Peru-China BIT, the Tribunal 
concluded that the definition of ‘investment’ in the BIT was too broad and that it did not 
                                                          
502 Tza Yap Shum  v. Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/6, at 1. 
503 Ibid. at 35. 
504 Ibid. at 90. 
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contain any specific references as to direct vis-à-vis indirect investment. The Tribunal 
further alluded to object and purpose of the BIT concluded between China and Peru, 
which aimed at promoting and protecting investments, and particularly to intentions of the 
Republic of Peru to promote and protect investments of Chinese nationals in Peruvian 
territory.
505
 Article 1(1) of the Peru-China BIT established that the term “investment” 
meant every kind of asset invested by investors of one Contracting Party in accordance 
with the laws and regulations of the other Contracting Party in the territory of the latter, 
including, though not exclusively: 
‘[…] a) movable, immovable property …, b) shares, stock and any other kind of 
participation in companies; c) claims to money or to any other performance having an 
economic value, d) concessions conferred by law or under contract, …’.506 
 
Based on the above, the Tribunal maintained that intentions of the BIT’s Contracting 
parties to promote and protect investment were decisive in defining the term ‘investment’ 
extensively. Additionally, Tribunal considered that ‘no evidence had been produced that 
indirect investments are not “in accordance with the laws and regulations” of the Republic 
of Peru’.507 Consequently, the Tribunal found ‘no indication in the BIT leading them to 
exclude indirect investments of Chinese nationals in Peruvian territory from the scope of 
application of the Treaty, particularly when it [was] proven that they [exerted] the property 
and control over such investments’508 thereby conferring its jurisdiction to proceed to 
merits of the dispute.  
  CONCLUSION 7.4.
As established by this research, there is no definition of an ‘investment’ in the ICSID 
convention The Author asserts that term ‘investment’, however, is a term of art: its 
ordinary meaning cannot be extended to bring any rights having an economic value within 
its scope, for otherwise violence would be done to that ordinary meaning, in contradiction 
to Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. In simple word, the right to 
performance embodied in a train ticket cannot qualify as an investment. 
                                                          
505 Ibid. at 101. 
506 Ibid. at 105. 
507 Ibid. at 107. 
508 Ibid. at 221. 
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The Author affirms that precisely the same considerations apply to the use of the term of 
art ‘investment’ in the first article of investment treaties. The standard formulation in 
investment treaties is to define an investment as ‘any asset’ and then provide a non-
exhaustive list of assets that might qualify as an investment.  
The proprietary nature of the assets or rights over assets listed in investment treaties serves 
to distinguish, for example, the rights to performance arising out of a concession contract 
and rights to performance embodied in a train ticket. Furthermore, the open-textured 
nature of the standard formulation in investment treaties preserve the ordinary meaning of 
the term ‘investment’ and therefore its consistency with the characteristics that must be 
attributed to the same term as employed in Article 25 of the ICSID Convention. 
 The Author contends that it would be difficult to conceive of a hypothetical conflict 
between the conceptions of an investment in Article 25 of the ICSID Convention and the 
investment treaty because the use of the term ‘investment’ in both instruments imports the 
same basic economic attributes of an investment derived from the ordinary meaning of 
that term.   
But suppose an investment treaty defined an investment as an asset, and listed a train 
ticket as an example of such an asset. In this case there would be a conflict between the 
definition of an investment in an investment treaty and Article 25 of the ICSID 
Convention because the state contracting parties in the former instance have transcended 
the frontier of the ordinary meaning of the term ‘investment’.  
A bilateral act of this kind cannot produce effects in relation to a multilateral treaty (the 
ICSID Convention) and hence, if ICSID arbitration proceedings were to be commenced, 
the tribunal would be compelled to decline jurisdiction. 
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8. CHAPTER EIGHT: JURISDICTION RATIONE VOLUNTATIS 
- CONSENT IN INVESTMENT ARBITRATION 
 INTRODUCTION 8.1.
Consent of the respondent host state to investor/state arbitration in the investment treaty is 
the most important condition for the vesting of adjudicative power in the tribunal. In the 
taxonomy outlined in Chapter 4, consent was listed as an issue of jurisdiction (ratione 
voluntatis), among other issues relating to the proper scope of that adjudicative power. The 
Author asserts that the range of in-depth scholarly research available on jurisdiction 
ratione voluntatis - as to whether or not the respondent host state has consented to the 
arbitration of investment disputes is relatively narrow.  
In the vast majority of cases, exceptionally, questions might arise concerning the 
geographical scope of the respondent state’s consent, such as for overseas territories in 
respect of which the respondent state exercises sovereign powers.
509
 Also, if the 
investment treaty envisages a form of provisional applications, such as the Energy Charter 
Treaty, this may entail a delicate inquiry as to whether the consent of the respondent host 
state to investment arbitration is valid for the adjudication of the particular investment 
dispute.
510
 
The difficulty facing tribunals is one of characterization: namely, whether the particular 
issue alleged to constitute an impediment to the tribunal’s power to adjudicate the 
investment dispute is one relating to the consent to the investment arbitration 
(jurisdiction),
511
 admissibility or seisin. The importance of distinguishing jurisdictional 
issues from those pertaining to admissibility or seisin was considered in Chapter 3. 
The task for this chapter is to distinguish those conditions prescribed in an investment 
treaty that are properly characterized as ‘conditions precedent to the consent of the host 
contracting state party to the arbitration of investment disputes’ from other stipulations in 
                                                          
509 E.g. Petrobart v Kyrgyz Republic (Merits) (whether the UK had extended the application of the BIT to Gibraltar). 
510 E.g. Kardassopoloulos v Georgia (preliminary Objections). 
511 Such as a provision in the treaty requiring the exhaustion of local remedies before the commencement of international 
arbitration: Maffezini v Spain (Preliminary Objections) 5 ICSID Rep 396, 403/35-6; TSA Spectrum v Argentina 
(Preliminary Objections) para 107; Wintershall v Argentina (Preliminary Objections) paras. 119-22. 
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the investment treaty. By ‘seisin’ of the tribunal is meant: those procedural steps that must 
be taken by the claimant to commence arbitration proceedings before a tribunal is 
constituted pursuant to an investment treaty.    
Increasing but yet still insufficient recognition is being accorded to the analysis of ratione 
voluntatis – or of consent to arbitrate – which is the fundamental requirement for a dispute 
to be arbitrable as such. In the context of ICSID, which eclipses other arbitral tribunals in 
the field of investor-state arbitrations, it does not confer its compulsory jurisdiction over 
disputes with its Member States by a mere ratification of the ICSID Convention. This 
Chapter aims to look at the pre-requisite of ratione voluntatis within the framework of 
article 25 of the ICSID Convention.  
In this chapter, the Author will try to address following questions and propose unified 
rules and principles based on which they might be clarified for future reference. Questions 
such as: 
Can ICSID’s jurisdiction be established through a unilateral act of the host State? Is it 
possible to give consent to ICSID’s jurisdiction with respect to disputes that may arise in 
the future? Does every reference to ICSID arbitration in national legislation amount to an 
expression of consent to jurisdiction? Is it possible for a host State to withdraw its 
expression of consent to ICSID’s jurisdiction contained in national legislation by repealing 
the legislation? Can the investor forestall such an attempt to withdraw consent? Is it 
possible to establish ICSID’s jurisdiction merely through a provision in a treaty between 
the host State and the investor’s State of nationality? 
 
Is it possible to give consent to jurisdiction after the institution of arbitration proceedings? 
Is it necessary to exhaust local remedies before instituting ICSID arbitration? Is it 
plausible to argue that consent to ICSID’s jurisdiction given by a State must be interpreted 
restrictively since such consent constitutes derogation from that State’s sovereignty? Can a 
State terminate consent to the jurisdiction of ICSID by cancelling an investment licence 
that contained the consent clause? 
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  THE CONCEPT OF ‘CONSENT’ IN ARBITRATION 8.2.
A. The Concept and Scope of Consent 
The scope of consent to arbitration offered in treaties varies. Many BITs in their consent 
clause contain phrases such as ‘all disputes concerning investments’ or any legal dispute 
concerning investment’.  These provisions do not restrict a tribunal’s jurisdiction to claims 
arising from the BIT’s substantive standards. By their own terms, these consent clauses 
encompass disputes that go beyond the interpretation and application of the BIT itself and 
would include disputes that arise from a contract in connection with the investment. 
In saline v Morocco, Article 8 of the applicable BIT defined ICSID’s jurisdiction in terms 
of ‘[t]ous les différends ou divergences … concernant un investissement’.512 The tribunal 
noted that the terms of this provision were very general and included not only a claim for 
violation of the BIT but also a claim based on contract: ‘… Article 8 obliges the state to 
respect the jurisdictional choice arising by reason of breaches of the bilateral Agreement 
and of any breach of a contract which binds it directly’.513 
In Compania de Aguas del Aconquija, S. A. & Vivendi Universal,
514
 Article 8 of the BIT 
between France and Argentina , applicable in that case, offered consent for’[a]ny dispute 
relating to investments’. In its discussion of the BIT’s fork in the road clause, the ad hoc 
Committee said; 
‘… Article 8 deals with disputes “relating to the investments made under this Agreement 
between one Contracting Party and an investor of the other Contracting party”. It is those 
disputes which may be submitted, at the investor’s option, either to national or 
international adjudication. Article 8 does not use a narrow formulation, requiring that the 
investor’s claim allege a breach of the BIT itself. Read literally, the requirements for 
arbitral jurisdiction in Article 8 do not necessitate that the Claimant allege a breach of the 
BIT itself; it is sufficient that the dispute relate to an investment made under the BIT. This 
may be contrasted, for example, with article 11 of the BIT [dealing with state-state dispute 
settlement], which refers to disputes ‘concerning the interpretation or application of this 
Agreement”, or with Article 1116 of the NAFTA, which provides that an investor may 
                                                          
512 Italy/Morocco BIT Article 8. 
513 Salini Costruttori SpA and Italstrade SpA v Royaume du Maroc (Decision on Jurisdiction) 23 July 2001, Journal de 
Driot International 196 (2002), 6 ICSID Rep 400, at para 61. 
514 Compania de Aguas del Aconquija, S. a. and Vivendi Universal (formerly compagnie Générale des Eaux) v Argentine 
Republic (Decision on Annulment) 3 July 2002, 6 ICSID Rep 340. 
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submit to arbitration under Chapter 11 “a claim that another Party has breached an 
obligation under” specified provisions of that Chapter.’515  
The tribunal in SGS v Pakistan reached a different conclusion. Article 9 of the applicable 
BIT between Switzerland and Pakistan referred to ‘disputes with respect to invest5ments’. 
The tribunal; found that the phrase was merely descriptive of the factual subject matter of 
the disputes and did not relate to the legal basis of the claims or cause of action asserted in 
the claims. The tribunal said:  
‘… from that description alone, without more, we believe that no implication necessarily 
arises that both BIT and purely contract claims are intended to be covered by the 
Contracting Parties in Article 9’.516 
Therefore the tribunal held no jurisdiction with respect to contract claims that did not also 
constitute breaches of the substantive standards of the BIT. That decision has attracted 
criticism.
517
  
Other BIT clauses offering consent to arbitration do not refer to investment disputes in 
general terms but circumscribe the types of disputes that are submitted to arbitration. A 
provision that is typically for United States BITs is contained in Article VII of the 
Argentina-US BIT of 1991. It offers consent for investment disputes, which are defined as 
follows: 
‘a dispute between a Party and a national or company of the other Party arising out of or 
relating to (a) an investment agreement between that Party and such national or company; 
(2) an investment authorization granted by that Party’s foreign investment authority (if any 
such authorization exists to such a national or company; or (c) an alleged breach of any 
right conferred or created by this Treaty with respect to an investment.’ 
A narrower offer of consent to arbitration in BITs, cover only violations of the BIT’s 
substantive standards. For instance, the BIT between El Salvador and the Netherlands 
contains a submission to arbitration in Article 9 only for: ‘… disputes which arise within 
the scope of this agreement between one Contracting Party and an investor of the other 
Contracting Party concerning an investment. …’ 
                                                          
515 Ibid. para 55. 
516 SGS v Pakistan (Decision on Jurisdiction) 6 august 2003, 8 ICSID Rep 406, at para. 161. 
517 See also Tokios Tokeles v Ukraine (Decision on Jurisdiction) 29 April 2004, note 42 at para 52.  
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Similarly under Article 1116 of the NAFTA, the scope of the consent to arbitration is 
limited to claims arising from alleged breaches of the NAFTA itself. Also, under Article 
26(1) of the ECT, the scope of the consent is limited to claims arising from alleged 
breaches of the ECT itself. 
The Author asserts that an umbrella clause in the BIT should extend the jurisdiction of 
tribunals to violations of contracts even if the consent to arbitration is restricted to claims 
arising from breaches of the treaty. If it is true that under the operation of an umbrella 
clause violation of a contract relating to the investment became treaty violations, it would 
follow that even a provision in a BIT merely offering consent to arbitration for violations 
of the BIT extends to contract violations covered by the umbrella clause. Some 
expressions of consent to arbitration are narrowly confined as to their subject matter. 
Typical examples for narrow clauses of this kind are expressions of consent that are 
limited to the amount of compensation for expropriation.
518
 For instance, the China-
Hungry BIT of 1991 provides in Article 10(1):  
‘Any dispute between, either Contracting State and the investor of the other Contracting 
State concerning the amount of compensation for expropriation may be submitted to an 
arbitral tribunal.’  
Some national laws also offer consents only in respect of narrowly circumscribed issues. 
In Tradex v Albania the consent expressed in the Albania Law on foreign Investment was 
limited in the following terms  
‘…if the dispute arises out of or relates to expropriation, compensation for expropriation, 
or discrimination and also for the transfers in accordance with Article 7, …’519 
After a detailed examination of the facts, the tribunal found that the claimant had not been 
able to prove that an expropriation had occurred.
520
 
B. The Condition to Consent – (Exhaustion of Cooling off period) 
Most consent clauses in treaties provide for procedures that must be followed. A common 
condition for the institution of arbitral proceedings is that an amicable settlement has been 
attempted through consultation or negotiations. This requirement is subject to certain time 
                                                          
518 For applications of consent clauses of this kind, see Telenor v Hungry, Award, 13 September 2006, paras 18(2), 25, 
57, 81-83; ADC v Hungry, Award, 2 October 2006, paras 12, 445.   
519 Tradex v Albania (Decision on Jurisdiction) 24 December 196, 5 ICSID Rep 47, at pp. 54-55. 
520 Tradex v Albania (Award), 29 April 1999, 5 ICSID Rep 70 at paras. 132-205. 
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limits ranging from three to twelve months. If no settlement is reached within that period, 
the claimant may proceed to arbitration. The NAFTA (Article 1120) prescribes a waiting 
period of six months since the events giving rise to the claim. Article 26(2) of the ECT 
offers consent to arbitration if the dispute cannot be settled within three months from the 
date on which either party requested amicable settlement. 
In Author’s view, the arbitral tribunals have not reacted uniformly to these provisions of 
an amicable settlement.
521
 In the majority of cases the tribunals found that the claimants 
had complied with these waiting periods before proceeding to arbitration.
522
 In other cases, 
the tribunals found that non-compliance with the waiting periods did not affect their 
jurisdiction.
523
 The author contends to the view that periods foreseen for negotiations are 
not of jurisdictional nature.  The reason being that, by the time the tribunals make a 
decision on this issue, any waiting period would likely to have collapsed. Under these 
circumstances insistence on the compliance with the waiting period before the institution 
of proceedings would make little sense and would merely compel the claimant to start 
proceedings anew. 
The question is therefore: Whether a claimant’s failure to comply with the prescribed 
cooling-off period before commencing the arbitration proceedings against the host state be 
construed as an ultimate obstacle for the exercise of the jurisdiction or constitutes a breach 
of a procedural rule relating to the seisin of the tribunal ?  
                                                          
521 For more detailed treatment, see C Schreuer, ‘Travelling the BIT Route – Of waiting Periods., Umbrella Clauses and 
Forks in the Road’ (2004) 5 Journal of World Investment and Trade 231, 232. 
522 Salini Costruttori SpA and Italstrade SpA v Royaume du Maroc (Decision on Jurisdiction) 23 July 2001, Journal de 
Driot International 196 (2002), 6 ICSID Rep 400, at paras 15-23; CMS v Argentina, (Decision on Jurisdiction), 17 July 
2003, 7 ICSID Rep 494, at paras 121-123; Generation Ukraine v Ukraine, (Award), 16 September 2003, 10 ICSID Reps 
240, paras 14.1-14.6; Azurix v Argentina, (Decision on Jurisdiction), 8 December 2003, 43 ILM 262 (2004) at para 55; 
Tokios Tokeles v Ukraine, (Decision on Jurisdiction), 29 April 2004, paras 101-107; LG &E v Argentina, (Decision on 
Jurisdiction), 30 April 2004, para 80; MTD v Chile, (Award), 25 May 2004, para 96; Occidental v Ecuador, (Award), 1 
July 2004, para 7; Siemens v Argentina, (Decision on jurisdiction), 3 August 2004, paras 163-173; L.E.S.I.- DIPENTA v 
Algeerie, (Award), 10 January 2005, paras 32,33; Corp. v Arengtina, (Decision on Jurisdiction), 26 April 2005, paras 62-
71. 
523 The first such case was decided under 1120 of the NAFTA: Ethyl Corp. v Canada, (decision on Jurisdiction)), 24 
June 1998, (Decision on Jurisdiction), 7 ICSID Rep 12 at paras 76-88: the tribunal dismissed the objection based on the 
six-month provision, since further negotiations would have been pointless. In Wena Hotels v Egypt, (decision on 
Jurisdiction), 29 June 1999, 6 ICSID reps pp. 74, 87, the tribunal noted approvingly that the respondent had withdrawn 
its objection to jurisdiction based on the waiting period. In Ronald s. Lauder v The Czech Republic, (Final Award), 3 
September 2001, 9 ICSID Reps 66, para 187, the tribunal found that the waiting period of six-month was not a 
jurisdictional provision. In Bayindir Insaat Turizm Ticaret Ve Sanayi A. S. v Pakistan, (Decision on Jurisdiction), 14 
November 2005, paras 88-103, the tribunal found that a requirement to give notice of the dispute for the purpose of a 
negotiated settlement was not a precondition to jurisdiction.  
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The question is aggravated in the circumstances where there is no real prospect to reach an 
amicable resolution which, as Schreuer aptly notes, adds little sense to observe the above 
mentioned requirement. The ICJ jurisprudence has dealt with the foregoing query in 
Nicaragua case, and jurisdiction thereof was based upon article XXIV (2) of the Treaty of 
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the United States and Nicaragua of 1956:  
‘Any dispute between the Parties as to the interpretation or application of the present 
Treaty, not satisfactorily adjusted by diplomacy, shall be submitted to the International 
Court of Justice, unless the Parties agree to settlement by some other pacific means.’ 
Remarkably, the aforementioned dispute resolution provision does not contain a limit 
within which a dispute shall be ‘adjusted by diplomacy’. The United States invoked the 
argument that attempt to resort to amicable resolution was a pre-requisite to submitting a 
dispute to the competence of the ICJ and that Nicaragua ‘had never raised the Treaty in its 
negotiations with the United States.’ The motion of the United States was, however, 
rejected by the ICJ:  
‘In view of the Court, it does not necessarily follow that, because a State has not expressly 
referred in negotiations with another State to a particular treaty as having been violated by 
conduct of that other State, it is debarred from invoking a compromissory clause in that 
treaty … It would make no sense to require Nicaragua now to institute fresh proceedings 
based on the Treaty, which it would be fully entitled to do. As the Permanent Court 
observed, 
‘…the Court cannot allow itself to be hampered by a mere defect of form, the removal of 
which depends solely on the party concerned’  
 
The above mentioned judicial reckoning is based on the premise that prior consultation is 
not a pre-requisite for jurisdiction, but rather a formality. In Ronald S. Lauder v The Czech 
Republic, the arbitral proceeding was held under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules on the 
basis of the BIT between the Czech Republic and the United States. Article VI(3) of the 
BIT provided: 
‘At any time after six months from the date on which the dispute arose, the national or 
company concerned may choose to consent in writing to the submission of the dispute for 
settlement by conciliation or binding arbitration …’ 
The Tribunal affirmed that the cooling off period was to start not from the date on which 
the alleged breach took place, but from the date on which the State was advised of the 
breach. The motion of the Respondent as to non-observance of the waiting period was 
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nevertheless rejected by the Tribunal. It held that the foregoing provision was procedural 
and was not to bar the Tribunal from considering the case on its merits.  
In addressing the question above, this research supports the paradigm that it clearly goes to 
the seisin of the tribunal rather than its jurisdiction. It would be extraordinary, for instance, 
if the court at the seat of the arbitration could entertain an application to quash the 
tribunal’s award because it deemed the dispute to have arisen too early, or ruled that any 
negotiation was futile in light of the host state’s conduct.  In other words, one should be 
cautioned against overreliance on the procedural requirement of the waiting period. 
Indeed, the jurisprudence of the arbitral tribunals adds value to this proposition as 
tribunals have by and large construed the consultation periods as ‘directory and 
procedural’ rather than ‘mandatory and jurisdictional in nature’.524  
A common condition for the institution of proceedings before ICSID is that an amicable 
settlement has been attempted through consultations or negotiations. Where this is the 
case, negotiations must be undertaken in good faith. Some national investment laws
525
 and 
numerous BITs contain the condition that a negotiated settlement must be attempted 
before resort can be had to the Centre. In order to forestall dilatory tactics and in order to 
make it clear when the condition precedent for settlement under the Convention has been 
satisfied, the treaties typically lay down time limits for negotiations. If no settlement is 
reached within a certain period of time, access to ICSID is open.  
 
In Tradex v. Albania, the consent clause in the Albanian Law was subject to the condition 
that the dispute “cannot be settled amicably”.526 The Tribunal noted that Tradex had sent 
five letters over four months to the competent Albanian Ministry but that none of these 
was answered or resulted in any relevant action. The Tribunal found these letters to be a 
sufficient good faith effort to reach an amicable settlement. 
 
                                                          
524 SGS v Pakistan, Decision on Jurisdiction, 6 August 2003, 18 ICSID Rev. – F.I.L.J. 184 (2003). 
525 Albania Law on Foreign Investments, 1993, Art. 8(2); Cameroon Investment Code, 1990, Art. 45; Tanzania National 
Investment (Promotion and Protection) Act, 1990, sec. 29(1); Togo Investment Code, 1985, Art. 4; Uganda Investment 
Code, 1991, Art. 30(2). 
526 Tradex v. Albania, Decision on Jurisdiction, 24 December 1996, 14 ICSID Review—Foreign Investment Law Journal 
161, 174 (1999). 
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Another procedural condition that may be inserted into a consent clause concerns 
conciliation. Since conciliation is one of two procedures under the ICSID Convention, 
provision for it is not, strictly, a condition for the Centre’s jurisdiction. But arbitration can 
be made contingent upon prior unsuccessful conciliation under the Convention. Under the 
1993 Model Clauses 1 and 2, consent can be given for conciliation followed, if the dispute 
remains unresolved within a certain period of time, by arbitration. 
C. The Condition to Consent – (Exhaustion of Local Remedies)   
Provisions giving consent to investment arbitration do not, in general, require the 
exhaustion of local remedies before international proceedings are instituted. One of the 
purposes of investor-state arbitration is to avoid the vagaries of proceedings in the host 
state’s courts. 
It is open to a host state to make the exhaustion of local remedies as a condition of its 
consent to arbitration. Also some BITs offering consent require the exhaustion of local 
remedies. But clauses of this kind are rare and are found mostly in older BIT’s.527  In the 
absence of such a proviso, the investor does not need to exhaust local remedies before 
starting an international arbitration. The tribunal in Generation Ukraine v Ukraine
528
 said:  
’13.4.The first sentence of Article 26 secures the exhaustively of a reference to ICSID 
arbitration vis-à-vis any other remedy. A logical consequence of this exhaustively is the 
waiver by Contracting State to the ICSID Convention of the of the remedies rule, so that 
the investor is not compelled to pursue remedies in the respondents state’s domestic courts 
or tribunals before the institution of ICSID proceedings. This waiver is implicit in the 
second sentence of Article 26, which nevertheless allows Contracting States to reserve its 
right to insist upon the prior exhaustion of local remedies as a condition of its consent.’529 
Some BITs provide that before an investor may bring a dispute before an international 
tribunal, he or she must seek its resolution before the host state’s domestic courts for a 
certain period of time, often 18 months.
530
 The investor may proceed to international 
                                                          
527 C Schreuer, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary (2001) 392.  
528 Generation Ukraine Inc. v Ukraine, (award), 16 September 2003, 44 ILM 404, 10 ICSID Report 240. 
529 Para 13.4. See also Lanco International Inc. v Argentina, (Decision on Jurisdiction), 8 December 1998, 40 ILM 457 
(2001), 5 ICSID Reports 369, para 39; AES Corporation v The Argentine Republic, (decision on Jurisdiction), 26 April 
2005, paras 69,70.  
530 For more detail , see C Schreuer, ‘Calvo’s Grandchildren: the Return of Local Remedies in Investment Arbitration’ 
(2005) 4 Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals 1, 3-5. 
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arbitration if the domestic proceedings do not result in the dispute’s settlement during that 
period or if dispute persists after the domestic decision.  
Author contends that the usefulness of such requirement is questionable. It creates a 
considerable burden to the party seeking arbitration with little chance of advancing the 
settlement of the dispute. In author’s view, the most likely effect of a clause of this kind is 
delay and additional cost since it is unlikely that the dispute will be resolved before the 
domestic courts within that time frame. The most notorious example of a requirement to 
waive local remedies is Article 1121 of NAFTA, which is entitled ‘Conditions Precedent 
to Submission of a Claim to Arbitration’ and directs claimants to: 
‘[W]aive their right to initiate or continue before any administrative tribunal or court under 
the law of any Party, or other dispute settlement procedures, any proceedings with respect 
to the measure of the disputing Party that it alleged to be a breach of an obligation under 
the NAFTA.’   
Based on Article 26 of the ICSID Convention, a State may require the exhaustion of local 
administrative or judicial remedies as a condition of its consent to arbitration under the 
Convention. In the absence of such a provision there is no requirement to exhaust local 
remedies. Only a few States have conditioned their consent to ICSID jurisdiction on the 
prior exhaustion of local remedies. A relatively small number of bilateral investment 
treaties and a few investment agreements with investors contain such a condition. 
The condition that local remedies must be exhausted before ICSID arbitration can be 
instituted, may be expressed by a State party to the Convention only up to the time consent 
to arbitration is perfected but not later. This is a consequence of the principle that once 
consent to jurisdiction has been given, it may not be unilaterally withdrawn or restricted. 
In the annulment proceedings to Amco v. Indonesia, Indonesia argued ‘that the Tribunal 
manifestly exceeded its powers by holding that Amco could bring its claim for 
compensation of damages based on the acts of the army and police personnel involved 
directly to an ICSID Tribunal without previously seeking redress before the Indonesian 
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courts in conformity with the general international law rule on exhaustion of local 
remedies.’531 The ad hoc Committee had little problem to dispose of this argument: 
‘… By acceptance of ICSID jurisdiction without reserving under Article 26 of the 
Convention a right to require prior exhaustion of local remedies as a condition for 
obtaining access to an ICSID tribunal, Indonesia must be deemed to have waived such 
right ...’532 
It is questionable whether insistence by a host State on the exhaustion of local remedies 
prior to ICSID arbitration serves any useful purpose. Resort to local remedies before the 
institution of ICSID arbitration may be seen by the investor as a waste of time and money. 
The public proceedings in the host State’s courts may further exacerbate the dispute 
between the parties and may affect the host State’s investment climate. If the ICSID 
tribunal overturns a decision by the host State’s highest court, this may be a source of 
acute embarrassment. Therefore, it seems wisest to leave the Convention’s basic rule of 
non-exhaustion in place and to follow the example of the vast majority of consent 
agreements in not requiring the exhaustion of local remedies. 
D. The ICSID’s approach to  consent533 
Arbitration is always based on an agreement between the parties. In the case of ICSID, 
there must be an agreement to arbitrate between the host State and the foreign investor. 
Art. 25, first sentence, of the ICSID Convention provides to this effect: 
‘The jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to any legal dispute arising directly out of an 
investment, between a Contracting State (or any constituent subdivision or agency of a 
Contracting State designated to the Centre by that State) and a national of another 
Contracting State, which the parties to the dispute consent in writing to submit to the 
Centre.’ 
 
The parties giving consent must be a State party to the ICSID Convention (or a designated 
constituent subdivision or agency) and a national of a State party to the ICSID 
Convention. In addition, there must be a legal dispute arising directly out of an 
investment. Participation in the Convention alone does not carry any obligation or even 
                                                          
531 1 ICSID Reports 526. 
532 1 ICSID Reports 526. 
533 See also the ‘COURSE ON DISPUTE SETTLEMENT - Module 2.3. ICSID: Consent to Arbitration.’ 
(UNCTAD/EDM/Misc.232/Add.2), at <http://www.UNCTAD.org>, accessed 22 August 2011.  
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expectation that there will be consent to jurisdiction. A Contracting State remains free as 
to whether or not, and if so to what extent, it wishes to give consent. 
Under the Convention, consent must be in writing. But there is no particular form in which 
this must be done. Consent in writing will normally be communicated between the parties 
but there is no need to notify the Centre at the time of consent. In fact, the Centre has no 
precise knowledge of the number and the contents of various consent clauses covering 
investments. But proof of consent in writing will be required at the time a request for 
arbitration is made.Consent in writing must be explicit and not merely construed. 
 
In Cable TV v. St. Kitts and Nevis, the Respondent was not a party to the agreement 
containing the consent clause. The Claimant argued that consent by the Respondent could 
be construed from the institution of proceedings by the Attorney-General of St. Kitts and 
Nevis against the Claimants in a domestic court of the Respondent. The purpose of the 
domestic court proceedings was to obtain an injunction to restrain the Claimant from 
raising its rates prior to the resolution of the dispute through ICSID arbitration. The 
Tribunal held that the references in the court documentation to the ICSID clause in the 
agreement were merely statements of fact and did not amount to consent by any person to 
ICSID jurisdiction.
534
 
In practice, consent is given in one of three ways. The most obvious way is a consent 
clause in a direct agreement between the parties. Dispute settlement clauses referring to 
ICSID are very common in contracts between States and foreign investors. ICSID has 
prepared and published a set of Model Clauses to facilitate the drafting of these 
contracts.
535
  
Another technique to give consent to ICSID dispute settlement is a provision in the 
national legislation of the host State, most often its investment code. Such a provision 
offers ICSID dispute settlement to foreign investors in general terms. Many capital 
importing countries have adopted such provisions. Since consent to jurisdiction is always 
                                                          
534 Cable TV v. St. Kitts and Nevis, Award, 13 January 1997, 13 ICSID Review–Foreign Investment Law Journal 328, 
354-361 (1998). 
535 ICSID Model Clauses, Doc. ICSID/5/Rev. 2 of 1993. Reproduced in 4 ICSID Reports 357. 
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based on an agreement between the parties, the mere existence of such a provision in 
national legislation will not suffice. The investor may accept the offer in writing at any 
time while the legislation is in effect. In fact, the acceptance may be made simply by 
instituting proceedings. 
The third method to give consent to ICSID jurisdiction is through a treaty between the 
host State and the investor’s State of nationality. Most bilateral investment treaties (BITs) 
contain clauses offering access to ICSID to the nationals of one of the parties to the treaty 
against the other party to the treaty. The same method is employed by a number of 
regional multilateral treaties such as the NAFTA and the Energy Charter Treaty. Attempts 
to create a global Multilateral Agreement on Investment that would include a similar 
dispute settlement clause have not come to fruition. Offers of consent contained in treaties 
must also be perfected by an acceptance on the part of the investor. 
 
Consensual nature of ICSID’s jurisdiction is a backbone of its Convention and of 
arbitration in general. State participation in Washington Convention carries neither an 
obligation nor even an expectation as regards that state’s consent to arbitrate under the 
auspices of the Centre. Notably, it is merely to ‘provide facilities for conciliation and 
arbitration of investment disputes between Contracting States and nationals of other 
Contracting States in accordance with the provisions of the ICSID Convention’. In other 
words, the Convention leaves freedom to its Contracting States as to ultimate decision 
whether or not to give assent to ICSID jurisdiction.  
The Report of the Executive Directors (see Appendix 3) summarizes the foregoing in the 
following way: 
‘The scope of such consent is within the discretion of the parties. In this connection, it 
should be noted that ratification of the ICSID Convention is, on the part of a Contracting 
State, only an expression of its willingness to make use of ICSID machinery. As such, 
ratification does not constitute an obligation to use that machinery. That obligation can 
arise only after the State concerned has specifically agreed to submit to ICSID arbitration 
a particular dispute or classes of disputes. In other words, the decision of a State to consent 
to ICSID arbitration is a matter of pure policy and it is within the sole discretion of each 
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Contracting State to determine the type of investment disputes that it considers arbitrable 
in the context of ICSID.’536 
Article 25 of the ICSID Convention provides that ICSID extends its jurisdiction over 
dispute, which the parties to this dispute ‘consent in writing to submit to the Centre’ and 
such consent must be obtained from both or all parties. This is referred to as the only 
formal requirement for consent under the ICSID Convention.
537
  
Remarkably, as Schreuer aptly notes, consent in writing ‘must be explicit and not merely 
construed’.538 In Cable TV v St. Kitts and Nevis, the Government of Nevis, the executive 
entity of the Nevis Island Administration and a constituent element of the Federation of St. 
Christopher and Nevis (hereinafter, the Federation), entered into the agreement dated 18 
September 1986 (hereinafter, the Agreement) with Cable Television of Nevis, Ltd. and 
Cable Television of Nevis Holdings, Ltd. (hereinafter, Cable), granting the latter the 
exclusive right to provide cable television services on the island of Nevis. Clause 16 of the 
Agreement read: 
‘any disputes relating to this agreement, its performance or nonperformance shall be 
referred to arbitration under the rules of procedure for arbitration proceedings (hereinafter 
the ‘Rules’) in effect as of February 1, 1981 adopted under the 1965 Convention on the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of other States.’539  
The Agreement also permitted Cable to increase charges for its services, but despite 
Cable’s numerous submissions addressed to the Federation to increase the rates, the latter 
had consistency refused the same. This led to inability of Cable to recoup its initial 
investment. On 25 October 1995, Cable submitted its request for ICSID arbitration.  
The Federation had therefore been regarded by Claimants in its Request as the other party 
to arbitration as well as the Contracting State for the purposes of article 25 of the ICSID 
Convention. Cable Television of Nevis Limited and Cable Television of Nevis Holdings 
Ltd. – or Cable, the Claimants, – were formed under Companies Act of the Federation and 
were 99% owned by nationals of the United States of America. As per Agreement, the 
Federation and Cable agreed to treat the latter as ‘National of a Contracting State’ under 
                                                          
536 G Delaume, ICSID Arbitration, pp. 104/5. 
537 See Schreuer, Commentary to ICSID, p. 193. 
538 See UNCTAD Handbook.   
539 Cable Television of Ncvis Ltd. and Cable Television of Nevis Holdings, Ltd. v The Federation  of St. Christopher (St. 
Kitts) and Nevis; ICSID Case No. ARB19512; para. 1.03, p. 332. 
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article 25 (2b) of the ICSID Convention.
540
 The Claimants also argued that institution of 
the court proceeding by the Attorney General of the Federation to obtain injunction to 
restrain the Claimants from raising its rates for cable television services on Nevis prior to 
the completion of ICSID arbitration serves as a confirmation of Federation’s consent to 
ICSID Arbitration.  
In response to Claimants’ motion, the Respondent argued that the Tribunal was not 
competent to substitute the Federation for Nevis Island Administration. The Federation 
submitted that Nevis Island Administration was party to the Agreement with Cable and 
was therefore the proper party to arbitration.  
The Request for arbitration was ultimately dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. It held that 
the proper party to the Agreement was Nevis Island Administration, Federation’s 
constituent subdivision and not the Federation itself, and mere institution of proceedings 
by the Attorney General for injunction could not be construed as Federation’s consent to 
arbitrate under ICSID.  
E. The Interpretation of Consent 
In a number of cases the respondent argues that an expression of consent to arbitration 
should be construed restrictively. Most tribunals have rejected this argument. The vast 
majority of tribunals have favoured a balance approach that accepts neither a restrictive 
nor an expansive approach to the interpretation of consent clauses.
541
  
                                                          
540 Cable TV v St. Kitts and Nevis, ICSID Reports, vol. 5, pp. 106-107. 
541 Amoco v Indonesia, (Decision on Jurisdcition0, 25 September 1983, 1 ICSID Reports 389 at paras 12-24; Soabi v 
Senegal, (Award), 25 February 1988, 2 ICSID Reports 190, paras 4.08-4.10; Cable TV v St. Kitts and Nevis, (Award), 13 
January 1997, 5 ICSID Reports 108 at para6.27; CSOB v Slovakia, (Decision on Jurisdiction), 24 May 1999, 5 ICSID 
Reports 335 at para 34; Ethyl Corp. v Canada, (Decision on Jurisdiction), 24 June 1998, (Decision on Jurisdiction), 7 
ICSID Reports12 at para 55; Loewen v United States, (decision on Competence and Jurisdiction), 9 January 2001, 7 
ICSID Reports 425, para 51; Methanex v United States, (Preliminary Award on Jurisdiction), 7 August 2002, paras 103-
105; El Paso Energy Intl. Co. v Argentina, (Decision on Jurisdictoon), 27 April 2006, para 68-70; Suez, Sociedad 
General de Aguas de Barcelona S. A., and InterAguas Servicios Integrales del Agua S.A. v Argentina, (Decision on 
jurisdictin0, 16 May 2006, paras 59, 64; Pan American v Argentina, (Decision on Preliminary Objections), 27 July 2006, 
paras 97-99. 
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Some tribunals seem to be leaning more towards an extensive interpretation on consent 
clauses.
542
  In Tradex v Albania,
543
 the tribunal expressed a certain preference, although 
with some qualifications, in favour of a doctrine of effective interpretation for clauses 
conferring jurisdiction upon ICSIID.  
Occasionally tribunals seemed to favour a restrictive approach towards the interpretation 
of consent clauses.
544
 Tribunals have held consistently that expressions of consent were to 
be interpreted not in the light of the host state’s domestic law but in the framework of 
international law. The tribunals have also held that questions of jurisdiction are not subject 
to the law applicable to the merits of the case. Rather, questions of jurisdiction are 
governed by their own system, which is defined by the instruments determining 
jurisdiction.
545
  
Exceptionally, the host state’s domestic law is relevant to jurisdiction if the consent to 
arbitration is based on a provision in its legislation.
546
 This was the case in SPP v Egypt.
547
 
The tribunal refused to accept the argument that the parties’ consent to arbitration should 
therefore be interpreted in accordance with Egyptian law. Neither did it accept the 
argument that the arbitration clause was subject to the rules of treaty interpretation.
548
   
A recurrent theme in the pleadings before ICSID tribunals is the argument that consent by 
the host State to the Centre’s jurisdiction should be construed restrictively. Respondent 
Governments have insisted on the need for a restrictive interpretation of a State’s 
undertaking to arbitrate which had to be seen as a derogation from its sovereignty. The 
Claimants have at times attempted to invoke an alleged principle of interpretation in the 
opposite sense: that of effective interpretation epitomized in the Latin phrase of ut res 
magis valeat quam pereat. ICSID tribunals have repeatedly refused to embrace either of 
the two principles. 
                                                          
542 SGS v Philippines, (Decision on Jurisdiction), 29 January 2004, 8 ICSID Reports 518, para 116; Eureka v Poland, 
(Partial Award), 19 August 2005, para 248. 
543 Tradex v Albania, (Decision on Jurisdiction), 24 December 1996, 5 ICSID Reports 47. 
544 Noble Ventures v Romania, (Award), 12 October 2005, para 55. 
545 Camuzzi v Argentina, (Decision on Jurisdiction), 11 May 2005, paras 15-17, 57; AES Corp. v Argentina, (Decision on 
Jurisdiction), 26 April 2005, paras 34-39; Jan de Nul N.V., Dredging Intl. N.v. v Egypt, (Decision on Jurisdiction), 16 
June 2006, paras65-68. 
546 See also Inceysa v el Salvador, (award), 2 August 2006, at paras 131, 22-264. 
547 SPP v Egypt, (Decision on Jurisdiction) II, 14 April 1988, 3 ICSID Reports 131. 
548 Ibid. at paras 55-60. 
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In Amco v. Indonesia, the Tribunal was confronted with the argument that the consent 
given by a sovereign State to an arbitration convention amounting to a limitation of its 
sovereignty should be construed restrictively.
549
 The Tribunal rejected this contention 
categorically. It said: 
‘… like any other conventions, a convention to arbitrate is not to be construed 
restrictively, nor, as a matter of fact, broadly or liberally. It is to be construed in a way 
which leads to find out and to respect the common will of the parties: such a method of 
interpretation is but the application of the fundamental principle pacta sunt servanda, a 
principle common, indeed, to all systems of internal law and to international law. 
Moreover–and this is again a general principle of law–any convention, including 
conventions to arbitrate, should be construed in good faith, that is to say by taking into 
account the consequences of their commitments the parties may be considered as having 
reasonably and legitimately envisaged.’550 
In the Tribunal’s view, the proper method for the interpretation of the consent agreement 
was to read it in the spirit of the ICSID Convention and in the light of its objectives. 
ICSID arbitration was in the interest of both parties, a thought that was expressed in the 
first paragraph of the Convention’s Preamble. The investor’s interest in submitting 
investment disputes to international arbitration was matched by a parallel interest of the 
host State: to protect investments is to protect the general interest of development and of 
developing countries.
551
 
 
In SPP v. Egypt, the argument of the restrictive interpretation of jurisdictional instruments 
was raised in relation to an ICSID clause in national legislation. The Tribunal found that 
there was no presumption of jurisdiction, particularly where a sovereign State was 
involved, and that jurisdiction only existed insofar as consent thereto had been given by 
the parties. Equally, there was no presumption against the conferment of jurisdiction with 
respect to a sovereign State. After referring to a number of international judgements and 
awards, the Tribunal said: 
                                                          
549 (Decision on Jurisdiction), 25 September 1983, 1 ICSID Reports 393, 397. 
550 Ibid. at p. 394. See also remarks to the same effect at pp. 398 and 402. See also Cable TV v. St. Kitts and Nevis, 
Award, 13 January 1997, 13 ICSID Review—Foreign Investment Law Journal 328, 386 (1998); CSOB v. Slovakia, 
Decision on Jurisdiction, 24 May 1999, 14 ICSID Review—Foreign Investment Law Journal 251, 263 (1999). 
551 Ibid. at p. 400. 
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‘Thus, jurisdictional instruments are to be interpreted neither restrictively nor expansively, 
but rather objectively and in good faith, and jurisdiction will be found to exist if—but only 
if—the force of the arguments militating in favour of it is preponderant.’552 
 
Therefore, neither of the two presumptions or alleged principles of interpretation carry 
much weight when applied to expressions of consent to the jurisdiction of ICSID. Neither 
a principle of restrictive interpretation nor a doctrine of “effet utile” will do justice to a 
consent clause. 
A special problem of interpretation is the applicability of consent clauses to successive 
legal instruments. Investment operations often involve complex arrangements expressed in 
a number of successive agreements. Some such related agreements concern peripheral 
operations such as financing or arrangements with subcontractors. These agreements may 
be concluded in stages and over a period of time. Though economically interrelated, the 
agreements are legally distinct and often have different features. At times, ICSID clauses 
are included in some of these agreements but not in others. If ICSID clauses are neither 
repeated nor incorporated by reference in related agreements, the question arises whether 
the parties’ consent to ICSID’s jurisdiction extends to matters regulated by these related 
agreements. 
ICSID tribunals have dealt with this question in a number of cases.
553
 These cases suggest 
that ICSID tribunals are inclined to take a broad view of consent clauses where the 
agreement between the parties is reflected in several successive instruments. Expressions 
of consent are not applied narrowly to the specific document in which they appear but are 
read in the context of the parties’ overall relationship. Therefore, a series of interrelated 
contracts may be regarded, in functional terms, as representing the legal framework for 
one investment operation. ICSID clauses contained in some of the different contracts may 
be interpreted to apply to the entire operation. 
The need to settle an investment dispute finally and comprehensively would make any 
other solution impracticable. A situation in which an ICSID tribunal were to address only 
                                                          
552 (Decision on Jurisdiction), 14 April 1988, 3 ICSID Reports 143/4. 
553 Holiday Inns v. Morocco, (Decision on Jurisdiction), 12 May 1979; Lalive, The First ‘World Bank’ Arbitration, 51 
British Yearbook of International Law 123, 156-159 (1980); Klöckner v. Cameroon, (Award), 21 October 1983, 
(Decision on Annulment), 3 May 1985, 2 ICSID Reports 13-18, 65-69, 89-93, 97-117; SOABI v. Senegal, (Decision on 
Jurisdiction), 1 August 1984, (Award), 25 February 1988, 2 ICSID Reports 185-188, 204-208, 293-322. 
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some of the issues between the parties but would leave other related ones to be litigated 
elsewhere would be highly unsatisfactory. Partial settlements are uneconomical and liable 
to delay resolution even further. 
Ideally, the parties might eliminate most problems of this nature through consistency in 
the drafting of their various documents. But experience tells that arbitration clauses often 
do not get the detailed attention they deserve. Therefore, the approach developed in the 
practice of ICSID tribunals would appear to be the only reasonable solution. But this 
approach can be maintained only to the extent that it reflects the parties’ presumed 
intentions. 
 MODALITIES OF CONSENT TO ARBITRATION 8.3.
A. Consent Through Designated Subdivision or Agency   
As per paragraph (3) of article 25, ‘consent by a constituent subdivision or agency of a 
Contracting State shall require the approval of that State unless that State notifies the 
Centre that no such approval is required.’  
Nevis Island Administration (hereinafter, NIA) in Cable TV v St. Kitts and Nevis was 
considered to be the constituent subdivision of the Federation for the purposes of article 25 
(3). Pursuant to the Constitution of the Federation, the NIA had the power to enter into the 
Agreement on its own and independently of the Federation. The Tribunal held in this 
context: 
‘The Consent to ICSID arbitration contained in Clause 16 of the Agreement can only take 
effect in the present case on the matter of jurisdiction of ICSID if the Contracting State, 
i.e. the Federation, is a party to the dispute, or, if it is not a party and the relevant party to 
the dispute is a constituent subdivision or agency of the Contracting State, then that 
relevant party must have been designated as such to ICSID by the Federation. In addition, 
the consent by a constituent subdivision or agency of a contracting state requires the 
approval of that state unless that state notifies ICSID that no such approval is required. No 
documentation has been furnished to the Tribunal evidencing that NIA or the Government 
of Nevis has been so designated to ICSID by the Federation.’ 
Indeed, there are numerous instances wherein public companies or other similar entities 
which exercise public functions, but are legally distinct from the State, enter into 
investment agreements. In some States, these may also be not the central government, but 
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a province or a municipality which enters into agreements with investors. After lengthy 
discussions and debates as to what constitutes ‘constituent subdivision’, the drafters of the 
ICSID Convention intended to create maximum flexibility and include ‘any territorial 
entity below the level of the State itself. The term ‘agency’ was agreed to be read ‘not in 
structural terms but functionally’ and what matters most is whether it performs public 
functions on behalf of the Contracting State or one of its constituent subdivisions.
554
 It is 
also noteworthy that the very fact of designation by the Contracting State would entail a 
very strong presumption that the entity in question is indeed a ‘constituent subdivision or 
agency’.  
B. Consent through Separate Instruments 
Any investment arbitration dispute is grounded in the provisions of an investment treaty, 
an investment contract with a dispute resolution clause which refers to ICSID or the 
provisions of the foreign investment legislation of the host State. Parties to the dispute, 
which has already arisen, may submit their consents to jurisdiction through submission 
agreements, or so-called ‘compromis’ agreement which has the meaning of an agreement 
to arbitrate concluded by separate act. Hence, it is equally possible for the parties to grant 
consents to arbitrate for future and existing disputes.  
An arbitration agreement also need not be embodied in a single instrument. An investment 
application made by investor may provide for arbitration and, provided the state gives its 
approval to such application, be reflective of consent to arbitration by both parties. In this 
regard, in Amco v Indonesia the investor had applied for establishing a locally 
incorporated entity to carry out investment activities to the Indonesian Foreign Investment 
Board. The application, inter alia, contained a clause which effectively enabled dispute 
resolution through ICSID. When a dispute arose, investor referred to ICSID, which upheld 
the application. The government of Indonesia accepted the existence of the consent in 
principle at the same time denying the applicability of that consent to the dispute and to 
the subject matter, the Tribunal held:  
                                                          
554 C H Schreuer, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary (Cambridge University Press 2001) p. 151. 
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‘while a consent in writing to ICSID arbitration is indispensable, since it is required by 
Article 25(1) of the Convention, such consent in writing is not to be expressed in a 
solemn, ritual and unique formulation. The investment agreement being in writing, it 
suffices to establish that its interpretation in good faith shows that the parties agreed to 
ICSID arbitration, in order for the ICSID Tribunal to have jurisdiction over them.’ 
Despite the possibility of submitting compromis to arbitrate the dispute which has already 
arisen, the majority of cases brought to ICSID arbitration hinge on consent provisions, 
which refer to future disputes. These consent clauses are conventionally embodied in 
foreign investment legislation of host states, bilateral or multilateral investment 
agreements (BITs/MITs).  
C. Consent through Host State Legislation 
The possibility of consenting to ICSID arbitration through host state legislation is now 
becoming an accepted practice. Indeed, a State may commit to refer a dispute to ICSID in 
its foreign investment code or the law for the promotion of foreign investment.
555
 Pate 
argues that while some foreign investment laws do express unequivocal consent to ICSID 
arbitration, some are not clear and are not inclusive of all types of disputes. According to 
his analysis, it is commonplace for a host state to offer investors a number of options as to 
dispute resolution – either ICSID arbitration, or arbitration under the aegis of the 
International Chamber of Commerce, or through separate agreement with state, etc.  
Pate classifies these foreign investment laws into three categories. The first category 
includes foreign investment laws which contain express or unequivocal consent to settle 
disputes under ICSID or ICC. These are considered to be unilateral offers, which require 
only acceptance by investors. The second category comprises foreign investment laws 
which refer to the possibility of referring to ICSID or ICC, which allows foreign investors 
to choose among the options.  It is also commonplace that these laws include dispute 
resolution methods such as conciliation/mediation mechanisms or national courts of the 
host state. The third category includes those foreign investment laws which require an 
express agreement with a foreign investor as to international arbitration.  
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Table 4: Classification of National Investment Legislations
556
 
Country Category Unilateral offer Condition 
Albania 1 Yes Only refers to expropriation 
Kazakhstan 2 No  
Kyrgyzstan 1 Yes 3 months ‘cooling off period’ 
Armenia 3 No  
Egypt 2 No  
Namibia 2 Yes Investor must specify in the certificate 
Ivory Coast 2 Yes Investor must ask for it in license 
Mauritania 2 Yes Investor must ask for it in license 
Nigeria 2 Yes Only when conciliation is exhausted 
Uganda 2 No  
Zaire 2 Yes 
Must consent in the request for 
admission 
Tanzania 3 No  
Ivory Coast 1 Yes Investor must ask for it in license 
Tunisia 3 No  
Botswana 1 Yes Consent within 1 year 
Ghana 2 Yes Only when conciliation is exhausted 
Central African 
Republic 
2 Yes Investor must ask for it in license 
Ethiopia 2 No  
Mexico 3 No But highly liberal under NAFTA 
El Salvador 2 Yes  
Peru 2 No  
Venezuela 2 Yes  
 
Category 1 – Unilateral offer is given.  
Category 2 – list of dispute resolution options is given to the investor.  
Category 3 – only by agreement. 
                                                          
556 Source: T Pate, ‘The past, present, and future of the arbitral clause in foreign investment legislation: In Pursuit of the 
Balance’. 
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For example, article 8 of the 1993 Albanian Law on Foreign Investment reads: 
‘If a foreign investment dispute arises between a foreign investor and the Republic of 
Albania and it cannot be settled amicably, then the foreign investor may choose to submit 
the dispute for resolution to a competent court or administrative tribunal in the Republic of 
Albania in accordance with its laws. In addition , if the dispute arises out of or relates to 
expropriation, compensation for expropriation or discrimination and also for the transfers 
in accordance with Article 7, then the foreign investor may submit the dispute for 
resolution and the Republic of Albania hereby consents to the submission thereof, to the 
International Centre for the settlement of Investment Disputes established by the 
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Dispute between States and Nationals of 
Other States, done at Washington, March 18, 1965.’  
Tunisian foreign investment legislation has a dynamic history of repeals and changes. The 
now rescinded version of the Tunisian Law Relative to the Code of Investments stipulated: 
‘Any dispute arising between the foreign investor and the Government either from the 
investor side or from a measure taken by the Government against the investor, shall be 
settled in accordance with the procedure of arbitration and conciliation. 
These procedures are those foreseen: either in the framework of the bilateral agreements 
relative to the protection of the investments between Tunisia and the country of nationality 
of the investor, or the framework of the International Convention for the settlement of 
disputes between the State and Nationals of Other States, a convention ratified by law no. 
66-33 of May 3, 1966.’ 
 
It is noteworthy that in Gaith Pharaon v. Republic of Tunisia the Claimant referred to the 
foregoing provision as a basis for ICSID jurisdiction. The case was eventually settled, and 
Tunisia’s objections to ICSID jurisdiction based on the aforementioned article were never 
addressed. The Tunisian government however undertook measures to change the then 
existing legislation, and as a result the Industrial Promotion Agency was established and 
new foreign investment laws were adopted. The current Law Promulgating the Investment 
Incentives Code provides for dispute resolution in local courts of Tunisia: 
‘Tunisian courts are competent to investigate any disputes between foreign investors and 
the Tunisian State unless otherwise agreed upon in an arbitration clause or a clause 
permitting one of the parties to appeal to an arbitration procedure.’ 
 
Hence, the aforementioned provision permits arbitration provided there is an explicit 
agreement thereto.  In contrast, the 1970 Settlement of Investment Disputes Act of 
Botswana was alluded to by one commentator as containing an implicit and ‘potential 
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unilateral consent in writing to submit disputes to ICSID.’ The Section 11 of the law 
reads: 
‘Any national of any other State which is party to the [ICSID] Convention may submit to 
the Centre, for settlement by conciliation or arbitration in pursuance of the Convention, 
any legal dispute with Botswana, provided that such foreign national has within one year 
after the commencement of this Act or within one year after the making of the investment, 
whichever is the later, filed with the Minister a consent in writing to the like submission to 
the Centre by Botswana of any such legal dispute’.  
Furthermore, falling under the rubric of category 3 countries, article 24 of the 1994 Law of 
the Republic of Armenia on Foreign Investments reads: 
‘Any disputes on foreign investments, which may arise between the foreign investor and 
the State shall be considered by the courts of the Republic of Armenia based on the 
legislation of the Republic of Armenia. 
Other disputes where the Republic of Armenia is not involved as a side, shall be 
considered, based on the legislation of the Republic of Armenia, by the courts of the 
Republic of Armenia or other bodies resolving economic disputes, unless it is otherwise 
specified by international contracts or preliminary agreement of the sides (on the basis of 
foundation documents, economic agreements, etc.)’ 
In other words, the foregoing provision makes the dispute resolution regime quite 
restrictive. Undoubtedly, the dispute resolution clause does not contain a unilateral offer to 
arbitrate, but emphasize the overarching role of the Armenian courts in settlement of 
disputes between the state and foreign investors unless otherwise provided in the express 
agreement between the parties. 
This is also confirmed by the jurisprudence of the Tribunal in Tradex v. Albania
557
, SPP v. 
Egypt,
558
 Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. v. Egypt and General Authority for Investment 
and Free Zones.  
The most prominent case on this issue was SPP v. Egypt, where a central issue on 
jurisdiction was the discussion of the legislative provision of Egypt’s Law Concerning the 
Investment of Arab and Foreign Funds and the Free Zone that stated: 
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“Investment disputes in respect of the implementation of the provision of this law shall be 
settled in a manner to be agreed upon with the investor, or within the framework of the 
agreements in force between the Arab Republic of Egypt and the investor’s home country, 
or within the framework of the Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
between the State and the nationals of other countries to which Egypt has adhered.”559  
The Tribunal construed the foregoing provision as a unilateral promise that was afterwards 
successfully invoked by the investor. It held: 
‘On the basis of the foregoing considerations, the Tribunal finds that Article 8 of Law 43 
establishes a mandatory and hierarchic sequence of dispute settlement procedures, and 
constitutes an express ‘consent in writing’ to the Centre’s jurisdiction within the meaning 
of Article 25(1) of the Washington Convention in those cases where there is no other 
agreement upon method of dispute settlement and no applicable bilateral treaty’560 
This reasoning is stated to be rooted in common law concepts of offer and acceptance and 
is firmly entrenched on common law notions of arbitration.
561
 However, another point in 
this vein is that not all references in host state legislation amount to consent to compulsory 
arbitral jurisdiction. The parallel is again drawn to the common law approach that 
differentiates between a definite offer and merely an invitation to treat.  
In this regard, Egypt argued that the use of expressions “within the framework of the 
Convention” and “where it applies” implies a need for separate consent to ICSID 
jurisdiction. In fact, Egypt did not regard its legislation as constituting an offer. It 
manifested that simple reference to the Convention was insufficient, and even amended 
the legislation immediately after the case.
562
  
In SPP v. Egypt ICSID tribunal rejected the arguments of Egypt and took the view that the 
requirement ratione voluntatis has been met grounding its decision on general principles 
of statutory and treaty interpretation,
563
 historical considerations,
564
 a decree implementing 
the original legislation
565
 and principles of international law applicable to unilateral 
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561 M Sornarajah, The international law on foreign investment (3rd end., Cambridge University Press 2010) p. 210. 
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563 SPP v. Egypt, (Decision on Jurisdiction) I, 3 ICSID Reports 142/3. 
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declarations”.566 The position of ICSID on the method of interpretation of consent is not 
entirely uniform.
567
 
D. Consent through Multilateral Investment Treaties  
References to ICSID mechanism of dispute resolution can be found in the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the 1994 Energy Charter Treaty, the 1994 Colonia and 
Buenos Aires Investment Protocols of the Common Market of the Southern Cone and the 
1994 Free Trade Agreement between Mexico, Colombia and Venezuela.  
For instance, NAFTA’s Chapter 11 on Investments contains article 1122, which entitles 
aggrieved investors to seek dispute resolution under ICSID: 
‘1. Each Party consents to the submission of a claim to arbitration in accordance with the 
procedures set out in this Agreement. 
2. The consent given by paragraph 1 and the submission by a disputing investor of a claim 
to arbitration shall satisfy the requirement of:  
(a) Chapter II of the ICSID Convention (Jurisdiction of the Centre) and the Additional 
Facility rules for written consent of the parties.’ 
 
It should be, however, noted that, as of 2010, only the United States have ratified the 
ICSID Convention, meaning that the mechanism is still of limited relevance. It follows 
that as long as Canada and Mexico are not parties to Washington Convention, the 
NAFTA’s provision will not take effect to confer ICSID’s jurisdiction. The Energy 
Charter Treaty also contains an unconditional consent of its Member States to ICSID and, 
where applicable, to the ICSID’s Additional Facility.  
Similarly, article 9 of the 1994 Colonia and Buenos Aires Investment Protocols of the 
Common Market of the Southern Cone and articles 17-18 of the Free Trade Agreement 
Between Mexico, Colombia and Venezuela offer an unequivocal consent of their member 
states to international arbitration, thereby enabling investors to seek redress under, inter 
alia, ICSID facility.  
 
                                                          
566 Ibid. at 142/3. 
567 C H Schreuer, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary (Cambridge University Press 2001) p. 248. 
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E. Consent through Bilateral Investment Treaties  
Schreuer argues that the majority of contemporary BITs include an express consent of the 
Contracting States to ICSID arbitration. A simple ICSID dispute resolution clause can be 
found in the 1980 United Kingdom and Sri Lanka BIT: 
‘Each Contracting Party hereby consents to submit to the International Centre for the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (herein referred to as ‘the Centre’) for settlement by 
conciliation or arbitration under the Convention … any legal dispute arising between that 
Contracting Party and a national or company of the other Contracting Party concerning an 
investment of the latter in the territory of the former.’568 
There is also a possibility of mentioning ICSID dispute resolution mechanism as one of 
the alternatives. For instance, article 12 of the 1991 Switzerland-Ghana BIT provides: 
‘(2)If such dispute cannot be settled according to the provisions of paragraph (1) of this 
article within a period of six months from the date either party to the dispute requested 
amicable settlement, the dispute shall be submitted to international arbitration or 
conciliation. 
(3)Where the dispute is referred to international arbitration or conciliation, the aggrieved 
party may refer the dispute either to: 
(a) the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes …; or 
(b) an international arbitrator or an ad hoc arbitration tribunal to be appointed by a special 
agreement or established under the arbitration rules of the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law. 
(4) Each Contracting Party hereby consents to the submission of an investment dispute to 
international arbitration or conciliation.’ 
 
However, not every dispute resolution provision echoes such tactics. Some references by 
signatory states may not qualify as advance consent to the ICSID arbitration. For instance, 
there are instances wherein seemingly obligatory character of dispute resolution under the 
ICSID is rather misleading. For example, the 1979 treaty between Sweden and Malaysia 
reads: 
‘In the event of a dispute arising between a national or a company of one Contracting 
Party and the other Contracting Party in connection with an investment in the territory of 
that other Contracting Party, it shall upon the agreement by both parties to the dispute be 
submitted for arbitration to the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
                                                          
568 19 ILM 886, 888 (1980). 
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established under the Washington Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
between States and Nationals of other States, dated March 18, 1965.’ 
Another interesting approach was adopted in treaties concluded by the Netherlands. For 
instance, the 1970 treaty between the Netherlands and Kenya stipulates: 
‘The Contracting Party in the territory of which a national of the other Contracting Party 
makes or intends to make an investment, shall give sympathetic consideration to a request 
on the part of such national to submit, for conciliation or arbitration, to the Centre 
established by the Convention of Washington of 18 March1965, any dispute that may arise 
in connection with the investment.’  
It is obvious that the foregoing provision does not itself constitute Contracting state’s 
consent to the ICSID jurisdiction; however it explicitly urges the signatory states to give 
such consents if requested by investors. Remarkably, other treaty also concluded by the 
Netherlands and Pakistan in 1988 apparently contains an obligation, yet not the consent 
itself, of the Contracting states to give assent to arbitration under the ICSID: 
‘The Contracting Party in the territory of which a national of the other Contracting Party 
makes or intends to make an investment, shall assent to any demand on the part of such 
national to submit, for arbitration or conciliation, to the Centre established by the 
Convention of Washington of 18 March 1965 on the settlement of investment disputes 
between States and nationals of other States, any dispute that may arise in connection with 
the investment.’ 
Dolzer and Stevens note that similar provisions can be found in Japanese BITs, and some 
other BITs concluded by Australia, France and the United Kingdom. It should be noted 
that, under none of these dispute resolution mechanisms, would investors gain immediate 
access to ICSID’s dispute settlement procedure. Such right is contingent on the host state’s 
granting of the required assent.  
The difference between the 1988 Netherlands-Pakistan treaty and 1970 Netherlands-
Kenya BIT is that, should any of the Contracting states of the former treaty fail to give 
consent to ICSID arbitration, it would be tantamount to a breach of the international 
obligation contained in the bilateral investment treaty, and remedy for which would 
possible fall within the rubric of inter-governmental arbitration under BIT.  
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Other type of BITs merely foresees a future agreement as to granting of consent to 
arbitrate. Article 6 of the 1978 Sweden-Yugoslavia BIT explicates the notion in the 
following paragraph: 
‘In the event of a dispute between a national or a company of one Contracting State and 
the other Contracting State in connection with an investment on the territory of that other 
Contracting State, it shall upon the agreement by both parties to the dispute be submitted 
for arbitration to the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes’. 
 
 OTHER CRITERIA OF CONSENT569 8.4.
A. Time of Consent 
The time of consent is determined by the date at which both parties have agreed to 
ICSID’s jurisdiction. If the consent clause is contained in an offer by one party, its 
acceptance by the other party will determine the time of consent.  
If the host State makes a general offer to accept ICSID’s jurisdiction in its legislation or in 
a treaty, the time of consent is determined by the investor’s acceptance of the offer. At the 
latest, this offer may be accepted through bringing a request for conciliation or arbitration 
to the Centre. The investor is under no time constraints to accept the offer and thus to 
complete the consent unless the offer, by its own terms, provides for acceptance within a 
certain period of time. But it should be borne in mind that consent, once completed, has a 
number of legal consequences. Therefore, care should be taken to perfect consent at the 
appropriate time and not to rely on a standing offer without actually taking it up. 
In Holiday Inns v. Morocco, no fewer than three conditions for the full validity of consent 
were lacking at the time the agreement containing the consent clause was signed: (i) the 
host State had not yet ratified the Convention; (ii) the investor’s home State had not yet 
ratified the Convention; and (iii) one of the corporate parties to the dispute had not yet 
been created. The Tribunal noted that all these defects had been cured before the 
institution of proceedings and stated that ‘... it is the date when the conditions are 
                                                          
569 See also the ‘COURSE ON DISPUTE SETTLEMENT - Module 2.3. ICSID: Consent to Arbitration.’ 
(UNCTAD/EDM/Misc.232/Add.2), at < http://www.UNCTAD.org >, accessed 22 August 2011. 
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definitely satisfied ... which constitutes in the sense of the Convention the date of 
consent…’.570 
Consent to the jurisdiction of the Centre triggers a number of legal consequences under the 
Convention. The most important one is that consent, once perfected, becomes irrevocable 
under the last sentence of Article 25(1). The nationality of the foreign investor under 
Article 25(2) is determined by reference to the date of consent. Both, natural and juridical 
persons must be nationals of another Contracting State on the date of consent. Article 44 
of the Convention provides that proceedings will be conducted in accordance with 
Arbitration Rules in effect on the date on which the parties have given their consent.  
Consent by both parties must exist at the time of the institution of the proceedings. It does 
not make sense to go through the procedure of constituting a tribunal if it is likely that it 
will find that there is no jurisdiction. Therefore, manifest absence of consent is an absolute 
bar against a request ever reaching a tribunal. 
In Tradex v. Albania, the Claimants relied on the bilateral investment treaty between 
Albania and Greece as one of two bases for jurisdiction. The Tribunal noted that the 
Request for Arbitration was dated 17 October 1994 but that the BIT had come into force 
only on 4 January 1995. It found that jurisdiction must be established on the date of the 
filing of the claim and rejected the BIT as a basis for jurisdiction.
571
 
Once the proceedings are instituted, the parties may confirm or even extend their consent 
to jurisdiction. A tribunal will examine the validity or scope of consent only if a party 
raises a jurisdictional objection. A party that has not challenged the existence of consent at 
an early stage in the proceedings is precluded from doing so later on. 
B. Limitations on Consent 
Article 25 of the ICSID Convention merely defines the outer limits of the consent that the 
parties may give. There is nothing to stop them from circumscribing it in a narrower way. 
The parties are free to delimit their consent by defining it in abstract terms, by excluding 
                                                          
570 Lalive, The First ‘World Bank’ Arbitration, 51 British Yearbook of International Law 123, 146 (1980). 
571 Tradex v. Albania, (Decision on Jurisdiction), 24 December 1996, 14 ICSID Review—Foreign Investment Law 
Journal 161, 178-180 (1999). 
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certain types of disputes or by listing the questions they are submitting to ICSID’s 
jurisdiction.  
In practice, broad inclusive consent clauses are the norm. They are also generally 
preferable. Narrow clauses, listing only certain questions or excluding certain questions, 
are liable to lead to difficulties in determining the tribunal’s precise competence. 
Moreover, narrow clauses may inadvertently exclude essential aspects of the dispute.  
References to ICSID contained in national investment legislation typically relate to the 
application and interpretation of the piece of legislation in question. Some national laws 
are more sweeping and simply refer to disputes ‘concerning foreign investment’. Others 
describe the questions covered by consent clauses in narrower terms. These may include 
the requirement that ‘the dispute is fundamental to the investment itself’ or that the dispute 
must be ‘in respect of any approved enterprise’. 
Some national laws circumscribe the issues that are subject to ICSID’s jurisdiction 
narrowly. The Albanian Law on Foreign Investment of 1993 offers consent to ICSID’s 
jurisdiction but limits this consent in the following terms: 
 
‘... if the dispute arises out of or relates to expropriation, compensation for expropriation, 
or discrimination and also for the transfers in accordance with Article 7, ...’ 572 
 
In Tradex v. Albania, the Tribunal held that it had jurisdiction subject to joining to the 
merits the issue as to whether or not an expropriation had been shown to exist.
573
 In its 
Award it found, after a detailed examination of the facts that the Claimant had not been 
able to prove that an expropriation had occurred.
574
 
 
Clauses in bilateral investment treaties (BITs) are generally quite broad and refer to ‘any 
legal dispute . . . concerning an investment’.575 
                                                          
572 See Tradex v. Albania, Decision on Jurisdiction, 24 December 1996, 14 ICSID Review—Foreign Investment Law 
Journal 161, 174 (1999). Article 7 deals with the investor’s right to transfer funds abroad. 
573 Ibid. At pp. 185, 196. 
574 Tradex v. Albania, Award, 29 April 1999, 14 ICSID Review—Foreign Investment Law Journal 197, 
217, 223, 232-248 (1999). 
575 Great Britain Model Agreement, Art. 8, Dolzer/Stevens, Bilateral Investment Treaties, p. 234. Most of the other 
Model Agreements contain similarly sweeping clauses. 
228 
 
 
Where ICSID’s jurisdiction is based on an offer made by one party, subsequently accepted 
by the other, the parties’ consent exists only to the extent that offer and acceptance 
coincide. For instance, the host State’s investment legislation or its BIT with the investor’s 
home State may provide for the Centre’s jurisdiction in the most general terms. If the 
investor accepts ICSID jurisdiction only with regard to a particular dispute or in respect of 
certain investment operations, the consent between the parties will be thus limited. It is 
evident that the investor’s acceptance may not validly go beyond the limits of the host 
State’s offer. Therefore, any limitations contained in the legislation or treaty would apply 
irrespective of the terms of the investor’s acceptance. If the terms of acceptance do not 
correspond with the terms of the offer there is no perfected consent. 
C. Irrevocability of Consent 
Article 25 (1), last sentence of the ICSID Convention provides: ‘When the parties have 
given their consent, no party may withdraw its consent unilaterally.’ 
 
The binding and irrevocable nature of consent to the jurisdiction of ICSID is a 
manifestation of the maxim “pacta sunt servanda” and applies to undertakings to arbitrate 
in general. The applicability of this maxim is obvious where the consent is expressed in a 
compromissory clause contained in an agreement. It applies equally where an offer of 
consent is contained in national legislation or in a treaty which has been accepted by the 
investor. Consent to ICSID’s jurisdiction is always by agreement even if the elements of 
agreement are expressed in separate documents. 
 
The irrevocability of consent operates only after the consent has been perfected. A mere 
offer of consent to ICSID’s jurisdiction may be withdrawn at any time unless, of course, it 
is irrevocable by its own terms. In the case of national legislation and treaty clauses 
providing for ICSID jurisdiction, the investor must have accepted the consent in writing to 
make it irrevocable. Therefore, it is inadvisable for an investor, to rely on an ICSID 
consent clause contained in the host State’s domestic law or in a treaty without making a 
reciprocal declaration of consent. This may be done by a simple letter addressed to the 
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host State. Alternatively, the investor may accept the offer of consent simply by instituting 
proceedings before the Centre but in doing so runs the risk that the offer may be 
withdrawn at any time before then. 
 
The irrevocability of consent only applies to unilateral attempts at withdrawal. It is clear 
that the parties may terminate consent to jurisdiction by mutual agreement either before or 
after the institution of proceedings. 
 
The ICSID Convention not only declares the unilateral withdrawal of consent inadmissible 
but also makes provision for the institution and continuance of proceedings despite the 
refusal of a party to cooperate. The provisions on the constitution of arbitral tribunals 
(Articles 37-38) on ex parte procedure (Article 45) and on the enforcement of awards 
(Article 54) are designed to secure the successful conclusion of proceedings even in the 
face of a recalcitrant party. 
 
The parties are free to subject their consent to limitations and conditions. However, once 
consent has been given, its irrevocability extends to the introduction of new limitations 
and conditions. In other words, the prohibition of withdrawal covers the full extent of the 
consent to jurisdiction. Consent, once it is perfected, may not be withdrawn indirectly 
through an attempt to remove one of the other jurisdictional requirements under the 
Convention. To this end Article 72 of the ICSID Convention provides that the 
Convention’s denunciation by the host State or the investor’s home State shall not affect 
consent to jurisdiction given previously. Similarly, if the consent to ICSID’s jurisdiction 
was given by way of an investment licence or similar authorization, the withdrawal of the 
licence will not defeat jurisdiction. 
 
A host State is free to change its investment legislation including the provision concerning 
consent to ICSID’s jurisdiction. An offer of consent contained in national legislation that 
has not been taken up by the investor will lapse when the legislation is repealed. The 
situation is different if the investor has accepted the offer in writing while the legislation 
was still in force. The consent agreed to by the parties then becomes insulated from the 
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validity of the legislation containing the offer. It assumes a contractual existence 
independent of the legislative instrument that helped to bring it about. Therefore, repeal of 
investment legislation providing for ICSID’s jurisdiction will not affect a withdrawal of 
consent if the investor has accepted the offer during the legislation’s lifetime. 
Bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and multilateral international instruments providing 
for consent to ICSID’s jurisdiction are more difficult to terminate than national legislation. 
The fact remains that consent based on treaties is only perfected once it is accepted by the 
investor. It is only after its acceptance by the investor that an offer of consent contained in 
a BIT or other international instrument becomes irrevocable and hence insulated from 
attempts by the host State to terminate the treaty. 
 
In CSOB v. Slovakia, the Tribunal found that the BIT had never entered into force despite 
the fact that it was published in Slovakia’s Official Gazette together with a notice 
announcing its entry into force. After the institution of ICSID proceedings, Slovakia 
published a corrective notice in its Official Gazette asserting the BIT’s invalidity. The 
Tribunal said: 
‘In this connection, it should be noted that if the Notice were to be held to constitute a 
valid offer by the Slovak State to submit to international arbitration, the corrective notice 
published by the Slovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Official Gazette on November 
20, 1997, asserting the invalidity of the BIT, would be of no avail to Respondent, since 
Claimant accepted the offer in the Request for Arbitration filed prior to the publication of 
the corrective notice.’576 
 
If an investment agreement between the host State and the investor containing a clause 
providing for ICSID’s jurisdiction is alleged to be invalid or is terminated, it may be 
argued that the consent clause is also invalidated or ceases to operate. But a unilateral 
invocation of invalidity or termination of the investment agreement will not defeat the 
consent clause. A tribunal must have the power to decide on disputes concerning the 
alleged invalidity of investment agreements even if the tribunal’s very existence depends 
on the agreement’s validity. Under the doctrine of the severability or separability of the 
arbitration agreement, the agreement providing for arbitration assumes a separate 
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existence, which is autonomous and legally independent of the agreement containing it. 
This principle of severability of the arbitration agreement is supported by the weight of 
international arbitral codifications
577
 as well as by national and international arbitral 
practice.
578
 
 
The argument that a State’s own expression of consent was defective under its law and 
hence invalid is unlikely to succeed. There are weighty arguments to dismiss a plea of 
incapacity as vitiating a State’s consent. It is the primary duty of the Contracting State to 
ensure the observance of its own law. Alternatively, good faith requires that any 
incapacities or procedural requirements must be divulged to the other side. A party may 
not avail itself of its own violation of legal rules. 
 CONCLUSION 8.5.
‘Consent’ of the respondent host state to investor/state arbitration in the investment is one 
of the most important conditions for the vesting of adjudicative power in the tribunal. 
Despite such eminent role the range of scholarly research available on jurisdiction ratione 
voluntatis - as to whether or not the respondent host state has consented to the arbitration 
of investment disputes remains to be relatively narrow. 
Increasing but yet still insufficient recognition is being accorded to the analysis of ratione 
voluntatis – or of consent to arbitrate – which is the fundamental requirement for a dispute 
to be arbitrable. Tribunals have faced tedious challenge in deciding whether the particular 
issue alleged to constitute an impediment to the tribunal’s power to adjudicate the 
investment dispute is one relating to the consent to the investment arbitration (jurisdiction) 
or admissibility. 
The task for this chapter was to distinguish those conditions prescribed in an investment 
treaty that are properly characterized as ratione voluntatis from other stipulations in the 
                                                          
577 See ICC Rules of Arbitration (1998), Art. 6(4), 36 ILM 1604, 1609 (1997); UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (1976), 
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16(1), 24 ILM 1302, 1306 (1985); Institut de Droit International, Resolution on Arbitration between States, State 
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investment treaty. It also surveyed the pre-requisite of ratione voluntatis within the 
framework of article 25 of the ICSID Convention. Some expressions of consent to 
arbitration are narrowly confined as to their subject matter. Typical examples for narrow 
clauses of this kind are expressions of consent that are limited to the amount of 
compensation for expropriation. Some national laws also offer consents only in respect of 
narrowly circumscribed issues. 
The author contends to the view that periods foreseen for negotiations are not of 
jurisdictional nature.  The reason being that, by the time the tribunals make a decision on 
this issue, any waiting period would likely to have collapsed and would merely compel the 
claimant to start proceedings anew. Author also asserts that the usefulness of such 
requirement is questionable. In Author’s view, the most likely effect of a clause providing 
exhaustion of the host state’s domestic courts is delay and additional cost since it is 
unlikely that the dispute will be resolved before the domestic courts within that time 
frame. 
Ambiguous expressions of consent have been, and still are, the source of discontent and 
academic debate, and have led to controversy in a number of cases before ICSID. It is 
generally accepted that consent which falls under the aegis of a BIT/MIT and ambiguities 
associated with it are to be interpreted in accordance with general principles of public 
international law. The Author’s view favours a balance approach that accepts neither a 
restrictive nor an expansive approach to the interpretation of consent clauses.The Author 
contends that good faith requires that any incapacities or procedural requirements must be 
divulged to the other side. A party may not avail itself of its own violation of legal rules. 
Article 25 of the ICSID Convention merely defines the outer limits of the consent that the 
parties may give. There is nothing to stop them from circumscribing it in a narrower way. 
In practice, broad inclusive consent clauses are the norm. They are also generally 
preferable. This research affirms that narrow clauses, listing only certain questions or 
excluding certain questions, are liable to lead to difficulties in determining the tribunal’s 
precise competence. Moreover, narrow clauses may inadvertently exclude essential 
aspects of the dispute. 
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9. CHAPTER NINE: SUMMARY CONCLUSIONS 
Over the last two decades, few areas of international economic law and policy have 
experienced such tectonic changes as international investment. The transformations 
affecting international investments have been profound and multi-dimensional. They relate 
not only to the direction of the flows of international investment, but also to the nature of 
investment and, above all, to the international rules and disciplines governing investment 
activity.  
Investment has also become one of the most dynamic areas of international economic law. 
This has been the result of the negotiation of a patchy but extensive network of 
International Investment Agreements (IIAs) around the globe, and of the increasing 
application of these agreements to address conflicts surging between foreign investors and 
states hosting the investment. By 2010, according to UNCTAD, the number of existing 
IIAs was over 3,000, and the cumulative number of known treaty-based investor-State 
disputes submitted to international arbitration was more than 350. 
An arbitral setting is composed of the parties, arbitrators, institutions, interest groups such 
as NGOs, scholars etc. The nationality of the parties, the growing proliferation of 
international arbitral institutions, the autonomous nature of the principles, and the ability 
of the parties to reap the fruit of their labour by enforcing successful arbitral awards 
against private and state entities across the globe are all hallmarks to the assertion that 
arbitration is indeed a form of international justice. International courts and tribunals are 
generally seen as administrators of justice in international fora.  
The establishment of the Permanent Court of International Justice and subsequently of the 
International Court of Justice are some forms of attestations to the linkage between the 
conception of justice in abstract and the concrete institutional representation.  Indeed, 
arbitral courts and tribunals such as the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), investment 
treaty tribunals (under ICSID, NAFTA, BITs) and other international institutional arbitral 
tribunals are seen within the wider context of international administrators of justice.  
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The International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes is portrayed as the 
world’s foremost arbitral institution to counteract imbalances on the landscape previously 
dominated by the concept of sovereign immunity. Availability of neutral arbitration of 
investment disputes reinforces investor confidence and makes it possible for them to 
mitigate political risk. As events and political turmoil in Middle East unfold, 2012 and 
2013 are expected to bring further deterioration of expropriation and regulatory risk 
indices, which will presumably trigger further explosion in ICSID arbitration proceedings.  
At the same time, relatively immature nature of academic scholarship on ICSID 
jurisprudence rests on the statistics which reveals that over half of all ICSID cases for its 
thirty seven year history have been registered within the period 2004-2010. 
The thesis is among pioneering in-depth study of article 25 of the 1965 Washington 
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes (hereinafter, the Washington 
Convention), which articulates three arbitrability requirements for dispute resolution under 
the aegis of ICSID – ratione materiae, ratione personae and ratione voluntatis. Quite 
expectedly, it is the Respondent that usually alleges a dispute’s inadmissibility under 
article 25 of the Washington Convention, and this scenario is virtually ubiquitous.   
Divergence of views on article 25 of the ICSID Convention coupled with uncertainty 
surrounding three jurisdictional criteria articulated therein pose a threat to the international 
uniformity and is further exacerbated by inconsistent practice of ICSID tribunals. In view 
of this, this study sought legal clarity on the requirements ratione personae, ratione 
materiae and ratione voluntatis as lack of it marks a challenge for the system and 
immediate stakeholders, i.e. investors and host governments. Construction of legal 
argument in the context of these jurisdictional requirements ratione personae, ratione 
materiae and ratione voluntatis lacks coherence and consistency, and is extensively 
premised on references to secondary sources of law, as main concepts remain vague and 
ill-formulated under primary treaty law. Accordingly, the thesis attempted to streamline 
contending interpretations of these requirements by ICSID tribunals and in the legal 
scholarship and extract a coherent line of reasoning.  
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While the core claim of this research deals with significance of arbitral jurisprudence for 
the interpretation and development of international investment law, author has 
endeavoured to reach beyond a static perspective of investment jurisprudence in an 
attempt to make a contribution towards developing a theory of international investment 
law that conjoins the subtleties of arbitral jurisprudence and investment treaty making. It 
contends on resolving one of the principal impediments to developing a theory of 
international investment law, namely the fragmented, disintegrated and disordered state of 
the law that is entrenched in several, largely bilateral treaties and implemented by arbitral 
tribunals which, established on a case-by-case basis, that generate increasing 
jurisprudential inconsistencies. 
This research is expected to provide, hopefully, a conceptual taxonomy for apprehending 
the nature and functioning of international investment law as a genuine system of law and 
dispute resolution and offer remedies to several practical and theoretical complications, 
inter alia, questions of treaty interpretation, of the use of the notions of investor, 
investment and consent regarding the establishment of jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals and 
admissibility of claims. 
Author’s personal experience of ambiguities surrounding arbitral awards rendered by ad 
hoc tribunals caused by implementation of contradictory interpretation of jurisdictional 
and admissibility requirements under the auspices of international arbitration institutions 
has been the main motivation behind initiating this research. It is thus expected that this 
research may pave the path forward in laying down foundations of the basis for legal 
unification and harmonization in investment arbitration based on constitution of set of 
rules and regulations deliberately instituted for the purpose of tackling jurisdictional and 
admissibility issues. 
 REVISITING RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 9.1.
 
International investment law has become increasingly prominent in the international legal 
order. This rise to prominence and the current surge of investor-state disputes have, 
however, not always been matched by academic reflection on the content of procedure of 
international investment law which is coined by the dispute settlement activities of arbitral 
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tribunals under investment treaties. International investment law transpires and develops 
more on arbitral precedent and case law than textual approaches to treaty interpretation. 
Like every legal system that relies on the judicial solutions of individual conflicts the 
treaty based investment arbitration needs to deal with conflicting and contradictory 
decisions.  
Inconsistence and incoherence in decision making of investment tribunals has ensued great 
concern and debate about investment treaty arbitration. A number of factors rooted in 
substantive international investment law are responsible for the potential for inconsistent 
decisions. Fragmentation of sources of international investment law, differing assessments 
of law and fact, inconsistent interpretation of terminologies and multiplicity of 
proceedings can be among numerous potential factors. For an investment treaty tribunal to 
proceed to adjudge the merits of claims arising out of an investment, it must have 
jurisdiction over the parties and the claims, and the claims submitted to the tribunal must 
be admissible. Thus the main research question: 
How can the uncertainties surrounding jurisdictional and admissibility issues related to 
the notions of investment, investor and consent be resolved in investment arbitration? 
The main hypotheses, findings and suppositions of the research are as follows:  
1) ICSID’s jurisdictional double-filtering, which has been largely overlooked in ICSID 
jurisprudence, is fundamental to correct decision-making by ICSID tribunals. 
2) ‘Fraudulent intent’ criterion, which borrows its rationale from the concurrent themes in 
international law jurisprudence, is instrumental to test nationality compliance as required 
in the upper jurisdictional keyhole.    
3) The compliance with the objective requirements of article 25 of the ICSID Convention 
measured through the ‘bona fide investor’ test runs counter to the object and purpose of 
the ICSID Convention.  
4) ‘Dynamic’ test for the contemplated investment, rather than plain ‘objective’ test, is an 
adequate pattern to ensure compliance with article 25 of the ICSID Convention due to 
evolving meaning of such generic term. 
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5) Legal unification and harmonization is proposed through introduction of a set of rules, 
principals and mechanisms for tackling waivers of arbitrability and upholding jurisdiction 
(lex Juridictio). 
The first contribution of the thesis to the field of investment arbitration has been a 
thorough review of extant literature, whereby much attention was dedicated to make this 
overview systematic. Existing literature dealt with these jurisdictional criteria in a 
narrower and context-specific style. While some writings have made an attempt to analyse 
three jurisdictional criteria imposed by article 25 of the ICSID Convention on all requests 
for arbitration registered with ICSID, these attempts are rather fragmentary and 
insufficient to capture the peculiarities surrounding the double-jurisdictional nature of 
ICSID arbitration.  
Indeed, most authors disregard these two jurisdictional keyholes in their analysis of 
ICSID-based investment arbitration. It is understood that ICSID’s double-jurisdictional 
test – or a ‘double-barrel’ test or a ‘double-jurisdictional keyhole’ approach – requires the 
claimant to persuade the ICSID tribunal that the respective jurisdictional requirements are 
met under both the applicable consent instrument – generally BIT or MIT – and article 25 
of the ICSID Convention. Hence, for instance, such double-jurisdictional test would 
require the asset in question qualify as ‘investment’ not only under the BIT or the MIT, 
but also meet the requirements of being an ‘investment’ under article 25 of the ICSID 
Convention as well.  
While the qualification under the BIT or the MIT is largely easy to establish as the 
respective definition of ‘investment’ is usually contained in article 1 of most BITs and 
MITs, the notion of ‘investment’ under article 25 of the ICSID Convention remains 
nebulous as the Convention provides no definition. Neither does the Convention contains 
criteria for the same and explanation as to what constitutes an ‘investment’ under the 
ICSID Convention.          
In view of the above, attempts to ascertain the meaning of article 25 of the ICSID 
Convention by citing interpretations of and/or offering a range of texts from BITs/MITs, 
whose reading and construction are regarded as falling within the ambit of a lower 
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jurisdictional threshold, are misleading and incorrect. For instance, it was established 
through this research that implicit refusal to double-filter respective notions of 
‘investment’ can be traced in several arbitration awards, including SGS v Pakistan, M.C.I. 
Power Group L.C. v Ecuador, ICSID Annulment Committee in the Malaysian Historical 
Salvors, Biwater  v Tanzania.  
In order to clarify the meaning of article 25, which lies within upper jurisdictional 
keyhole, one should analyse the Washington Convention itself, and not the BIT that might 
‘advise’ the meaning of ‘investment’ and of ‘investor’ as it is understood in lower 
jurisdictional framework.   
The first working hypothesis has been formulated as follows: 
1) ICSID’s jurisdictional double-filtering, which has been largely overlooked in 
ICSID jurisprudence, is fundamental to correct decision-making by ICSID 
tribunals as to what constitutes ‘investment’ under requirement ratione materiae, 
what nationality a corporate investor has for the purposes of the requirement 
ratione personae and what constitutes consent under requirement ratione 
voluntatis.  
Undeniably, BITs, which are bilateral arrangements between two state parties, cannot 
contradict the definition of the ICSID Convention. In other words, they can confirm the 
ICSID notion or restrict it, but they cannot expand it in order to have access to ICSID. A 
definition included in a BIT, being based on a test agreed between two States, cannot set 
aside the definition of the ICSID Convention, which is a multilateral agreement. 
The hypothesis outlined above has immediate implications for non-ICSID arbitrations and 
the jurisdictional threshold thereof, i.e. non-ICSID investment arbitration requires 
compliance only with the respective jurisdictional criteria expressed in the relevant 
consent document – a BIT or a MIT.  
Tribunals under MIT’s such as the Energy Charter Treaty at times have affirmed the 
existence of an investment dispute under the treaty, but at the same time omitted the 
discussion of the so-called typical ‘characteristics of an investment’ . In other words they 
thereby disregard any ‘limiting phrases’, which such typical ‘characteristics of an 
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investment’ may impose on the asset in question under article 25 of the ICSID 
Convention.  
In view of the foregoing, it is also noteworthy that the research aimed to marry two so far 
isolated, albeit corresponding, legal debates, that is of subjective vs. objective test under, 
or restrictive vs. deferential approach to, ratione materiae requirement and the debate on 
double-filtering of ICSID’s jurisdiction. Hence, mere compliance of the respective 
jurisdictional definitions with the subjective test contained in the relevant consent 
document – BIT/MIT – would be construed as passing the lower jurisdictional filter, 
whilst their conformity with the objective criteria/test bears witness to their observance of 
the upper jurisdictional requirement/threshold.  
In other words, the subjective test, or a lower-jurisdictional keyhole, is by and large 
controlled by the parties’ agreement or generally contained in article 1 of the relevant 
BIT/MIT or other consent instrument, whilst the objective test refers to the notion of 
‘investment’ envisaged under the ICSID Convention, whose criteria should be met in 
order for a dispute to be considered as arising ‘out of investment’ as it is required by 
article 25 of the ICSID Convention. The tribunal in Petrobart v. Kyrgyz Republic has 
manifestly delineated the distinction between ICSID arbitrations and those administered 
by other institutions, such as the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce arbitration facility. 
The conclusion drawn is that a non-ICSID institution would not require the investor to 
pass the so-called objective test, or to establish that the asset in question has the objective, 
rather than only subjective, ‘characteristics of an investment’, as it would have been 
required had the arbitration been held under the auspices of ICSID.        
Remarkably, a number of countries, including the United States, in their recent BITs 
which contain different options as to dispute resolution, including non-ICSID arbitration, 
are gradually attempting to introduce uniformity between ICSID and non-ICSID dispute 
resolution and are including the above mentioned objective criteria (‘characteristics of an 
investment’) for an asset to qualify as ‘investment’ to wipe out aforementioned 
jurisdictional distinction between the two.  
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This research therefore suggests that such growing acceptance among the countries of the 
distinct character of ICSID arbitration demonstrates growing conviction in objective, 
rather than only subjective, nature of jurisdictional requirements of ICSID arbitration, 
therefore the requirement to double-filter the respective notions remains imperative.  
The research presented several important considerations regarding verification and 
validation of this hypothesis. The presented hypothesis has been verified through 
integration with all existing – at times even conflicting - theories on ICSID’s jurisdictional 
requirements. In regard of the requirement ratione materiae, some authors have contended 
that at the time of drafting the ICSID Convention the assumption was that in most cases 
there would be an agreement in writing on consent to arbitrate thereby suggesting that if 
the parties surrendered their dispute to the competence of ICSID, such parties obviously 
had agreed that there had been investment, whilst others vehemently reject the foregoing 
contention stating that parties are indeed at liberty to settle on what constitutes investment, 
but only within those ‘outer limits’, and beyond those ‘outer limits’ their consent is of no 
use when establishing conformity with ICSID’s requirement of investment.  
This notwithstanding, the considerable unanimity has been reached among commentators 
in terms of the existence of marginal limits which rule out ‘truly exceptional cases’ under 
the ICSID Convention, and that those ‘characteristics of an investment’ enunciated by the 
Salini tribunal and which form the upper jurisdictional threshold may be relevant to 
expose such ‘truly exceptional cases’. In other words, ‘short-term’, ‘occasional’ 
arrangements having the nature of ‘volatile capital’, yielding only ‘quick gains’ and which 
followed by ‘immediate departure from the host country’ might not be construed as 
investment. 
Historical context of the ICSID Convention as well as the referenced literature has proved 
the validity of the first hypothesis. The novelty value of the hypothesis has been 
demonstrated in terms of publication of the paper which contained analysis of the 
literature review and author’s conclusions stemming therefrom in one of the leading peer-
reviewed journals and in terms of references to literature that demonstrate how the 
hypothesis builds upon and extends.  
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The proof of the hypothesis provides an important step in addressing the first research 
question. While the first research question originally was centred around the Salini test, 
also referred to as containing the criteria of the objective test to establish that the asset is 
‘investment’ for the purposes of article 25 of the ICSID Convention, the fundamental 
premise of the first hypothesis lays solid background as to necessity of passing such 
objective test at upper jurisdictional threshold. Moreover, uncertainty surrounded by 
divergent views as to Salini criteria has been resolved through the above mentioned 
literature review. As it is noted above, the review of extant literature upheld the 
characteristics of ‘investment’ professed by Salini tribunal, however, affirmed that ICSID 
tribunals do have leeway in application of these characteristics and that the test is not 
onerous.             
In addition to it, the review of extant literature gave sound footing for another premise 
outlined in the working hypothesis, that is as to relevance and applicability of the objective 
test, and, therefore, of double-filtering to the requirement ratione personae. This aspect 
has been overlooked or neglected as the foregoing debates as to subjective versus 
objective tests have been, and still are, centred around the notion of investment and their 
applicability thereto. Hence, for the purposes of ICSID arbitration, the imperative to meet 
both the subjective and objective test, and, therefore, the double jurisdictional threshold, is 
categorical and binding not only on the notion of an ‘investment’ (i.e. under the 
requirement ratione materiae), but also on the definition of an ‘investor’ (i.e. under the 
requirement ratione personae).       
For the purposes of passing the ‘objective’ test or upper jurisdictional keyhole, the 
investor should meet the respective ‘subjective’ criteria in regard of the definition of 
‘investor’ articulated in the consent instrument, which is, as it was mentioned earlier, 
usually contained in article 1 of the BIT or MIT, and satisfy the ICSID Convention’s 
requirements as to the notion of ‘investor’. In this regard, while the criteria of the 
subjective test are generally readily available in the BIT or the MIT, no attempt was made 
so far to define or formulate what constitutes ‘the objective test’ for the requirement 
ratione personae. This research attempted to scrutinize this perspective and offer the 
concept of ‘bona fide investor’ test which is discussed further in detail.               
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 (2) The second contribution revolves around definition of nationality and the requirement 
ratione personae applicable to legal entities under article 25 of the ICSID Convention, 
which lies within upper jurisdictional keyhole.  
The standing of international law as to nationality of a physical person is lucid as it is 
predominantly subject to each state’s municipal law, which settles the rules governing its 
acquisition and loss. The notion of corporate nationality, on the other hand, remains vague. 
Although the main criterion to attribute nationality dwells on incorporation theory which 
prevails in countries like the United Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, the 
Netherlands, other states like Germany, France, Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg, Greece, 
Portugal, Spain and Italy largely follow the doctrine of the real seat or of siege social. 
Bilateral treaties with these countries generally resemble these preferences. The opinions 
of scholars converge towards the consensus that these two theories, i.e. either the 
incorporation or incorporation and siege social, shall advise the nationality of the legal 
entity.   
In addition to it, the scholarship accepts the existence of the third ‘control’ standard to 
establish corporate nationality, which, however, does not fall squarely within the above 
mentioned orthodox parameters.   
It was first submitted that both the treatment and interpretation of the control criterion to 
establish corporate nationality are not yet clear. The doctrine of corporate veil-lifting is 
closely intertwined with the aforementioned control standard, which asserts that veil-
lifting is necessary in instances where protection offered to shareholders by the corporate 
veil was objectively abused.  
International law jurisprudence as well as the jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Justice have been investigated to prove the relevancy of the assumption that corporate veil 
lifting may be justified to reach for the reality behind the cover of nationality, primarily to 
‘prevent misuse of legal personality’ and ‘evasion of legal requirements or obligations’. In 
view of article 38 (1) of the ICJ Statute, which is widely recognized as a definitive 
statement of sources of international law, the reasoning adopted by the ICJ and the ECJ 
was proved to be applicable in the analysis of corporate veil-lifting by ICSID tribunals.  
243 
 
Hence, the second hypothesis professed in the thesis has been formulated as follows:  
2) ‘Fraudulent intent’ criterion, which borrows its rationale from the concurrent 
themes in international law jurisprudence and is detected in the jurisprudence of 
the EU courts and the international tribunals, is instrumental to test compliance 
with the requirement ratione personae as required in the upper jurisdictional 
keyhole.    
 
Tribunals have referred to fraud as a critical factor triggering recourse to the veil-lifting 
process. In support of this statement, the tribunal cited Barcelona Traction case which, 
albeit being premised on a municipal law rationale, is considered to play a similar role in 
international law. Awards of this sort support the paradigm that in international law the 
corporate veil can be pierced in order to prevent the misuse of the privileges of legal 
personality or to prevent the evasion of legal requirements or obligations. Furthermore, the 
recent awards such as the Phoenix case (Phoenix v The Czech Republic) confirm that in 
cases of abuse of a corporate structure, the tribunal should look beyond the apparent facts 
and lift the corporate veil.  
This research reveals that  indeed, the country of incorporation and/or the siege social 
seems to be the most appropriate and favourable connecting factor in establishing 
corporate nationality as it is required by article 25 of the ICSID Convention to uphold 
arbitrability of the dispute under ICSID’s facility, except in cases where foreign investors 
abuse this rule. Additionally, it is also a common practice for a recipient state to impose 
the requirement on foreign investors to incorporate a local company and carry out 
investment activities through such entity. Assuming that the very existence of such 
agreement on nationality implies the existence of foreign control, this scenario should 
naturally render it possible for investors to refer disputes to ICSID.  
Conventionally, the agreement which establishes corporate nationality of the investor is 
contained in the consent document – BIT/MIT or an investment contract, - and it shall be 
unequivocally explicit. Ambiguous phrasing such as that ‘the nationality requirements are 
fulfilled’ may entail unwanted ramifications and complications to enforce ICSID’s 
jurisdiction and will not serve the best interests of the foreign investor, which is intent to 
refer disputes to ICSID. Additionally, the argument stemming from the main hypothesis as 
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to ratione personae is that foreign control is assumed to be an objective requirement 
which should be examined independently of the agreement on corporate nationality.   
Certain national and supranational jurisdictions and international tribunals uphold the veil-
lifting process in certain circumstances which are largely controlled by public policy 
considerations. In this context, the general principle as to corporate veil-lifting is that it is 
justified if inequitable or wrongful conduct, fraud, misrepresentation or evasion of 
contractual obligations takes place. This conclusion resembles the approach professed by 
courts of the United States in Paumier v. Barge B.T. that held: ‘[G]ood faith is immaterial. 
If good faith were to become a defence in actions of this type, every defendant would 
claim good faith of some sort even though he did exactly what he intended to do in 
misrepresenting certain facts to an innocent party ... [T]he corporate identity can be 
pierced to prevent not only fraud, but any injustice.
’
 
Indeed, this research affirms that while the rationale to use corporate form to stimulate 
risk-taking in the market and lessen shareholders’ financial exposure thereby limiting the 
liability is legitimate, ‘there is nothing illegal about it as long this is done appropriately’.    
As to the EU law, the European Company Law, which is regarded as supranational law 
and is submitted in this research to be the source of public international law as per the 
aforementioned article 38 (1) of the ICJ Statute, while recognizing that company is a 
separate legal entity from its shareholders upholds that this principle is not absolute. 
Corporate veil-lifting is required to prevent shareholders from pursuing goals that cause 
their company to act in a prohibited manner. The same logic is applicable to parent-
subsidiary relationship. This scenario would also trigger veil-lifting whereby wrongful 
conduct would be imputed to the parent corporation had the parent been the real force 
behind such prohibited conduct.       
(3) The third contribution is the proposal in regard of the objective interpretation of ratione 
personae requirement. The objective test for the notion of ‘investor’ and the hypothesis 
stemming therefrom benefits greatly from the foregoing discussion on corporate 
nationality and the argument on the double-barrelled approach to the jurisdictional 
requirement ratione personae. In this context, the concept of ‘bona fide investor’ test has 
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been developed in response to the requirement to ascertain compliance of corporate 
entities invoking their status as investors with the ICSID Convention’s jurisdictional 
threshold.    
In view of the above, the third working hypothesis was posited as follows: 
3) In view of the double-jurisdictional nature of ICSID arbitration, the compliance 
with the objective requirements of article 25 of the ICSID Convention as to ratione 
personae is measured through the ‘bona fide investor’ test, which implies that 
abuse of corporate structure and inequitable conduct, which encompasses fraud 
and misrepresentation and entails corporate veil-lifting, runs counter to the object 
and purpose of the ICSID Convention.  
As the research revealed, two methods have been developed by the EU institutions to 
expose instances where the corporate veil is to be lifted: the presumption and the 
examination approach. While the context under the EU law is rather to define the level of 
control necessary to lift the veil and reach parent companies for actions of their 
subsidiaries, these methods contribute to the toolbox of mechanisms to establish 
nationality and address the inquiry as to whether investors are investors in good faith, or 
‘bona fide investors’.   
Under the EU’s presumption approach, absent the rebuttal of the presumption that the 
parent exercises control over the subsidiary, ‘it is proper for the parent and the subsidiary 
to be treated as a single undertaking’, and that ‘the presumption can only be rebutted if it 
is shown affirmatively, by those concerned to rebut it, that the subsidiary in fact conducted 
its business autonomously’. On the other hand, under the examination approach, the 
burden of proof lies with the claimant, and ‘the actual exercise of the parent’s power of 
control must be shown by those who request the veil to be lifted’. 
Applying the logic to the ‘bona fide investor’ test, the proposal as to suggested application 
of the test was to combine the method of presumption with that of examination. It was 
therefore suggested that a plausible approach would rather entail a rebuttable assumption 
that investors acted in good faith, and it is for the concerned party to unambiguously prove 
otherwise and reverse the tribunal’s inference.  
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(4) Inspired by the analysis on treaty interpretation techniques, a fourth contribution is the 
proposed concept of the ‘dynamic test’ in respect of the notion of ‘investment’. The 
explanatory sway for putting forth the argument as to ‘dynamic’ nature of the test –  
particularly, of ‘objective’ test – applicable in the upper jurisdictional threshold lies in the 
discussion of the Salini criteria. The quest for an exhaustive definition of ‘investment’ is 
seen as rather elusive; however, a careful consideration of the Salini paradigm 
demonstrates its ‘forward-looking’ component and at the same time proves that Salini 
criteria are justified by, perhaps paradoxically, the mandate of uniformity. In other words, 
while Salini test is viewed as being flexible, or ‘forward-looking’, there is a growing 
consensus that these characteristics are typical to ‘investment’.  
As regards its ‘forward-looking’ component, the fourth hypothesis was formulated as 
follows: 
4) ‘Dynamic’ test for the contemplated investment, rather than plainly ‘objective’ test 
professed by Salini tribunal, is an adequate pattern to ensure compliance with 
article 25 of the ICSID Convention due to evolving meaning of such generic term 
as ‘investment’.  
The concept bears ample evidence to the conclusion drawn above in respect of the first 
hypothesis and the Salini criteria. Hence, the development of public values and further 
evolution of the concept of ‘investment’ will naturally trigger development of new legal 
standards and prompt international tribunals to adapt to changed societal and legal 
environment.   
The model for the aspirations of the ‘dynamic test’, among others, was the recent 
judgment of the ICJ on the Dispute Regarding Navigational and Related Rights in regard 
of the interpretation of the 1858 Treaty which delineates the borders between Costa Rica 
and Nicaragua. There is perhaps no better example to substantiate the dynamic 
jurisprudence on many generic terms similar to the notion of ‘investment’, such as the 
notion of commerce envisaged by ICJ in Costa Rica v Nicaragua. 
This research asserts that the treaty terms must be understood to have the meaning they 
bear on each occasion on which a treaty is to be applied, and not necessarily their original 
meaning. Thus, even assuming that the notion of investment does not have the same 
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meaning today as it did in the mid-nineteenth century, it is the present meaning which 
must be accepted for purposes of applying the Treaty. 
Thus, where the parties have used generic terms in a treaty, the parties necessarily having 
been aware that the meaning of the terms was likely to evolve over time, and where the 
treaty has been entered into for a very long period or is “of continuing duration”, the 
parties must be presumed, as a general rule, to have intended those terms to have an 
evolving meaning.  
(5) As for the jurisdictional requirement ratione voluntatis, the diversity of interpretative 
decisions in this context may thwart the efforts towards international uniformity; however, 
a constructive dialogue on an international level would be required to reach a consensus as 
to method of interpretation. At the same time, implicit in such rhetoric is a persisting and 
living nature of law which is based on certain fundamental principles and having the 
capacity to adapt to dynamically new environment.   
‘Consent’ of the respondent host state to investor/state arbitration in the investment is one 
of the most important conditions for the vesting of adjudicative power in the tribunal. 
Despite such eminent role the range of scholarly research available on jurisdiction ratione 
voluntatis - as to whether or not the respondent host state has consented to the arbitration 
of investment disputes remains to be relatively narrow. 
This research proposes the necessity of according more recognition to the analysis of 
ratione voluntatis – or of consent to arbitrate – which is the fundamental requirement for a 
dispute to be arbitrable. Tribunals have faced tedious challenge in deciding whether the 
particular issue alleged to constitute an impediment to the tribunal’s power to adjudicate 
the investment dispute is one relating to the consent to the investment arbitration 
(jurisdiction) or admissibility. 
The author contends to the view that periods foreseen for negotiations are not of 
jurisdictional nature.  The reason being that, by the time the tribunals make a decision on 
this issue, any waiting period would likely to have collapsed and would merely compel the 
claimant to start proceedings anew. Author believes that tribunals should neglect the 
requirement for exhaustion of local remedies as the most likely effect of a clause of this 
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kind is delay and additional cost since it is unlikely that the dispute will be resolved before 
the domestic courts within that time frame. This research also favours a balance approach 
that accepts neither a ‘restrictive’ nor an ‘expansive’ approach to the interpretation of 
consent clauses. 
(6) This research sought to scrutinize waivers of arbitrability of disputes, absence of 
essential pre-requisites to establish a jurisdiction of a particular forum as well as claims 
related to invalidity of the agreement that contains the arbitration clause – which in 
author’s view fall under the purview of a broader concept of lex juridictio – law related to 
establishing a jurisdiction of a particular forum. The author contends that lex juridictio is a 
multifaceted area of law, which embraces a number of fundamental and so far least 
researched aspects.  
The principles which could be used as rules for prosecuting claims in investment treaty 
arbitration are very limited in number and quite general in prescription in the texts of 
investment treaties. The crucial task of development of these rules seems to be apparently 
entrusted to the international tribunals constituted on ad hoc and incremental basis. In 
Author’s view, such faith should not provide a carte blanche; the rules for prosecuting 
claims must be fair and just and the system for the resolution of disputes must be 
internally coherent and sustainable for the duration of treaties.  
Solutions to the problems of jurisdiction and admissibility must ultimately contribute to 
the expected fairness and justice of the system for resolving disputes.  The dispute 
resolution system needs to be sustainable as well. Sustainability and coherency of the 
system, in Author’s opinion, can be achieved through legal unification and harmonization 
of the principles and rules governing the existence and exercise of tribunals’ adjudicative 
power. 
In the existing literature on investment arbitration much seems to have been said about the 
importance of attaining consistency from one investment treaty award to the next. But, 
what about coherency (consistency in principle) that is required to ensure a single and 
comprehensive vision of justice? The investment arbitration under unclearly defined 
notions of jurisdiction and admissibility, with no appellate review, is exposed to the 
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danger inherent in the uncritical adoption of a previous solution to a recurring problem. 
We have been warned by earlier writers that ‘consistency in dealing is compatible with 
great iniquity’. The instances in legal history are plentiful and notorious. This research 
thus proposes the hypothesis that the international rules and principles of jurisdiction and 
admissibility in investment law must aspire to the higher value of coherency rather than 
mere statements of law revealed in different ad hoc arbitral awards.  
This research proposes the hypothesis that there are clear signs of a missing body of 
international jurisdictional rules and principals within the purview of international 
investment law concerning the admission of claims ,establishment and uphold of 
jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal which in author’s view should be named lex Juridictio. 
This research also affirms application of following rules (extracted from the relevant 
ICSID tribunals’ awards) to jurisdiction ratione personae for inclusion within the propose 
set of law, lex juridictio: 
RULE 1: The jurisdiction ratione persone extends to legal entities which hold the 
nationality of a contracting state party in accordance with provision of the investment 
treaty and the municipal law of that contracting state party and Article 25 of the ICSID 
Convention. 
RULE 2: The nationality at the time of the alleged breach of the obligation and continuity 
of the tie until the arbitral proceedings are commenced is the determining factor for 
upholding jurisdiction. 
Rule 3: The control over the investment at the time of the alleged breach of the obligation 
and not the continuous control over the investment thereafter are taken in consideration to 
establish jurisdiction. 
RULE 4: If an investment treaty specifies, then it is immaterial that the investment is held 
through an intermediary with the nationality of a third State. 
RULE 5: The claimant must have capacity to sue in accordance with its personal law or 
the lex societatis, at the time adjudicative power is established.   
RULE 6: There is no requirement that the capital invested by the claimant originates from 
the claimant or another legal entity or individual with the nationality of the claimant. 
RULE 7: The tribunal’s jurisdiction ratione personae may extend to a legal entity having 
the nationality of the host contracting state party where such legal entity is under the 
control of an individual or legal entity, in accordance with an express provision in an 
investment treaty or by application of the ICSID Convention. 
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RULE 8: Where an individual claimant hold dual nationality, the tribunal’s jurisdiction 
ratione personae extends to such an individual only if the former nationality is the 
dominant of the two, subject to the application of the Article 25 of the ICSID Convention. 
RULE 9: The rules for nationality of claims in the general international law of diplomatic 
protection do not apply to issues of nationality in investment treaty arbitration.  
This research also affirms application of following rules (extracted from the relevant 
ICSID tribunals’ awards) to jurisdiction ratione materiae for inclusion within the propose 
set of law, lex juridictio: 
RULE 10: Where a property is recognized by the rules of the host state’s private 
international law or is created by the municipal law of the host state, the acquisition of a 
bundle of rights in property is legally realized as an investment. 
RULE 11: The economic realization of an investment requires the commitment of 
resources to the economy of the host state by the claimant entailing the assumption of risk 
in expropriation of commercial return. 
RULE 12: The rights in personam as between the contracting parties and rights in rem that 
are memorialized by the contract must be distinguished by tribunals. The rights in 
personam do not generally qualify as an investment independently of the rights in rem.  
RULE 13: The tribunal’s jurisdiction ratione materiae may extend to claims related to an 
investment treaty obligation, a contractual obligation, a tort, unjust enrichment, or a public 
act of the host contracting state party.      
RULE 14: The tribunal’s ratione materiae may extend to counter claims by the host 
contracting state party related to a contractual obligation, a tort, unjust enrichment, or a 
public act of the host contracting state party directly related to the investment. 
RULE 15: The legal foundation of investment claims as above must be objectively 
determined in ruling upon the scope of jurisdiction ratinone materiae in a preliminary 
decision. 
RULE 16: The tribunal’s ratione materiae may extend to claims related to an international 
obligation on the treatment of foreign nationals and their property in general international 
law, an applicable investment treaty obligation, a contractual obligation, a tort, unjust 
enrichment or a public act of the host state party  relating to claimant’s investment. 
This research also affirms application of following rules (extracted from the relevant 
ICSID tribunals’ awards) to jurisdiction ratione voluntatis for inclusion within the propose 
set of law, lex juridictio: 
RULE 17: The parties must have consented to the arbitration of investment disputes 
pursuant to the provisions of the investment treaty and ICSID Convention. Such consent if 
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valid at the time the arbitration proceedings are commenced can support tribunal’s 
jurisdiction – ratione voluntatis. 
RULE 18: The claimant must have satisfied any conditions precedent to the arbitration of 
investment disputes as stipulated in the investment treaty for the existence of jurisdiction- 
ratione voluntatis. 
This research also affirms application of following rules (extracted from the relevant 
ICSID tribunals’ awards) to arbitrability for inclusion within the propose set of law, lex 
juridictio: 
RULE 19: For an investment treaty tribunal to adjudge the merits of investment claims, it 
must have jurisdiction over the parties and the claims, and the claims must be admissible 
and arbitrable.  
RULE 20: A decision whether a claim is arbitrable is a decision on the merits 
insusceptible of review beyond that which is available to decision on the merits generally.  
 
 RECOMMENDATION FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 9.2.
This research has also attempted to prompt the ever increasing requirement for institution 
of codified domain of law that is at a nascent stage of development and that is barely idle 
for more than an instant.  
Notwithstanding the inevitable imperfection of this attempt, it is hoped that the argument 
deployed to justify the lex Juridictio will be met with approval and with dissent in awards 
and pleadings and academic writing. Constructive disagreement will lead to the 
development of better rules.  
Constitution of lex juridictio based on unification and harmonized principles require 
focused study and comparative analysis of municipal laws of active nations in 
international investment field. It would also require a rigorous attempt to superimpose the 
national law to those of international law. Such academic objectivity can be the subject of 
similar and complementary research by itself and could not fall within the purview of the 
current thesis.  
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 LIMITATIONS 9.3.
 
This research was limited to the intersection between domestic systems and transnational 
investment law to the extent they relate to adjudication and dispute settlement. Mere 
policy formulations do not fall within the purview of this research except where such 
policies constitute a clear state measure affecting foreign investor.  
Indeed, another limitation to the study was the differences in the treaty text, thereby 
strengthening the principle that treaty binds only the parties. Same limitation goes to 
arbitral awards as they bind only the parties to the award. Therefore, it is difficult to justify 
a generic study of various treaties and awards. The adjudicatory method seems, however, 
to debunk this reasoning as tribunals do rely on previous awards regardless of the parties 
involved on the basis of relevancy. 
Lastly, there is an inherent limitation to all comparative studies that the comparator may 
not match in all respect. Similarly, where comparative judicial practice is seen as judicial 
decision making, the discretionary powers of the adjudicator are wider, thus susceptible to 
abuse.  In legal research however, adjudicators are notoriously known for relying on 
precedents, and where none exist, they transpose from precedents decided in other 
regimes. Therefore, the role of adjudicators is no longer passive but active.  
 
‘Judicial law-making is a general phenomenon in societies where justice is administered by 
judicial tribunals… International tribunals, by the very nature of the judicial function, are not 
confined to a purely mechanical application of the law.’579 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
579 E Lauterpacht, The absence of an international legislature and the compulsory jurisdiction of international tribunals 
in Hersch Lauterpacht, Disputes, War and Neutrality parts ix-xiv (CUP 2004) p. 210. 
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APPENDIX 1 
ICSID REPORTS: 2012 
(Excerpts) 
 
 
Figure 3: Basis of Consent Invoked to Establish ICSID Jurisdiction in Cases Registered under the 
ICSID Convention and Additional Facility Rules: 
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Figure 4: Geographic Distribution of All Cases Registered under the ICSID Convention and 
Additional Facility Rules by State Party Involved: 
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Figure 5: Distribution of All Cases Registered under the ICSID Convention and Additional 
Facility Rules by Economic Sector: 
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Figure 6: Arbitration Proceedings under the ICSID Convention and Additional Facility Rules – 
Outcomes: 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Disputes Decided by Arbitral Tribunals under the ICSID Convention and Additional 
Facility Rules – Outcomes: 
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Figure 8: Conciliation Proceedings under the ICSID Convention – Outcomes: 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Conciliation Proceedings under the ICSID Convention – Commission Reports: 
 
 
 
 
Conciliation 
Commision Report 
issued,  
67% 
Proceeding 
Discontinued, 
 33% 
Report recording 
failure of the 
parties  
to reach 
agreement, 
 75% 
Report recording 
agreement of the 
parties,  
25% 
267 
 
Figure 10: Arbitrators, Conciliators and ad hoc Committee Members Appointed in Cases 
Registered under the ICSID Convention and Additional Facility Rules – Distribution of 
Appointments by Geographic Region: 
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APPENDIX 2 
CONVENTION ON THE SETTLEMENT  
OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES BETWEEN STATES  
AND NATIONALS OF OTHER STATES (1965) – ICSID (excerpts) 
PREAMBLE 
The Contracting States 
Considering the need for international cooperation for economic development, and the role of 
private international investment therein; 
Bearing in mind the possibility that from time to time disputes may arise in connection with such 
investment between Contracting States and nationals of other Contracting States; 
Recognizing that while such disputes would usually be subject to national legal processes, 
international methods of settlement may be appropriate in certain cases; 
Attaching particular importance to the availability of facilities for international conciliation or 
arbitration to which Contracting States and nationals of other Contracting States may submit such 
disputes if they so desire; 
Desiring to establish such facilities under the auspices of the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development; 
Recognizing that mutual consent by the parties to submit such disputes to conciliation or to 
arbitration through such facilities constitutes a binding agreement which requires in particular that 
due consideration be given to any recommendation of conciliators, and that any arbitral award be 
complied with; and 
Declaring that no Contracting State shall by the mere fact of its ratification, acceptance or 
approval of this Convention and without its consent be deemed to be under any obligation to 
submit any particular dispute to conciliation or arbitration, 
Have agreed as follows: 
[…] 
CHAPTER II 
Jurisdiction of the Centre 
Article 25 
(1) The jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to any legal dispute arising directly out of an 
investment, between a Contracting State (or any constituent subdivision or agency of a Contracting 
State designated to the Centre by that State) and a national of another Contracting State, which the 
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parties to the dispute consent in writing to submit to the Centre. When the parties have given their 
consent, no party may withdraw its consent unilaterally. 
(2) "National of another Contracting State" means: 
(a) any natural person who had the nationality of a Contracting State other than the State party to 
the dispute on the date on which the parties consented to submit such dispute to conciliation or 
arbitration as well as on the date on which the request was registered pursuant to paragraph (3) of 
Article 28 or paragraph (3) of Article 36, but does not include any person who on either date also 
had the nationality of the Contracting State party to the dispute; and 
(b) any juridical person which had the nationality of a Contracting State other than the State party 
to the dispute on the date on which the parties consented to submit such dispute to conciliation or 
arbitration and any juridical person which had the nationality of the Contracting State party to the 
dispute on that date and which, because of foreign control, the parties have agreed should be 
treated as a national of another Contracting State for the purposes of this Convention. 
(3) Consent by a constituent subdivision or agency of a Contracting State shall require the 
approval of that State unless that State notifies the Centre that no such approval is required. 
(4) Any Contracting State may, at the time of ratification, acceptance or approval of this 
Convention or at any time thereafter, notify the Centre of the class or classes of disputes which it 
would or would not consider submitting to the jurisdiction of the Centre. The Secretary-General 
shall forthwith transmit such notification to all Contracting States. Such notification shall not 
constitute the consent required by paragraph (1). 
Article 26 
Consent of the parties to arbitration under this Convention shall, unless otherwise stated, be 
deemed consent to such arbitration to the exclusion of any other remedy. A Contracting State may 
require the exhaustion of local administrative or judicial remedies as a condition of its consent to 
arbitration under this Convention. 
Article 27 
(1) No Contracting State shall give diplomatic protection, or bring an international claim, in 
respect of a dispute which one of its nationals and another Contracting State shall have consented 
to submit or shall have submitted to arbitration under this Convention, unless such other 
Contracting State shall have failed to abide by and comply with the award rendered in such 
dispute. 
(2) Diplomatic protection, for the purposes of paragraph (1), shall not include informal diplomatic 
exchanges for the sole purpose of facilitating a settlement of the dispute. 
[…] 
 
 
270 
 
CHAPTER IV 
Arbitration 
 
Section I 
Request for Arbitration 
Article 36 
(1) Any Contracting State or any national of a Contracting State wishing to institute arbitration 
proceedings shall address a request to that effect in writing to the Secretary-General who shall 
send a copy of the request to the other party. 
(2) The request shall contain information concerning the issues in dispute, the identity of the 
parties and their consent to arbitration in accordance with the rules of procedure for the institution 
of conciliation and arbitration proceedings. 
(3) The Secretary-General shall register the request unless he finds, on the basis of the information 
contained in the request, that the dispute is manifestly outside the jurisdiction of the Centre. He 
shall forthwith notify the parties of registration or refusal to register. 
Section 2 
Constitution of the Tribunal 
Article 37 
(1) The Arbitral Tribunal (hereinafter called the Tribunal) shall be constituted as soon as possible after 
registration of a request pursuant to Article 36. 
(2) (a) The Tribunal shall consist of a sole arbitrator or any uneven number of arbitrators appointed as the 
parties shall agree. 
 
(b) Where the parties do not agree upon the number of arbitrators and the method of their appointment, the 
Tribunal shall consist of three arbitrators, one arbitrator appointed by each party and the third, who shall be 
the president of the Tribunal, appointed by agreement of the parties.  
Article 38 
If the Tribunal shall not have been constituted within 90 days after notice of registration of the request has 
been dispatched by the Secretary-General in accordance with paragraph (3) of Article 36, or such other 
period as the parties may agree, the Chairman shall, at the request of either party and after consulting both 
parties as far as possible, appoint the arbitrator or arbitrators not yet appointed. Arbitrators appointed by the 
Chairman pursuant to this Article shall not be nationals of the Contracting State party to the dispute or of the 
Contracting State whose national is a party to the dispute. 
Article 39 
The majority of the arbitrators shall be nationals of States other than the Contracting State party to the 
dispute and the Contracting State whose national is a party to the dispute; provided, however, that the 
foregoing provisions of this Article shall not apply if the sole arbitrator or each individual member of the 
Tribunal has been appointed by agreement of the parties. 
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Article 40 
(1) Arbitrators may be appointed from outside the Panel of Arbitrators, except in the case of appointments 
by the Chairman pursuant to Article 38. 
(2) Arbitrators appointed from outside the Panel of Arbitrators shall possess the qualities stated in paragraph 
(1) of Article 14. 
Section 3 
Powers and Functions of the Tribunal 
Article 41 
(1) The Tribunal shall be the judge of its own competence. 
(2) Any objection by a party to the dispute that that dispute is not within the jurisdiction of the 
Centre, or for other reasons is not within the competence of the Tribunal, shall be considered by 
the Tribunal which shall determine whether to deal with it as a preliminary question or to join it to 
the merits of the dispute. 
Article 42 
(1) The Tribunal shall decide a dispute in accordance with such rules of law as may be agreed by 
the parties. In the absence of such agreement, the Tribunal shall apply the law of the Contracting 
State party to the dispute (including its rules on the conflict of laws) and such rules of international 
law as may be applicable. 
(2) The Tribunal may not bring in a finding of non liquet on the ground of silence or obscurity of 
the law. 
(3) The provisions of paragraphs (1) and (2) shall not prejudice the power of the Tribunal to decide 
a dispute ex aequo et bono if the parties so agree. 
Article 43 
Except as the parties otherwise agree, the Tribunal may, if it deems it necessary at any stage of the 
proceedings, 
(a) call upon the parties to produce documents or other evidence, and 
(b) visit the scene connected with the dispute, and conduct such inquiries there as it may deem 
appropriate. 
Article 44 
Any arbitration proceeding shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions of this Section 
and, except as the parties otherwise agree, in accordance with the Arbitration Rules in effect on the 
date on which the parties consented to arbitration. If any question of procedure arises which is not 
covered by this Section or the Arbitration Rules or any rules agreed by the parties, the Tribunal 
shall decide the question. 
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Article 45 
(1) Failure of a party to appear or to present his case shall not be deemed an admission of the other 
party's assertions. 
(2) If a party fails to appear or to present his case at any stage of the proceedings the other party 
may request the Tribunal to deal with the questions submitted to it and to render an award. Before 
rendering an award, the Tribunal shall notify, and grant a period of grace to, the party failing to 
appear or to present its case, unless it is satisfied that that party does not intend to do so. 
Article 46 
Except as the parties otherwise agree, the Tribunal shall, if requested by a party, determine any 
incidental or additional claims or counterclaims arising directly out of the subject-matter of the 
dispute provided that they are within the scope of the consent of the parties and are otherwise 
within the jurisdiction of the Centre. 
Article 47 
Except as the parties otherwise agree, the Tribunal may, if it considers that the circumstances so 
require, recommend any provisional measures which should be taken to preserve the respective 
rights of either party. 
Section 4 
The Award 
Article 48 
(1) The Tribunal shall decide questions by a majority of the votes of all its members. 
(2) The award of the Tribunal shall be in writing and shall be signed by the members of the 
Tribunal who voted for it. 
(3) The award shall deal with every question submitted to the Tribunal, and shall state the reasons 
upon which it is based. 
(4) Any member of the Tribunal may attach his individual opinion to the award, whether he 
dissents from the majority or not, or a statement of his dissent. 
(5) The Centre shall not publish the award without the consent of the parties. 
Article 49 
(1) The Secretary-General shall promptly dispatch certified copies of the award to the parties. The 
award shall be deemed to have been rendered on the date on which the certified copies were 
dispatched. 
(2) The Tribunal upon the request of a party made within 45 days after the date on which the 
award was rendered may after notice to the other party decide any question which it had omitted to 
decide in the award, and shall rectify any clerical, arithmetical or similar error in the award. Its 
decision shall become part of the award and shall be notified to the parties in the same manner as 
the award. The periods of time provided for under paragraph (2) of Article 51 and paragraph (2) of 
Article 52 shall run from the date on which the decision was rendered. 
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Section 5 
Interpretation, Revision and Annulment of the Award 
Article 50 
(1) If any dispute shall arise between the parties as to the meaning or scope of an award, either 
party may request interpretation of the award by an application in writing addressed to the 
Secretary-General. 
(2) The request shall, if possible, be submitted to the Tribunal which rendered the award. If this 
shall not be possible, a new Tribunal shall be constituted in accordance with Section 2 of this 
Chapter. The Tribunal may, if it considers that the circumstances so require, stay enforcement of 
the award pending its decision. 
Article 51 
(1) Either party may request revision of the award by an application in writing addressed to the 
Secretary-General on the ground of discovery of some fact of such a nature as decisively to affect 
the award, provided that when the award was rendered that fact was unknown to the Tribunal and 
to the applicant and that the applicant's ignorance of that fact was not due to negligence. 
(2) The application shall be made within 90 days after the discovery of such fact and in any event 
within three years after the date on which the award was rendered. 
(3) The request shall, if possible, be submitted to the Tribunal which rendered the award. If this 
shall not be possible, a new Tribunal shall be constituted in accordance with Section 2 of this 
Chapter. 
(4) The Tribunal may, if it considers that the circumstances so require, stay enforcement of the 
award pending its decision. If the applicant requests a stay of enforcement of the award in his 
application, enforcement shall be stayed provisionally until the Tribunal rules on such request. 
Article 52 
(1) Either party may request annulment of the award by an application in writing addressed to the 
Secretary-General on one or more of the following grounds: 
(a) that the Tribunal was not properly constituted; 
(b) that the Tribunal has manifestly exceeded its powers; 
(c) that there was corruption on the part of a member of  the Tribunal; 
(d) that there has been a serious departure from a fundamental rule of procedure; or 
(e) that the award has failed to state the reasons on which it is based. 
(2) The application shall be made within 120 days after the date on which the award was rendered 
except that when annulment is requested on the ground of corruption such application shall be 
made within 120 days after discovery of the corruption and in any event within three years after 
the date on which the award was rendered. 
(3) On receipt of the request the Chairman shall forthwith appoint from the Panel of Arbitrators an 
ad hoc Committee of three persons. None of the members of the Committee shall have been a 
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member of the Tribunal which rendered the award, shall be of the same nationality as any such 
member, shall be a national of the State party to the dispute or of the State whose national is a 
party to the dispute, shall have been designated to the Panel of Arbitrators by either of those States, 
or shall have acted as a conciliator in the same dispute. The Committee shall have the authority to 
annul the award or any part thereof on any of the grounds set forth in paragraph (1). 
(4) The provisions of Articles 41-45, 48, 49, 53 and 54, and of Chapters VI and VII shall apply 
mutatis mutandis to proceedings before the Committee. 
(5) The Committee may, if it considers that the circumstances so require, stay enforcement of the 
award pending its decision. If the applicant requests a stay of enforcement of the award in his 
application, enforcement shall be stayed provisionally until the Committee rules on such request. 
(6) If the award is annulled the dispute shall, at the request of either party, be submitted to a new 
Tribunal constituted in accordance with Section 2 of this Chapter. 
Section 6 
Recognition and Enforcement of the Award 
Article 53 
(1) The award shall be binding on the parties and shall not be subject to any appeal or to any other 
remedy except those provided for in this Convention. Each party shall abide by and comply with 
the terms of the award except to the extent that enforcement shall have been stayed pursuant to the 
relevant provisions of this Convention. 
(2) For the purposes of this Section, "award" shall include any decision interpreting, revising or 
annulling such award pursuant to Articles 50, 51 or 52. 
Article 54 
(1) Each Contracting State shall recognize an award rendered pursuant to this Convention as 
binding and enforce the pecuniary obligations imposed by that award within its territories as if it 
were a final judgment of a court in that State. A Contracting State with a federal constitution may 
enforce such an award in or through its federal courts and may provide that such courts shall treat 
the award as if it were a final judgment of the courts of a constituent state. 
(2) A party seeking recognition or enforcement in the territories of a Contracting State shall 
furnish to a competent court or other authority which such State shall have designated for this 
purpose a copy of the award certified by the Secretary-General. Each Contracting State shall notify 
the Secretary-General of the designation of the competent court or other authority for this purpose 
and of any subsequent change in such designation. 
(3) Execution of the award shall be governed by the laws concerning the execution of judgments in 
force in the State in whose territories such execution is sought. 
Article 55 
Nothing in Article 54 shall be construed as derogating from the law in force in any Contracting 
State relating to immunity of that State or of any foreign State from execution. 
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APPENDIX 3 
REPORT OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS ON THE 
CONVENTION ON THE SETTLEMENTOF INVESTMENT DISPUTES 
BETWEEN STATES ANDNATIONALS OF OTHER STATES 
 
I 
1. Resolution No. 214, adopted by the Board of Governors of the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development on September 10, 1964, provides as follows: 
"RESOLVED: 
(a) The report of the Executive Directors on "Settlement of Investment Disputes," dated August 6, 
1964, is hereby approved. 
(b) The Executive Directors are requested to formulate a convention establishing facilities and 
procedures which would be available on a voluntary basis for the settlement of investment disputes 
between contracting States and Nationals of other contracting States through conciliation and 
arbitration. 
(c) In formulating such a convention, the Executive Directors shall take into account the views of 
member governments and shall keep in mind the desirability of arriving at a text which could be 
accepted by the largest possible number of governments. 
(d) The Executive Directors shall submit the text of such a convention to member governments 
with such recommendations as they shall deem appropriate." 
[…] 
IV 
The International Centre for Settlement 
of Investment Disputes 
General 
15. The Convention establishes the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes as 
an autonomous international institution (Articles 18-24). The purpose of the Centre is "to provide 
facilities for conciliation and arbitration of investment disputes * * *" (Article 1(2)). The Centre 
will not itself engage in conciliation or arbitration activities. This will be the task of Conciliation 
Commissions and Arbitral Tribunals constituted in accordance with the provisions of the 
Convention. 
16. As sponsor of the establishment of the institution the Bank will provide the Centre with 
premises for its seat (Article 2) and, pursuant to arrangements between the two institutions, with 
other administrative facilities and services (Article 6(d)). 
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17. With respect to the financing of the Centre (Article 17), the Executive Directors have decided 
that the Bank should be prepared to provide the Centre with office accommodation free of charge 
as long as the Centre has its seat at the Bank's headquarters and to underwrite, within reasonable 
limits, the basic overhead expenditure of the Centre for a period of years to be determined after the 
Centre is established. 
[…] 
V 
Jurisdiction of the Centre 
22. The term "jurisdiction of the Centre" is used in the Convention as a convenient expression to 
mean the limits within which the provisions of the Convention will apply and the facilities of the 
Centre will be available for conciliation and arbitration proceedings. The jurisdiction of the Centre 
is dealt with in Chapter II of the Convention (Articles 25-27). 
Consent 
23. Consent of the parties is the cornerstone of the jurisdiction of the Centre. Consent to 
jurisdiction must be in writing and once given cannot be withdrawn unilaterally (Article 25(1)). 
24. Consent of the parties must exist when the Centre is seized (Articles 28(3) and 36(3)) but the 
Convention does not otherwise specify the time at which consent should be given. Consent may be 
given, for example, in a clause included in an investment agreement, providing for the submission 
to the Centre of future disputes arising out of that agreement, or in a compromise regarding a 
dispute which has already arisen. Nor does the Convention require that the consent of both parties 
be expressed in a single instrument. Thus, a host State might in its investment promotion 
legislation offer to submit disputes arising out of certain classes of investments to the jurisdiction 
of the Centre, and the investor might give his consent by accepting the offer in writing. 
25. While consent of the parties is an essential prerequisite for the jurisdiction of the Centre, 
consent alone will not suffice to bring a dispute within its jurisdiction. In keeping with the purpose 
of the Convention, the jurisdiction of the Centre is further limited by reference to the nature of the 
dispute and the parties thereto. 
Nature of the Dispute 
26. Article 25(1) requires that the dispute must be a "legal dispute arising directly out of an 
investment." The expression "legal dispute" has been used to make clear that while conflicts of 
rights are within the jurisdiction of the Centre, mere conflicts of interests are not. The dispute must 
concern the existence or scope of a legal right or obligation, or the nature or extent of the 
reparation to be made for breach of a legal obligation. 
27. No attempt was made to define the term "investment" given the essential requirement of 
consent by the parties, and the mechanism through which Contracting States can make known in 
advance, if they so desire, the classes of disputes which they would or would not consider 
submitting to the Centre (Article 25(4)). 
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Parties to the Dispute 
28. For a dispute to be within the jurisdiction of the Centre one of the parties must be a Contracting 
State (or a constituent subdivision or agency of a Contracting State) and the other party must be a 
"national of another Contracting State." The latter term as defined in paragraph (2) of Article 25 
covers both natural persons and juridical persons. 
29. It should be noted that under clause (a) of Article 25(2) a natural person who was a national of 
the State party to the dispute would not be eligible to be a party in proceedings under the auspices 
of the Centre, even if at the same time he had the nationality of another State. This ineligibility is 
absolute and cannot be cured even if the State party to the dispute had given its consent. 
30. Clause (b) of Article 25(2), which deals with juridical persons, is more flexible. A juridical 
person which had the nationality of the State party to the dispute would be eligible to be a party to 
proceedings under the auspices of the Centre if that State had agreed to treat it as a national of 
another Contracting State because of foreign control. 
Notifications by Contracting States 
31. While no conciliation or arbitration proceedings could be brought against a Contracting State 
without its consent and while no Contracting State is under any obligation to give its consent to 
such proceedings, it was nevertheless felt that adherence to the Convention might be interpreted as 
holding out an expectation that Contracting States would give favorable consideration to requests 
by investors for the submission of a dispute to the Centre. It was pointed out in that connection that 
there might be classes of investment disputes which governments would consider unsuitable for 
submission to the Centre or which, under their own law, they were not permitted to submit to the 
Centre. In order to avoid any risk of misunderstanding on this score, Article 25(4) expressly 
permits Contracting States to make known to the Centre in advance, if they so desire, the classes of 
disputes which they would or would not consider submitting to the Centre. The provision makes 
clear that a statement by a Contracting State that it would consider submitting a certain class of 
dispute to the Centre would serve for purposes of information only and would not constitute the 
consent required to give the Centre jurisdiction. Of course, a statement excluding certain classes of 
disputes from consideration would not constitute a reservation to the Convention. 
Arbitration as Exclusive Remedy 
32. It may be presumed that when a State and an investor agree to have recourse to arbitration, and 
do not reserve the right to have recourse to other remedies or require the prior exhaustion of other 
remedies, the intention of the parties is to have recourse to arbitration to the exclusion of any other 
remedy. This rule of interpretation is embodied in the first sentence of Article 26. In order to make 
clear that it was not intended thereby to modify the rules of international law regarding the 
exhaustion of local remedies, the second sentence explicitly recognizes the right of a State to 
require the prior exhaustion of local remedies. 
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Claims by the Investor's State 
33. When a host State consents to the submission of a dispute with an investor to the Centre, 
thereby giving the investor direct access to an international jurisdiction, the investor should not be 
in a position to ask his State to espouse his case and that State should not be permitted to do so. 
Accordingly, Article 27 expressly prohibits a Contracting State from giving diplomatic protection, 
or bringing an international claim, in respect of a dispute which one of its nationals and another 
Contracting State have consented to submit, or have submitted, to arbitration under the 
Convention, unless the State party to the dispute fails to honour the award rendered in that dispute. 
[…] 
VII 
Place of Proceedings 
44. In dealing with proceedings away from the Centre, Article 63 provides that proceedings may 
be held, if the parties so agree, at the seat of the Permanent Court of Arbitration or of any other 
appropriate institution with which the Centre may enter into arrangements for that purpose. These 
arrangements are likely to vary with the type of institution and to range from merely making 
premises available for the proceedings to the provision of complete secretariat services. 
[…] 
VIII 
Disputes Between Contracting States 
45. Article 64 confers on the International Court of Justice jurisdiction over disputes between 
Contracting States regarding the interpretation or application of the Convention which are not 
settled by negotiation and which the parties do not agree to settle by other methods. While the 
provision is couched in general terms, it must be read in the context of the Convention as a whole. 
Specifically, the provision does not confer jurisdiction on the Court to review the decision of a 
Conciliation Commission or Arbitral Tribunal as to its competence with respect to any dispute 
before it. Nor does it empower a State to institute proceedings before the Court in respect of a 
dispute which one of its nationals and another Contracting State have consented to submit or have 
submitted to arbitration, since such proceedings would contravene the provisions of Article 27, 
unless the other Contracting State had failed to abide by and comply with the award rendered in 
that dispute.  
 
 
 
